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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to critically examine the legal ramifications of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FOI) in Saudi Arabia, its connection with the energy sector, and to suggest 
techniques to bring about a reform in the implementation of FOI from a legal perspective. 
Saudi Arabia has the world's largest oil reserves. This fact presents the Kingdom with 
unprecedented opportunities for growth, development and technological, social and economic 
breakthrough. Oil, its production, sale, regulation and the investment opportunities it affords 
therefore, is central to any meaningful examination of the future of the Saudi State and indeed 
the sub region. It is the contention of this thesis that despite the importance of oil and the 
investment it attracts to the Saudi Arabian economy the country's long and short-term policies 
remain in a state of underdevelopment. The central task of this thesis, therefore, is to identify 
the many shortcomings of the Saudi Arabia regulatory system in the area of energy law and 
international laws as well as international relations and place them in the context of doctrinal 
analysis that reflect the growing demand for progressive, meaningful and drastic changes. 
The thesis attempts a holistic diagnosis of the pertinent areas of law, politics and international 
relations and suggests a drastic root and branch transformation of Saudi Arabia's national 
policies and even constitutional reforms. The hypothesis that was tested is that there are a 
long list of identifiable and necessary regulatory framework changes which will enable Saudi 
Arabia to progress and move the country forward to an enviable status in the international 
society but that this can only take place when Saudi Arabia ensures that its constitutional and 
other laws allow it to meaningfully comply with international laws (broadly construed) and 
practice. 
The thesis adopts the doctrinal framework of critical legal studies and socio-Iegal scholarship 
in taking positions across a host of crucial reform areas including environmental, human 
rights, foreign direct investment law and resource exploitation. Specifically the thesis 
critiques the perceived negative aspects of Saudi Arabian law as well as the inadequacies and 
inequities of international foreign direct investment law and practice but, on the whole, the 
thesis takes the bold position that it is more in line with the true national interest and 
profitable development of the Saudi Arabian state when dealing with matters of international 
trade and investment to embrace a liberalised legal system free from the religious influence 
and which is compatible to pertinent international norms. 
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Principal solutions advanced include the need for constitutional changes in the direction of 
better democratisation and liberalisation of the polity as a means of further unlocking the 
potentials of the populace and to facilitate wider participation in business and investment. The 
scope for massive improvements in professional training and skill developments in areas such 
as investment law, arbitration and dispute resolution is discussed as well as recommended 
changes to specific legal regimes of law which will guarantee respect for rights of the 
ordinary citizens and of investors. The thesis thus provides a blueprint for the transformation 
of the country in order to attain holistic development and transform Saudi Arabia into a 
favourite investment destination in numerous sectors but particularly in oil and gas. 
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Chapter 1; INTRODUCTION; RESEARCH QUESTIONS, METHODOLOGICAL 
APPROACH AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
1.1 Statement of the Problem 
The purpose of this study is to critically evaluate the legal regime regulating FDI in 
Saudi Arabia and to determine if it is fit for purpose in light of its domestic realities, 
its quest for economic development and its international commitments. I There is a 
presumption that the reason why the Saudi Arabian government's efforts to preside 
over the most advanced investment environment in the Middle East at least in the 
energy sector has not yielded the full benefits it deserves is because of an inherent 
tension between a conservative if not moribund system of government and a 
misunderstanding of the demands of an international investment law. It therefore, 
becomes important to resolve the question of whether the problems and limited 
successes of Saudi Arabia as a destiny for investment even with its much envied 
position as the country with the largest oil reserves is internal or whether there is an 
inherent incompatibility between its interests and that of its rich investors. 2 
Specifically, the study considers the connection between the pertinent FDI rules and 
the challenges and prospects of the energy sector which is the main source of the 
Saudi economy. It is the position of this thesis that oil is the foundation of any future 
development. Yet, both investor and the national interests cannot be secure if the 
country is unprotected by advanced legal structure which encourages foreign 
investors not only in the oil sector, but other fields of investments. Furthermore, can 
true development be attained without attempts to develop the society holistically at 
home?3 It is a truism that the hydrocarbon riches and potentials of the Saudi Arabian 
IArbitration Regulations of the Kingdom of Saudi ArabiaArab Law Quarterly, Vol. 1, No.3 (May, 
1986), pp. 346-349; See generally AI-Rasheed Madawi, A History O/Saudi Arabia (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007) pp. 171-172; R.M. Auty, Resource Abundance and Economic 
Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
2 Krasner S.D., Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy, 1999, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) 
5-20. Interests vary greatly in nature; they can range from political, economic, and legal. A plethora of 
other interests arise if they are related to the globalization trends and where each one can lead to a 
different end. G. Dorrien, "Spirit in the World: Christianity and the Clash oflnterests," vo1.15 Word & 
World no. 41995. Available also at http://www.1uthersem.edulword&worldlArchiveslI5-
4_NationslI5-4_00rrien.pdf. Available at 12 January 2012. See also Nelken op.cit., pp.14-15. 
3It is worth noting, that the Saudi courts are currently being reorganised. The Saudi Arabian Judiciary 
Law provides in part for the creation of a new Commercial Court, while a new Grievances Board Law 
enacted in 2007 has reduced the scope of the Grievances Board's jurisdiction primarily to the 
resolution of administrative disputes and the enforcement of foreign judgments and foreign arbitral 
awards. While the Judiciary Law does not specify the precise jurisdiction of the new Commercial 
Courts, it appears likely that such courts will be the Competent Authority for commercial arbitrations 
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state have been central to its economic fortunes for at least the last six decades. Yet, it 
is possible to argue that economic progress has not translated into technological 
progress nor has it improved socialjustice.4 
Thus, this thesis seeks to identify and critique those issues and factors that may have 
hampered the socio-Iegal development of Saudi Arabia, particularly as they may 
relate to lapses in legal regulation or policy directives. The assumption is that once the 
law and politics of FDI in oil production and transactions is fine-tuned, giving full 
regard to the position of Saudi Arabia as a developing state, genuine and sustainable 
development will emerge. In other words, this work will seek to identify the crucial 
lessons that must be learnt in light of current realities and international best practices, 
particularly among other successful developing states. The thesis will identify and 
evaluate Saudi Arabia's long and short-term policies in the FDI sector and in relation 
to its proposed constitutional and on-going constitutional reforms. It is, therefore, 
admitted ab initio that there are complex tasks of internal changes. These would range 
from internal constitutional reforms to significant changes in dispute resolution 
processes particularly in international commercial arbitration. One of the most recent 
cases proving this point in Saudi Arabia is Emaar and JadaweZ. 5It is, however, 
held in Saudi Arabia under the Arbitration Law, once the provisions of the Judiciary Law and the new 
Grievances Board Law are fully implemented. However, it remains to be seen whether this will 
substantively change the current position, i.e. whether arbitration awards rendered in Saudi Arabia will 
escape a merits review by the local courts. Available at: https:llwww.bog.gov.salwps/portallextar 
4 Mushtaq H. Khan, "Social justice and sustainable development in Muslim countries" Article available 
on line at http://eprints.soas.ac.ukl99521l1Sustainable_developmentjn _Muslim _ countries. pdf 
accessed 28 January 2012; Lewis, Bernard Islam and Liberal Democracy, 271 Atlantic Monthly (1993) 
(2) pp. 89-98. See also Mann, Michael The Sources of Social Power. Volume I. A History o/Power 
from the Beginning to A.D. 1760. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press I 986); North C. Douglass 
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 1990). 
s One of the most recent cases proving this point in Saudi Arabia is Emaar and JadaweJ. It has been 
suggested that the role of one of the most senior member of the royal family acting as lawyer to a party 
-Jadawel could raise some serious points relating to the whole issue of fair trial under the Diwan 
Almazalem (Saudi Arabian Board of Grievances). This is because in a traditional monarchy like Saudi 
Arabia the influence of a Prince in such close connection may have had an impact on the ends of 
justice. A company owned by Saudi billionaire Mohammed Bin Issa Al Jaber failed in its bid to claim 
$381 m in damages from Emaar, marking the end of a long-running and complex legal battle. Saudi 
Investment Support Centre, "Dubai's Emaar, Saudi's Jadawel settle dispute" available at 
http://www.sisc.info/category/announcementslvisited I February 20 12.Thus, although Saudi Arabia is 
a signatory to the New York Convention since 1994 (Done at New York, 10 June 1958; Entered into 
force, 7 June. 1959.330 U.N.T.S. 38 (1959).).and is also party to other multi-lateral treaties, there 
remains much suspicion about its indigenous arbitral practice which provide for the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign arbitration awards. Moreover, it can be an indication of the lack of transparency 
of the legal system since there are no official references from the court or the authorities. 
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realised that there are also significant problems in international investment law and 
international economic relations that make the Saudi Arabian effort very difficult.6 
While the problem the thesis alms to resolve will reqUIre adherence to the best 
traditions of intellectual analysis, and particularly the need to be critical and 
evaluative, the thesis is certainly not aimed at disapproving or undermining past or 
present governments of Saudi Arabia. 7 If anything the thesis aims at a balanced 
critique of both the Saudi government's efforts and the external forces (such as 
multilateral institutions and multinationals) that appear to perpetuate a relationship of 
exploitation in relation to Saudi Arabia. In this way the thesis will critique the 
contents of international laws and the actual practice of some investors (including 
their uncompromising posture) that actually work against the interests of Saudi Arabia 
and by extension many developing states in similar circumstances.8 Hence, the thesis 
will necessarily examine the role of power relations on investment law, as well as the 
strength, and limitation of international law widely defined in acting as a channel to 
provide innovative strategies specific to economic progress of developing states. 
6 The unfair nature and inequities of international investment law and practice have been highlighted in 
a number of works by leading scholars. Qureshi and Ziegler lament the near eradication of economic 
sovereignty that has afflicted developing nations: A.H. Quereshi and A.R. Ziegler, International 
Economic Law Second Edition (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2007) pp. 51-58. See also Braithwaite 
and Drahos, Global Business Regulation, (Cambridge: CUP 2004) pp. 163,219521. 
7 Western societies took hundreds of years to develop their societies. They colonised and enslaved 
people all over the world to achieve their development. Nonetheless, even their legal and political 
systems took a long time in order to reach this stage, unlike other nations or cultures. Yet, countries 
like Saudi Arabia did not follow the West in its actions in order to achieve its development. Saudi 
citizens have to appreciate the actions of the authorities that promote the progress of national 
development. Some may disagree with this argument but it is perhaps better understood from a Saudi 
citizens' viewpoint and those living in a developed country. See further Harold J. Berman, Law and 
Revolution II (Harvard University Press, 2003) p. 19. Also see, Samia Satti Osman Mohamed Nour. 
Arab Spring: Will more freedom boost knowledge transfer? 2011, United nation university. Available 
at: http://unu.edularticleslscience-technology-societylknowledge-transfer-in-arab-world. 
8 See further Wade Mansell, Belinda Meteyard & Alan Thomson. A Critical Introduction to law. 
2004). pp, 9-24; Toby Jones, "Seeking a social contract for Saudi Arabia," Middle East Report, no. 228 
Autumn 2003. PP.42-48; See also J. Berman; Law and Revolution, II. (Havard: Harvard University 
Press, 2003); Terrell, T, "Confronting the Legal Meaning of ReJigious Faith: Wringing Universal 
Values Out of Pluralism Itself," Emory Law Journal 54, No. 337 (2005); H. Lesnick, Religion in Legal 
Thought and Practice, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931) pp. 12-31. 
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1.2. Scope of the study 
The centrality of access to energy, and the equitable use of the proceeds from the sale 
of natural energy resources to the domestic and economic fortunes of developing 
states is well-understood. This study, therefore, concerns itself solely with the 
evaluation of the challenges facing and affecting investments in the hydrocarbon 
resources sectors (Le. oil and gas) of Saudi Arabia. Thus, although it focuses on Saudi 
Arabia it considers cross-disciplinary scholarly literature in law, politics, international 
relations, and economics, especially as it affects developing states in relation to 
energy investment law and by extensions international environmental security. The 
study includes within its scope issues of socio-Iegal relations between and among 
developing states inter se, and looks at the shared peculiarities with Saudi Arabia in 
their relations with developed states. It, therefore, includes within its field of enquiry 
pertinent issues of the critical legal tradition and those of the so-called law of 
development as it applies generally to developing states. 
'Socio-Legal Studies' in the UK has grown mainly out of the interest to promote 
interdisciplinary studies of law and it is our position that this approach will prove very 
useful in analysis of the internal factors militating progress in the Saudi state and 
which have a serious effect on its chances as a choice investment destination.9 We are 
not referring to Max Travers's, view of Socio-Legal Studies as a subfield of social 
policy, 'mainly concerned with influencing or serving government policy in the 
provision of legal services,.I'Neither are we necessarily referring to that aspect that 
deals with social scientific methods, including qualitative and quantitative research 
techniques. II By socio-Iegal enquiry in this thesis we concentrate on the idea that for a 
fuller understanding of the topic there is need to go beyond the legalistic or 
positivistic aspects of Saudi Arabia law alone but we must understand law in its socio 
context and its interactions with other social sciences including the history and 
sociology of the people. In other words the relationship of the law, in its many 
aspects to a social situation should be considered a necessary part of the 
9 Thomas, P. (1997) "Socio-Legal Studies: The Case of Disappearing Fleas and Bustards" in Phil 
Thomas (ed.) Socio-Legal Studies, pp. 1-22. Aldershot: Dartmouth 
'0 M. Travers, "Sociology of Law in Britain" in 32 American Sociologist (2001) 26-40. 
"Black, D. "The Boundaries of Legal Sociology" Yale Law Journal (1972) 81. 
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understanding of that situation. 12 
Critical legal studies refer to an intellectual movement whose members argue that law 
is neither neutral nor value free but are in fact inseparable from politics. Thus, the 
critical legal philosophy which we will embrace within the scope of this thesis it is 
hoped will prove useful in exposing any possible bias in the international legal system 
which militate against the inclusion of Saudi Arabia among the fast developing 
economic successes in the international system. 13 Thus, by critical legal scholarship 
we refer to the widening of our analysis to cover and to critique, aspects of the actions 
of multinational corporations in developing states, the condemnable practices of 
investors and the general international investment climate,14 the subjectivity of 
international courts and arbitral tribunals 15 and the particular vulnerability of Saudi 
Arabia to negative international media coverage. These issues are all crucial to 
understanding the problems and prospects for FDI in Saudi Arabia and in formulating 
meaningful programs of reform. 
12DN Schiff, "Socio-Legal Theory Social Structure and Law" Vol. 39, The Modern Law Review. No.3, 
May, 1976 p. 287. 
13 Law and Ideology Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy Oct 22, 2001 available online at 
http://plato.stanford.edulentries/law-ideology/ accessed 07 February 2012; A Hunt, The Theory of 
Critical Legal Studies 1986 Volume6 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Issuel pp. 1-3. 
14 For instance, allegations that the Royal Dutch Shell committed grievous crimes in furtherance ofthe 
corporations activities in the Niger delta area of Nigeria. AJIL, "Contemporary Practice of the United 
States Relating to International Law" American Journal of International Law, Vol. 103, Issue 3 (July 
2009), p. 593. The pertinent issues and connections between economic development and universal 
human rights will be discussed so as to indicate the imperative directions that will assist the 
government of Saudi Arabia to usher in an era of genuine and lasting national development. The 
phenomena of globalization and its strong connections to Westernization and the prevalence of the 
ideology of economic and societalliberalisation will be considered to the extent that it explains the 
peculiar challenges faced by Saudi Arabia and other leading developing states. In relation to national 
law and politics, this thesis will examine efforts of the reigning Saudi King's or government and its 
aspirations as well as potentials to implement necessary reforms. 
IS Warnke, G., Justice and Interpretation, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992,63. It can be said, in some 
cases, that the judges are mainly restricted and mobilised by their laws and personal political 
prejudices. Judges are not like international lawyers, who look only to what is rational and applicable 
to reality; See also Powell B.,"Don't Mess With the Saudis,"FORTUNE.Monday, 28' April 2003, 
Available at: www.fortune.comlfortuneiarticles/O.15114.447134.OO.html. 
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1.3. Research Methodology 
The methodology used in this work is primarily that of a pertinent literature review. 16 
It adopts a socio-Iegal approach to the analysis of the regulation of FDI in Saudi 
Arabia The methodology therefore, attempts to fuse a socio-Iegal approach with a 
critical legal approach, whilst not abandoning the realism of international economic 
relations. Thus, this thesis describes, analyses, and advances solutions to the 
prescriptive rules governing FDI and the operations of multinational corporations 
within the Saudi legal system. This study combines international norms and standards 
with comparative and empirical approaches. Incursions are made both to the fields of 
public international law as well as international commercial law. 
The methodology aims to reveal the injustices of the current system of international 
trade and investment law which appear to be the causative factors of old wars, assist 
in the maintenance of an unequal world order, and uphold gross inequities within the 
Saudi Arabian state. It aims to reveal how trade can be regulated under a new global 
legal system such as the United Nations, to assist the developmental instincts of 
developing states. 17 Therefore, the law and practice of the leading international and 
regional organizations are considered to reveal their role in the development and/or 
underdevelopment of weaker states. To this extent the treaties and conventions 
relating to and emanating from the work of the United Nations given that it embodies 
the relations of the "organised world community" will be discussed. IS A significant 
16 Some references related to the Saudi government in the thesis are from classified and confidential 
government records. Thus it is not available to the public or to most researchers but may be available 
on file with the author. 
17 K. Suter, "Reforming the United Nations," Contemporary Review Magazine, October 1999. Also 
see, Global Issues in the United Nations' Framework, P. Taylor and A.J.R. Groom, 1989, p.285, UN 
Reform? Not anytime soon but, "Mondial", The World Federalists of Canada, Oct. 1999, available at 
http://www.rufuspollock.orglwto/wto_crit....Phil.htm accessed 19 January 2012. 
18 DelbrUck, Jost, Allocation of Law Enforcement Authority in the International System. Proceedings of 
an International Symposium of the Kiel Institute of International Law. March 23-25, 1994. Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 1997, 198; Curl J., "Bush aides press case for pre-emptive strikes,"The 
Washington Times, September II, 2002, available at: http://www.washtimes.comlnationalldefault-
200291 I I 2438.htm. Accessed 15 January 2012. One must question why primitive attacks on other 
nations have been allowed as opposed to not having a secure development and economic plan of the 
future. An apt example of this is the war on Iraq and the French I German position against the war 
where power was wielded to achieve development progress. The use of money can be less coercive in 
order to achieve development than the use of force. 
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challenge that besets any enquiry of this nature is the relative dearth of critical legal 
scholarship (at least in the West) that is specifically related to the Saudi legal system. 
The result of this is both exacting just as much as it is rewarding. This explains much 
of the inspiration and desire of the present writer to embark on significant research 
and engage in original thinking in order to make useful and pertinent connections 
regarding the relationships between socio economic development of the Saudi people 
and foreign direct investment, on the one hand, and the interaction between the 
following. 
a) Local or National laws; 
b) Cultural Norms and traditions; 
c) Islamic law e.g. Shari'ah; 
d) Regional laws e.g. EU, GCC; 
e) International law e.g. UN, WTO; 
f) Bilateral and international treaties. 
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1.4. Significance and Justification of the study 
This study is significant for a number of reasons. In view of various tensions in the 
Arab world especially in this era of the so-called Arab spring it is necessary to 
critique the position that there is an inherent contradiction between Saudi law 
(shari'ah) and modem international laws. 19 Such enquiry will of course as explained 
earlier have to be both inward and outward looking. Many decades after the 
celebrated cases Saudi Arabia v. ARAMCO 20and Kuwait v. AMINOIL, 2Iit is important 
to understand how the cases continue to explain the attitude of the Saudi Arabia state 
to international investment law and how the reaction to the case continue to define the 
attitude of investors to development law and practice. These cases are evaluated from 
different perspectives to give credit to the international dispute settlement 
mechanisms, such as the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID),22 The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA),23 and the role of 
arbitration. 
The calls for reforms not only in Saudi Arabia but elsewhere in the Arab world makes 
it timely for us to revaluate investment laws including arbitral practice and the result 
of judgments of international courts and to place them in the context of global trends. 
It is only as a result of such academic enquiry that meaningful reforms may be 
suggested.24 The focus on oil and gas issues is indeed justified because investment in 
19 The Arab Spring refers to the pro-democracy uprisings currently sweeping the Middle East and 
North Africa. As a writer put it "In reality, the movements that are shaking the Arab world are 
profoundly different from the revolutions that ended the Soviet empire. The Arab spring is about 
justice and equity as much as it is about democracy, because societies in which millions of young men 
and women have no jobs - and millions live with less than two dollars a day - crave justice as much 
as democracy". See Jean-Marie Gunenno, "The Arab Spring Is 2011, Not 1989", The New York Times 
April 21, 2011 available online at http://www.nytimes.coml20 11l04/22/opinionl22iht-
edguehenno22.html accessed 06 February 2012; Lisa Anderson, "Demystifying the Arab Spring 
Parsing the Differences Between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya" 
90 Foreign Affairs 2 (2011) p. 2. 
2°Saudi Arabia v Arabian Am Oil Co (Aramco) (1963) 27 ILR 117. 
21 Kuwait v. AMINOIL 21 ILM 976, 1000 ( 1982). 
22575 UNTS 159. Cases and materials about the ICSID are available at 
http://icsid.worldbank.orglICSID/Index.jsp. The Saudi government ratified the ICSID Convention on 
June 7, 1980. Convention of the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States opened for signature, Mar.l8, 1965. 
23 Information and material about the MIGA are available at http://www.miga.orgl accessed 12 March 
2012. 
24Chui, J, "Legal Reform in Japan at the Dawn of the 21 st Century," 7, Available at 
http://intemational.calbar.ca.govlLinkClickaspx?fileticket=2Qmxb9cFftM%3D&tabid=919 accessed 
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the energy sector tends to create economic advancement just as much as they produce 
serious tensions and complications in global commercial relations. Since oil and gas 
transactions are the main tools for economic development of Saudi Arabia it is 
important for scholars from the country to analyse and evaluate various aspects of the 
law and practice in this important area in order to formulate the right method for 
speeding up the country's integration into the globalization of international 
opportunities. The case for reform is manifest and new policies and methods must be 
brought into existence in order to create prosperity at home and an atmosphere 
conducive to peace for all states. This dissertation thus focuses on analysing and 
evaluating issues related to energy supply and foreign direct investment and how 
diplomacy, law, and economy can achieve the goal of peace in the end. 
A study like this will of course, also highlight dangers in the horizon of an 
Environmental nature and therefore will contribute to international discussion on how 
to avert serious mistakes.2s Similarly, the focus on internal constitutional and social 
reforms will hopefully increase the chances of the Saudi Arabian state to attain 
holistic development in a short period of time rather than later. In addition, the thesis 
will contribute to literature that can influence development and progress. 26 
International organizations, authorities, multinational corporations (MNCs), non-
governmental organizations (NOOs), and intergovernmental organization (IOOs) will 
be afforded reliable and recent academic commentary in relation to a country that is 
of significant interest to the entire world. The issues and areas of law treated in a 
thesis like this are not only topical but will increasingly become more important. As 
such, they have ramifications in future energy and natural resources projects. Oiven 
these developments, it becomes imperative for these issues to be studied and solutions 
04 February 2012: M, Innovation/or the 21" Century: Harnessing the Power o/Intellectual Property 
and Antitrust Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
25 In addition to this thesis' focus, the environment is also a vital issue to discuss, and as such, an 
investigation and consideration of the methods it can be protected through international and regional 
organizations is additionally presented. Prof. A.F .M. Maniruzzaman, "The pursuit of stability in 
international energyinvestment contracts: A critical appraisalofthe emerging trends,"Journal o/World 
Energy Law & Business, Vol. 1, No.2, 2008. 
26Paul Sieghart, The Lawful Rights 0/ Mankind (Oxford University Press, OxfordlNew York, 1985), pp. 
167. Also see, United Nations, Human Rights and Scientific and Technological Developments (UN, 
New York, 1982), p. 76. Also see, Arab State Contract Disputes: Lessons from the Past, Khaled 
Mohammed AI-Jumah. Arab Law Quarterly. Vol. 17, No.3 (2002), pp. 215-240. URL: 
http://www .jstor .org/stable/3 3 82023 
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to be sought in order to find the right balance between concerns for these issues and 
the development of energy and natural resources. 
Furthermore, although the primary area of focus is Saudi Arabia the findings of this 
thesis will transcend the country and help in understanding issues of law and 
development as well as social change in developing states. This is because the 
political, economic, and legal challenges that a developing state like Saudi Arabia 
faces are in many ways similar to that of many other states in the region. As a result, 
credible solutions may also within reason provide a blue print for other developing 
states in overcoming challenges. It is our hope that this thesis will contribute to the 
search for new bridges of communication between developed and developing states 
and will dispense the myth that the Islamic legal system and Islamic civilization at 
large is incompatible with modern international economic relations and diplomacy. 
Accordingly, the study will be useful to understanding some of the difficulties 
surrounding Saudi Arabian development. Perhaps most importantly, this thesis will 
establish the proper role of international lawyers in the creation of a fair and equitable 
international legal system, which will allow for a developing state such as Saudi 
Arabia to thrive.27 
The thesis reflect upon the limited successes of the Saudi government so far in 
attracting FDI and aims at advancing cogent arguments in the direction of the core 
and imperative socio-Iegal reforms necessary for outstanding economic growth in the 
21 st century. If the thesis further helps in raising sufficient debate and in exposing the 
internal and external problems that beset the state of Saudi Arabia, which also militate 
against its progressive assimilation into the international investment community it 
would have succeeded in its task. It may, therefore, also succeed in playing a vital 
role towards building a solid foundation for future development of Saudi Arabia. 
27 Alston P., "The Myopia of the Handmaidens: International Lawyers and Globalisation,"European 
Journal 0/ International Law,vol. 8 no. 3, 1997.1nternationallawyers are likely to be more flexible than 
local Saudi judges whose viewpoint can be narrow-minded, due to the limitations in their respective 
jurisdictions. Therefore, international lawyers are able to evaluate the goals and benefits of 
globalisation on a more lateral level. As a long-term policy, the Saudi authorities should be equipped 
with expertise in such fields to ensure that if any disputes in the future should arise, they will be 
confident of the outcome. See further A.F.M. Maniruzzaman, "The pursuit of stability in international 
energyinvestment contracts: A critical appraisalofthe emerging trends"Vol. 1 Journal o/World Energy 
Law & Business (2008) No.2. 
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Chapter 2; SAUDI ARABIA AS A CASE STUDY 
It is perhaps important to set the thesis in context by providing some discussion about 
the monarchical, theocratic state that is Saudi Arabia. This chapter therefore 
introduces the importance of the traditional heritage of Saudi Arabia as an Islamic 
State and the sit of some of the holiest sites in the Islamic world to all aspects of its 
national and international life. The schools of Islamic law also play a role in the 
political life of many Islamic states. Therefore the particular nuances of the 
predominant school of Islam which prevails will be explained as a means of 
explaining the legitimacy of some of the proposed reforms we will be discussing as 
well as a providing explanation for some of the difficult choices facing the 
government of the Kingdom. It is important to note that further exploration of these 
issues will be made in Chapter eight of this thesis in relation to the constitutional 
design of the Saudi State as a monarchy (with a focus on the scope for reforms and 
democratisation of the institution). This chapter also sets the discussion of trade and 
investment in jurisprudential perspective. It endeavours to link international trade and 
investment and the concepts of ownership and property to their philosophical 
underpinnings in law. 
2.1. Background of the Study; The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the largest country in the Arabian Peninsula. Its 
population of 28 million includes 5.6 million foreign residents according to a 2010 
census. 28 The Kingdom's political system is rooted in rich Islamic traditions and 
culture. This foundation mandates a commitment to peace, justice, equality, and 
respect for the rights of the individual. 21 st Century Saudi Arabia has adopted 
enthusiastic developmental programs spanning areas such as education, transportation 
and communications infrastructure. In pursuance of these laudable goals the attraction 
of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the energy fields among others has become 
imperative. The country has a monarchical system of government and is run under 
Islamic law. The Islamic state is based on principles prescribed by the Quran (Islam'S 
28Saudi Arabia's 2010 population was estimated to be about 28 million, including about 5.6 million 
resident foreignershttp://www.state.gov/r/paleilbgn/3584.htm#people 
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Holy Book) and the Shari'ah (Islamic system of jurisprudence), Provincial Council, a 
Consultative Council (Majlis Al-Shura), and a Council of Ministers. 
It is a common assumption that Saudi Arabia would be a difficult place to do 
business, given that it is a traditional society and an Islamic state. It, however, is the 
case that the country does not do too badly in the World Bank's rankings of states and 
the ease of doing business there. Saudi Arabia currently ranks 12th on the World 
Bank's league table and are down just two notches from 10th ranking which it 
occupied in 2011.29 It is also a common perception that reforms may be impossible or 
at best difficult to achieve because the state's social and governmental institutions are 
viewed as anachronistic in the modern world. Embedded in these assumptions is the 
question of whether the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia can meaningfully engage in 
international diplomacy and intergovernmental affairs to ensure the state's economic 
success. However, the ability to conduct international diplomacy appears not to be the 
problem. In fact, the Kingdom was one of the founding members of a number of 
international organizations, including theGulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 30 the 
League of Arab States,31the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC),32 and the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).33 It is also a member of 
many international organizations, including The United Nations, The World Bank 
(WB), The International Monetary Fund (IMF),34 and the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), as well as a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).3s It 
also has meaningful diplomatic relations with the European Union (EU),36 and the 
29 The World Bank, "Ease of Doing Business in Saudi Arabia" Rankings, Data and materials relating to 
doing business in various states are available 
http://www.doingbusiness.orgldatalexploreeconomies/saudi-arabial visited I January 2012. 
30 The United Nations, "Member States of the United Nations" available at 
http://www .un.orglen/members/ also see, http://www.oic-oci.orglmember_states.asp. Also see, 
http://www.gcc-sg.orgienglindexc64c.html?action=GCC. Also see, 
http://www.opec.orgiopec_web/enlabout_usl2S.htm. Also see, 
http://www.wto.orglenglishlthewto_elwhatis_eltif_elorg6_e.htm. 
31 Information and material about the Arab League is available at the official website 
www.arableagueonline.org. 
32 Information and material about the OIC is available at the official websitehttp://www.oic-oci.orgl 
33 Information and material about OPEC is available at http://www.opec.orglopec_weblen/ 
34 Information and material about the IMF is available at http://www.imf.orglextemallindex.htm 
3S Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons opened for signature July 1, 1968,21 U.S.T. 
483,729. U.N.T.S. 161. 
36 The European Community was established by the Treaty of Rome (1957) and is also called the 
European Union (EU). The 27 members of the EU formed a customs union, which aims for eventual 
economic and political unity. 
27 
28 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).37 Yet, in spite of its involvement 
in these international organizations, the Kingdom still has not achieved its full 
potential in the economic and commercial sense. The vast majority of the country's 
citizenry still live below the poverty line and, on the whole, the country ranks low on 
the indicators of socio-economic development. 
It may be argued that the authorities of the Kingdom are slowly coming to the 
realization that- to lift its population out of poverty and to enjoy the full potential of 
its oil wealth-it must embark upon massive socio-Iegal and socio-economic reforms. 
In recent years, the government of Saudi Arabia has implemented a number of 
reforms to encourage political participation, promote economic growth, increase 
foreign investment, and expand employment opportunities. The Kingdom has held 
municipal elections as part of a comprehensive plan to streamline and strengthen local 
government. 38 In addition, the Kingdom is promoting free market economy by 
privatizing major state enterprises, such as the Energy Companies that provide 
electricity and the national airlines. Many regulatory authorities are being established 
to carry out reforms, improve foreign investment laws, revise a broad range of 
commercial laws and implement intellectual property (lP) rights to foster innovation. 
Of particular relevance to the thesis is the fact that Saudi Arabia became a member of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2005 aiming to liberate the 
market and lead to legal reforms in accordance with the global norms.39 
This wave of reform is remarkable and much of our discussion in this thesis will 
evaluate the potentials for actual legal implementation. It suffices here to mention that 
the goal of any reform must reflect a nation's ambition for development and social 
justice. Slowly but inexorably the Saudi government is beginning to marshal a 
37Information and material about NAFTAis available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/. 
38 Information relating to Saudi Elections are available at Saudi Arabia Election website. See, Saudi 
Arabia backs women voting in 2015; available at, 
http://saudielection.comleninews/117/ARTICLEl2201l2011-06-27.htmI 
the current development is an attempt to modernize its academic curricula, and monitoring its religious 
schools. Saudi Arabia's first municipal elections were held in 2005. Elections for members of the 
municipal councils were held in three phases; the Riyadh region voted on February 10; the Eastern and 
Southern regions voted on March 3; and the Western and Northern regions voted in the final phase on 
April 21. A total of 592 representatives were elected. 
39 Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia Information Office, "Political, Economic and Sociallnitiatives the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia," p. 1, Available at: 
http://www.saudiembassy.netlfilesIPDFlReports/200SReports/Refonn_Report_MayOS.pdf, Accessed 
on October 17,2010. 
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comprehensive vision of where it wants to take the state within this century. For 
instance in 2003, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia presented a new initiative, the so 
called "Charter to Reform the Arab Stand.40 Under this initiative the Arab states 
would implement unified tariffs and duties within 10 years. It was hoped that this 
development would in time serve as the basis for the entrenchment of a Common 
Arab Market (CAM).41 This initiative is important not because it has created much 
success but it does establish an important aspect of any discussion about the future of 
the Saudi states. This is that any strategy to rescue the economic fortunes of the Saudi 
Arabia is somewhat inextricably linked with the fate of the region it is situated. This 
agreement also encourages members of the League of Arab States to modernize local 
economies, privatize government-owned industries, and open economic development 
opportunities to outside investment and participation.42 
Perhaps it may even be said that any discussion about reforming Saudi foreign direct 
investment laws must examine developments in the field at the global level and 
particularly the fate of other comparative developing state. It is indeed true that: 
40 The Charter For Reform of Arab Condition stated inter alia: "The Arab heads of state, after 
surveying the current situation in the Arab World, ... believe it is high time to urge for an awakening of 
the Ummah [Islamic community] to solidify its will and to demonstrate its resolve to prove its vitality 
and its ability to face the threats and challenges of the latest developments and the consequences they 
entaiL .. resolve to adopt a new Arab Charter .... ensure the protection of lawful Arab interests and 
needs, it must build the structure of joint Arab action on the basis of the strongest and not the weakest 
of links, and it must direct both inter-Arab and international relations and guide the Arab World in its 
relations with the international community. All that would necessitate specific mechanisms and clear 
programs to guarantee unequivocal and sincere implementation of Arab summit proclamations". 
[Unofficial translation, courtesy 'Arab News']. See the Saudi Arabian Embassy website 
http://www.saudiembassy.netlPressLinkl03-ST -Arab-Reform-Charter-Jan03 .aspx. Accessed 29 
February 2012. 
41 The idea of a common Arab is a longstanding one. The CAM was founded in August 1964 on the 
basis of a resolution passed by the Council of Arab Economic Unity (CAEU). The long-term goal of 
the ACM was to establish a full customs union that would abolish amongst its members trade 
restrictions, trade quotas, and restrictions on residence, employment, labour, and transportation. These 
aspirations have however fallen short of reality although some customs duties and taxes were 
eliminated in gradual stages between 1965 and 1971. For a history of this development see Abdel 
Hamid, Abdel EI Motaleb, "Reformation of an Arab Common Market" Research and Arab Studies 
Magazine, July 1996; EI-Agraa, Ali M. Economic Integration Worldwide (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1997). 
42Ibid, 4,5. Recent milestones include the 16th Arab Summit in Tunis, May 22-23, 2004, Saudi Arabia 
along with the other 21 members of the Arab League issued the 'Tunis Declaration' and pledged to 
carry out political and social reforms, promote democracy, expand popular participation in politics and 
public affairs, and reinforce women's rights. This resolve was reiterated at the 17th Arab Summit held 
in Algiers, Algeria, March 22-23,2005, and at the 19th Arab Summit held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 
March 28-29, 2007. Available at; http://www.saudiembassy.netlPressLinkl03-ST-Arab-Reform-
Charter-Jan03.aspx 
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"a global consensus has emerged in support of South- South and triangular 
cooperation, with renewed commitments on the part of States, non-State actors 
and regional and international organizations to harness emerging opportunities 
to meet the internationally agreed development goals, including the 
Millennium Development Goals. New partnerships, innovative funding and 
support mechanisms have been established to address a ranfe of social and 
economic challenges at the global, regional and locallevels".4 
Indicators of Saudi Arabia's economic growth are strong, but it is indisputable that 
the state could do much better. 44 
In terms of inward looking developmental strategies a host of initiatives and strategies 
have been explored in the last decade and most of these will be evaluated below but it 
suffices to mention specifically here the foreign investment law, enacted by Saudi 
Arabia General Investment Authorities' (SAGIA), which was set up to allow foreign 
investors to own property, transfer capital and profits, claim full ownership of their 
43 UNDP Report of the Secretary-General "The state of South-South cooperation" Sixty-sixth session 
Item 24 (b) of the provisional agenda: Operational activities for development: South-South cooperation 
for development 3 August 2011 A/66/229 available at 
http://ssc.undp.orgicontentidam/ssc/documents/SG%20ReportsiSG%20Report%200n%20SSC%20201 
l.pdfvisited 3rd February 2012. 
44 It has been predicted that there will be an increase in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) between 
6.6-8.8 from 2011 -2016, and the income increase will be from $20 billion in 1970 to an expected $678 
billion in 2011. Saudi Arabia's economy is also the largest in the Middle East. The Kingdom ranked 
35th out of 131 countries in the Global Competitiveness Report for 2007-2008. As of December 2007, 
Moody's Investors Service assigned long-term local and foreign currency issuer ratings of Al to Saudi 
Electricity Company (SEC) and gave the state a positive outlook. The wealth created is also being 
expended on innovative programs such as the King Abdullah Economic City, which was launched in 
Rabigh by King Abdullah on December 20, 2005. The $26.6 billion residential and commercial project 
near Jeddah will include an international airport, a port, and educational facilities. The per capita 
income is $20,600 (2009 est.) and in comparison to global standards Saudi Arabia ranks 61 st See, The 
IMF fiscal monitor, pp122. Available at, 
http://www .imf.orgl externaVpubs/ftlfmI20 II /0 I /pdf/frn II ° I.pdf accessed IS January 2012. See, 
achievements of the plan (version 27)2011, the ninth plan (2010-2014) aspires to eliminate poverty and 
increase development in infrastructure, medical services, educational capacity, and residential housing. 
The plan also aims to increase real GOP by 15% over 5 years and calls for substantial government 
investment in human resource development, in order to decrease Saudi unemployment from See, CIA 
World Factbook, available at: https:llwww.cia.gov/library/publicationslthe-world-
factbook/geos/sa.html, Accessed on September 17,2010. In April 2007, Moody's also gave the Saudi 
Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) a long-term local and foreign currency rating of A I, with a 
stable outlook. In July 2007, Standard & Poor's raised the Kingdom's foreign and local currency long-
term sovereign credit ratings from A+ to AA-. The ratings previously achieved an A to A+ upgrade in 
2006 on the basis of excellent financial performance. Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia Information 
Office, op.cit. p. IS, also see, 
http://www.moodys.com!Pages/rr003_0.aspx?bd=4294966708&ed=4294966848&rd=4294966708&tb 
=O&po=O&sb=&sd=&lang=en&cy=global&searchfrom=Search Within&kw=secJsaudi. Royal 
Embassy of Saudi Arabia Information Office, op.cit. p. 15, also see, 
http://www.moodys.com!Pages/rr003_0.aspx?bd=4294966708&ed=4294966848&rd=4294966708&tb 
=O&po=O&sb=&sd=&lang=en&cy=global&searchfrom=Search Within&kw=secJsaudi 
44 See, The IMF fiscal monitor, ppI22. Available at, 
http://www.imf.orglexternaVpubs/ftlfml20I1/01/pdf/frnll01.pdfaccessed 15 January 2012. 
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projects, and enjoy a reduction in tax rates. The law protects foreign investors from 
confiscation of property without a court order or expropriation of property, except for 
public interest, against an equitable compensation. 
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia established the Supreme Council for Petroleum and 
Minerals (SCPM) to handle oil exploration and production investment in January 
2000. This body is responsible for policymaking on the exploitation of petroleum, gas 
and other hydrocarbon materials. The SCPM passed the Gas Initiative to develop 
natural gas fields, transmission pipelines and petrochemical projects in cooperation 
with international and national companies. The body's tasks are central to the hopes 
and aspirations of the Saudi government to attain genuine economic progress using 
the natural resource that has become central to its economic destiny.45 
The council was set up to operate for four years renewable by royal decree. The 
Council has the final word on all affairs of petroleum, gas and other hydrocarbon 
Materials. Other important tasks include the following: 
1 - Fixing and deciding the policies and strategies for petroleum, gas and other 
hydrocarbon materials in light of national circumstances and interests. This includes 
determining the size of production, deciding the pricing plans of different fuel sources 
in the Kingdom. 
2 - Setting the general policy for the Saudi Aramco Company, particularly: 
a) Endorsing the company's five-year plan including its program to produce crude oil 
and its program for exploration for new reserves of hydrocarbon materials and 
developing them. 
b) Endorsing the company's five-year program for capital future investments 
c) Appointing the company's chairman upon a nomination by the board of directors 
d) Appointing an auditor and fixing his financial compensations 
e) Reviewing the auditor's report and endorsing the company's budget and profit and 
4'Cordesman, Anthony H.Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-First Century: the Political, Foreign Policy, 
Economic, and Energy Dimensions. (Westport USA: Praeger, 2003) pp. 320-335; see also news report 
of the Saudi government available at bttp:llwww.saudiembassy.netlarcbiveI2007/newslpageI46.aspx 
accessed 12 December 2012. 
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loss accounts 
f) Accrediting the annual report of the board of directors and acquitting the board of 
directors for the year in question 
g) Deciding whether to increase, decrease the capital of the company or allow others 
to contribute to it. 
h) Fixing the salaries of the chairman and members of the board of directors 
i) Appropriating any increase in the net value of the rights and assets of the company 
either to increase its capital or transfer it to the company's reserves.46 
2.2. Saudi Arabia and Islam in the Twenty-First Century 
It can be argued that any attempt to understand Saudi Arabia's effort to project itself 
as a serious player in the competitive world of investment destination in the 21 st 
Century must be based on an understanding of its Islamic past. The trend towards 
Saudi Arabian legal and economic modernisation is another manifestation of "law-in-
action" -a well-recognised aspect of socio-Iegal and critical jurisprudence.47 For this 
reason, we must at this stage present some fundamental concepts in Islamic 
jurisprudence and political history of the Kingdom. Understanding the concepts of 
rights and ownership from all the Islamic schools of thought will, for instance, not 
only place our later discussions in the context of Islamic law, in general, but it will 
make it possible to dispel arguments that Islamic traditions may render impossible 
complex modem, economic and investment arrangements. 
Ownership is a critical incentive for engaging in economic activity, given that the 
owner has the right to utilize or dispose of whatever they may own. In the Islamic 
system absolute ownership rests with Allah (God), and a Muslim or any person is 
merely an owner by proxy, as stated in the Holy Quran: 
Unto Allah belonged whatsoever is in the 
Heavens and whatsoever is in the Earth. 
46Saudi Embassy, ibid. p. 146. 
47 Bodenheimer E., "Book Review "Foundation of Jurisprudence," vo1.48 Tulane Law Review, no.3, 
1973, pp. 771-779 available at 
www.oecd.orgidocumentl60/0,2340,en_2649_20118S _36478140_1_1_1_1 ,OO.html. Accessed 06 
February 2012. 
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There is also the concept of collective ownership, where according to Ibne Qudamah, 
the Prophet of Muhammad (PBUH) stated: 
Muslims are partners in three things: water, 
green herbage and fire. 
With regard to ownership of natural resources of a people or country, all four major 
schools of Islamic jurisprudence agree to the same fundamental principles which 
proceed from the premise that there is a possibility to own resources, to alienate such 
property in exchange or for sale. Yet, it must be admitted that there are some 
differences in conceptualisation. It is essential to study these differences in order to 
understand the specific approach of Saudi Arabia's towards its most valuable mineral 
resource.48 
The Hanafi School of Muslim Jurisprudence: 
The ownership of a mine discovered in land that is already owned belongs to the 
surface landowner. On the other hand, if the discovery is made in land that has not 
been captured, the mine belongs to the surface owner subject to himlher paying one 
fifth of the proceeds to the Sovereign, who represents the Muslim community. If a 
mine is found in a public domain, then it belongs to the public and cannot be 
exploited by an individual under a concession unless the Imam rightfully grants the 
concession. 
The Shafi School of Muslim Jurisprudence: 
According to the Shafi School, oil belongs to the surface owner subject to himlher 
paying the relevant taxes. If petroleum is found in a dead land or public land, it is for 
the state to grant a concession to an individual for its exploitation. 49 
The Hanbali School of Muslim Jurisprudence: 
48Toriguian, Shavarsh, Legal Aspects of on Concessions in the Middle East (Beirut: Hamaskaine 
Press, 1972) pp.lO 1. 
49 Rahim, Sir Abdur, The principles of Muhammadan Jurisprudence According to the Hanaji, Malik;, 
Shaji'; and Hanbali Schools (London: Luzac 1911) p. 223-7. 
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The predominant view in Saudi Arabia, a follower of the Hanbali School of Muslim 
Jurisprudence, is that petroleum belongs to the community as a whole, and as such 
should be managed by the state. The state can confer rights to mine and own these 
minerals to an appropriate investor. There is another view that recognises the right of 
the owner of the land to own the petroleum by analogy to crops and solid minerals. 50 
The Maliki School of Muslim Jurisprudence: 
Irrespective of ownership of the land, all minerals whether hidden or unhidden belong 
to the Ummah, and, therefore, are under the direct control of the state.51 
It may be helpful at this point to present a table that attempts to compare the schools 
of Islamic thought on ownership of resources in order to reveal the interesting 
differences but the essential unity of the schools that indeed permit modem 
commercialisation of mineral resources. 
Table 1: Natural resources and its ownership from Islamic state perspectives 
Country School of Constitution Article Ownership 
Jurisprudence Vintage 
Azerbaijan 
-
1995 Article 14 Natural resources belong to 
Azerbaijan Republic 
Iraq Hanafi 1990 (interim) Article 13 Natural resources are 
owned by people 
Kuwait Maliki 1962 Article 21 Natural resources and all 
revenues are property of the 
state 
Libya Maliki 196911992 Article 8 (Private property 
(proclamation) exploitative) 
~ Abdul Qadir Zubair, Islamic Legal Doctrine and Interest in Land 1996 (Lagos: AI- Madinah 
Publications) p.107; AI- Mawardi, Al-Ahkam al-sultaniyyah wa al-wilayat al diniyyah (Cairo: Halabi 
Press, 2009) p.117. 
is 
51Aharon Layish. "Saudi Arabian Legal Reform as a Mechanism to Moderate WahhabI Doctrine, 1987," 
vol. 1 07 The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, American Oriental Society, No.2 1987 pp. 279-292. 
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ownership 
Oman Ibadi 1996 (Royal Article 11 Natural resources are 
Decree) property of the state 
Pakistan Hanafi 1973 Article Minerals belong to the 
172(1) federal authorities 
Saudi Hanbali 1993 (Royal Article 14 Natural resources are 
Arabia Decree) property of the state. The 
state is to exploit, protect 
and develop natural 
resources in the best interest 
of people. 
Syria Hanafi 1973 Article 14 Natural resources are under 
public ownership. The State 
undertakes to exploit and 
supervise the administration 
of this property in the best 
interest of the citizens. 
Data compded from varIOUS pnmary and secondary sources. 52 
The differing views of Muslim scholars on petroleum ownership can be categorised 
into two groups: those restricting ownership to the state, and those allowing private 
ownership of petroleum resources. Many intellectuals of Muslim theologies in oil-
producing countries hold the former view. They believe that ownership lies with the 
state, and it is only the state that can wield it in trust for the people. 53 It may be noted 
that this ties with the position of many federations that have petroleum resources. 54 
S2 Laila Al-Zwaini and Rudolph Peters, A Bibliography of Islamic Law, J 980-1993, (Leiden: Brill 
Islamic law, 1994); "Madhab & School of Thought," Islamic-Islamic, Accessed June 11,2011, 
Available at: http://islamicislamic.comlschool_oCthought.htm accessed 3 March 2012. 
S) Arthur J. Gemmell, Commercial Arbitration in the Islamic Middle East, p.169. Commercial 
Arbitration in the Islamic Middle East: PP 169 193.2007 
S4 These include Nigeria, Malaysia, Angola and-China other developing countries. Gbenga Oduntan, 
"The Emergent Local Regime for Exploration of Hydrocarbons in the Gulf of Guinea: Imperative 
Considerations for Participating States and Multinationals" 57 International Comparative Law 
Quarterly, (2) (2008) pp. 253-5. 
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The Islamic economIC principles of ownership are concurrent with legislative 
schemes found in most developing countries. 55 The state has title to the minerals in 
the ground irrespective of private rights over the surface, whether freehold, leasehold 
or customary. 56 The present day oil and gas agreements that have developed since the 
commencement of the last century shall be briefly outlined below. 
The first half of the last century saw a steady progress of various legal arrangements 
between oil companies and authorities. Large colonial style concessions were 
common during the initial stages of oil exploration in the Middle East. 57 A concession 
is defined as: 
An agreement between authorities and a company, that grants the 
company the right to explore for, develop, produce, transport and 
market hydrocarbons or minerals within a fixed area for a specific 
amount of time. The concession and production and sale of 
hydrocarbons from the concession are then subject to rentals, 
royalties, bonuses, and taxes. Under a concessionary agreement the 
company would have the title to the resources that are produced. 58 
The concessions granted to the Iraqi Oil Company and American Arabian Oil 
Company in Saudi Arabia are very similar. 
Production-sharing agreements are not found to be most favourable in upstream 
petroleum arrangements in most Muslim countries. Yet, the fiscal composition of 
production-sharing agreements may not be in harmony with the Islamic legal 
principles. All these agreements contain an element of interest (Riba) 59 and 
55See, An-Na'im, Abdullahi Ahmed, The Foundations 0/ Law: Globalization and Jurisprudence: an 
Islamic Law Perspective, 54 Emory L.J. 25 (2005) pp. 26-33. 
56Raj Kumar, The Evolution o/Fiscal Regimes, in J. Otto (ed), Taxation o/Mineral Enterprises, 17. 
57 The Middle East (ME) from the perspective of this Thesis is geographically made up of Bahrain, 
Iraq, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) and Yemen. Other scholars have indicated that Palestine, Israel and Turkey are also technically 
part of the description of the Middle East. Emilia Onyema, "Developments and Enforcing Arbitration 
Awards in Middle East and African Countries", Paper delivered at the 2nd Annual Cross Border 
Arbitration and Dispute Resolution Conference, Melia White House Hotel on 16 November 20 lOp. I. 
Available at www.transnational-dispute-management.com accessed 13 March 2012. 
58Daniel Johnston, International Petroleum Fiscal Systems and Production Sharing Contracts, 
PennWell Books 1994) 296. 
59Sayen, George, "Arbitration, Conciliation and the Islamic Legal Tradition in Saudi Arabia," U. Pa. T. 
Int. Bus. L. 211 (1987), pp,212-217. 
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uncertainty, which is forbidden under the Islamic legal system. Muslim law is also 
averse to commercial operations encompassing risk, which could violate the rule in 
the Quran against gambling and causing disorder. The Quran states: 
o ye who believe! Intoxicants and gambling, 
dedication of stones and divination by arrows, 
are an abomination, of Satan's handiwork: 
Eschew such abomination, that ye may prosper. 60 
Hence, all speculative contracts offend the Islamic legal system. 
By supplying most of the world's oil, the Middle East becomes part of OPEC by 
default. As such, it is a key policy for countries to uphold and enlarge their role within 
OPEC and OAPEC in particular. Searching for a new cultural and political identity as 
a result of younger leadership and the encouragement of reforms in the Islamic world 
can cause political instability, which in turn can interrupt supply. It is important to 
illustrate the potential impact of this on oil production and distribution. 
There is nothing in Islam that prohibits the supply of oil to non-Muslims; in fact, the 
Holy Quran encourages it: 
o ye who believe! Eat not up your property 
among yourself in vanities: but let there be 
amon1st you traffic and trade by mutual good 
will. 6 
Islamist groups with an anti-West agenda can manipulate certain facets of religion to 
challenge the status quo. There is a negative view of oil in Saudi Arabia, as its wealth 
has been restricted to a minority, and the majority have not received any monetary 
benefit. 62 Those at the extreme end of the spectrum support the destruction of oil 
related facilities as they consider the Western-dominated oil companies to be in 
support of the ruling elite. This view is impractical and these actions self-destructing, 
as oil is the foundation of the economy. A more practical remedy would be to limit 
60 The Holy Quran, Sura 11, Verse 219 
61 The Holy Quran, Sura IV, verse 29 
62 Soraya W. Assad "Facing the Challenges of Consumerism in Saudi Arabia" Vol. 19 J. King Saud 
Univ., 1, pp. 1-20; Peter W. Wilson, Douglas Graham, Saudi Arabia: the coming storm (USA: M.E. 
Sharpe 1994) p. 179. 
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sales to Western countries, however not all Muslim oil countries can afford to do this, 
as not all Gulf countries have developed alternative revenue sources.63 
Saudi Arabia, like any other country, is obligated to work under the accepted 
universal norms developed and followed by the major industrial states over the past 
two centuries. It cannot enforce any of its domestic rules upon the international 
community. The following chapter will illustrate more facts and reasons why Saudi 
authorities should govern the state using internationally accepted rules and regulations 
and not according to the current system of Islamic law. 
To conclude, it can be seen that such legal and religious applications are suitable for 
monetary transactions, which have existed since 700AC, but are no longer suitable in 
the twenty-first century. Arguments such as those from Bunter demonstrate that the 
Islamic applications are not fit for modem legal practice when related to trade and 
international commercial transactions.64 Is it convincing in the context of trade and 
international commercial transactions, as in the case of Riba, that all businesses incur 
certain amounts of risk anyway, which certainly Islam does not prohibit? Due to the 
lack of legal development in the last 500 years, Islamic literature leads to gaps in the 
legal interpretation, which allows for Islam to be within the internationally acceptable 
competence and interpretation of the advanced Western legal applications and norms. 
The main point of this chapter is to present reasons for the need for reforms within the 
Islamic laws. The following chapter will explore the lack of legal reforms and 
judicial developments in Islamic states. 
63Thomas Waelde, "Managing the Risk of Sanctions in the Global Oil and Gas Industry: Corporate 
Response Under Political, Legal and Commercial Pressures," in John Mitchell (ed.) Companies in a 
World a/Conflict: NGO's, Sanctions and Corporate Response (London: Earthscan Publications with 
the Royal Institute of, 1998). 
64M. Bunter, "Petroleum Contracts in Islamic Law: the Concession (Equity) and Contractor 
(Production Sharing) Agreements," Oil, Gas & Energy Law Intelligence, Vol. 3 No.3, 2005. 
38 
39 
2.3. The philosophical and theoretical basis of Trade and Investment 
Professor Sornarajah observed quite rightly that, "few areas of International Law 
excite as much controversy as the law relating to foreign investment.,,65 This area of 
study has, therefore, produced several schools of thought, theoretical approaches, and 
different margins of appreciation of the law and practice of foreign direct investment, 
particularly in relation to developing states. This thesis works upon the assumption 
that the entire international system is based upon a delicate network of economic 
interests, all of which must be respected and allowed to flourish in an international 
environment of cooperation and compromises. It may be argued that global trade 
networks such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) already work on the basis of 
this realization, and this is why they tend to enjoy a wider buy-in from the 
international society, both in capital-producing and capital natural resource based 
economies. It is, however, worthwhile to consider how the instinct of trade and the 
desire to enter economic relations runs deep in international practice and through time 
and space in the human experience. 
The philosophical schools of thought in law are, therefore, a good place to start the 
enquiry. This enquiry will complement our earlier discussion relating to how freedom 
to contract and right to ownership is just as compatible with much of Islamic thought 
as it is in the most sophisticated legal systems. 
Investment and trade in oil and gas, therefore, has a long and noble history. The trend 
has only increased over time to the extent that writers now talk about a problem of 
acceptability of trade and investment in oil. A writer states: "the acceptability of oil is 
becoming more important than its availability, and that the issue is particularly acute 
in developing countries with weak governance".66 
It is indeed important to note that each epoch since antiquity and even beyond has 
produced its own cross boundary transactions based upon what is traded in at the 
period. In a sense investment in foreign lands has also developed according to various 
6S M. Sornarajah, The International Law of Foreign Investment, Second edition (Cambridge: CUP, 
2007) 1. 
66 Malcolm Keay, "Oil and Governance: Focus on West Africa" The Royal International Affairs 
Briefing Paper July (2002). 
39 
40 
levels of sophistication. Charles Darwin in his Voyage of the Beagle denoted the truth 
of the fact that international trade and the zeal to do business in other lands is a human 
instinct. He described travels and trading with natives of Tierra del Fuego as 
primitive, yet he noted: "[t]hey had a fair idea of barter. I gave one man a large nail (a 
most valuable present) without making any signs for a return; but he immediately 
picked out two fish, and handed them up on the point of his spear.,,67 It has, however, 
been argued that even through such accounts we may see the tensions between traders 
and the various interests that meet on a commercial level. As one writer stated "we 
will indeed argue about the sufficiency of the value of a large nail in exchange for two 
fish and point to accounts like this evidence of the lop-sidedness and unfairness of 
much of the trade in the colonial era".68 
The merchants of Europe were clearly not one of the first sophisticated traders to 
engage in significant transnational trade or to invest in other lands. Letters of credit, 
for instance, existed among the black civilisations along the Nile including ancient 
Egypt. In time it spread to the ancient Greeks and to Roman civilisation. Indeed there 
is real evidence of a Babylonian clay promissory note dating back to about 3000 BC 
and there are accounts of bills. Eventually, merchants driven by economic goals 
began to speak in a common language. Perhaps the culmination of this age-long 
reality is the development of the so called/ex mercatoria.69 
Scholars like Chia-Jui Cheng are a bit more charitable and discern a first stage in the 
development of lex mercatoria. 
" ... ancient, primitive commercial usages and practices which dominated the 
acts of Chinese, Indian Persian, Arab, Phoenicia, Greek and Roman traders 
in the different trading ports and trading markets of the Persian gulf, the 
Middle east, the Eastern Mediterranean coast and the vast lands of Central 
Asia, along the 'Silk Roads' between the East and the West. This was truly 
cosmopolitan trading based on a variety of primitive customs. Yet all these 
local customs involved the same category transaction in the different places; 
67See Charles Darwin, The Voyage of the Beagle (Chapter 10 - Tierra Del Fuego) 
Literature.org The Online Literature Library available at 
http://www .literature.org/authorsldarwincharles/the-voyage-of-the-beagle/chapter-l O.html visited 10 
February 2012 
68 Gbenga Oduntan, "The Province ofInternational Business Transactions Defined: Content, Scope and 
Intersections with International Legal Studies" Vol. 5 Manchester Journal of International Economic 
Law Issue No. 1(2008) 87-111. 
69 See further A.F .M. Maniruzzaman, "The Lex Mercatoria and International Contracts: A Challenge 
for International Commercial Arbitration?" 14 American University International Law Review No.3 
(1999) p. 657. 
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together they constituted one of the basic sources of the law merchant of the 
Middle Ages". 70 
It is indeed true that the development of international trade has gone through several 
different stages but its development is so immemorial that it is neither possible nor 
worthwhile to sensibly assert authorship of the concept to any given era or strictly to 
certain parts of the world unless, of course, one speaks only in terms of inherent 
subjectivity and unhelpful chronology. The recognition and respect for practice and 
custom among merchants as a source of commercial legal obligations is one that can 
be traced even in the Biblical book of Genesis and beyond. Abraham is recorded to 
have agreed to a land transaction on the terms offered by Ephron. Thereafter, he 
"weighed out for him the price he had named ... four hundred shekels of silver, 
according to the weight current among the merchants" (emphasis added). This shows 
that merchants of that period were as much a coherent group with common 
understandings just as much as their counterparts today. The Islamic Sharia law as we 
have shown certainly recognises the exclusivity of commercial law. It is even asserted 
that where commercial custom is inconsistent with general custom, then the former 
will supersede the latter in order to protect the interests of the public and render a 
decision that is closer to the realities of their daily transactions. The only instances 
where the exclusive mercantile custom will not supersede the general custom are 
where the general custom is also under a Qur'anic obligation to do or abstain from a 
course of action.71 
Examples of the coming to maturity of investment law include the modern 
sophisticated tools of investment such as the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA) which promotes foreign direct investment by providing political risk 
insurance to investors and lenders against losses caused by non-commercial risks. 72 
70 Peter T. Leeson "One more time with feeling: the law merchant, arbitration, and international trade" 
Indian Journal of Economics and Business, (6).Sept 2007 p. 29. See also M.J. Trebilcock and R. 
Howse, Regulation of International Trade (Oxon: Routledge, 2005) p. 1. See similar accounts in 
Douglas Irwin Against the Tide: an Intellectual History of Free Trade (Princeton NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1996; Richard Harris, Trade Industrial Policy and International Competition, 
Research Study No 13). 
71 For instance, a mercantile custom which suggests or permits the giving or taking of usury would be 
in direct conflict with both the Qur'anand the Islamic Sunnah. See Z. Ibraheem Alashbah wa Annatha'r 
(Beruit: Dar Alfekr Letba'ah Wa Annaher BeDemashq, 1983), 105; A. Qutah, Alorf(Beruit: 
Almaktabah Almakeah, 1997), 242. 
72 MIG A promotes foreign direct investment by providing political risk insurance to investors and 
lenders against losses caused by non-commercial risks. Its mission includes providing political risk 
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It, therefore, appears that trade and investment arise out of the recognition of peoples 
and states of their mutual interests in participating in the enterprise. One of the most 
sensible places to begin drawing up reforms for any legal system, therefore, is to 
recognise that there is always the need to ensure that trade and investment must 
produce mutual benefit. 
Yet, to recognise the mutuality of interests in international trade and in investment 
law and practice is not to disregard the possibility that there is and perhaps will 
always be power relations at play. Mutuality of interests certainly may not be 
tantamount to equality or fairness. The classic legal philosophers and jurists have in 
some ways addressed this point. Hans Kelsen's promulgation that the "law is not only 
a dynamic system of norms, but also a coercive order" is also useful to our analysis.73 
His submission, however, raises the question: whose coercive order is investment 
law? Kelsen also applied the sanction theory of legal norms to develop the Pure 
Theory of Law.74 This view allows us to immediately treat with suspicion irrational 
prejudices that have found themselves integrated into the international legal ordering 
of international economic law. In other words: to whom belongs the 'big stick' to 
apply sanctions in international economic law? And is there a normative process of 
determining when sanctions such as refusal to invest in any particular territory fairly 
or even validly withheld? There is also the strong pull to examine the need for new 
insurance guarantees to private sector investors and lenders. MIGA's guarantees protect investments 
against-non-commercial risks and can help investors obtain access to funding sources with improved 
financial terms and conditions. It is a member of the World Bank Group and is structured as an 
international organization with shareholders including most countries of the world Since inception in 
1988, MIGA has issued more than $24 billion in political risk insurance for projects in a wide variety 
of sectors, covering all regions of the world. MIGA also conducts research and shares knowledge as 
part of its mandate to support foreign direct investment into emerging markets. For materials about the 
MIGA see http://www.miga.org/index.cfin. Accessed 12 March 2012. 
73 H. Kelsen, R. Rechtsleher, (2nd ed. Vienna) 1960, pp.l.Cf. Pure Theory of Law, Transl. By Max 
Knight, (Berkeley: London) 1970. 
74 Kelson's theory criticisms are many but in this respect, there is some affinity with John Austin's 
'command' theory oflaw. But Kelsen's approach is quite different from Austin's. For Kelsen, legal 
norms are addressed primarily to officials. Officials are directed to apply sanctions to individuals when 
the individuals' behaviour does not conform to a pattern specified in the norm. It is anticipated that 
individuals, in choosing how they will behave, will take into account the possibility that an official will 
apply the sanction. In that way, norms and the orders to which they belong can be effective. However, 
most if not all jurists now accept H.L.A. Hart's point in The Concept of Law, though directed 
principally against Austin, that not aU legal norms are coercive - some, and some of the most 
important, are facilitative. The Pure Theory of Law can accommodate this by accepting that what 
matters most is not whether particular legal norms are coercive but whether, by containing coercive 
norms, the legal order as a whole is coercive - which Hart does not deny. D.Mahajan, Jurisprudence 
and Legal Theory, (Lucknow: Eastern Book Company, 2006) p. 45; Pure Theory of Law, M. Knight, 
trans., (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1961) See particularly chapter 3. 
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methods and legislation - "coercive laws" - to govern international economlC 
activities, and in some special cases, reshuffle the system itself when it can become 
out-dated. To this extent it is necessary to enquire into the processes of change at the 
decision making level in the WTO and even at the ICSID. It is notable that Kelsen 
urges us to separate pure laws from extra legal considerations such as morals, fairness 
and other subjective criteria. The separation between legal and other types of norms in 
Kelsen's theories is only useful in our case study in so far as it aims to give the law 
superiority over any other field of knowledge, in order to create a rational atmosphere 
for all parties to start a new era of development interactions. 75 
The following Kelsenian view remains relevant to the understanding of the 
international economic law and the investment relation law . 
. . . Statements of law are hypothetical judgments asserting that, 
according to some-national or international-legal order of which we 
have legal cognisance, certain conditions defined by this legal order 
being given, certain consequences defined by this order are to 
follow. Legal norms are not judgments, i.e., statements about an 
object given to cognition.76 
This thesis will to a large extent draw upon the Kelsenian invitation to legal experts to 
maintain a clear understanding of the pivotal role of power to the concept of law. This 
is especially true in relation to economic matters in the world's system. However, to 
maintain the ideas of the right of property possession and justice in their original 
forms, we must not follow the interests and policies outside the nature of legal 
science. Therefore, it seems that the reason why Kelsen's "sanction theory" has not 
been successfully challenged is because of its continuous observance as universal 
reality. Identification of evidence of this reality in relation to the Saudi Arabian 
experience in international economic relations will follow over the next few chapters. 
7SThe Pure Theory of Law ignores, though it does not deny, the law's connection with the facts of 
psychology, sociology, morals and politics, but insists emphatically on purity in the avoidance of any 
syncretism of methods, "which obscures the essential character of legal science and erases the 
boundaries set for it by the nature of its subject-matter." 
76 H. Kelsen, Essays in Legal and Moral Philosophy,trans. Peter Heath, (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing 
Company 1973). 
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Other philosophical theories support the trend towards international governance of 
investment. This arguably includes the functional approach 77 and the legal realist 
view, which especially grapples with the existence of manifest injustices. 78 This 
theory is fundamentally: (1) a descriptive theory about the nature of judicial decision, 
according to which, (2) judges exercise unfettered discretion, in order (3) to reach 
results based on their personal tastes and values.79 
Beyond enquiries into the future of economic relations with the West a central focus 
of our discussion will also be on the question whether oil and hydrocarbon resources 
have so far benefited the people of Saudi Arabia, or if the system benefits only the oil 
producing states and their industries. This thesis will engage with literature that 
suggests oil exploitation has not yet delivered the best results for the Kingdom -
especially after the oil embargo of 1973.8oAs one writer put it "The dismal economic 
performance of Arab countries in comparison with other developing countries has 
rekindled interest in the relationship between resource abundance and economic 
growth". 8 1 
77 P. Davies et. aI, The Anatomy o/Corporate Law. A Comparative and Functional Approach. (Oxford: 
University Press, 2004) pp. 157-189,215-222; Bill Ridley, Fahrenheit - Gold and Oil. 2004, Available 
at: http://www.kitco.comlindlRidley/oct072004.htmlaccessed 15 January 2012. Also see, Paul Joseph 
Watson & Alex Jones "The Myth Of Peak Oil" October 122005 available at 
http://www.prisonplanet.comJarchives/peak _ oillindex.htm accessed 12 March 2012; Posner R. 
Economic Analysis 0/ Law (8th ed. Aspen Publishers, 2011) pp77-76; D. Detomasi, "International 
Institutions and the Case for Corporate Governance: Toward a Distributive Governance Framework?" 
8 Global Governance no. 42002 (United Nations University Press) pp. 423; W. H. Reinicke and F. 
Deng, Critical Choice: the United Nations. Networks and the Future o/Global Governance (Ottawa: 
International Development Research Centre, 2000) pp. 27. 
78Mitchell Aboulafia, Myra Bookman, Cathy Kemp, Habermas and Pragmatism, (London: Routledge, 
2002) pp.83- 139. American legal realisms have reached two crucial theses that merge with Frank's 
argument: first, by nature, rules cannot control decisions by courts and other officials: second, the 
overriding function of law is the settlement of disputes. Yet this leads us to argue that due to 
development the law needs to adopt new ideas and settlement systems based on the nature and 
circumstances of conflict. If the idea is new, it means this is a healthy development in a legal system 
that needs to grow and develop in the long term in order to survive. 
79 B. Leiter, "Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence", Tex. L. Rev., 1997 p. 
48. 
80 Such conclusions have been reached not only by political commentators (e.g. Nicholas M. Guariglia 
"Of Women and Wahhabism: The Strange Backwardness of Saudi Arabia" - 7/7/2008available at 
http://globalpolitician.coml250 1 O-obama-elections-black-nationalism accessed 06 February 2012. 
6/18/2006) but also majority of those within the "Dutch disease" literature. That is those that believe 
that the phenomenon of vast oil wealth does not bring real progress but is explained from the 
perspective of a reallocation of resources across sectors and structural transformation, rather than as a 
dynamic growth process. Majid AI-Moneef, "The Contribution of the Oil Sector to Arab Economic 
Development" Paper presented at the High-level Roundtable Partnership for Arab Development: A 
Window of Opportunity held at OFID on May 5, 2006 OFID (Pamphlet Series 34 Vienna, Austria 
September 2006). 
81 Moneeflbid. p. 15, Most of the literature on the relationship between resource abundance and 
economic growth draws from the neo-classical "Dutch disease" analytical framework, which describes 
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Indeed the law and practice of the United Nations (UN), the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFT A), the 
European Union (EU), the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), the Energy Treaty 
Charter (ETC), and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) are 
all in many ways geared towards maintaining a balance of interests in international 
trade. These agencies play an important role not only in regulating trade through 
various agreements and treaties but by maintaining the sanctity of trade. 
Finally, in terms of chronological development the phenomenon of globalisation and 
its philosophy of liberalisation of trade and investment has had a particular impact on 
the law and practice of resource management and energy relations. Yet this reading of 
international society must not fail to admit the possibility that Saudi Arabia, like other 
developing states, may really be lesser participants in an equal field and more of 
victims of a game strategl2 adopted by the developed, richer Western states.83 In the 
final analysis our reading of the existing philosophical models including those of 
Jurgen Habermas, Kelsen, critical legal scholars and developmental law theorists, 
must, however, remain that they in many ways prepared the ground for the 
cooperation and coordination that typifies much of International investment law. 
The lesson in this for Saudi Arabia is to recognise that the theoretical and 
philosophical basis for modem investment law is somewhat universal. A separate and 
completely peculiar legal regime based on anachronistic laws and legal culture is not 
desirable. The unique quality of a network and its success is likely to be based upon 
the synchrony of its parts. The role of those tasked with incorporating the Saudi 
kingdom into the global economy for its own continuous and beneficial development 
how a sudden surge in an export activity can be expected to cause a retardation of traded sectors 
compared to non-traded sectors. The term Dutch disease is derived from the experience of the Dutch 
economy following the development of gas in The Netherlands in the 1970s. Allen Gelb, Oil Windfalls, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). 
82 Game theory is a major method used in mathematical economics and business for modelling 
competing behaviours of competitors. This model has been used by scholars like Oduntan to explain 
similar occurrences in international relations and International law. Gbenga Oduntan, "International 
Law and the Discontented: How the West Underdeveloped International Laws," in Parashar, Archana 
and Dhanda, Amita, Deco\onisation of Legal Knowledge in India, Routledge, (2009) pp, 109-113. 
83 A. Dixit and S. Skeath (1999) pp. 2-4, 26-29. Also see, K. Bagwell and R. W. Staiger 
Enforcment, Private Political Pressure, and the General Agreement on Tarifft and Trade! World Trade 
Organization. 
4S 
46 
is to ensure that the state's membership in the global network is enhanced by an 
increase in its ability to tap into other members of the international network, 
particularly those more closely associated with the oil market. 
It is, therefore, possible at this stage to pre-empt much of what may be knee jerk 
reactions of the religious forces in Saudi Arabia to modernisation in favour of 
investment by showing as we hope we have done that trade and investment are not 
necessarily western but they are universal concepts. Thus, much of the religious 
philosophy, which jeopardies the nations development for the last 40 years as 
preached by some clerics is unsupportable and has only slowed down progress 
needlessly. The proposed paradigm of mutual benefits as watchword and strategy 
also works on the assumption that international lawyers from the Saudi state, as well 
as bureaucrats and government officials will acquire the knowledge and skills of their 
global counterparts and utilize these tools as they work in concert with other 
comparable states to remove major obstacles to their progress. 84 
84World Trade Organization Report,"Trade and Foreign Direct Investment," October 1996, Available 
at: http://usinfo.state.gov/joumalslitesl0497/ijee/ej6fact3.htm. See also, 
http://www.twnside.org.sgltitle/fla-cn.htm. Accessed 17 January 2012. 
46 
47 
2.4. Conclusion 
Saudi Arabia is an important investment destination in the Middle East that currently 
ranks 12th on the World Bank's Investment league table and are down just two 
notches from 10th ranking which it occupied in 2011. The Kingdom was one of the 
founding members of a number of international organizations, including the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC), the League of Arab States, the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC), the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and is 
a major player on the diplomatic stage in the region and internationally. The country 
aims to lift its population out of poverty and to enjoy the full potential of its oil 
wealth. It is becoming clear that the country must embark upon massive socio-Iegal 
and socio-economic reforms to sustain current growth and achieve even more 
successes. To do this Saudi foreign direct investment laws must examine 
developments in the field at the global level and particularly the fate of other 
comparative developing state. The strategies to be developed will ideally include 
creation of new-dedicated institutions and good support for existing ones such as the 
Supreme Council for Petroleum and Minerals (SCPM) to handle oil exploration and 
production investment in January 2000. 
It is important to add that any attempt to understand Saudi Arabia's effort to project 
itself as a serious player in the competitive world of investment destination in the 21 st 
Century must be based on a thorough understanding of its traditions, culture and its 
special Islamic inheritance. Thus nearly all-relevant factors in the discussion of 
reform must at least grapple with the test of compatibility with Islamic principles and 
doctrines. Islamic law is, however, not totally unready or unhelpful to the task of 
modernisation and can cope with complex jurisprudential concepts and issues. 
Ownership is a critical incentive for engaging in economic activity, is also recognised 
as a concept in Islamic law. Indeed with regard to ownership of natural resources of a 
people or country, all four major schools of Islamic jurisprudence agree to the same 
fundamental principles, which proceed from the premise that there is a possibility to 
own resources and to alienate such property in exchange or for sale. There is also a 
danger that certain conservative Islamist groups with an anti-West agenda can 
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manipulate certain facets of religion to challenge the status quo. There is a negative 
view of oil in Saudi Arabia, as its wealth has been restricted to a minority, and the 
majority have not received any monetary benefit. 
The benefits of international trade and investments are, and ought to be, mutual. This 
has been the case from time immemorial. It is indeed true that the development of 
international trade has gone through several different stages but its development is so 
immemorial that it is neither possible nor worthwhile to sensibly assert authorship of 
the concept or its usefulness to any particular geocentric origin. Yet, to recognise the 
mutuality of interests in international trade and in investment law and practice is not 
to disregard the possibility that there is and perhaps will always be power relations at 
play. Mutuality of interests certainly may not be tantamount to equality or fairness. 
These realisations make it useful to further enquire in this thesis into how best the 
country may respond to its inherent advantages and challenges in the international 
arena in terms foreign direct investment. 
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CHAPTER : 3 INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT CONTRACTS UNDER SAUDI 
LAWS 
3.1. Introduction 
To understand the case for reform of saudi Investment laws it is important to put the 
present situation into historical context. This chapter discusses the events and facts 
leading to the celeberated ARAMCO, AM/NOlL and Abu Dhabi v Qatar cases that 
have become locus classicus internationally in relation to regulation of FDI. The 
chapter offers a critique of the strengths and weakneses of the arguments of the 
parties in both cases and their relative positons in terms of political power. The 
significance of Saudi Arabia's position as a state that is bound under its own 
constitution (Article 45) and by its history to operate under the Holy Quran and the 
Sunnah shall be discussed in order to evaluate the impact this has in relation to the 
realities of international investment treaties and arbitration law. The chapter also 
provides commentary on the alleged inadequacy of Islamic law (Shari'ah) to deal 
with modem commercial affairs. An attempt is made to show that the position is 
caused in equal measure by the ignorance of the Western jurists and scholars the 
power-politics in the international system and an unduly conservative interpretation of 
Islamic Law without adequate elaboration and utilisation of the ljma and Qiyas by 
Muslim jurists and scholars. The chapter highlights the glaring inequities in the early 
concessions. The suggestion that international courts and arbitration panels have been 
deliberately under-developing international law through biased jurisprudence is 
considered. It also considers the legality of expropriation and nationalisation and the 
imperatives of the so called Hull formula upon which international laws demand that 
expropriation or nationalisation must be followed by prompt compensation. 
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3.1. Saudi Arabia Investment Contracts Disputes: Lessons from the Past 
Thus far we have sought to argue that Islamic jurisprudence is not necessarily 
unsuitable for modem trade and investment agreements. We have also tried to show 
that trade and investment practice emanate from a common heritage of civilisation 
based on mutual benefits of the parties. We now need to instruct our understanding of 
the shortcomings of existing law and practice by examining the experience and 
history of Saudi Arabia in investment practice as may be seen through the lenses of 
past disputes and development law generally. The rationale for doing so using 
particularly arbitral awards is that past disputes expose lapses in political and legal 
judgment and may be used I predicting areas of possible future disagreements. Any 
effort at reforms must therefore, be informed by the experience of disagreements over 
usual pitfalls. The common areas of disagreement between states and commercial 
entities include: Disagreements over Production Sharing Contracts (PSA); resource-
rent calculation formula; stabilisation clauses; tax law and tax assessments; 
renegotiation clauses; 85 indirect expropriation; bribery, grafts and grease payments; 
competition issues,86 intensive regulation; straddling resources; territorial disputes 
and boundary disputes and maritime disputes.87 
8SRepublic a/Kazakhstan v. Biederman Int'l, 168 FJd 880 (5th Cir.) See also V.V. Veeder, "The Lena 
Goldfields Arbitration: The Historical Roots of Three Ideas", Vol. 47, International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly (1998), pp. 747-792. 
86 United States v. Aluminum Co. 0/ America, 148 F .2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) 
The Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 (IS U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq.) is the basis for antitrust law, and many 
states have modelled their own statutes upon it. As weaknesses in the Sherman Act became evident, 
Congress added amendments to it at various times through 1950. The most important are the Clayton 
Act of 1914 (15 U.S.C.A. § 12 et seq.) and the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 (15 U.S.C.A. § 13 et 
seq.). Congress also created a regulatory agency to administrate and enforce the law, under the Federal 
Trade Commission Act of 1914 (IS U.S.C.A. §§ 41--58). In an on-going analysis influenced by 
economic, intellectual, and political changes, the U.S. Supreme Court has had the leading role in 
shaping how these laws are applied. 
In 191 I, the Supreme Court ordered the dissolution of the Standard Oil Company and the American 
Tobacco Company in landmark rulings that brought down two of the most powerful industrial trusts. 
But these were ambiguous victories. In Standard Oil Co. a/New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1,31 
S. Ct. 502, 55 L. Ed. 619, for example, the Court dissolved the trust into thirty-three companies, but 
held that the Sherman Act outlawed only restraints that were anticompetitive---subject, furthermore, to 
a rule of reason. Critics of all stripes jumped on this decision. Some feared that conservative judges 
would now gut the Sherman Act; others predicted a return to lax enforcement; and businesses worried 
that in the absence of specific unlawful restraints, the rule of reason gave courts too much freedom to 
read the law subjectively. Available at: http://myweb.clemson.edul-maloney/424/alcoa.pdfaccessed05 
February 2012. 
87 See further T.W. Walde "Oil & Gas Arbitration -Some Historical Background and Current 
Significance", Vol. 3, issue 5 Transnational Dispute Management Issue 5 (Dec 2006) p. II. 
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The early arbitration cases centred on many of these important issues. For illustrative 
purposes we will highlight immediately below two arbitrations that are in many ways 
locus classicus both of which reveal many salient points about the Arab experience in 
oil and gas investment law and practice. They are the cases of ARAMC088 and 
AMINOIL. 89 The relevance of these cases continues till present and must inform our 
analysis as they reveal problems of law and practice that arguably still persist 
nationally and internationally. Relevance of such an exercise has been attested to by 
Maniruzzaman when he submitted: "The issue of damages or compensation for 
breach of contract and for that matter expropriation or nationalisation in international 
investment law still remains as enigmatic as ever". 90 
88Saudi Arabia v American Oil Co (Aramco) (1963) Vol 27 ILR. 
89Government of Kuwait v American Independent Oil Company (Aminoi/) (1984) Vol 66 ILR. 
90 A.F .M. Maniruzzaman, "Damages for Breach of Stabilisation Clauses in International Investment 
Law: Where Do We Stand Today?" I.E.L.T.R. [2007] p. 246. 
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3.2. Saudi Arabia - The New and Inexperienced State 
3.2.1 The ARAMCO case 
This thesis will first consider the context of ARAMCO and the Saudi Arabian 
Authorities. In 1933, the authorities of Saudi Arabia entered into an oil concession 
with the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO). The agreement provided for 
ARAMCO to explore and drill for oil reserves within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
for a term of 60 years. At that time, there was no history of commercial oil production 
within the Kingdom, and ARAMCO undertook a venture of considerable risk and 
financial cost. Prior to granting the concession to ARAMCO in 1923, King Ibn Saud 
granted an oil concession to the Eastern and General Syndicate, a British company. 
The attempts to find and recover oil from the Kingdom were unsuccessful and the 
grant lapsed. Ten years later (November 8th, 1933) the authorities signed an exclusive 
concession assigning Saudi oil rights to ARAMCO The Royal Decree no. 1135 issued 
in Riyadh on July 7th, 1933 ratified this concession.91 
In the course of their commercial relationship, the parties negotiated and made several 
amendments and supplements to the original concession agreement (,The Principal 
Agreement'). It stated that all amendments and supplemental agreements are to be 
read together and form one agreement. The concession granted to ARAMCO covers a 
vast area (all of eastern Saudi Arabia, inclusive of islands and territorial waters, from 
the eastern boundary to the westward edge of the Dahana, and from the northern 
boundaries to the southern boundary of Saudi Arabia) over which the company has 
exclusive rights. The company soon discovered oil and enjoyed an annual increase in 
production that far exceeded the expectations of either party.92 This was not at no 
initial cost. ARAMCO embarked on tasks that included exploring and drilling in a 
country that did not have the infrastructure, or specific expertise to support such an 
91 See "Review of Nelson Robertson, Origins of the Saudi Arabian Oil Empire: Secret U.S. 
Documents, 1923-1944" Foreign Affairs (Spring 1980), also available at pp. 190. Available at 
http://www.foreignaffairs.comlarticles/3356Sljohn-c-campbeIVorigins-of-the-saudi-arabian-oil-empire-
secret-us-documents-1923 accessed 21 January 2012. 
92 From 495,125 barrels to 89,851,646 barrels in 1947347,844,850 barrels in 1954 and 352,239,912 
barrels in 1955; "Saudi Oil Production 2011," US Government Benefits Help, 2011, Accessed June II, 
2011, Available at: http://usgovernmentbenefits.orglhdlindex.php?t=saudi+oil+production+2011 
accessed 3 February 2012. 
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endeavour. ARAMCO was responsible for providing the technical know-how and 
engineering support necessary to find, drill, and transport the oil they were drawing. 
In turn, they received the understanding and support of the Saudi Arabian authorities, 
who were fully aware of the benefits. The Saudi State was in turn afforded benefits of 
technical know-how and revenue. 
In order to distribute the oil, ARAMCO constructed a refinery on the Bahrain Island, 
which was connected to the mainline by the country's first oil pipeline in 1945. In that 
same year, a large refinery was constructed in Ras Tanura. In 1950, an additional 
pipeline was opened to transport Saudi oil to the Mediterranean. The most important 
factor to consider in regard to the export of the refined oil is the shipping 
arrangements. ARAMCO did not itself own, or charter, any of the tankers that 
exported its product. Instead, it utilized the different forms of contract of sale 
available in maritime law, concluding Cost, Insurance, and Freight Contracts 
(C.I.F.),93 Cost and Freight Contracts (C. F.), 94 and Free on Board Contracts 
(F.O.B.).95 A common aspect in all of these contracts is that the seller has to enter into 
a contract of carriage with the ship owner for the transportation of oil. The main 
benefit of this stipulation is that ARAMCO does not have to undertake distribution 
and marketing, as these will be taken care of by the buyers. This has enormous benefit 
to both ARAMCO and Saudi Arabia in as much as it opened up a huge market for 
Saudi oil with minimal effort required from either party. 
In accordance with the 'Principal Agreement,' ARAMCO agreed to make loans to the 
authorities and pay a royalty on the crude oil produced. Over time, and in response to 
the volume of production, the authorities began to insist on bigger returns, which 
93 'Cost, insurance, freight (CIF)' contract. Means that the seller delivers when the goods pass the 
ship's rail in the port of shipment. The seller must pay the costs and freight necessary to bring the 
goods to the named port of destination.But the risk of loss of or damage to the goods, as well as any 
additional costs due to events occurring after the time of delivery, are transferred from the seller to the 
buyer. However, in c.Lf. the seller also has to procure marine insurance against the buyer's risk of loss 
of or damage to the goods during the carriage. See Charles Debattista, "Incotenns and the contract of 
Carriage" in Incotenns in Practice C. Debattista ed. (Paris: ICC Publishing S.A., 1996) p. 10-15; 
Schmittoff Export Trade: The Law and Practice of International Trade, Eleventh ed. London SWeet 
and Maxwell, 2007) pp. 7-57. 
94 'Cost and freight (CF), contract 
95 'Free on board (FOB), contract: means that the seller delivers when the goods pass the ships rail at 
the named port of shipment. This means that the buyer has to bear all costs and risks of loss of or 
damage to the goods from that point. The FOB term requires the seller to clear the goods for export. 
This term can be used only for sea or inland waterway transport. If the parties do not intend to deliver 
the goods across the ship's rail, the FCA term should be used. Schmittofflbid. 
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resulted in a further agreement (signed on October 30th, 1950) that required 
ARAMCO to pay the authorities an income tax. When taken into consideration 
alongside the other payment arrangements, by 1950 ARAMCO was paying the 
authorities 50 present of its net operating income. 
3.2.2. Facts to the Legal Disputes 
The first two decades saw no disputes stemming from the partnership between 
ARAMCO and Saudi Arabia that were not easily resolved by agreement between the 
parties. The authorities were often obliging, and did not put any obstacles in the way 
of ARAMCO, and did not fetter the activities of the company. Both parties indeed 
prospered greatly under the agreement, and Saudi Arabia enjoyed a veritable period of 
accelerated financial and economic growth. 
Matters came to a head when the authorities entered into an agreement with Mr. A.S. 
Onassis ('the Onassis Agreement') on January 20th, 1954. This agreement was ratified 
by the Royal Decree, and gave permission to Onassis to form a company (SATCO) in 
Saudi Arabia with the express purpose of transporting oil. SA TCO was bound by the 
terms of the agreement to maintain a fleet of tankers 96 under the Saudi flag and 
bearing Saudi names. As with all Saudi companies, SATCO enjoyed the protection of 
the Saudi authorities and would, under the terms of the Onassis Agreement, have a 
right of priority for the transport of oil for a period of 30 years from the date of the 
agreement. 
96 Judge Stephen M. Schwebel. The kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Aramco arbitrate the Onassis 
agreement. The Journal of World Energy Law & Business Advance Access published September 28, 
2010. Vol. 20 Journal o/World Energy Law & Business, 2010 Available at: 
http://jwelb.oxfordjournals.orglcontentlearly/20 1 0/09/28/jwelb.jwqO 12.full.pdf+html accessed 15 
January 2012. 
In 1933 The Government hereby grants to the Company an the terms and conditions hereinafter 
mentioned, and with respect to the area defined below, the exclusive right, for a period of sixty years 
from the effective date hereof to explore, prospect, drill for, extract, treat, manufacture, transport, deal 
with carry away and export Petroleum asphalt, naphtha natural greases, ozokerite and other 
hydrocarbons and the derivatives of all such products. It is understood, however, that such right does 
not include the exclusive right to sell crude or refined products within the area described below or 
within Saudi Arabia. Available at: 
http://jwelb.oxfordjoumals.orglcontentlearly/20 1 0/09/281jwelb.jwqO 12.fuU accessed 04 February 2012. 
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Thereafter, the authorities invited ARAMCO to abide by the tenns of this agreement. 
Preference was to be given to the SATCO tankers for the transportation of oil and 
petroleum products produced by ARAMCO. On February 8th, 1954, the President of 
ARAMCO's Board of Directors communicated that the company could not accept the 
terms of the 'Onassis Agreement' on the basis that it infringed upon exclusive rights 
that were granted to ARAMCO in the 'Principal Agreement.' 
Central to the Saudi argument for this new proposal was that it was exercising its 
sovereign powers in entering into the SATCO agreement, and could competently 
introduce any new legal restrictions it wished. Furthennore, it was asserted that 
ARAMCO, like any other Saudi citizen or entity, was obliged to abide by the laws 
introduced by the state, and that the concession agreement in no way precluded 
ARAMCO from being subject to the sovereign powers of the state, and furthermore, 
the laws that it introduced in accordance with the SA TCO agreement. 
The authorities contended that the concession agreement made no explicit mention of 
the arrangement for distribution and transportation of the oil, and that as such the 
authorities were free to grant the concession, or priority to any party they choose. In 
any event, to prevent them from doing so would be to deny them sovereignty over 
their own national affairs. The authorities further argued that the state had enjoyed 
good relations with ARAMCO and that it did not seek to "change, modify or deprive 
the company of any of its rights under the concession,,,97 stressing that it was not in 
dispute with the terms of the original agreement, but that the state's actions were 
distinct and separate from the original agreement. Rather, Saudi Arabia was merely 
exercising its prerogative as a sovereign state over its own natural resources. 
Furthermore, the issue of transportation had to be explicitly agreed. 
The Government of Saudi Arabia both challenged the jurisdiction of the ad hoc 
arbitral Tribunal and sought to expand it. The Government took the position that it 
could withdraw from arbitration any act done by it in the exercise of its sovereign 
power. The first finding of the tribunal is that they are competent to determine the 
dispute. It held that it was authorized to be the judge of its own competence, as 
97 Saudi Arabia v American Oil Co (Aramco) (1963) Vol 27 ILR. 
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expressed in Article 11 of the Draft Convention on Arbitral Procedure adopted by the 
International Law Commission (United Nations, New York 1955). 
The tribunal found that, "by reason of its sovereignty within its territorial domain the 
State possess the legal powers to grant rights (by) which it forbids itself to withdraw 
before the end of the concession".98 Therefore, the agreement that it had entered into 
with SATCO was found to be in violation of the ARAMCO concession, and the 
authorities were bound by their agreement with ARAMCO. 
It is apposite at this stage to make the preliminary conclusion that the major 
shortcoming of the Saudi Arabian state in relation to this case, at least from the 
perspective of the Arbitrator, was an inadequate appreciation of the rules of 
engagement with multinationals as encapsulated in the state's own contractual 
agreements. In other words. the crucial issue was not about state sovereignty, but 
rather what the state has chosen to do with its sovereignty. The pacta sunt servanda 
principle, which means that agreements must be honoured, was therefore an operative 
basis for the decision. It may be said at this stage that there is nothing about pacta 
sunt servanda that is incompatible with Saudi Law based as it is on the Sharia. We 
have indeed made allusion above to the principle that Sharia law itself permits that 
agreements of a commercial nature even with non-believers must be kept sacrosanct. 
We will, however, address many of the salient observations in relation to this case 
below, asour analysis will be incomplete until the overall lessons of the AMINOIL 
case are also considered. 
98 B· h . 18 op Op.Clt. supra note 
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3.3. Investment Arbitration: Regional Expectations and Dimensions 
3.3.1 The AMINOIL Case 
The Aminoil case involves another Arab state but also succeeded in raising just as 
much questions and disaffection as in the Aramco case on the part of the territorial 
state. We shall, thus, briefly discuss the background of the AMINOIL dispute. 
In 1948, the Kuwaiti authorities entered into a concession agreement with AMINOIL 
that made clear provisions for the adoption of arbitral processes in the determination 
of related legal disputes. Article 18 of the agreement refersall disputes to arbitration. 
Under the agreement, production began in 1954, seven years before Kuwait gained 
independence from the United Kingdom. Under the terms of the agreement, 
AMINOIL was obliged to follow "good oil field practice" and, in the year of the 
Kuwaiti independence,99 AMINOIL was further required to accept a supplement to 
the agreement that increased the taxes and royalties due to the authorities. These dues 
were payable to the authorities and further increased by way of a draft agreement 
negotiated by the parties in 1973. In addition to increasing the taxes, the draft 
agreement contained a new arbitration agreement and defined the applicable law to 
the agreement between the parties as the principles common to the laws of Kuwait 
and the State of New York, USA. In the event that no such common ground exists, the 
"principles of law normally recognized by civilian States in general, including those 
which have been applied by international tribunals" applied. 100 
The explicit benefit to AMINOIL was that the draft agreement stipulated that they 
"should not be denied a reasonable opportunity of earning a reasonable rate of return 
(having regard to the risks involved) on the total capital employed.,,101 In addition to 
this undertaking to secure the revenues of the company, the authorities also agreed to 
enact a new income tax law that would enable AMINOIL to take advantage of the 
United States double taxation immunity.102 The draft agreement was to be ratified by 
the Kuwaiti Parliament; however at the request of the authorities, AMINOIL agreed 
99 Kuwait obtained full independence from the United Kingdom in 1961. 
IOOOovernment o/Kuwait v American Independent Oil Company (Aminoi/) (1984) Vol 66 ILR. 
10IOp.cit.Aminoi! (1982) 
102 Aminoil was incorporated in Delaware, USA. 
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to abide by the agreement as if it had been ratified and was in force. As from 1973, 
AMINOIL began duly paying the authorities in accordance with the terms set out in 
the draft agreement. The Kuwaiti authorities failed to ratify the draft agreement and 
failed to pass the new income tax law. In October 1975, the authorities informed 
AMINOIL that they were introducing the so-called 'Abu Dhabi Formula,' 103 with 
retroactive effect as from November 1974. During 1976, the parties negotiated and 
AMINOIL agreed to the application of the formula, but not to its retroactive effect. 
AMINOIL also negotiated for an increase of profits to what was considered a 
reasonable rate, and for further changes to the financial arrangements. 
In the course of these negotiations, AMINOlL proposed to substitute the concession 
agreement with a service contract. With this proposed change, AMINOlL would hand 
over all of their assets and rights within the concession area to the Kuwaiti authorities, 
and in return they would receive a payment for the value of the assets and from 
thereon function as the authorities' contractor. The authorities approved the 
suggestion and agreed to the changes in the nature of the agreement and relationship 
between the parties. 
Despite both parties agreeing to the proposal, the agreement faltered over the amount 
of compensation that AMINOIL would receive for the assets that were to be 
transferred to the authorities, and the amount of money that was due to the authorities 
from AMINOIL under the implementation of the 'Abu Dhabi Formula.' On 
September 19th, 1977, the authorities enacted Decree Law no. 124, which terminated 
the concession agreement and nationalized all of AMINOIL 's assets in Kuwait. 
Law 124 made provisions for the calculation of compensatory payments due to 
AMINOIL for the seizure of their assets and the appointment of a committee on behalf 
of the authorities to determine the amount outstanding to Kuwait. AMINOlL objected 
to the enactment of Law 124, and invoked the arbitration provisions of the concession 
agreement. The arbitration concluded in favour of the nationalization arrangement, 
stating that compensation should be paid to AMINOIL, and AMINOlL had become the 
103 The Abu Dhabi Formula was adopted by the Gulf States and made provision for further increases in 
the taxes and royalties applicable to, and due from, oil concession holders. See, Suleiman, Atef, "The 
Oil Experience of the United Arab Emirates and Its Legal Framework," Vol. 6 Journal of Energy & 
Nat. Resources L. 1 (1988). 
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authorities' contractors. This clearly reflected the nature of the partnership that the 
parties had prior to the Kuwaiti authorities terminating the agreement. 
Clearly, the intention to assert sovereignty rights lies at the heart of Kuwaiti actions. It 
was appropriate that the arbitration procedure was adopted, and in this way the 
Kuwaiti authorities are able to enjoy the dispassionate consideration outside of the 
public glare. 104 At the heart of this dispute was AMINOIL's decision to act on an 
interim agreement that was never ratified. Furthermore, the reciprocal actions 
required by the Kuwaiti authorities in respect of their side of the agreement were 
never fulfilled. AMINOIL felt comfortable enough, following their negotiations, that 
the authorities could formalize the interim agreement, and obligations and duties 
would follow and become enforceable. The agreement was manifestly legitimate and 
was duly negotiated by officers of the company authorized to enter into negotiations 
and to agree upon terms. On the side of the Kuwaiti authorities, the Minister of 
Finance and Oil was similarly authorized. There would appear therefore to be no 
reason that the intentions of the parties to be bound by the agreement should not have 
been respected. 
Following the agreement, the Kuwaiti authorities served a letter on AMINOIL, which 
required the company to fulfil its obligations under the agreement. AMINOIL did so, 
although they would later complain to the tribunal that they were acting under duress. 
The tribunal rejected this argument on the grounds that none of the required legal 
principles were present to satisfy a claim of duress. 
104 See, P. Sanders, International ArbitrationLiber Am/corum/or Martin Domke (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff Press, 1967) pp. 330-337. Also see Hersch Lauterpacht, International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University press, 1970) pp. 314-315. In my view this analysis demonstrates the power of 
the autonomy of parties and to some extent the flexibility of international law . Also, the role of other 
aspects that can shape universal understanding among nations; when they interact with each other 
under peaceful and mutual respect, even when dispute evolves. 
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3.4. The Many Lessons of the Arbitral Locus Classicus on Investment Regulatory 
Readiness 
3.4.1 State Sovereignty and the Autonomy of the Contracting Parties 
It is notable that the period between ARAMCO and AMINOIL was one in which 
nationalisation and expropriation was rampant. State sovereignty was used to assert 
control over national resources in the dawn of an inevitable era of foreign direct 
investment practice. Arguably, the AMINOIL case presents an aggressive assertion of 
sovereignty where the authorities put AMINOIL in such a position that they felt they 
must proceed with the contract even though it was not formally concluded. The 
company was going through lean times, and was no doubt conscious and aware that 
nationalization was an imminent threat, having witnessed the piecemeal 
nationalization of oil production and refinement within the Saudi Arabia. AMINOIL 
had also watched profits slide and were the last of the oil concession holders left in 
Kuwait. From this arguably difficult position, AMINOIL was prepared to negotiate 
vigorously to preserve some commercial legacy in Kuwait in respect of the industry 
the company had helped build. 
The tribunal acknowledged the company's need for stability and considered the issue 
of duress. The tribunal examined constituent parts of the agreement and the 
complaints of AMINOIL. The failure of the authorities to ratify the agreement was 
interpreted as a consequence of the authorities having to consider their position in 
regard to other oil interests (the Kuwait Oil Company and OPEC) and the effects that 
ratification may have on them and the global instability in economic petroleum 
relations. 
The tribunal also considered the other obligation agreed to by the authorities, which is 
the issue of the adoption of a new tax law that would have given AMINOIL the 
benefit of avoiding double taxation. As no such law was forthcoming, the already 
precarious finances of AMINOIL were beset further. The company appealed to the 
tribunal for damages for the loss it suffered by virtue of the authorities' failure to 
implement the law. Ultimately, the tribunal indirectly found in favour of Kuwait. It 
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would appear that the failure of the company to adequately quantify the extent of its 
loss, and the damage, it felt was due, led the tribunal to the finding that they could not 
consider the issue in any more detail. Arguably, had this been presented in greater 
detail the company would have fared better by the tribunal's decision. The tribunal 
had indeed recognized that there had been some financial suffering borne by the 
company. 
In both these cases, the composition of the tribunal and the selection of the applicable 
law proved to be a complex procedure with significant impact upon the eventual 
awards. In AM/NOlL, as opposed to the situation in ARAMCO there was a clear 
choice of law within the arbitration agreement. Both parties agreed that the 
concession agreement would be decided and interpreted in accordance with the laws 
and principles common to both Kuwait and the State of New York. In the event that 
no common principles existed, then the issues would be decided in accordance with 
the laws recognized by civilized states in general, with particular reference to those 
applied to international tribunals and arbitrational proceedings. The arbitration 
agreement provided for the tribunal to decide on the applicable law "having regard to 
the quality of the parties, the transnational character of their relations and the 
principles of law and practice prevailing in the modem world."lOS The tribunal was 
careful to interpret this as meaning that it should "decide according to law, signifying 
here principally international law which is also an integral part of the law of 
Kuwait."lo6 The law that was to govern the substantive issues was essentially to be 
Kuwait's law. This may be contrasted to the findings of the tribunal in the ARAMCO 
dispute. 
The nature of the substantive issues at hand dictated that the law of Kuwait was the 
predominant legal system to be applied. This was bolstered by the assertion of the 
authorities that Kuwaiti law was highly evolved and that "established public 
international law is necessarily a part of the law in Kuwait." It is important to note 
that similar agreements entered into by the Kuwaiti authorities bore the hallmark of 
IOSGovernment of Kuwait v American Independent Oil Company (Aminoi/) (1984) Vol 66 ILR. 
I06Government of Kuwait v American Independent Oil Company (Aminoi/) (1984) Vol 66 ILR. For a 
full history of the case see also 
http://jwelb.oxfordjournals.orgl contentlearly/20 1 0/09/28/jwelb.jwqO 12. full.pdf+htm I accessed 27 
January 2012. 
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this standard approach to the choice of law. t07 This explicit agreement between the 
parties was underlined by their statement in the arbitration agreement that, ''the law 
governing the substantive issues between the parties shall be determined by the 
tribunal, having regard to the quality of the parties, the transnational character of their 
relations and the principles oflaw and practice prevailing in the modem world."t08 
Clearly, the tribunal had an element of discretion, or flexibility in the choice of law 
through which it could determine issues. While there was clearly a choice that could 
have been made, or at least a discretion that could have been exercised, the very fact 
that the parties were clear as to the choice of governing law, the tribunal was put in a 
position to satisfactorily deduce the intentions of the parties in the context of the law 
of Kuwait was the fundamental starting point, and since it reflected international law 
with all its associations to a rich history of oil concessions; the sovereignty of Kuwait 
was asserted, and, perhaps at the same time, reinforced. 
In the ARAMC0109 case it was agreed between the parties that the tribunal would 
apply Saudi law, as far as matters within the jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia were 
concerned, and that the tribunal has the power to determine the applicable law to 
those other areas of dispute. This decision was complicated by the fact that the laws 
of Saudi Arabia were to be applied in accordance with the Muslim law taught by the 
school of Imam Ahmed Ibn Hanbal. The tribunal held that both the parties were aware 
that different laws would have to be applied to the different matters arising from the 
dispute, and that gaps in Saudi law would need to be supplemented. Furthermore, as 
the agreement was between a company in the private sector and a state the application 
of rules of public international law could not be applied, as they would if the dispute 
had been between states. 
107 Offshore Concession Agreement of the Arabian Oil Company states that the legal principles 
common to Kuwait and Japan shall be applied (Article 39,AR Vol IV, Exh 39), the Oil Concession 
Agreement with the Kuwait national Petroleum Company and Hispanica de Petro leos, 1967 refers to 
principles common to Spanish and Kuwaiti law. Available at: http://www.biicl.orgldamages/aminoiV 
accessed 05 February 2012. 
108 Article lIl, 2 of the Arbitration Agreement. Text available at: http://www.biicl.orgldamages/aminoiV 
accessed 05 February 2012. 
I09Saudi Arabia v American 0;/ Co (Aramco) (1963) Vol 27 ILR. 
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The tribunal, therefore, determined that in the absence of an express choice by the 
parties, it was for the tribunal to determine what law the parties would have intended 
to be applied. As this was not clear the tribunal was obliged to determine what law a 
reasonable person would have chosen and intended to have applied. By comparing the 
positions of both ARAMCO and AMINOIL in regard to the choice of law, it is 
evident that a clear choice of applicable law can benefit both parties. It also makes the 
job for the tribunal much easier when arbitrating the dispute and interpreting the 
intentions of the parties when they originally agreed on applicable law. 
The Saudi Arabia position was clearly based upon supremacy of the Quran and 
Sunnah over all laws. Article 7 of the Saudi Basic Law (1992) indeed provides that 
the governmental system of Saudi Arabia derives power from the Holy Quran and the 
Prophet's tradition, and also, Article 45 provides that the Holy Quran and the Sunnah 
shall be the main sources of formal legal opinion.The imposition of public policy 
restrictions within the Kingdom cannot be relied upon to violate Shari'a principles 
under any circumstances. The Basic Law emphasises that even a temporary state of 
emergency during turmoil cannot violate Article 7, which renders the Shari'a the only 
source of regulation in the Kingdom. The fact, however, was that while the Shari'a 
was quite supervening in all circumstances at home, it was clearly unsuitable for the 
very complex international transaction the state had entered into with ARAMCO. 
In fact, one of the fundamental arguments raised by ARAMCO was the tacit consent 
demonstrated by the Saudi authorities that suggested to ARAMCO that the authorities 
were indeed happy for the company to transport their oil, in the absence of an explicit 
agreement. It was argued by ARAMCO that the authorities failed to raise any 
question or issue with regard to the shipping arrangements that the company used. In 
seventeen years of activity, Saudi authorities and ARAMCO had never considered (at 
least not explicitly) the issue of international shipping of oil products beyond those 
means undertaken by the off loaders, or ARAMCO's customers. The reservation of 
shipping rights, that the Saudi authorities argued they had undertaken, was countered 
by the argument proposed by ARAMCO that the authorities had tacitly agreed to the 
shipping arrangements that ARAMCO had put in place. In the absence of any 
interference from the authorities, or insistence that any preferential rights existed, it 
63 
64 
was understood that ARAMCO was entitled, by virtue of its concession, to employ 
whatever means it chose to distribute the petroleum products. 110 
The shipping contracts that ARAMCO put in place facilitated effective marketing and 
distribution enjoyed by both parties to the concession. Significant profits also accrued 
to the benefit of both parties. In doing this, ARAMCO ensured the flow of Saudi oil 
around the world at such an exponential rate that not only did they secure their own 
position as reliable energy suppliers, but they also empowered the Saudi authorities, 
both in economic and political terms, to sufficiently look beyond the bounty 
guaranteed by the original concession agreement. 
If we compare this with the actions of AMINOIL and their actions in accordance with 
the subsequently un-ratified draft agreement, there is a parallel in the way that the oil 
companies behaved. Authorities in both states have used the veil of state sovereignty 
to attempt to avoid contractual obligations and duties. 
In the AMINOIL dispute, the tribunal recognised the sovereign right of Kuwait to 
nationalize a previously privately owned industry, and referred to the offer that 
AMINOIL had made to Kuwait to take over their operation and to replace the 
concession agreement with a service contract. The tribunal found that Kuwait acted 
lawfully in its nationalization of AMINOIL, and that this did not constitute a breach 
of any obligations owed to AMINOIL. III 
Looking further to the role that sovereignty plays in these disputes, it can be seen that 
the issue of the sovereignty of the state over its natural resources is central to both 
cases. Both cases further reveal a rich mixture of the interaction between commerce, 
politics, and governance. States such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were latecomers to 
IIOMartin Hunter and Anthony C Sinclair. Ammoil Revisited Reflections on a Story of Changing 
Circumstances. International investment law and arbitration: leading cases from ICSID, NAFT A, 
Bilateral treaties and customary international law. Ed, Todd Weiler .pp 347-381. Available at: 
http://www .arbitration-icca.orgimedialO/1223293677461 O/martin_and _anthony-on _aminoil.pdf 
accessed 12 January 2012. 
III The Tribunal noted that "it is incontrovertible that, though without haste, Kuwait had consistently 
pursued a general programme aimed at placing the state in control over the totality of the petroleum 
industry." See, Talal AI-Emadi Joint Venture Contracts (JVCs) among Current Negotiated Petroleum 
Contracts; A Literature Review of JVCs Development, Concept and Elements. 
http://www.law.georgetown.eduljournalslgjiVpdfll_l_al_emadi.pdfaccessed 12 January 2012. 
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the world trade table I 12 and are developing countries. States such as these tend to be 
considerably more protective (with good reasons) over their natural resources and are, 
quite naturally, preoccupied with the idea of protecting their natural resources, 
national interests, and enforcing sovereignty. It is a central feature of developing 
states that they are sceptical of giving away 'full' and 'exclusive rights' over natural 
resources in the face of domestic energy insecurity as well as pressing developmental 
needs in all areas of their national life. It is indeed a surprising feature that some 
developing states can suffer a scarcity of the very energy source they should have in 
abundance. The sovereignty that the Kuwaiti authorities sought to establish over their 
resources is in a sense inalienable. The point, however, is that they sought to exercise 
their sovereignty in a way that was incompatible with modem commercial practices. 
Similarly, Saudi Arabia exercised its state sovereignty in such a way that the 
introduction of a new law was legal and self-affirming. 
The ARAMCO dispute illustrates the emergmg commercial challenges to state 
sovereignty, the changes in the state's involvement in national economic 
development, and the modem interpretation of permanent sovereignty that a state has 
over its natural resources. Saudi Arabia interpreted its sovereign rights over its natural 
resources and its choice of how best to exploit them as inalienable. Furthermore, any 
refusal to act in compliance with the state's wishes, in respect of exercising this right, 
was seen as a questioning of its sovereignty. The tribunal roundly rejected the claim 
that Saudi Arabia was entitled to withdraw any sovereign actions from the arbitration. 
In the later Texaco Award (1977)113 that dealt with the nationalization of Libyan oil 
resources it was noted: 
Territorial sovereignty confers upon the state an exclusive competence 
to organise as it wishes the economic structure of its territory and to 
introduce therein any reforms, which may seem to be desirable to it. It 
is an essential prerogative of sovereignty for the constitutionally 
authorised authorities of then State to choose and build freely an 
economic and social system. International law recognises that a State 
has this prerogative to determine freely its political regime and its 
constitutional institutions. 114 
112 Distinct from the point I wish to make, but perhaps illustrative of it all the same, is the long overdue 
acceptance of Saudi Arabia as the 1491h member of the WTO, having taken the world's largest oil 
producer 12 years to complete membership negotiations, the second longest accession period behind 
China, who took 14 years. 
\I3Texaco v Libyan Arab Republic, 17 ILM (1978) para 59. 
114 Ibid. p. 56. 
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This sentiment was echoed by the tribunal in the AM/NOlL case when it noted, "many 
constitutions state that natural wealth and resources are the property of the State.,,115 
Kuwait claims that the permanent sovereignty over its natural resources could not be 
interfered with by contract, treaty, or agreement, and that the State is prohibited from 
giving any permanent rights relating to the natural resources of the country to any 
other bodies or organizations, or guarantees against the exercising of public authority 
over its natural riches. Despite this the tribunal found that this "contention lacks all 
foundation." 116 
However, the tribunal did recognize that the state has made significant efforts in 
managing and commercially exploiting its own natural resources, as evidenced by the 
program of nationalization that the authorities had implemented in the years preceding 
the AMINOIL dispute, and determined that the nationalisation decree, Law 124, was 
"a necessary protective measure in respect of essential national interests which it (the 
Kuwait Authorities) was bound to safeguard." 117 This is further reflected in the 
statement of the tribunal that the "profound and general transformation in the terms of 
oil concessions that occurred in the Middle East, and later throughout the world,,, 118by 
which "the State thus became, in fact if not in law, an associate whose interests had 
become predominant." 119 This perspective, and an appreciation of the developing 
economic position in the Middle East, contributed to the tribunal's decision to endorse 
the termination of AMINOIL's concession of exploring and exploiting oil reserves, 
that was held to be in itself a lawful 'right' in order to enable Kuwait "to take over 
full ownership of its oil resources and put them under national management.,,120 This 
finding is also reflected in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 626 that 
prescribes that states may exercise their right freely to use and exploit their natural 
lIS Article 21 of the Constitution of Kuwait states "All of the natural wealth and resources are the 
~roperty of the State." 
16Government o/Kuwait v American Independent Oil Company (Aminoi/) (1984) Vol 66 ILR. 
Il7lbid., p. 56 
118Ibid., p. 56 
119Ibid., p. 56 
120 Ibid., p. 56 
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wealth and resources "wherever deemed desirable by them for their own progress and 
development.,,121 
Clearly, it appears that the problem for states like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait is not that 
international law and international relations no longer appreciates the gravity of 
sovereignty and national jurisdiction. Despite all that has been said about the 
overwhelming influence of globalization, it has not managed to jettison the central 
importance of sovereignty. Arguably, the significant issue is the adoption of 
arbitration as a means to resolve international trade law disputes. By this, it is meant 
that the means of resolution of business dispute, the forum, and the venue of such 
resolution may be as much as important (and some will say even more so) as the law 
that is applied. This recognition of a state's right to determine the use of its own 
natural wealth and resources for its own development has become gradually affirmed 
over time through the oil industry arbitration. If we refer to, and compare, the 
ARAMCO and AMINOIL cases we can illustrate the business friendly effect of 
arbitration as a route to trade disputes. The tribunal in the ARAMCO case decided 
that Saudi authorities had infringed the initial concession agreement entered into with 
ARAMCO when they entered into the SATCO agreement. 
The tribunal states that: 
The rights and obligations of the concessionary company are in the 
nature of acquired rights and cannot be modified without the 
company's (ARAMCO) consent. 
The tribunal further noted: 
Nothing can prevent a State in the exercise of its sovereignty, from 
binding itself irrevocably by the provision of a concession and from 
granting to the concessionaire irretraceable rights. 122 
Conversely, the finding of the tribunal in the AMINOIL dispute makes reference to 
the changing economic times in respect of the manner in which oil concessions are 
121UNGA res. 1803 (XVII) - 14 December 1962; http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/resources.htm. 
See: Annex II pp,33. http://untreaty.un.org!codlrepertory/art2/englishlrep_orig_voll-art2_1-5_e.pdf 
accessed 07 February 2012. 
122Saudi Arabia v American Oil Co (Aramco) (1963) Vol 27 ILR. 
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being addressed by developing countries throughout the world, as well as the fact that 
states are taking a greater role in managing their natural resources so that they can 
obtain much greater benefits and higher returns on their natural assets, stating: 
This concession in its origin a mining concession granted by a State 
whose institutions were still incomplete and directed to narrow 
patrimonial ends- became one of the essential instruments in the 
economic and social progress of a national community in full 
process of development. This transformation, progressively 
achieved, took place at first by means of successive levies going to 
the State in the economic and technical management of the 
undertaking ... and the regulation of works and investment 
programmes. The contract of Concession thus changed its character 
and became one of those contracts in regard to which, in most legal 
systems, the State, while remaining bound to respect the contractual 
equilibrium, enjoys special advantages. 123 
Taking this view of arbitral route, it becomes arguable that the decisions in both cases 
are nearly predictable, if not unavoidable. The ARAMCO and AM/NOIL disputes are 
according to another possible view indicative of their times. State sovereignty was in 
recession and it remains severely curtailed both under investment laws and as a result 
of the development of the concept of international justice. 124 The affected states in 
both cases discussed here had little knowledge and practice of resource exploitation. 
The agreements initially allowed for small percentages or royalty payments to the 
right-granting 125 authorities in exchange for exclusive rights over vast deposits of 
natural wealth. The lesson to be learnt here thus is that the pre-eminence of state 
sovereignty and its attributes such as culture, religion, tradition, national pride must 
be put aside at the stage of planning investment laws. In place of a strong reliance on 
123Government of Kuwait v American Independent Oil Company (Aminoil) (1984) Vol 66 ILR.Cf 
Geboye Desta Melaku, "Legal Issues of OPEC Production Management Practices: An Overview" 
Vol. 9, Transnational Dispute Management, Issue 1 (January 2012) passim; 
124 As one writer stated: "The extension of 'international justice' has reflected a widely welcomed 
decline in the legal weight attached to state sovereignty as a barrier to external judgement and 
intervention in a state's affairs. State sovereignty, the recognition of self-government and autonomy, is 
perceived to be increasingly dangerous or inadequate for many states and peoples". David Chandler, 
From Kosovo to Kabul and Beyond: Human Rights and International Intervention, new ed. (pluto 
Press, 2006) pp. 123-126. 
m In this context I am referring to the exclusive rights of oil and petroleum exploration and 
exploitation granted to oil companies by States. 
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these, states must plan to engage with international law and the lex mercatoria126 on 
the terms of their contemporary development. 
Perhaps most importantly the cases do show that current international investment 
regime compels a state which nevertheless wants to exercise its sovereignty by 
expropriation or nationalisation to embark upon prompt compensation. Decision 
makers must assess the discriminatory character of a termination, seizure or 
expropriation rather than a mechanical consideration of its effect on various groups of 
foreigners. In other words, exercise sovereignty if you must, but be guided by the 
requirement that "compensation has to be paid" and the emphasis is on 'prompt', 
adequate and effective compensation or the so called Hull formula. 127 As Arsanjani 
rightly advises: "this element expresses that compensation should be paid either 
before the taking or within a short time after".128 
It is a well-recognised rule in international law that the property of aliens cannot be 
taken, whether for public purposes or not, without adequate compensation. The "Hull 
formula" was first articulated by the United States but it has grown to be accepted by 
most developed countries. The doctrine was endorsed by the Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull in response to Mexico's nationalisation of American petroleum 
companies in 1936. Hull posited the view that international law requires "prompt, 
adequate and effective" compensation for the expropriation of foreign investments.129 
Developing countries during the 1960s and 1970s, on the other hand, supported the 
Calvo doctrine. This was as reflected in major United Nations General Assembly 
resolutions. In 1962, the General Assembly adopted its Resolution on Permanent 
Sovereignty over natural resources, which affirmed the right to nationalise foreign 
owned property and required only "appropriate compensation". This compensation 
standard was considered an attempt to bridge differences between developed and 
126 See A F M Maniruzzaman, "The Lex Mercatoria and International Contracts: A Challenge for 
International Commercial Arbitration 7" 14 American University International Law Review (1999, 
No.3) p. 657. 
127 Mahnoush H. Arsanjani International regulation of internal resources: a study of law and policy 
(Virginia: University Press of Virginia, 1981) p. 301. 
128 Ibid., pp. 307, 309. 
129 OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, "Indirect Expropriation and the right to 
regulate in international law working paper on international investment," Working Papers on 
International Investment Number 2004/4 No, p. 2. Available at 
http://www.oecd.orgldataoecdl22/54/33776546.pdf accessed 15 February 2012. 
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developing states. In 1974, the UN General Assembly in fact, decisively rejected the 
Hull formula in favour of the Calvo doctrine and adopted the Charter of Economic 
Rightsand Duties of States. While Article 2( c) repeats the "appropriate compensation" 
standard, it goes on toprovide that "in any case where the question of compensation 
gives rise to a controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of the 
nationalising State and by its tribunals ... "It is the case that the Hullformula is 
accepted and considered as part of customaryinternational law. 130 No better testament 
to that fact exists than that, even developing states now also include the Hull formula 
in treaties between themselves. 13 I 
It is submitted here that there is nothing about the Hull formula and its variations, 
which Shari'ah law and Saudi attitude to International law cannot cope with. For 
instance, it is indeed the case that the Saudi state maintained the concession 
agreement and honoured it until 1981 whereupon the government acquired hundred 
per cent interest of Aramco Company and it became a Saudi private company. 132 
In order to do so meaningfully states must be forward looking in protecting their 
interests. They must sufficiently equip themselves with the much needed expertise to 
engage in business contractual relations rather than hope to renegotiate by coercive 
means. They must equally realise that the investment dispute resolution puts the 
parties at equal reckoning in the determination of rights and duties when courts and 
tribunals consider the dispute. Some of the tools and strategies of preparation for 
modern investment and arbitral law and practice will be discussed next. 
130 Ib.id. p. 2. 
131 M. Somarajah, The International Law o/Foreign Investment, Second edition (Cambridge: CUP, 
2010) p. 212. Somarajah, however, thinks this is primarily because the treaties are Indeed merely 
extraction oftemplates of treaties that are indeed directed at developed states and their multinationals. 
132 Shukri Mohammed Ghanem, "OPEC, the Rise and Fall of an Exclusive Club" (London: KPI 
Limited, 1986) p. 51; See also A. William E. Mulligan, "Kingdom and a Company" Saudi ARAMCO 
World Magazine available at 
http://www.saudiaramcoworld.comlissuelI98403/a.kingdom.anda.company .htm accessed 06 February 
2012. 
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3.4.2. Sufficiency of Islamic Law in Relation to Complex Investment Contracts in 
Light of Aramco, Aminoil and Qatar cases 
One commonality that ties the three arbitrations discussed above together is the 
finding that ordinarily the law applicable to the concession will be the law of the host 
state. If the ordinary techniques of conflict of laws were applied as the inescapable 
conclusion would be that the law applicable was the law of the host state. 133 Even the 
Arbitrators conceded on this point. Sir Alfred Bucknil admitted in the Qatar 
arbitration that the subject matter of the contract, together with the fact that the state 
was party to the contract, made Islamic law the applicable law to the contract. In the 
Abu Dhabi arbitration Lord Asquith's view was that this is a contract made in Abu 
Dhabi and wholly to be performed in that country. If any municipal system of law 
were applicable, it would, prima facie, be that of Abu Dhabi. In Aramco the 
arbitration Sasser-Hall observed •• .. .it is generally admitted in private international 
law that a sovereign state is presumed, unless the contrary is proved to have subjected 
its undertaking to its own legal system". 134 Yet in all three cases the learned 
arbitrators still came to the conclusion that Islamic law, which would otherwise have 
applied as the domestic law of the host state, was not sophisticated enough to deal 
with transactions involving exploration for oil. Sornarajah noted that European 
Arabists who came to the conclusion that Islamic law did not contain principles on 
petroleum contracts helped them along in this reasoning. 135 Yet there were contrary 
views even at this time from some Western writers like Anderson and Goulson who 
ascertained that there was in fact Islamic law on the issue and that Islamic law does 
indeed support the principle of sanctity of contract. 136 
The implications of the finding that Islamic law was not sophisticated enough are in 
retrospect a much-criticised one especially by Islamic writers. The decisions on this 
issue appear to fall into a recognisable pattern in Western relations with Islamic states 
that has been protested. Alan Godlas writes on this saying "Unfortunately, in their 
writings on Islam, many Western non-Muslims have been motivated not merely by an 
133 Sornarajah op.cit., (2010) p. 290. 
134 (1958) 27 ILR 117 
135 Opcit., p. 290. 
136J.N.D. Anderson and N.J. Goulson, "The Moslem Ruler and Contractual Obligations" (1958) 33 
New York UniverSity Law Review p. 917. 
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enlightened desire to understand but rather by desires to dominate and control". 137 It 
is also seen as the result of an era of "othering" (involving psychological and socio-
cultural distancing) is a key step in the downward attitudinal spiral that may be 
followed by dehumanizing and subsequently demonizing". It is the position of this 
thesis however that the arbitrators like many scholars of their period were only simply 
mistaken as to the way Islamic law works and indeed its true contents. Thus the deep 
suspicion that clouds the discussion of the Aramco may have arisen only because of 
unfamiliarity with Islamic law rather than any bad faith. The disappointment was so 
deep that the government forbade all government agencies from resorting to 
arbitration without prior approval from the Council of Ministers 138 
What the arbitrators needed to have understood is that Islamic law does have several 
mechanisms to help the law out in situations that new and novel situations arise. This 
may be by resort to any of the Fiqh methodologies. In other words at worst the case 
should have been decided with the aid of methods like /jma (consensus) Qiya 
(Analogy), Istihsan (The Public Interest), Istihab (presumption of Continuity) and Urj 
(Local custom». 139 Ijma and Qiyas are principles of interpreting and deciding the 
Islamic law when when the Qur'an and the Sunnah are silent or absent on certain 
matters that have to be decided legally. Two of these methods will have been very 
suitable in coming to a decision under Islamic law in the Aramco case. Ijma is based 
upon the consensus of the community, which in practice is the community of Islamic 
scholars, on matters where the first two sources did not suffice. 140 Scholars and 
arbitrators in that case could also have resorted to the qiyas, which is reasoning by 
analogy and logical inferences. 141 
Islamic law is, thus, flexible enough to allow complex commercial arrangements to 
occur in Islamic countries. For instance, Shari'a does not directly address finance in 
its modem meaning; it does incorporate general principles governing the economic 
137 Alan Godlas, "Islam, the Modern World, and the West: General Considerations" Islam, the Modern 
World, and the West: Contemporary Topics available at http://islam.uga.edulislamwest.htmlaccessed 
17 March 2012. 
138 Council of Ministers Resolution No. 58 of June 25, 1963. See also Sayen op.cit., 
139 Abdal-Haqq, Irshad, "Islamic Law: An Overview oflts Origin and Elements" J. Islamic L. 1 (1996) 
P£·26-34. 
Herbert M. Kritzer, Legal Systems o/the World (ABC-CLlO., 2002) p. 73. 
141 Irshad op.cit., p. 32. 
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behaviour of the Islamic society and specific instruments regulating classic 
commercial transactions. Thus, Islamic banks are unable to use conventional methods 
of financing but they are not left unaided because Islamic law permits them to provide 
Shari'a compliant alternatives to the services rendered by western banks. They also 
use a different paradigm of financing, namely asset based financing and employ the 
well-defined structure of nominated contracts in Islamic law. 142 Furthermore Islamic 
Law may be used to rescue inherent conflicts or deficiencies created by modem 
commercial transactions and problems of International arbitration. As Mary Ayad 
describes 
International Commercial Arbitration is the preferred method of dispute 
resolution between parties from different legal jurisdictions precisely because 
of its flexibility in the choice of law. Yet, that same flexibility poses risks to 
award enforcement; different jurisdictions perceive ordre public and 
international public order differently. Empowering arbitral tribunals to decide 
on questions related to international public ordre by priVileging the concept of 
pacta sunt servanda would go far in reducing these risks. An understanding of 
the interplay between ICA law and the Sharia would lend to facilitation of 
ICA award enforcement 143 
Therefore, impressively Islamic law may come to the rescue of deficiencies in 
Arbitration rather than becoming a clog in its progress. An understanding of the 
interplay between ICA law and the Sharia would lend to facilitation of ICA award 
enforcement. Allowing arbitral tribunals, particularly those in the MENA to employ 
the Qiya or ijtihad would circumvent obstacles to award enforcement based on 
privileging ordre public over pacta sunt servanda. It appears therefore that what was 
needed in the ARAMCO case was the use of Ijtihad or novel legal reasoning. Ijthihad 
in the terminology of Muslim legal scholars means that the scholar is to do his utmost 
to derive a practical legal ruling. There are limitations on this principle. Where the 
sharia texts are clear in its meaning and definite in its intention then it is not allowed 
142 Nima Mersadi Tabari, "Islamic Finance and the Modern World the legal principles governing 
Islamic Finance in International Trade" Vol. 10 NLSWP No.1 (2010) available at 
http://lawwp.webapp2.uea.ac.uklwp/index.php/workingpapers accessed 17 March 2012; In the Shi'ite 
jurisprudence, the methodology of their founding scholar and Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq (d. 748) allowed 
greater use of human reason in deriving the entire system of the Shari'ah. Shi'ite jurists perfected the 
principle of the correlation between a judgment derived from reason and the one promulgated by the 
Qur'an and the Sunna, thereby giving human intuitive reason a substantial role in deriving legal 
decisions at all times. The 'rule of correlation' (qa'idat al-mulazama) in Shi'ite law allows the jurists to 
infer the rulings in the Shari'ah from the sole verdict of reason. Abdulaziz Sachedina, "The Issue of 
Riba in Islamic Faith and Law" available at http://people.virginia.edul-aas/article/article7.htm accessed 
18 March 2012. 
143 Ayad, Mary, Harmonisation of International Commercial Arbitration Law and Sharia: The Case of 
Pacta Sunt Servanda Vs Ordre Public Vol. 6 MqJBL (2009) pp. 93, 117. 
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to deviate from it in determining its intention with the claim of interpreting it 
allegorically (tawi!)) 144 
3.4.3. Protecting Sovereignty and National interests through Legal Protection -
Contract Formation Stage, the Dispute Resolution Clause, and Legal Reform. 
While allowance may be made for the right to returns for economic investments, it 
must also be appreciated that there were glaring inequities in the early concessions. 
As wealth grew and as the technology and infrastructure was incrementally put in 
place, the need for applicable laws and methods of dispute resolution become 
increasingly important. While the Western-owned corporations and their diplomatic 
representations appreciated this phenomenon and sharpened their practice of 
investment laws and arbitral practice, it would appear that the Saudi Arabian and the 
governments of many other developing states have not. 
Perhaps more alarming is the fact that at least in the case of the Saudi state glaring 
lapses still exists in terms of arbitral capacity development and legal reform. By 
capacity development we refer among others to the need for the state to develop 
reputable arbitral centres and responsive arbitral laws. It has, for instance, been 
recognised that rather than quickly learning from the experience of ARAMCO and 
incorporating this into a programme of action towards modernisation the case actually 
caused a regression in the development of Saudi Arabian arbitration. Certainly it has 
"slowed down Saudi ratification of New York and ICSID Conventions".145 
It is suggested here that one of the principal conclusions that could be drawn in 
relation to these two cases is that much more needs to be done by developing states at 
the stage of formation of contracts in international trade. The contractual formation 
stages are crucial. The forms that contracts take in terms of substantive provisions are 
also, of course, crucial. This is particularly true for developing states like Saudi 
Arabia, which have to be forward-thinking and must envisage developments as much 
as possible to ensure that their national interests will not be compromised by 
I440ussama Arabi Studies in Modern Islamic Law and Jurisprudence (Hague: Kluwer, 2001) pp. 27, 
38,200. 
145 Waelde, (2006) op.cit., p. 7. 
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developments that ought to have been foreseen. It must be realized that Multinational 
Corporations and their trading partners are men of business and commercial men who 
have been conducting business for longer periods and are usually aware of the 
unusual developments and other providential issues that may arise to distort the 
fortunes of other parties. 
Whereas the companies would have taken care of themselves by mechanisms that 
may not at first be clear to the developing states, they will not be as forthcoming on 
the tools that may work to the benefit of the states involved - such as in the 
ARAMCO case, with the massive increases in fortunes. It is very important that 
valuable natural resources are not allowed to be wasted or unfairly appropriated by 
commercial agents of foreign economies or private companies, but it is equally 
important in the context of contemporary international commercial laws that pacta 
sunt servanda not only applies, but is always clearly seen to be applied. The only way 
to avoid being short-changed as a state is to give the most serious considerations 
contractual terms at the drafting stages. 
Doak Bishop146 cites the actions of the Mexican authorities147 as being the precursor 
of the nationalization of the oil industry on behalf of overly generous right-granting 
authorities. What follows is the awakening of the right-granting authorities to the fact 
that they could, through the enforcement of their state sovereignty, reassert their 
ownership and ultimate control over economically profitable petroleum resources. 
The economically lucrative nature of this proposition was further improved by the 
rising price of oil and the development of agreements and alliances between oil 
producing nations and the consuming countries, and OPEC and Non OPEC 
Members. 148 
1~ Doak Bishop, "International Arbitration of Petroleum Disputes: The Development of a 'Lex 
Petrolea"'. Transnational Dispute Management 
http://www.dundee.ac.uklcepmlp/journallhtmllvoI2/article2-3 .html visited 08 February 2012. 
147 Marcelo Bucheli. Economic Nationalism, Political Constituencies, and Multinational Corporations: 
The Impact of the Mexican Oil Nationalization in Colombia. 2006. Available at: 
http://www .business. illinois.edulWorking_ Papers/papers/06-0 123. pdf accessed 02 February 2012. 
The Mexican Government began a long series of nation ali sat ion and expropriation of the property and 
rights of oil concessions within Mexico. Ultimately the Government took possession of all assets and 
rifts previously owned and enjoyed by oil concessions in the country. 
14 Speech by Mr. Mohammed Barkindo, Acting for the Secretary General, to the Offshore Technology 
Conference, Houston, Texas, 1-4 May 2006 - Panel Session: "Energy Leadership & Outlook". 
Available at: http://www .opec.orglopec _web/en/press Joom/l089.htm accessed 06 February 2012. 
7S 
76 
As a result of the appropriation of rights and assets by right-granting authorities, and 
the nationalization of formerly private sector oil companies, Doak Bishop argues that 
a "Lex Petrolea" emerged. The awards and findings of arbitration tribunals that have 
been made public are generating the source material from which applicable and 
customary law is emerging. The important enquiry, therefore, is whether the 
jurisprudence that is collating into existence is one which is Eurocentric, Western-
centric, or generally equitable and in the interest of all. 
In a sense, whatever the outcome of the two leading cases discussed above would 
have been, it was expected that they would serve as a clear indication of legal 
developments and would put to test the use of law before international tribunals. 
Development scholars have, however, noted quite persuasively that international 
judicial and arbitral institutions may harbour a certain predisposition toward Western 
business. Perhaps more importantly, these scholars have further noted that there may 
be a bias in international commercial laws in favour of developed and richer states. I49 
Indeed, certain aspects of contemporary international laws broadly construed have 
been revealed as threatening the fairness and equitable conduct of the regulation of 
international relations. It has also been argued that there is a deliberate stultification 
of the progressive development of public international law, international commercial 
law, and indeed nearly all aspects of international regulation by richer and privileged 
states. It has for long been argued that much of Western law, including international 
commercial law, has developed in response to requirements of Western trade, 
business, and politics. ISO Therefore, it is worthwhile for Arabic scholars to engage in 
the enquiry whether, and to what extent, cases like AMINOIL and ARAMCO expose 
the means and strategies that have been deployed since the 19th and 20th centuries to 
manipulate international laws to serve Western interests, and perhaps to permanently 
work against the interests of the vast majority of resource rich Arab states. 
149 Vagts, DetIev, "Hegemonic International Law," 95 AJIL. (2001) p. 843-848; Hans Morgenthau, 
Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1985); 
Oduntan, Gbenga, "International Law and the Discontented: How the West Underdeveloped 
International Laws," in Parashar, Archana and Dhanda, Amita, Decolonisation of Legal Know/edge in 
India, Routledge, (2009) pp. 109-113. 
ISO O. J. Lissitzyn, International Law in a Divided World, International Conciliation (1963) pp. 37. 
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Some writers like Oduntan have indeed suggested that international courts and 
arbitration panels have been deliberately under developing international law. A 
particularly convincing description of this problem was formulated, 
Whether it be the Trendtex case where the plea of sovereign immunity 
was held not to avail the Central Bank of Nigeria against a Company in 
England or recent commercial arbitration such as the recent Greek 
Cement Company case where Egypt's revocation of the importation 
licence of a branch of a Greek owned company was held to be 
"tantamount to expropriation" developing countries have repeatedly 
been short changed in terms of the justice meted out to them by foreign 
courts and international arbitral tribunals. The problem transcends the 
main international courts and extends to other multilateral platforms for 
dispute resolution such as General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) and the World Trade Organization dispute settlement. Where 
lex latalaw is sufficiently in favour of a developing state as against its 
Western counterpart, development of the law is arguably accelerated to 
reverse the advantage. When lex /eranda is postulated in the interests 
of justice by developing States the formal and substantive qualities of 
international law is affirmed. lsl 
This idea of the use of force is based on a powerful partner who has the power to 
interpret the precedence and the legal procedures to justify the use of force in their 
interest. To some extent, this is the most salient argument that any Western legal 
expert can use against the use of Islamic Law. Lex Lata has become a norm. Building 
upon this norm is Lex Petrolea, in which a door to the use of force is opened in the 
contract. If this thesis holds true, then it appears that the decisions in the AMINOIL 
and ARAMCO cases, as in many other cases, were in effect predetermined and they 
could only have ended in decisions that were largely favourable to Western business. 
While there is certainly a trend to study further along this line of thinking, it will not 
be totally accepted. The fact that the AMINOIL case produced some level of victory 
for the Kuwaiti state is instructive. On the whole, however, we must heed the warning 
given in the above quote, and adopt a more critical view of the jurisprudence of 
international courts and arbitration awards. Developing states must consider this 
reality very carefully in agreeing to venue and forum of arbitration although there 
hands will be tied in many cases by the sheer weight of international practice. 
lSI Gbenga Oduntan, "How International Courts Underdeveloped International Law: Political, 
Economic and ... Adjudication in Relation to Developing States," Vol. 13 African Journal Of 
International And Comparative Law (2005) pp. 292. 
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Sophisticated licensing agreements, production sharing agreements, and service 
contracts are now the common contractual formula by which states with oil reserves 
enter into business with oil companies. 152These agreements are often combined into 
hybrid agreements and appear to firmly place the risk and the expense of oil 
exploration and exploitation at the feet of the oil companies. 
The resource-owning states in return enjoy royalties, taxation revenue, and bonuses. 
While there is the possibility of making vast profits on all sides, it appears that oil 
companies are now subject to far more risks, checks, and stages of negotiation than 
what was previously required. Before engaging in activities such as exploration, 
drilling, and transportation (both on land and sea), the resource-owning state must 
consider the costly sealing and closure of non-commercial well-heads. Consideration 
must be given to crude and refined oil sales and exchanges as separate processes. 
Doak Bishop reminds us that the environmental impact of drilling and exploitation 
must not be underestimated by right-granting states. IS3 At each step of production new 
agreements are reached and entered into. This necessarily introduces numerous points 
at which disputes may arise. All these areas must be anticipated and considered both 
in the relevant resource clauses and effort must be expended in deciding which areas 
are best suited for arbitration or best handled under other sophisticated and applicable 
methods of dispute resolution. 
In other words,Lex Petro/ea is something that must be decided upon and developed 
with the most acute appreciation of the event. Only the most qualified experts ought 
to be involved in the negotiations, and they must have received the best opportunities 
at the training stages. Unfortunately, this has not always been the case in many 
Middle Eastern resource-owning practices. 154 As Walde puts it, 
1S2 See A. F. M. Maniruzzaman, "New Generation of Energy and Natural Resource Development 
Agreements: Some Reflections" 11 Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law (U.K.) (No.4, 
1993), p. 207. 
1S3 Bishop op.cit., p. 65. Supra note 116. 
154 This problem is increasingly pointed out in much of critical scholarship emanating from the 
developing world. As a writer put It " In the case of negotiators from developing countries, a further 
handicap arises because of their lack of knowledge of the precise implications for their economies and 
their trade of the proposals that are under discussion." Vinod Rege, "Developing countries and 
negotiations in the WTO," Third World Network, Available at: http://www.twnside.org.sgltitlelvinod-
cn.htm. Accessed on September 12,2010. 
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Cross-border commercial and financial transactions are not for 
widows and orphans. They are trained, certified and well paid 
professionals on both sides ... This is a game for men and women, and 
not for boys and girls - caveat emptor and literal respect for a 
contract is more appropriate than importing easy escape from 
contractual commitments (duty to negotiate;large scope for 
recognition of error/mistake; force majeure; hardship, renegotiation) 
or using law to impose duties where no duties have been negotiated 
though they could have been. ISS 
The truth being denoted here is that there is little appetite for sympathetic treatment 
for a party that has not adequately fortified itself in the hard world of Western 
investment law much of which has become globalized into international commercial 
and investment law. The best of minds must have been applied to the task to ensure 
that the investment activity that is to be embarked upon is one that ties in with the 
socio-Iegal development needs of the state that will host the investment. The scope for 
making retrospective laws has shrunk beyond usefulness, and this indeed is a good 
thing as retroactivity of law making is as a general rule understandably frowned upon 
by internationallaw. ls6 Therefore, touchy issues such as the requirement of 'clean up' 
payments ought to be made clear to operators even before the contract is operative 
and included in the contract. Again, this will underline and necessitate the need for 
arbitration, and perhaps more importantly, clarity in arbitration agreements and 
reference to any applicable laws. 
Clarity is especially important in resource exploitation contracts and agreements 
given the usual lack of right of appeal in International Arbitration. The majority of 
arbitral processes do not have, or do not allow for any type of appeal process. IS7 
Clarity of drafting and adequate addressing of the minds of negotiators to all aspects 
of their work will indeed assist the ability for a tribunal to offer a final and binding 
ISS See Thomas Walde, Review of Dalhusien, Dalhusien on International Commercial Financial and 
trade Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000) in Volume 53 ICLQ Number 2 (2004) pp. 523. 
IS6 See JT Woodhouse, "The Principle of Retroactivity in International Law," (London: The Grotius. 
Society, Transactions for the Year 1955) vol. 41 (1956), pp. 69. 
IS7 Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration: Commentary and Materials, 2nd Edition 
(Netherlands: Kluwer 200 1) pp. 279; Anthony Colman, "The Question of Appeals in International 
Arbitration" Modem Law for Global Commerce Congress to celebrate the fortieth annual session of 
UNCITRAL Vienna, 9-12 July 2007, Available at: 
http://www .uncitral.orglpdflenglish/congresslColman.pdf, Accessed on October 4, 2010. 
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result. Wherever disagreement does ensue, initial attempts to achieve the best clarity 
possible are still of benefit to the parties that come to the arbitration. 
Clearly one of the lessons that the Aramco and Aminoil cases offer is that states must 
be quite clear about the nature of their commitments at the earliest stages of the 
drafting of contracts. This includes a proper appreciation of not only the preferred 
dispute resolution route but also a clear understanding of the dispute resolution clause. 
It is clear also that the Saudi Arabian system is similar to those of other developing, 
resource rich states in the need to develop a dispute resolution clause drafting 
capabilities and capacities to the most elaborate possible levels. The assumption that 
dispute resolution clauses can continue to be midnight clauses must be jettisoned in its 
entirety.I5S The arbitration or dispute resolution clause is one of the most important 
aspects of the task before parties to international resource or petroleum contracts. I59 
A question that has been very common in much of the reaction of non-experts to 
decisions that do not favour states is whether there is, or there ought to be a right to 
appeal decisions and awards. In the two major cases discussed in this chapter, the oil 
companies enjoyed pleasant and cordial relationships with their respective states. All 
had profited greatly from their partnerships together, and the arbitration indeed 
underlined a relationship worth salvaging as well as preserved the scope for future 
business. As a general rule, it may be suggested that appeal mechanisms ought to be 
excluded from the investment dispute resolution mechanisms, as they would only 
serve to dig deeper divisions between the parties. 
The cases discussed in this chapter demonstrate that the composition of the ad hoc 
tribunals and the selection of arbitrators and applicable law have been the remit of the 
parties. It is not inconceivable to appreciate that to have a method of appeal in these 
cases could have prompted allegations of bias against the arbitrators. To directly or 
ISBrhe phrase "the Midnight Clause" came into being because the clause is often the last clause 
negotiated by the parties after all other clauses have been concluded. Yet, the most important clause in 
any contract is the dispute resolution clause for so many reasons, not the least of which is that the way 
contracting parties manage any dispute, disagreement or controversy that arises in the course of 
implementing the contractual agreement, would invariably determine their future commercial 
relationship.http://www.nigerianlawguru.com/articles/arbitrationIDRAFTING%20THE%20DISPUTE 
%20RESOLUTION%20CLAUSE.pdf accessed 03 February 2012. 
IS9 F. Peter Phillips, "Drafting Dispute Management Clauses: Principles of Risk Management for 
Commercial Contracts," Business Conflict Management LLC Website Available at: 
http://www.businessconflictmanagement.comlpublication-drafting-contracts.html. Accessed on 
October 4,2010. 
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indirectly be seen to criticize arbitrators, even in the most high profile investment 
disputes, goes against one of the clear benefits of choosing arbitration. The 
philosophy of investment arbitration is that the parties can choose their arbitrators and 
effectively compose their own arbitration tribunal. This has a multitude of benefits for 
the autonomy of the contracting parties, and avoids what may become major domestic 
issues. Yet, considerable internal upset is inevitably generated when states lose cases 
before international courts and arbitrations. This was experienced in Nigeria 
following the ICJ judgement in Nigeria v. Cameroon.16oRelations between Cameroon 
and Nigeria had long been strained due to problems along their common border, 
which is more than 1700 kilometers long and extends from Lake Chad to the sea. 161 
After the judgment, which handed over an oil rich Peninsula to Cameroon from its 
previous owner Nigeria, many in Nigeria argued that "post-colonial" judges were 
deciding the validity of the colonial treaties. Thomas Waelde, an advocate of 
arbitration, wrote that there would have been no room for such allegations had the 
parties opted for arbitration. 162 
All states that opt for pacific resolution of disputes must understand that one party 
will be substantially victorious and the other may lose important points and issues. 
The loss of vital national interests does not usually come easy to statesmen and the 
populace. For instance after the International Court of Justice judgment in the 
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain case, 163 
that was favourable to Bahrain, the Bahraini Prime Minister issued an edict to declare 
a public holiday in Bahrain because: ..... this day is one of the great days in the history 
of Bahrain." 164 Qatar, on the other hand, expressed 'pain' at the loss of what it 
considered national territory. In a television address to the state after the verdict, the 
Qatar Amir, Shaikh Hamad bin Isa Al Thani stated that the recognition of Bahrain's 
160Cameroon v Nigeria ICJ Rep. 2002. http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?pl=l&p2=S&p3=2 
161 For a brief pre-independence era outline of the disputed area see Mendelson op.cit., 224-227. 
Maurice Mendelson, "The Cameroon-Nigeria Case in the International Court of Justice: Some 
Territorial Sovereignty And Boundary Delimitation Issues" vol. LXXV British Yearbook of 
International Law (2004). 
162Thomas W Walde, Vol. I Oil, Gas & Energy Law Intelligence, Issue 02 March 2003 
163Case concerning the Maritime Delimitation and territorial questions between Qatar and Bahrain 
(merits) (Qatar v. Bahrain) Judgment of 16 March 2001. ICJ Reports are available on the website of the 
IC available at www.icj.org. 
164Edict No. 7 of 200 1. Thousands of Bahrainis took to the streets. Press reports recalled that 
"celeberations broke out across the island with thousands pouring out into the streets .. , waving flags, 
blaring their car horns, cheering, congratulating and waving one another ", "Hawar Stays with 
Bahrain HH Amir Hails ICJ verdict" Bahrain Tribune Saturday, March 17,2001 pp.20. 
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sovereignty over the disputed Hawar territory "was not easy upon us." 165 The 
importance of such examples is to show that dispute resolution processes may yield 
painful results; but they are hardly a reason for states to recoil from international 
relations or indeed shy away from modern instruments such as international 
agreements or investment treaties. 
Thomas Waelde's thesis is, however, tested by other instances of party intransigence 
after an arbitration award. For instance, ten years after the much-celebrated award in 
the arbitration between Ethiopia and Eritrea by the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary 
Commission (EEBC), the award has not yet been given effect, and there is much 
recognition of failure to implement the award between the parties. 166 It, therefore, 
appears that both judicial resolution and arbitral award may end with dissatisfaction if 
their dispute is improperly delineated or if there is a lack of political will to achieve 
resolution. 
What is important is for states to appreciate the demands of capacity building in legal 
training and staffing of their various ministries -finance, judicial, central banking, etc. 
Indeed as a result of this realization, it becomes imperative that Saudi Arabia, take 
more seriously arbitration training and arbitral practice. At the very least it is 
necessary for states to take the arbitrator nomination stage very seriously. 
As has been demonstrated, the choice of arbitrator also affects the quality of the 
arbitration. In an ad hoc arbitration, such as those that have been profiled in this 
16S See, List of Cases referred to the Court since 1946 by date of introduction. Available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docketlindex.php?pl=3&p2=2accessed 05 February 2012. 
166 Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC), which was established as a result of the protracted 
Eritrea-Ethiopian border crises and in accordance with the Algiers Peace Agreement of 12 December 
2000 (Article 4).Also referred to as the December Agreement; see UN docs S/1999/32 and SIRES/1227 
(1999). See also UN docs S/1999/247, 250, 258-260, 696, 731,762,789,794,857; S/20OO/389, 413, 
421,422,430,435,437,568; available at: http://www.un.orglenldocumentslindex.shtml accessed 07 
February 2012. K. Vick, War Erupts along Border of Ethiopia and Eritrea, International Herald 
Tribune, 8 February 1999, 2; Battles Erupt on a 3d Front between Ethiopia and Eritrea, International 
Herald Tribune, 9 February 1999, 2; Addis Ababa Rules Out Border War Cease-Fire, International 
Herald Tribune, 11 February 1999, 7; K. Vick, Ethiopians Claim Victory in Border War with Eritrea, 
International Herald Tribune, 1 March 1999,8. Note also UN docs S/2000/610, 612,619,643,676 and 
793; SIPRST/2000122; and SIRES/1312 of31 July 2000, establishing the United Nations Mission in 
Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). See Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission Statement by the 
Commission available at http://www .pca-cpa.orgluploadlfiles/Statement%2027 I I 06.pdf visited 12 
October 20 10; UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Ethiopia-Eritrea: No end in 
sight for border standoff available at http://www.irinnews.orglreport.aspx?reportid=56830 visited 12 
Oct 2010. 
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chapter, individuals can be chosen to serve on the basis of possessing particular 
expertise, or two-fold expertise (such as specialist knowledge of particular legal 
principles, such as Shari'ah, as well as commercial dispute expertise). Arbitrators may 
also be drawn from a particular cultural or social background that reflects those of the 
parties and that bring with them an understanding of the issues that go beyond their 
expertise. This is true of state versus private arbitration, just as it is true of 
nominations or appointment to bodies such as the WTO or ICl Both these 
organizations offer an available, 'pre-selected' pool of experienced judges 167 and 
arbitrators that are familiar with each other and can work quickly and professionally 
together. The main problem with these bodies is that they tend to not have enough 
scholars from the developing world on their bench. This is accentuated by the fact that 
there is a dearth of truly well trained scholars in Islamic law and jurisprudence within 
these bodies. 168 
3.5. Conclusion 
The early cases on investment arbitration treated above reveal a pressing need for 
legal reform in relation to arbitration regime and investment laws of the Saudi 
Arabian state. Continuous modification is imperative in both capacity developments 
in legal training and reform of arbitration law. Although certain changes have been 
made since the era of the cases highlighted above it is fair to say that scholars still 
detect continuing failures of the Saudi Arbitration Law and its Implementing 
Regulations. 169 It is clear that those countries that look towards the Sharia as the 
supreme source of all rules must consider that international law regulating FDI 
167 In the case of the ICJ such judges are financed by the United Nations. 
168 Oduntan op.cit., pp. 310-313. 
169 Saudi Arbitration Law 1983 and the Implementation Regulations 1985 is available the Saudi 
Chamber of Commerce East Province Legal Department published in Official Gazette (Umm al Qura) 
Issue no 2969 dated 22 of August 1404 H (June 1983). For instance, the provisions to indicate on 
which grounds the challenge to arbitral awards will be successful results in leaving the door wide open 
to the challenge of awards. Therefore, it is recommended that express provisions setting down the 
reasonable grounds for challenges of arbitral awards should be incorporated in the Implementing 
Regulations when the time comes for its revision. It should be made clear and unequivocal that if the 
arbitral award is sought to be implemented in an Islamic country where the principles of Shari'a are 
applied, such an award should not be contrary to the rules ofIslamic law. Similarly, if the arbitral 
award is not contrary to the QurOan, Sunnah or Consensus, it should be automatically enforceable and 
not subjected to challenge. Faisal M. A. AI-Fadhel, Party Autonomy and the Role of the Courts in 
Saudi Arbitration Law, With Reference to the Arbitration Laws in the UK, Egypt and Bahrain and the 
UNCITRAL Model Law (PhD Thesis submitted at Queen Mary College University of London, 2010) 
pp. 238-248. 
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constitutes a necessary exception to their reliance upon the Shari'ah. Compliance 
with international laws may dictate outcomes that go against both the national interest 
and the Shari'ah. Autonomy of the contracting parties is the bane ofFDI relations and 
international commercial arbitration accords sanctity to contracts, the emerging lex 
mercatoriaand pacta sunt servanda. 
Finding the right balance between the rights and responsibilities of foreign investors, 
on the one hand, and those of governments, on the other, is a key imperative of legal 
reform. It needs to be a balance that combines the stability, predictability transparency 
and mutuality of interest that ought to guide investment decisions with the national 
interest of the state and the contracting party. It is indeed true as concluded by another 
scholar of the topic that "Finding regulatory solutions to this challenge is not easy. It 
is important that the process of rebalancing, which is already underway, proceed in a 
manner that strengthens the overall international investment regime". 170 
The arbitrators in both the ARAMCO and AMINOILcases recognized the validity of 
the property rights that oil companies possessed over the actions of the right-granting 
states, and the exercise of state sovereignty. Equally, the tribunals also addressed the 
issues of the authorities' sovereign right to expropriate those rights. In the case of 
AMINOIL, this was clearly shown by the awarding of compensation to AMINOIL 
following the expropriation of their assets and exclusive rights under the original 
concession agreement. On one hand, the oil companies lost highly lucrative streams 
of revenue and rights over massive deposits of natural wealth, but on the other hand, 
due to their expertise, commercial size and power, they were able to survive such 
intervention and continue in their businesses. These actions did not dissuade them 
from entering into future agreements with other states for their petroleum and crude 
oil contracts. One could also argue that the experience of the major oil companies in 
Saudi Arabia and other parts of the Middle East involving nationalization, forceful 
acquisition and egregious use of state power forced a sea-change within the petroleum 
investment industry that required oil companies to seek out and develop additional 
new sources of oil such as the North Sea, Africa, and the Caspian region.171 The fact, 
170 AI-Fadhel, ibid., p. 16. 
171 Thomas Wealde, "The Role of Arbitration in the Globalisation of Energy Markets," Vol. 6 
CPEMLP Journal (2000) pp. 7-9. 
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however, is that in many cases their actions in all these new places, particularly in 
Africa and Latin America, have continued to be heavily criticized and controversial. 
In relation to the idea that Islamic law is inadequate in dealing with modern 
commercial affairs, it appears that this view is erroneous. Every legal system just like 
every language is capable of being used to cover all human circumstances. The belief 
exists partly because of the ignorance of Western jurists and even some Muslim 
writers who do not sufficiently understand the true nature of the Shari' ab. With 
appropriate resort to the ljma and Qiyas when the Qur'an and the Sunnah is silent 
upon a matter or in new and analogous situation Islamic law will be able to cope with 
any transaction that can occur on earth. However, the fault is not only upon Western 
scholars but it also lies on Islamic scholars who have not being sufficiently 
elaborating Sharia principles in a confident and competent manner. Even worse are 
the clerics and scholars who adopt a fixed and very conservative view of Islamic 
principles. These scholars do the most damage and truly make it impossible for the 
Shari' ah to perform its task in modern international relations. This is also not to say 
that there is no deliberate bias against Islamic law and other competing legal world 
view as a result of power politics in world affairs. As a result it may indeed be better 
for the modern international law to be used when the matter is of international 
commercial nature. 
Ultimately, oil companies such as AMINOIL and ARAMCO are overseas investors 
and commercial trading entities. This fact must always be borne in mind by the 
leaders and decision-makers in their host states. Dispute resolution by an arbitration 
tribunal may be a long established method by which disputes between commercial 
transactions of companies are resolved, but it is not free or completely devoid of 
politics and international power. The size and economic capacity and influence of 
many multinational companies' means that they are able to facilitate, fund, and 
initiate the use of the GATT/WTO dispute panel procedures much more effectively 
than some states. It has been long observed that developing countries made limited 
use of the dispute settlement set out under the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT). 172 Most observers insist that the various GATT reforms that were 
172Marc L. Busch, "Developing Countries and GA lT/WTO Dispute Settlement", Journal of World 
Trade 37 (2003) pp,I-5; Eric Reinhardt, Marc L. Busch, Developing Countries and GAlT/WTO 
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intended to help developing countries failed to insulate them from the "power 
politics" of the system. l73 The effects of this differential attitude become apparent in 
the result of studies that establish the tendency of WTO rulings to lean for the 
complainant in 64 percent of rulings, and in the GATT-era Panels, 77 percent of 
rulings.174 Indeed, many oil multinationals have successfully hidden "in the shadow 
and under the mantle of a WTO member state.,,175 This means that not only ad hoc 
arbitrations like the ones focused on above harbour dangers for Saudi Arabia, but 
even institutional arrangements may also be difficult to resort to unless a lot more 
effort is expended in studying these institutions and adapting to their peculiar needs. 
The increase in transnational transactions, both between member states and 
commercial companies means that there will be a concomitant increase in 
transnational disputes. In light of current trends, we are likely to see more of these 
disputes resolved by way of arbitration, primarily for the reasons discussed above but 
also because the transnational nature of the transactions mean that disputes are likely 
to be born out as a result of differences in culture, law, business norms, and 
procedures. Equally so, domestic means of resolution will never be satisfactory to an 
oil company, or any other inward investor, on the grounds that the acceptability of 
their decision will have elements of bias and enforcement. 
It will appear that a similar situation as that which was faced by African states before 
the IC} and the PCA is applicable on a South-wide basis under both the GAIT and 
WTO, as well as in the ad hoc arbitration rule described above. Many of the 
judgments emanating from international courts have shaken the confidence of the 
resource-rich states in referring disputes to these bodies. This, however, does not 
mean that developing states like Saudi Arabia could not have approached their cases 
Dispute Settlement (Queen's School of Business and CIAR, 2011) available at 
http://userwww.service.emory.edul-ereinlresearchIBerkeley.pdf accessed 6 February 2012. 
173 P. E. Kuruvila, Developing Countries and the GAIT/WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism, (1997) 
31 J.W.T. (1997) pp., 171-208; M.L. Busch and E. Reinhardt, Developing Countries and General 
Agreement on Tariffs and TradeIWorld Trade Organization Dispute Settlement 37 Journal o/World 
Trade at 719. See also Faisal A S A Albasher and A F M Maniruzzaman, "Reforming the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System: A Rethink of the Third Party Right of Access to Panel and Appeal 
Processes from Developing Countries' Perspectives" Journal o/World Investment & Trade (June issue 
2010), p. 311. 
174Robert E. Hudec, En/orcing International Trade Law: The Evolution o/the Modern GATT Legal 
f1'sstem (Salem, NH: Butterworth Legal Publishers, 1993) pp. 33. 
I sBusch, Marc L. and Eric Reinhardt,. "Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early Settlement in 
GATT/WTO Disputes", Vol. 24 Fordham International Law Journal No. I & 2 (2000) pp. 158-172. 
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with more expertise and due care. In fact, the prevailing situation, as we have argued 
above, simply shows the crucial nature of the resource-rich state to acquire better 
expertise across board to cover contract negotiation and dispute resolution phases. 
There is also the need for international lawyers and scholars to argue in favour of 
changes that will make dispute resolution fairer and more responsive to the needs of 
developing states. 
WTO procedures and those of ad hoc tribunals have been shown to lean in favour of 
richer and more economically powerful countries and companies. It is argued that this 
disadvantage is in addition to other systemic faults in international relations that 
prevent powerful authorities from enacting legitimate rules and principles. 
Commendable improvements include the recently instituted WTO Legal Advisory 
Centre, which offers financial assistance to poor countries by co-financing their 
litigation. The better the legal advice a party obtains, the better the chances of its 
success. 
In conclusion, it is clear that both the cases of AMINOIL and ARAMCO have 
contributed to the manner in which oil arbitration is conducted, and to the overall pool 
of Lex Petrolea. These cases have been analyzed and reinterpreted in many other 
situations, and by scholars in other states in the Middle East and beyond. In the 
emerging global market, the development and expansion of the WTO means that it is 
highly likely that we will see many more disputes resolved by way of arbitration. 
With respect to oil companies, the economic and political future of these 
organizations is still uncertain, with environmental and nuclear issues coming to the 
fore at a pace that has not been previously witnessed. Nonetheless, this is good news 
for the arbitration industry as the better developed and equipped an oil company is to 
deal with the disputes arising from oil concessions, the better prepared it will 
inevitably be in its legal relations and technical operations. 
It is also important to mention briefly two other cases, which made similar impact in 
the region. They are indeed part of the body of the so-called Lex Petrolea, namely: 
Petroleum Development Limited v Sheikh of Abu Dhabi (1951) and The Ruler of 
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Qatar v International.These cases, when viewed in the context of Lex Petrolea, can 
reshape the entire legal understanding to any judgments or academic literature 
accomplished in the past 60 years. 
Petroleum Development Limited v Sheikh of Abu Dhabi (1951/ 76 
The Abu Dhabi dispute, which took place in 1951, was the first Arab oil arbitration 
case. Abu Dhabi has a coastline of about 275 miles on the Gulf. Sheikh Shajbut of 
Abu Dhabi nation engaged himself in a contract in Arabic with Petroleum 
Development Limited. In this contract, the Sheikh purported to transfer the exclusive 
right to drill for, and to win mineral hydrocarbon within a particular area in Abu 
Dhabi, for a period of 75 solar years from date of signature to the company. 
The umpire in this arbitration, Lord Asquith, in coming to the determination whether 
a concession granted by the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi extended to mineral exploitation of 
the territorial waters and the subsoil of the continental shelf, made certain conclusions 
worthy of discussion. On the one hand, his words were seized upon by some as 
showing the inadequacy of Islamic Law to be applicable to modern business. The 
argument of the state was that the Sheikh was quite unfamiliar with the legal term 
"territorial waters" and therefore held the argument that the subsoil of the territorial 
waters was included in the concession. Since there was not a choice of law clause, 
Lord Asquith concluded; "if any municipal legal system was applicable, it would 
prima facie be that of Abu Dhabi."177 But he also declared that, "No such law could 
reasonably be said to exist. .. it is fanciful to suggest that in this very primitive region 
there is any settled body of legal principles applicable to the construction of modern 
commercial instruments and that the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi administers a purely 
discretionary justice with the assistance of the Quran.,,178 Writers such as Anthony 
176Petroleum Development Ltd. v. Sheik o/Abu Dhabi (1951) ILR, pp. 144 181.L.R. (1951). 
177 See, Dr.Khaled M AI-Jumah, "Arab State Contract Disputes: Lessons From the Past" 
Vol.17 Arab Law Quarterly no.3, 2002 pp. 215-240; 
http://www .jstor .org!action!showPublication?journalCode=arablawquarterly accessed 04 February 
2012. 
178 Ibid. 
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Anghie argues that international law has strong links and connections with 
imperialism, and in the colonial era had a "civilizing mission" have used this case. 179 
A similar approach was evident in the case of Ruler of Qatar v. International Marine 
Oil Co. Ltd., where the arbitrator held that although Qatar law was the proper law to 
apply, it had to be dismissed because as he put it, "I am satisfied that Qatari law does 
not contain any principles which would be sufficient to interpret this particular 
contract." 180 
The question may then be asked, if the UAE has learned its lesson from the Abu 
Dhabi case, and Qatar from the Qatar case, then why did the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia not learn from the ARAMCO case? It is a prime contention of this thesis that a 
grand level of cultural legal philosophical chauvinism is apparent in these cases. 
Business was foisted on the Arab states in this period without any respect for their 
own legal and cultural civilization. Yet, it must also be argued that the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia must reform its constitution, and bring its state laws into conformity 
with international norms. This contention does not seek to make the Kingdom into a 
"Western Nation", but to operate in a 21 st century world of commerce and industry, 
the laws of which are in constant flux even traditional societies must adapt. As such, 
the Kingdom must consider the possibility of adopting constitutional reforms to 
allocate Islamic law for internal use, and embrace a parallel commercial private law 
program compatible with the international legal practice. This approach has been 
adopted in Dubai, and appears to be successful. 
It remains, therefore, to see how our conclusions may allow us to begin to understand 
the necessary holistic changes in Saudi Arabia's regulatory environment that must be 
put in place given the determination of the government to move away from a past of 
suspicion of international law and particularly International commercial arbitration. 
Given the unique natural gifts of oil resources that the country possesses the future 
must be planned for with more seriousness in order to maximise the benefits of trade 
179 Antony Anghie Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making o/International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2005) pp. 52-56. . 
180 Faisal Kutty .The Shari'a Factor in International Commercial Arbitration. Loy. Vol. 28 L.A.lnt'l & 
Compo L. Rev. (2006) p. 565, 590-592. http://ilr.lls.edulissuesl28/documentsIKutty.pdfaccessed 05 
February 2012. 
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and investment and modem international relations. It is suggested that the changes 
must first of all come from within in a socio legal sense. 
90 
Chapter 4; MAKING SAUDI ARABIA AN ATTACTIVE DESTINATION FOR 
FOREIGN INVESMENT- SOCIO-jEGAj DEVELOPMENT FOR BETTER 
PROTECTION OF INVESTORS' RIGHTS 
4.1. Introduction 
91 
This chapter aims to explore the historical, ideological and socio-Iegal basis for the 
differences between Saudi Arabia's legal regime and those of the majority of the 
western investor states. It is hoped that such an analytical approach will help 
understand the fundamental differences and also pinpoint precisely what strategies 
will best succeed in implementing reform. It has, for instance, been shown in chapter 
two that Islam itself is not opposed to economic and legal modernisation. It has also 
been shown there is recognition among all states as to the inevitability of international 
trade and the mutual interests for all. 
The purpose of this chapter is to appraise the socio-Iegal background to the Kingdom 
and question whether what is discovered lies behind the difficulties the State is having 
in realising its full potentials. Specifically the argument will be tested that without 
socio-Iegal changes Saudi Arabia cannot be or remain an attractive destination for 
foreign investment. The thesis in this chapter also looks at the Saudi legal system 
through the prism of the international legal regime that bears on the international 
investment law including international human rights and international investment 
dispute resolution. It is from this basis that the reform needed to address the identified 
shortcomings will be presented in later chapters. 
91 
4.2: Saudi Arabia Imperatives of Socio Legal Development and Changes to 
Human Rights Regime 181 
92 
The law of Saudi Arabia, however, presents a special case, not just because it is based 
on religious perspectives but because it is based upon a particular set of interpretation 
of these rules which does not permit the necessary development of the law in order to 
conform to modem international realities. The elaboration of the law is left us to this 
day primarily to religious clerics. These very traditional actors are still involved in the 
development and determination of national law without any training or appreciation 
of the resulting international implications. Furthermore as a result of the heavy 
reliance of the world on petroleum energy the difference between slowly developing 
Saudi law and international (Western) standards continue to cause serious problems. 
One frequently overlooked fact is that reform in Saudi Arabia is somewhat rendered 
more difficult because of its insular history having avoided the wave of colonialism 
that swept through many of the neighbouring states. 182 Thus, although it avoided the 
trauma of legal transplant of foreign legal civilisations this very fact also appears to 
have increased its resistance to changes that may have been taken for granted 
elsewhere even in the region. In a sense, therefore, unbroken sovereignty and national 
pride that ought to be of great advantage arguably has come at its own massive cost. 
The unfortunate result has been undue rigidity to change and resistance to 
modernisation particularly as a result of the influence of a conservative class of 
181Human Rights Commission Decision No (207) date: 8/81426AH the council of ministers. Having 
considered fileNo.16554/B of 1/5/1426H received from the officeOofMinisters and containing 
telegram No.35/4/251 00/2 S of 4/5/1425 H from HRH the 0 Minister of the Interior, together with the 
minutes of the meeting of the Ministerial 0 Committee formed in accordance with Royal Decree 
No.5135 of20/4/1419 H, concemingDthe draft statute of the Human Rights Commission, 0- Having 
considered the above-mentioned draft Statute of the Human RightsDCommission,O Having considered 
report No.428 of24111/1425 H prepared by the Panel of Experts 0 of the Council of Minister. Having 
considered article24, paragraph2, of the Statute of the CouncilDofMinisters promulgated by Royal 
Decree No. Al13 of3/3/1414 H, Having considered Royal Decree No.5464/MB of20/4111426 H. 
Having considered recommendation No.412 of 118/1426 H from the GeneralDCommittee of the 
Council of Ministers. 
http://www.hrc.gov.salHuman _Rights/Site! Aboutus.aspx?Type=PageS&Lang=En&Page=5 accessed 
19 Feb 2012. 
182D. Kirkby and C. Colebome, Law, History, Colonialism the Reach o/Empire (Manchester 
University Press 2001). Also see, Mark Tushnet, The New Constitutional Order (Princeton University 
Press, 2004) pp. 1-32 
92 
93 
religious clerics. This rigidity has over time begun to adversely affect Saudi market 
credibility and engendered a reputation of opaqueness rather than transparency. 
Furthermore, the refusal to continuously fine tune and reengineer the Saudi legal 
system particularly as it relates to international developments in human rights, 
democratic principles and the rule of law in order to make it fit for the lucrative 
investment destination it has become in the last six decades has made the country like 
many other Arab states unable to fulfil its socio-political destiny by attracting even 
more diverse quality foreign investment. 183 
It may be rightly said that throughout the ages all human societies have possessed 
notions of justice, fairness, dignity, and respect. Ancient manifestations may be found 
in the practice of the Greek city-states, traditional African concepts of peoples and 
ancestral rights, and even biblical accounts of cities of refuge. Indeed the 
understanding of human rights as we know it today is but one path to implement a 
particular conception of social justice. However, it is true to note that the idea of 
human rights, particularly the notion that all human beings, by the very fact of their 
humanity have certain inalienable rights that they may exercise against society and 
their rulers, was foreign to all major pre-modem Western and non-Western societies. 
Pre-modern societies generally see political authority as something that is to be used 
wisely and in pursuit of the common good. 184 In most cases, this mandate was 
explained by the theory of divine commandment, natural law, tradition, or even 
contingent political arrangements. Importantly, however, it did not rest on the rights 
(entitlement) of all human beings to be ruled under the rule of law. In other words, the 
183 As one writer notes: "scholars have begun to argue that the relationship between human rights and 
foreign direct investment is more complex. Various factors have been cited .... among these are 
increased public awareness of human rights abuse, greater effectiveness of activists via the internet, an 
increasing need for well-trained labour, and a desire for access to new markets. Arguably, respect for 
human rights creates an environment conducive to the development of human capital, with such 
countries generally more open, accountable, and economically efficient". Shannon Lindsey Blanton, 
"What Attracts Foreign Investors? An Examination of Human Rights and Foreign Direct Investment" 
p. 2 available at http://nathanjensen.wustl.edulmeifilesIBlanton.pdf accessed 16 February 2012. See 
also Shannon Lindsey Blanton, Robert G. Blanton, "Human Rights and Foreign Direct Investment A 
Two-Stage Analysis", Vol. 45 Business Society no. 4 (December 2006) pp. 464-485. 
184 See generally Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights (Colorado: Westview Press, 1993); Jack 
Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, (New York: Cornell University Press, 
1989); Falk, Richard "Cultural Foundations for the International Protection of Human Rights," in 
Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives- a Quest/or Consensus (Pennsylvania: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1992). 
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people had no natural or human rights to be maintained against unjustly constituted 
political or ecclesiastical leadership. 185 
It is a fortunate turn of events that has made the history of the 20th to 21 st century one 
that commands increasing respect for human and people's rights, personal freedoms, 
and economic development. However, the changes have come in stages and different 
societies approach this development at various speeds. It has become fashionable 
since writers like Karel Vasak and Bryan Garth introduced it in the 1970s for writers 
to claim that international human rights rules belong to three distinct generations. 186 
The first generation consists of civil and political rights central to the legal philosophy 
of the Western capitalist states, as evidenced in the postulations of John Locke, Jean 
Jacques Rousseau, and other writers of the "natural law" school. This particular 
generation of rights still eludes many traditional societies, such as Saudi Arabia, and 
constitutes a major aspiration of progressive elites. The second generation of rights 
are those economic, social, and cultural rights developed under socialist jurisprudence 
with the support of the developing states. The third generation of human rights is a 
product of the aspirations of the newer states to assist each other in attaining 
independence, and to create a more level field in the international system. This set of 
rights includes the right to self-determination and the right to development. To some 
extent the current Saudi legal framework for the freedom of movement is perhaps not 
to the global standards and it needs to be reformed to be in consonance with 
international practice. 187 
Human rights as a concept represent demands or claims that individuals or groups can 
make on society, either at the level of the nation-state or internationally. Some of 
these rights are recognizable lex lata, i.e. settled law, while others remain aspirations 
18S See Jack Donnelly "Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights", Vol. 6 Human Rights 
Quarterly, No.4 (1984) pp. 409-412; See also Abd ai-Karim al-Iryani "Yemen: the role of the state in a 
traditional society", Opening speech at the conference on "Yemen: The Challenge of Social, Economic 
and Democratic Development", organised by the Centre for Arab Gulf Studies at the University of 
Exeter, Exeter, 1-4 April, 1998. Speech available at Opening speech at the conference on "Yemen: The 
Challenge of Social, Economic and Democratic visited 14 February 2012. Dr Iryani was foreign 
minister of Yemen at the time and shortly afterwards became prime minister. 
186 Noberto Bobbio, The Age o/Rights (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996) pp. xi and xvi; Loren E. 
Lomarsky, "Gewirth's Generation of Rights", Vol. 31 The Philosophical Quarterly No. 124, Jul., 
(1981). 
187 U.S. Department of State, "Saudi Arabia: Country Specific Infonnation" available at 
http://travel.state.gov/traveVcis ""pa _ tw/cis/cis _10 12.html accessed 17 February 2012. 
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to be attained or elaborated upon in the future. These rights are generally aggregated 
under five sUb-groupings: civil, political, social, economic, and cultural. Civil and 
political rights are seen as including such rights as: the right to self-determination, the 
right to life, freedom from torture and inhumane treatment, freedom from slavery and 
forced labour, freedom of association, the right to liberty and security, freedom of 
expression and opinion, freedom of movement and choice of residence, rights to fair 
trial, privacy, assembly, marriage and family life, participation in governance, 
equality before the law and nationality. Economic, social, and cultural rights, on the 
other hand, refer to that entire gamut of rights as enshrined in the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966),188 such as the rights to 
work, just conditions of work, fair remuneration, adequate standard of living, 
collective bargaining, union activities, equal pay for equal work, social security, 
property, education cultural life and the benefits of scientific progress. These rights 
are of tremendous importance especially "as recognition of some link between human 
rights and development is relatively well supported,,189 Thus, there is a convincing 
basis for societal and necessary human rights reform. The argument for reform is, 
however, hampered by the influence of religious clerics who have repeatedly tried to 
control this reform through the insertion of religious guidelines within the 
government's administrative machinery. In this way among others, necessary and 
progressive changes have been obstructed. Such practice has led to conflicts within 
the state and indeed has halted reform of social and legal side relevance. 
There is indeed a general assumption that economic, social, and cultural rights are no 
more than political or moral aspirations, and that to speak in terms of them as rights is 
a misnomer. 190 This is probably a reflection of the initial schisms that were present in 
the formative years of human rights doctrines, namely the Western doctrine, the 
socialist doctrine, and the doctrine of developing countries. The Western doctrine is 
based on the assumption that human rights should be as clear as possible and woolly 
terminology should be avoided so as not to place too many restrictions on the freedom 
188 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 
2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 entry int%rce 3 January 1976, in accordance with article 27. 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm accessed 13 March 2012. 
189 Siobhan MCInerney-Lankford, Human Rights and Development: a Comment on Challenges and 
~portunities from a Legal Perspective Vol. I J Human Rights Practice (2009) No.1 pp. 51-52. 
I Alan Gewirth, The Community o/Rights, (Chicago: The Chicago Press, 1998) p. 57. 
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of individual states with the resultant effect that many states would shy away from 
ratifying treaties. The socialist doctrine, on the other hand, was clearly in favour of 
economic, social, and cultural rights; the right to self-determination for all peoples 
particularly the colonies and the equality of all persons including the prohibition of 
discrimination, especially of racial discrimination. Developing countries who gained 
independence from the 1950s upwards seemed to possess the collective opinion that 
considering their current state of development, it was better to focus on the realization 
of economic, social, and cultural rights. It was against this background that a strict 
separation of the so-called first and second generation of rights was maintained in the 
form of two separate international covenants of 1966,191 although the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) did not maintain this division. 
The Western states' rationale for the insistence on the primacy of civil and political 
rights is based on their shared legal and social traditions emanating from the events of 
the American and French revolutions, and other documents such as the Magna Carta, 
which include the strong influence of natural law thinking. Indeed, human rights in 
the sense that we know it today entered the mainstream of political theory and 
practice in 1 i h century Europe. John Locke's Second Treatise of Government 
(published in the wake of Britain's Glorious Revolution of 1688 which witnessed the 
overthrow of King James II) presented the first recognizable developed theory of the 
natural rights of man. It is also correct to state that Western philosophers in the 17th 
and 18th centuries were particularly concerned when they referred to the 'rights of 
man' with the individual civil liberties for men of the propertied class. 
However, it is probably fair to state that while statesmen debated extensively the 
primacy of certain political rights, the general population was making demands for 
food, work, and better pay are the antecedents of present day economic social and 
political rights. Substantive equality of human beings was a much later conception. In 
the first years of the operation of the UN Charter, it was naturally the Western 
political philosophy that prevailed. Civil rights and political freedoms were promoted 
191 They are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Adopted and opened for 
signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 
1966; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Adopted and opened for 
signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 
1966 entry into force 3 January 1976. 
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as having primary relevance and importance. This found prominent expression in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, and was then enshrined into positive 
law in the 1966 International Convention on Civil and Political Rights. 
It is important to point out that the doubts as to the readiness of Saudi Arabia to take 
the whole gamut of human rights more seriously and at least to the level satisfactory 
to investing states may continue to affect the decision of investors even in the 'cut 
throat' world of oil and gas investment. Furthermore, the general doubts as to judicial 
competence in the field of human rights appear to extend to the confidence of 
investors in the courts of Saudi Arabia. Indeed the influence and intervention from the 
religious clerics who give the justification for cases in a less than systematic fashion 
further erodes investor confidence. In a sense, therefore, the now politically incorrect 
assumption of Lord Asquith in respect of the law of Abu Dhabi continues to apply to 
impressions of law and justice in Saudi Arabia. 192 Indeed in some cases, the decisions 
are different based on a specific cleric or a judge's mood, understanding, and to an 
extent, level of education. Such arguments cannot be referenced or cited, however, 
due to the nature of the Saudi legal system, given that judgements are saved and 
archived as state confidential documents, and as such, are inaccessible to scholars. 
The second generation of rights emerged from socialist thinking. Tmces of these 
concepts can be found in Karl Marx's critique of 19th century capitalism.193 However, 
the emergence of more socialist countries in the UN around 1955 signalled the 
beginning of aggressive attempts to espouse these rights. On the part of the socialist 
states there is a necessity to create a preference for economic, social, and cultural 
rights based on their doctrinal focus on the transfer of real power to, or at least for, the 
benefit of the majority; i.e. the working class proletariat. The Western countries 
originally perceived the rights that are contained here as non-justiciable. They 
include,inter alia, the right to work, just conditions of employment, reasonable 
standard of living, participation in tmde unionism, and other forms of collective 
192 Petroleum Development Ltd v. Sheik of Abu Dhabi (195 I) ILR, pp. 144 18 I.L.R. (1951). 
193Center for Economic and Social Justice, "Louis Kelso's Critique of Karl Marx's Das KapitaJ", 
American Bar Association Journal, March 1957. Available at 
http://www.cesj.orglthirdway/almostcapitalist.htm accessed 2 March 2012. 
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bargaining, the right to equal pay for equal work, social security, education, property 
and the enjoyment of cultural rights, and the proceeds of scientific progress. 194 
Starting after the end of the Second World War, the quest and attainment of 
independence for the erstwhile colonial countries and territories became a reality. By 
the mid-1960s, the Afro-Asian bloc had become the largest group in the United 
Nations. These countries, which had suffered under colonial rule, had a special 
interest in human rights. They found a sympathetic hearing from the Soviet bloc and 
some countries in Europe and the Americas. The focus of this group, and the 
successes they achieved in shaping positive rules of human rights, constitutes what 
has been typified as the third generation rights or solidarity rights. 
The United Nations once again seriously began to attend to the elaboration of human 
rights. Most significantly, the International Human Rights Covenants were completed 
in December 1966. In the 1970s the developing countries used their numerical 
strength and enthusiasm in conjunction with the socialist states to espouse in addition 
to the economic and social rights, specific rights relevant to the removal of all 
vestiges of the injustices they collectively suffered as a result of colonial oppression. 
These led to the emergence of treaties against racial discrimination (1965), 
discrimination against women (1979), rights of the Child (1989), and on migrant 
workers (1990), etc. 195 It is interesting to note that some writers are beginning to 
speak in terms of a fourth generation of rights which have arisen as a result of the 
desire of states to correct previous and prevailing ills. Among these newer rights are 
the specialist areas of developmental rights and environmental rights. A good 
example of this is the Kyoto Protocol. 196 
194 Deprose Muchena, "The Place of economic and Social Rights in Human Rights and Development 
Discourse" Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (2009) pp. 10- 13, Available at: 
http://www .osisa.orgiresources/docsIPDFslOpenSpace-May2009/2 _ 4_ economic Jnjustice -pO I 0-
017 _ deprose _ muchena _economic_social Jights.pdf accessed July IS, 2010; Sen, "The Idea of Justice," 
Chapter 17, "Human Rights and Globallmperatives," Available at: 
http://publicreason.netl20 I 0/06/211sen-the-idea-of-justice-chapter-17 -human-rights-and-global-
imperatives! visited 23 September 2010. 
19S Bums H. Weston and Richard Pierre Claude, Human Rights in the World Community: Issues and 
Action (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania, 2006) pp. 279, 280. Also see, all the treaties 
available at: http://treaties.un.orglpageslUNTSOnline.aspx?id=1 
196 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11, 
1997,.2303 UNTS 162. 
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It has, however, been asserted with much credit that the history of human rights at the 
national level does not make it possible to place the emergence of different human 
rights into clear-cut stages. In 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR)197 contained the whole range of human rights within one consolidated text. 
The subsequent separation of rights into two human rights covenants in 1966 was 
primarily as a result of Cold War politics and ideological differentiation. 198 Moreover, 
the moral ground both the Western doctrine and the socialist approach claim to have 
is negated by objective examination. Indeed, it may be argued that the system of 
economic exploitation hiding behind the fa~ade of liberal democracy is in total 
contradiction to human rights, and many aspects of the so-called ideals of socialist 
rights and duties are a pretext leading to forced labour, exploitation, and a gross abuse 
of rights. It is this realization that makes agitation for political changes in Shari'ah 
countries very difficult to articulate, even though the case for progressive change 
becomes clearer in course of time. For meaningful progress to be made by a 
traditional society like Saudi Arabia, determined and sustained effort is imperative, 
whereas the contradictions and hypocrisy of the leading western states and blocs 
makes the argument for change difficult to articulate. l99 
The question that seems to suggest itself is which direction of the possible directions 
(political right or economic and social) a state that aspires for economic growth like 
Saudi Arabia must embark on. The initial conclusions reached on this are that both are 
needed in equal measure. In any case since 1966 the UNGA and municipal courts 
have always taken the view that these sets of human rights are interrelated and 
indivisible. On June 25, 1993, representatives of 171 states adopted by consensus the 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of the World Conference on Human 
Rights. The Conference examined the link between development, democracy, and 
economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights, and evaluated the effectiveness of 
the United Nations methods and mechanisms. The final document, which was 
197Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc.Al810 at 71 (1948). 
198Lou;S Henkin, The Universal Declaration and the Cold War. Volume 97,APA Newsletters Number 2 
(Spring, 1998) available at the http://www.apaonline.org/publications/newsletters/v97n2 _Law _03.ospx 
accessed 14 February 2012. 
199 Note may be taken of the numerous interrogation scandals in the prosecution of the war against 
terror, the policy of illegal rendition, the controversial Guantanamo bay detention centre, repressive 
reaction to some ofthe "Occupy Wall Street" movements. 
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endorsed by the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly (resolution 48/121, of 
1993), reaffirmed all the principles that have evolved since the end of the Second 
World War, and further strengthens the foundation for additional progress in the area 
of human rights. The significance of the Vienna Convention (1993) is that it more or 
less renders obsolete pre-existing divisions maintained between classes or generations 
of human rights. This is because it endorsed the recognition of the interdependence 
between democracy, economic development, and human rights. Thus, the continuing 
relevance of maintaining a strict distinction, particularly between the first and second 
generations, of rights is questionable. In order to receive the full benefits of economic 
development the Saudi people will have to exercise all the full range of rights 
applicable to them under international law, to the extent that these are not disruptive 
or incompatible with the public policy and provisions of the Shari'ab. 
There is, however, no shortage of people who take the view that states like Saudi 
Arabia must move slowly toward adoption of the same route to development that 
other states have done. Sceptics of the development of human rights are quick to point 
out that international law is a little more than an attempt to legitimize the interests of 
powerful Western states.200 In as much as human rights playa role in this process, it is 
because it serves the hegemon's interests, not because of concern for human security 
and dignity. The US, for instance, is said to have used its considerable political and 
economic power to promote a particular conception of human rights that sought to 
legitimise its own interests and those of capital. 201 The assumption that human rights 
are inherently Western concepts imposed upon other cultures takes a static view of 
moral and legal principles, and is, therefore, flawed. Even if it can be argued that the 
concept of 'right,' and political rights as we know today began as a Western concept, 
it is more reasonable to believe that these concepts are now separable from their 
genesis so as to be applicable universally. Furthermore, the contemporary concept of 
human rights as we know it today has been greatly enriched by legal and political 
inputs from other cultures and civilizations. Islamic civilization was indeed one of the 
major sources of both human rights as well as trading customs such as the lex 
mercatoria. 
200 Oduntan (2009) op. cit., p. 209-213. 
201 Tony Evans, The Politics of Human Rights: A Global Perspective, (London: Pluto Press, 200) pp. 
36. 
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As Braitwaite and Drahos correctly noted in their seminal work: 
Much that we have shown to be constitutive of European regulatory 
states and their economic power originated in these other empires: 
coins and paper money, paper itself that enabled and transformed 
complex state regulatory bureaucracies and legal systems that could 
carry its commands across long distances (China), monetary policy, 
commercial credit (China-Arab), enabled double -entry 
bookkeeping, maritime trading regulations, the commenda that was 
the foundation ofthe limited liability corporation, bills of exchange 
(India-Arab- Islam), systems of efficiently regulating slave labour 
(Africa-Arab-US) and perhaps the regulatory institutions of guilds 
and trade standardisation such as weights and measures (India-
Pakistan). 202 
101 
In that respect, it may be intellectually inaccurate to claim that all human rights or a 
sophisticated understanding of the demands of a trading civilization are the product of 
Western societies. 
The view that holds human rights as a Western concept is the ethical and cultural 
relativist argument. The reasoning here is that human rights standards, being 
peculiarly Western and individualistic, are products of imperialist thinking. There are 
also many writers who maintain the contrary in that human rights, in fact, emanate 
from a set of thinkers with an inherent abhorrence of tyranny. Writers from both the 
developing and developed states are divided in their opinionon this for various 
reasons. Higgins' view on this is that in many cases it may be no more than a fear of 
the local elites of a loss of their political, personal, and cultural hegemony. She states 
very persuasively, "individuals everywhere want the same essential things: to have 
sufficient food and shelter; to be able to speak freely; to practice their own religion or 
to abstain from religious belief; to feel that their person is not threatened by the 
state ... they are as keenly felt by the African tribesman as by the European city-
dweller, by the inhabitant of a Latin American shanty-town as by the resident of a 
Manhattan apartment." 203 The conception and drafting of the UDHR itself is 
202 Braithwaite and Drahos, op.cil., pp.480. 
203 See, Rosalyn Higgims. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994)pp, 96-97. 
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indicative of the universal relevance of human rights. It was adopted by the General 
Assembly without any state voting against it. There were 48 states in favour, but there 
were 8 significant abstentions: Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Saudi 
Arabia, Ukrainian SSR, Union of South Africa, USSR, and Yugoslavia. The days of 
opposition or indeed coolness towards human rights standards have long departed 
Saudi Arabia as well as the other states that voted in this manner. We have already 
highlighted the statements and pronouncements from the highest authorities 
signifying a willingness to engage in speedy political reform in Saudi Arabia. 
In conclusion, the view that there are generations of human rights from which a 
developing country may pick and mix is no longer convincing. Even if it were true 
that chronologically there were generations of rights, this does not mean that an 
aspiring state like Saudi Arabia is given the luxury of choosing which one to 
disregard completely. More importantly, the preferred view is that the international 
regime for human rights as progressively developed has taken into consideration and 
adopted aspects of the jurisprudence of the main legal systems and civilization. This 
formidable jurisprudence and legal practice must be tapped into by any state, 
resource-rich or not, that wants to retain all the benefits of its divine blessings. 
Thus, from the very beginning it was widely assumed that there were bound to be 
differences in the nature of the legal obligations and the systems of monitoring to be 
imposed by the conventions. A basic differentiation between both sets of rights 
suggested is that in the case of civil and political rights, for instance the right not to 
torture persons, are negative rules which are capable of immediate implementation by 
states that are involved, whereas economic and social rights such as the right to 
adequate housing are positively framed, and necessarily require a progressive and 
differential method of compliance. It is a trite observation that probably the best 
means of ensuring compliance for any right is to back it up with legal guarantees to be 
administered by courts of law, whether municipal or international. The regime for 
compliance at the universal level created for the Covenant on Civil and Political rights 
(1966) with the First Protocol (Optional Protocol) was to be monitored by the Human 
rights committee while that of the Economic and Social Rights Convention (1966) 
was to be monitored by the Committee on Economic and Social Rights. A central 
difference in the monitoring and actualization of the two conventions is that while the 
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fonner is designed, and has been operating with an individual complaints system 
under the First Protocot204 Aumeeruddy v. Mauritiuio5 to which at least 89 countries 
are party, no remedy lies for an individual victim of right abuse under the ICESCR. It 
was thought that the essentially programmatic and conditional nature of rights 
contained in the ICESCR, only a system of country reports was suitable. It is for these 
reasons that some have argued that economic and social rights are mere aspirations 
and are not justiciable. 
Having said that, it must be stated that the material scope of the protection of human 
rights generally, and the degree to which they are in fact protected, varies from 
country to country, and depends on the prevailing political will of governments. 
Several reasons exist supporting the justiciability of economic and social rights. Many 
contemporary scholars on the subject have rightly insisted that they are not 
aspirational goals, matters of generosity, privilege, or objectives to be achieved. In 
2002, the UN Commission on Human Rights pointed out that health, food, education, 
and housing were human rights, not market access opportunities. They should be 
viewed as inherent rights as articulated in the Universal Declaration (1948), and imply 
obligations on the part of governments to respect, promote, protect, and fulfil these 
rights. 
The truth is that the separation of both sets of rights is largely artificial and may lead 
to unnecessary confusion where much clarity is needed. There are civil and political 
rights, which require positive action and expenditure of funds in the future. For 
example, a state that undertakes to ensure a fair trial will have to build court buildings 
and develop a legal aid scheme. In other words, even those political rights, which are 
assumed to entail immediate implementation often, require relatively programmatic 
changes in societal structures or attitudes. Similarly, there are some economic, social, 
and cultural rights that are based on negative rules. Examples of these include the 
right to fonn trade unions, which would require restraint on the state not to interfere 
with the right. There are also undertakings expressed in the ICESCR that are designed 
204Shirin Aumeeruddy-Cziffra and 19 Other Mauritian Women v. Mauritius 
Human Rights Committee, Twelfth session. Available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/ref\.vorldicategory,LEGAL,,,MUS,3520cS62,0.hbn1.999 U.N.T.S. 302. 
2os(1981) Selected Decisions H.Re. 67. Available at: 
http://www .ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/SDecisionsVolSen.pdf accessed 15 February 2012. 
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to have immediate effect. Examples include Articles 2 (2) and (3) requiring states to 
'guarantee' and 'ensure' non-discrimination and equal rights and treatment, the duty 
of states to respect and not interfere with parental choice of schools (Article 13 (3)) 
and scientific freedom (Article 15). 
It may indeed be a controversial point to claim that economic and social rights are not 
justiciable when, in fact, individuals and communities are entitled to claim their rights 
through judicial or legislative means whenever they believe that those rights have 
been violated. The right to an effective remedy for the violation of rights is 
guaranteed in Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states 
"everyone has the right to an effective remedy, by the competent national tribunals for 
acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.206,, 
Accordingly, parties to the ICESCR undertake to "take steps ... with a view to 
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative 
measures. 207" In any case, the burden is on the state, which cannot meet up with 
specific provisions of the treaty to prove the inability and courts will not assume the 
inability. It is notable that in some jurisdictions such as South Africa economic, 
social, and cultural rights have thus been incorporated into constitutional 
provisions.208 
The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights (formulated during an international symposium in Maastricht, Netherlands 
1986), state that, "although the full realization of the rights recognized in the 
Covenant is to be attained progressively, the application of some rights can be made 
justiciable immediately while other rights can become justiciable over time." The 
Principles elaborate further, "States parties shall provide for effective remedies 
including, where appropriate, judicial remedies. 209" As mentioned above, this is 
206The Universal Declaration of Human Rights Art. 8. http://www.un.org/enldocuments/ucibr 
2o'Intemationai Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Adopted and opened for signature, 
ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966; entry 
into force 3 January 1976, in accordance with article 27. 
http://www2.ohchr.orglenglisMaw/pdflcescr.pdfaccessed 12 February 2012. 
208See United Nations, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Handbook for National Human Rights 
Institutions Professional Training Series No. 12 (2005) p. 57. 
209 Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. http://www.fao.org/righttofoodIKC/downloadsivVenldetailsl212296.htm 
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difficult for Saudi Arabia, as many companies do not come to engage in the country 
due to the state's Islamic law. The artificiality of the strict separation of rights view is 
clearly betrayed by the fact that justifiability of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
usually goes hand in hand with the requirements of respect for civil and political 
rights, including an independent judiciary. The interconnectedness of rights generally 
has been recognized in many cases where issues of law have cut across various 
categories and have had to be dealt with together. The Broeks case210 for instance 
confirms that Article 26 of the ICCPR prohibits discrimination in any area oflaw. The 
consequence of this decision therefore is that rights within the ICESCR may be the 
issue of an individual petition under the Optional Clause, as long as the claim is one 
of a sexual or racial inequality in the guarantee of the right concerned. 
The controversy as to whether economic, social, and cultural rights are inherently 
inferior to civil and political rights has been largely answered by the Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action (1993), adopted by consensus by 171 states. 
This instrument emphasizes the interconnectivity of rights and the need to treat them 
as a whole system. Furthermore, it supports the adoption of an Optional Protocol as a 
means of redressing the imbalance between rights, clarifying the scope and meaning 
of provisions in the Covenant and establishing a body of case law to ensure improved 
compliance with those provisions. 
4.3:Socio Economic Challenges to Saudi Arabia 
Although we have argued that all human rights must be pursued so far as they are not 
incompatible with the Shari' ah law and that both popular classification groups ought 
to be embraced, it is, however, argued that economic, social, and cultural rights must 
accelerate even faster in the next few years. This is particularly crucial over the next 
decade if the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are to be within realistic 
achievement in Saudi Arabia.211 This will mean better consideration for the people's 
interest in relation to business, as well as other areas of economic life. It is for this 
210Broeks v. Netherlands (1987) 2 Selected Decisions H.R.C. 196. 
211 Eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs}- form a blueprint agreed to by all the world's 
countries and all the world's leading development institutions. They range from halving extreme 
poverty to halting the spread of HlV / AIDS and providing universal primary education, all by the target 
date of2015 have galvanized. For more information on MOOs see United Nations, 
http://www.un.orglmillenniumgoalslbkgd.shtml Accessed 15 February 2012. 
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reason that the effective abandonment of the economIC cities by inaction is 
regrettable. Such development would have had a significant boosting effect on the 
provision of qualitative employment for vast sections of the population. The UNDP 
was particularly persuasive when it linked the attainment of Millennium Development 
Goals in Saudi Arabia to democratic governance and human rightS.212 Although in the 
Fall of 2010, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was specifically praised by the United 
Nation at the 2010 Millennium Development Goals Awards for its dedication to 
meeting the goals the tasks are significant and much more will have to be done to 
make a significant impact on the lives of the populace.213 The relevant MDGs that are 
aspired to by Saudi Arabia along with the majority of the developing world are as 
follows: 
Goall. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunge~14 
Goal 2. Achieve universal primary education215 
Goal 3. Promote gender equality and empower women216 
Goal 4. Reduce child mortality.217 
Goal 5. Improve maternal health218 
212 UNDP "Democratic Governance," Available at: 
http://www.undp.org.sa/sa!index.php?option=com _ content&view=article&id=30&Itemid=5S&lang=en 
Accessed on September 15,2010. 
213 UNDP, "Empowered Lives: Resilient Nations" available at http://www.undp.org.sa!sa! accessed 13 
February 2012. 
214 Target 1. Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than one 
dollar a day; Purchasing power parities (PPP) conversion factor, local currency unit to international 
dollar. Target 2. Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from Hunger. 
21S Children under 5 moderately or severely underweight, percentage; Children under 5 severely 
underweight, percentage; Population undernourished, number of people Population undernourished, 
percentage 
Target 3. Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a 
full course of primary school ing; Literacy rates of 15-24 years old, both sexes, percentage; Literacy 
rates of lS-24 years old, men, percentage; Literacy rates of 15-24 years old, women, percentage; Net 
enrolment ratio in primary education, both sexes; Net enrolment ratio in primary education, boys; Net 
enrolment ratio in primary education, girls; Percentage of pupils starting grade 1 reaching grade 5, both 
sexes; Percentage of pupils starting grade 1 reaching grade 5, boys; Percentage of pupils starting grade 
1 reaching grade 5, girls 
Primary completion rate, both sexes; Primary completion rate, boys; Primary completion rate, girls; 
Women to men parity index, as ratio of literacy rates, 15-24 years old. 
216 Target 4. Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 200S, and to 
all levels of education no later than 2015; Gender Parity Index in primary level enrolment; Gender 
Parity Index in secondary level enrolment; Gender Parity Index in tertiary level enrolment; Seats held 
by men in national parliament; Seats held by women in national parliament; Seats held by women in 
national parliament, percentage. 
217 Target 5. Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate 
Children 1 year old immunized against measles, percentage; Children under five mortality rate per 
1,000 live births; Infant mortality rate (0-1 year) per 1,000 live births. 
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Goal 6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases219 
Goal 7. Ensure environmental sustainabilitl20 
Goal 8. Develop a global partnership for development221 
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The deliberate focus over the next few years on human developmental rights will lift a 
lot of people out of poverty and put a stop to some of the excesses of governmental 
action. The lifting of a substantial part of the Saudi population out of poverty will, for 
instance, increase the earning capacity of the populace to buy luxury goods. This will 
translate to even more investment successes as investment in non-oil areas such as 
manufacturing and recreational businesses will improve. For instance, the right of the 
government to remove squatters from land does not permit them to do this without 
legal notice. In South Africa, for instance, economic and social rights have formed the 
basis of the prohibition on the state to make forced removals from land. In the 
218 Target 6. Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio 
Births attended by skilled health personnel, percentage Maternal mortality ratio per 100,000 live births; 
219 Condom use to overall contraceptive use among currently married women 15-49 years old, 
percentage 
Contraceptive use among currently married women 15-49 years old, any method, percentage; 
Contraceptive use among currently married women 15-49 years old, condom, percentage; 
Contraceptive use among currently married women 15-49 years old, modem methods, percentage; 
Target 8. Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases; 
Tuberculosis death rate per 100,000 population 
Tuberculosis detection rate under DOTS, percentage; Tuberculosis prevalence rate per 100,000 
population 
Tuberculosis treatment success rate under DOTS, percentage; Target 7. Have halted by 2015 and begun 
to reverse the spread of HIV / AIDS. 
220 Target 9. Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes 
and reverse the loss of environmental resources; Carbon dioxide emissions (C02), metric tons of C02 
per capita (CDIAC); Carbon dioxide emissions (C02), thousand metric tons of C02 (CDIAC); 
Consumption of all Ozone-Depleting Substances in ODP metric tons; Consumption of ozone-depleting 
CFCs in ODP metric tons 
Energy use (Kg oil equivalent) per $1,000 (PPP) GDP; Land area covered by forest, percentage 
Protected area to total surface area, percentage; Protected areas, sq. km.; Target 10. Halve by 2015 the 
proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water; Proportion of the population 
using improved drinking water sources, rural; Proportion of the population using improved drinking 
water sources, total; Proportion of the population using improved drinking water sources, urban; 
Proportion of the population using improved sanitation facilities, urban; Target 11. By 2020 to have 
achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers; Slum population 
as percentage of urban, percentage Slum population in urban areas. 
221 Target 16. In cooperation with developing countries, develop and implement strategies for decent 
and productive work for youth; Share of youth unemployed to total unemployed, both sexes; Share of 
youth unemployed to total unemployed, men; Share of youth unemployed to total unemployed, 
women; Target 18. In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new 
technologies, especially infonnation and communications; Internet users; Internet users per 100 
population; Personal computers; Personal computers per 100 population; Telephone lines and cellular 
subscribers; Telephone lines and cellular subscribers per 100 population. 
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Kyalami Flood Victims Case (2001),222 the issue before the court was whether a 
citizen's right places an obligation on a government to take action, places a self-
executing obligation on the government, or does it require legislation to be passed 
before there is an obligation for the government to act and on which those citizens can 
rely? The court's decision was an affirmation of the view that people's basic needs 
will outweigh formal considerations. Similarly, Articles 32 and 226 of the 
Constitution of India deems it that all economic and social rights are justiciable. Thus, 
in the cases of Bharati (1973)223 and Nawab Khan (1996),224 the proactive approach 
has been adopted by the courts. It may, however, be noted that this position is not 
universal and other countries have a different approach and treat economic rights as 
aspirational. 
Other developing states like Nigeria created Peoples Banks for the poor, mass transit 
systems, and other poverty alleviating schemes, some of which may be of use in 
Saudi Arabia. It is important to examine these devices, and not to limit innovations to 
boost socio-economic development only to the ideas introduced by the World Bank 
and other major international financial institutions. All of these may contribute to 
elements of the rights to housing, education, health, food, and so on. Saudi Arabia as 
the largest producer of oil with very significant earnings ought not to find it too 
difficult to finance poverty alleviation schemes and indeed the entire gamut of socio-
economic rights. Doing so will pull the citizenry out of poverty and assure that the 
state will be seen as a stable society in which investments can flourish. The success of 
Dubai in this area is quite instructive. It is suggested that Saudi constitutional 
provisions particularly are not incompatible with the ideas we have grappled with 
above and it is important that articles 50-55 provide a space of freedom for action in 
the area of economic and social rights. It is also appropriate to conclude in this area 
by agreeing with the erstwhile prime Minister of a neighbouring State, Yemen as to 
the role of modem Arab government: 
He wrote: 
222Minister of Public Works and Others v Kya/ami Ridge Environmental Association and Others 
(Mukhwevho Intervening) (CCT 55/00) [2001] ZACC 19; 2001 (3) SA 1151 (CC); 2001 (7) BCLR 
652 (CC) (29 May 2001). Available at: http://\\WW.saflii.orgIzalcaseslZACCflOOI/19.htmI2001 3 SA 1151 (CC). 
223 Bharati v. The State of Kerala and Others (AIR 1973 SC 1461) 
224Nawab Khan Gulab Khan v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (1996) 4 SCC 37.32. 
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"the universal role of the state at the advent of the 21 st century can be 
summarized as follows: 
1. Fostering the rule of law and individual as well as collective security of its 
citizens. 
2. Maintaining an independent judiciary. 
3. Adopting a stable economic policy, freeing the economy from distortions 
and combating corruption. 
4. Enhancing democracy or democratization and popular participation in free 
and fair elections. 
5. Judicious use of national wealth with special attention to disadvantaged 
groups in society. 
6. Directing state resources to investment in social services (health, education 
and welfare) and infrastructure projects. 
7. Protection of the environment. 
8. Protection of human rights,,22S 
There is little doubt that if reforms in all the areas suggested above are implemented 
in a genuine manner the present level of success in the area of foreign direct 
investment into Saudi Arabia will increase tremendously. It is, however, necessary to 
elaborate further on a crucial issue of democratic reforms to further buttress this point. 
22S Abd ai-Karim al-Iryani op.cit. 
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4.4. Globalization, Liberal Democracy and Right to Democratic Development of 
the Saudi People 
It is argued here that existing national rules may, in the short-term, be reconciled with 
the imperatives of the international legal rules to attain immediate steps toward 
democratic and economic development. There are favourable indications toward 
greater democratic change in Saudi Arabia. Held in 2005, the first elections in Saudi 
Arabia were heralded as a milestone by the world community. 226 However, the 
government has been exhibiting mixed signals to the worry of its domestic and 
foreign observers. Political dissent remains subject to the harsh religiously inspired 
repression, effectively freezing development processes in many areas of national 
life.227 The fate of the radical elements that sought to take advantage of the Arab 
spring in Saudi Arabia is instructive?28 The impression projected, therefore, is that the 
Saudi state is, at best, questioning the values of globalization and its imperative of 
liberal economic principles along with right to democratic development. 
4.4.1: The Right to Democratic Governance in Saudi Arabia 
In view of the forgoing, it is necessary to examine the trend toward recognition of the 
right to democratic governance, and to place Saudi practice within this discourse. The 
existence of an entitlement to democratic rule as a legal right is subject to 
jurisprudential debate. However, it is impossible not to recognize that significant 
changes have taken place in international affairs, in the last few decades, which make 
it credible to argue for the emergence of a right to democratic governance along with 
other 'new' norms collectively, referred to as the third generation rights (discussed 
above). It is recognizable that a greater percentage of the states in the world today are 
democratic than at any time in human history. Just over 30 years ago, there were 
226 Kim Ghattas, "Saudis' First Exercise in Democracy," BBC News Thursday, February 10, 2005, 
Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uklllhilworldlmiddle_eastl425230S.stm, Accessed on July 30, 2010. 
227 Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution II (Harvard University Press) 2003 pp. 4-20 
228 Note the discussion above in relation to the Arab Spring See footnote 18. It is true that the Arab 
spring has not been particularly strong in Saudi Arabia. Yet there are indications of some unrest that 
have ended tragically. See J. David Goodman, "Activists Report Death of Second Protester in Saudi 
Arabia" New York Times February 10 2012. Available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/20 12/021 11 Iworldlmiddleeastlactivists-report-death-of-second-protester-in-
saudi-arabia.html accessed 17 February 2012. 
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fewer than 30 established democracies in the world. As of December 2000, some 120 
of the more than 190 countries in the world had become legally committed to the 
preservation of freedom and democratic self-governance. 229This is a phenomenal 
change on a global scale, and offers compelling proof that the idea of democracy has 
genuinely universal appeal. Most of the new entrants into democratic society of states 
turned toward democracy in the last 10 years, with two of the world's most populous 
states - Indonesia and Nigeria - going democratic only within the last two decades.23o 
The most well established precursor of the emerging principle of democratic 
governance is the right to self-determination. Self-determination encapsulates the 
right of a people organized in an established territory to determine its collective 
political destiny in a democratic fashion. Therefore, it constitutes the core of what is 
now regarded as an entitlement to democracy. The development of this normative 
principle may be traced to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the two 
international Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, and Economic and Social 
Rights of 1966. Specific reference to the principle of internal self-determination is 
found in the 'codification' of existing practice, laid down in the 1970 UN Declaration 
on Friendly Relations. At that stage, however, claims to democracy and good 
governance were limited to the grant of rights to equal access to government given to 
racial groups, which had been denied such access. With time and the increasing 
ratification by states of these UN Covenants, which confer the right to internal self-
determination on the 'people' of each contracting state there was a clear realization 
that democracy was probably the best model for the actualization of the provisions of 
both instruments.231 In other words, the UDHR itself and its covenants created the 
229 Jane Mansbridge, James Bohman, Simone Chambers, David Estlund, Andreas Fellesdal, Archon 
Fung, Cristina Lafont, Bernard Manin, Jose luis Marti. The Place of Self-Interest and the Role of 
Power in Deliberative DemocracyJournal of Political Philosophy, Volume /8, Issue /, pages 64-100, 
March20JO 
230 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1999 Released by the Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights, and Labor U.S. Department of State, February 25, 2000. Available at: 
http://www.state.gov/www/globallhumanJights/99hrp_index.html. See also Harold Hongju Koh, 
Assistant Secretary of State For Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Democracy and Globalization 
Address at the Fourth International Conference of New or Restored Democracies Cotonou, Benin, 
December 4, 2000, Available at: 
http://www .state.gov/www/policLremarks/2000/00 1204_koh_benin.html, Accessed on September 15, 
2010. 
231 This right to internal democracy is as much a product of the sympathy of world opinion to formerly 
oppressed people as it was a reflection of the trend towards democracy in general. D. Archibugi, "A 
Critical Analysis of the Self-determination of Peoples", Vol. 10 Constellations No.4 (2003) pp. 493, 
Available at: 
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right atmosphere and statutory precedents upon which democratic rights naturally 
developed. The phenomenon of self-determination is not one with any reasonable 
application in contemporary Saudi Arabia. This is a fortunate reality, and arguably 
makes the journey toward democratic reform less fraught with political danger. 
Another central component of the gradual movement towards the recognition of this 
right was the creation of a normative requirement of participatory electoral process. 
Early manifestations of this date back to 1948 when the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights clearly enunciated the right of persons to take part in government, as 
well as in "periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal 
suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures" in 
Article 21. Two decades later, in Article 25, the ICCPR extended the right (a) to take 
part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; 
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal 
and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression 
of the will of the electors to every citizen. 
The UN has played a critical role in promoting the spread of democracy in the world. 
By providing electoral advice, assistance, and monitoring of electoral consultations, it 
has assisted (or, as in the case of Cambodia, enabled) people in a large number of 
countries (including Namibia, EI Salvador, Eritrea, Mozambique, Nicaragua, and 
South Africa) to participate in free and fair elections. In many of these places, people 
cast votes for the first time in their individual and national lives only in the last 15 
years. The Human Rights Committee, which is authorized to monitor compliance with 
the Covenants, has been active in ensuring compliance with the implementation of 
Article 25.232 
http://www.Ise.ac.uklDepts/globallPublicationslDiscussionPaperslDP28_ CriticaIAnalysis.pdf, 
Accessed on September 18,2010. 
232 Thomas M. Franck. The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance. The American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 86, No.1. (Jan., 1992), pp. 46-91. Available at: 
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=00029300%28199201%2986%3Al%3C46%3ATERTDG%3E2.0.CO%3 
B2-5 accessed 11 February 2012. 
Thus modest success has been demonstrated particularly in connection with the review of national 
reports on implementation and a small number of petitions lodged under the Optional Protocol. In 
reviewing two complaints filed by two Uruguayans against the military regime of Uruguay the 
Committee concluded that the complainants had been arbitrarily deprived of protected rights by 
decrees banning their political party and by being barred from running for office Case 34/1979, 1981 
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With a certain conclusion to the end of the Cold war era and the ideological struggles, 
the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session, in 1991 adopted a resolution entitled 
"Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections." 
Though non-binding, this important document reaffirms and further specifies the 
electoral entitlement. In it, the conviction of the international community that periodic 
and genuine elections are a necessary and indispensable element of sustained efforts 
to protect the rights and, interests of the governed was expressed. It was also stated 
that, as a matter of practical experience the right of everyone to take part in the 
government of his or her country is a crucial factor in the effective enjoyment by all 
of a wide range of other human rights and fundamental freedoms, embracing political, 
economic, social, and cultural rights.233 
Further proof in favour of the argument that a right to democracy is more or less in 
place can be seen in the apparent wiliness of states to enter into various multilateral 
agreements, which legislate the enthronement of the democratic principle as the basis 
of governmental legitimacy. The signing by 53 states (including Europe, the USA and 
Canada) of the 1975 Helsinki Declaration was significant because it explicitly grants 
the right of self-determination to all peoples and its follow-up Declarations, which 
were adopted by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), as 
it then was) explicitly laid down a right to democracy and to democratic institutions. 
Other notable instruments include the adoption by 116 states and territories of the 
Final Warsaw Declaration: Toward a Community of Democracies (Warsaw, Poland, 
June 27, 2000); the United Nations General Assembly Resolution on Promoting and 
Consolidating Democracy passed in 2000 (AlRes/55/1 07),234 and two successive 
resolutions of the United Nations Human Rights Commission explicitly recognizing 
democracy as a human right.235 With these new regulations for human rights, Saudi 
Report of the Human Rights Committee, 36 UN GAOR Supp. (No 40) at 42- 43 UN Doc. AI 36/40 
(1981) at 130; Case 44/1979. 
233GA Res. 45/150 (Feb. 21 1991). Available at http://www.un.orgldocumentslgalresl45/a45rI50.htm 
accessed 15 February 2012. 
234A155IPV.814 Dec. 2000 GAl9842 (109-52-7). 
235 Furthermore there are a variety of quasi-legislative developments and resolutions created by 
regional and international organizations on this theme such as the Charter of the Organisation of 
American States, which in Article 5 establishes the duty of members to promote ''the effective exercise 
of representative democracy." These instruments confirm that democracy is not the construct of any 
particular country or region, but rather, the universal right of all peoples everywhere See The right to 
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authorities are presenting a new precedence of international law shifting from pure 
Islamic literature toward international understanding in which the state must protect 
the basic rights of a human being. 
It is also possible to argue that respect for obligations under the general regime for the 
protection of human rights will necessarily lead to the right to participatory 
democracy in all societies. For instance, the rights to opinion (Article 18), expression 
(Article 19), and association (Article 22), and in fact most other rights in the political 
sphere as contained in the ICCPR are a refinement of the right to self-determination 
and constitute essential preconditions of an open electoral system which is the newest 
component of the democratic entitlement principle. In short, the logical conclusion of 
the respect for human rights in the municipal system is the enthronement of 
democracy. The holistic approach establishing a link between human rights and 
democracy was given legislative recognition in the preamble and substantive 
provisions of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, as adopted by the 
World Conference on Human Rights on June 25, 1993 (Articles 8, 9, 17, 27, 34, 66, 
and 68). Further, the Conference recommended that priority be given to national and 
international action to promote democracy, development, and human rights. This 
linkage has also received judicial backing in international proceedings (Perdoma v. 
DeLanza v. Uruguay). 236 
A clear sign of the significant strides made in this field is that conformity to 
democratic ideals has become a legitimising factor for states and governments. US 
Secretary of State James A. Baker noted the shift toward the democratic entitlement 
of peoples when he stated that, "legitimacy in 1991 flows not from the barrel of the 
gun but from the will of the people.,,237 New states seek legitimacy and recognition in 
the international community by displaying conformity as much as possible with 
democratic ideals. Presently, acceptance into regional and political groupings is 
predicated upon demonstrable adherence to democratic principles. One of the central 
conditions under the "Copenhagen Criteria" (developed during an EU summit in 
development Commission on Human Rights resolution 2000/SElCN .4/RES/2000/S of 13 April 2000. 
Commission on Human Rights resolution 1999/S7 Promotion of the right to democracy 
ElCN.4/RES/1999/S7 28 April 1999. 
23~eport of the Human Right Committee, 3S UN GAOR Supp. (No 40) at 111, UN Doc A/3S/ (1980). 
237 Quoted in Thomas M. Franck "The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance" Vol. 86 MIL No. 
1, (1992) p. 46. 
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Copenhagen in 1993), which the present 13 aspirants to membership of the European 
Union had to satisfy in order to join the EU, is that they must have stable institutions 
that can guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and protection of 
minorities?38 Even the international financial institutions are beginning to recognize 
the need to link democratic reforms to lending practices.239 
Similarly, new governments including military dictatorships, seek legitimacy by 
promising to uphold democracy. In the case of military regimes, the promise of a 
quick return to democratic rule is usually held out to the populace and international 
community in order to buy valuable legitimacy. In this manner it is notable that 
national governments confer legitimacy on international law just as much as 
international law confers legitimacy on national governments. The monitoring of 
national elections by international observers has also become a standard feature of 
international relations. Recent examples include the participation of hundreds of 
observers in covering elections in Bosnia and Indonesia in 1999, and in Zimbabwe 
and Cambodia in 2002. The effect of this development is that not only are states 
expected to adopt democratic governance in name, but they must also be seen to 
facilitate it in a genuine and verifiable manner. 
On the occasions when states brazenly fail to meet the emerging democratic 
standards, dire sanctions and checks are immediately brought to bear on the offending 
regime. For instance, the Organization of American States (OAS) imposed sanctions 
on the military regime that seized power in Haiti in 1991. The regime was eventually 
removed through the use offorce and the legitimate government was restored in 1993. 
This was achieved through the instrumentality of Security Council resolution 875 and 
238 The Union at the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, took a decisive step towards the fifth 
enlargement. It was agreed that "the associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so desire 
shall become members of the European Union." Concerning the timing, the European Council stated 
that: "Accession will take place as soon as an associated country is able to assume the obligations of 
membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions required." At the same time, it defined 
the membership criteria, which are often referred to as the 'Copenhagen criteria'. European 
Commission ""Enlargement" available at 
http://ec.europa.euienlargement!enlargement..process/accession''process!criteria/index_en.htm 
accessed 12 February 2012. 
239 The Managing Director of the IMF Horst KOhler stated recently at an International Conference on 
Poverty Reduction Strategies in Washington DC, January 14, 2002 that "Poverty reduction efforts will 
be successful if they are based on "self-help"-particularly the efforts of poor countries to establish 
peace, democracy, and good governance at home." Available at: 
http://www.imf.orglexternaVnp/speeches/2002/011402.htm 
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by virtue of actions taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The suspension of 
Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth in March 2002 for serious and persistent 
violation of the democratic principles contained in the Harare Commonwealth 
Declaration of 1991 is another case in point. Thus, it appears that a new principle of 
international law is gradually developing to the effect that the continuous denial of 
democratic governance in the face of popular clamour or the deliberate and illegal 
truncation of a democratic regime is to be equated with 'threat to peace.' The 
consequence of such an interpretation is that it dictates the right and duty of the 
members of the international community acting through the United Nations to 
intervene and take measures to correct the anomaly in the concerned state. 
However, it must not be assumed that the march to a universal democratic world is 
unstoppable. Significant threats to the emerging principle of democratic governance 
persist. For one, it appears that while some developing countries are quite 
aggressively recruited towards democratic change, some states like Saudi Arabia have 
received weak pressure to move towards democratic change. Thus, there is a paradox. 
Without progressive democratisation Saudi Arabia will not reach its full potentials as 
an investment destination even in the field of oil and gas. Yet, because of its vast oil 
and gas resources little pressure is assured on the state to democratise further. The 
reasons for this include the economic importance that Saudi's natural resources 
represents toward the very states that are most active in promoting democratic change 
elsewhere. It is well documented, by reputable NOOs, media outfits, and many 
Western governments' agencies, including the State Department and the US 
Commission on International Religious Freedom that rampant violations of minorities 
and expatriates' rights occur in countries considered allies of the US and other 
Western democracies such as Saudi Arabia.24o One such account goes: 
"American expatriates must accept and adjust to the Saudi way of life. 
Unfortunately, for some Americans living in Saudi Arabia, part of this 
adjustment include experiencing the Saudi system of criminal 
punishment ... rooted in traditional Islamic Law, a harsh system of punishment 
240 Josiah C. Russell and Elbert W. Russell, "Clash of Civilizations or Just a Phase in Democratic 
Development?" HNN, 29 Jan 2007, Available at: http://hnn.uslarticlesl34702.html. Accessed on Aug 
30,2011. 
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by Western standards. Drinkers of wine are flogged, thieves' hands cut 
off...,,241 
Even in those states where democracy has supposedly being enthroned, the political 
systems operating in reality are bizarre aberrations of democratic principles. In some 
African states, for instance, democratically elected leaders have proceeded to 
dismantle the multi-party systems and have either constructively elected themselves 
as Presidents for life, or ensured that no serious competitor emerged to challenge their 
rule. 242 In some countries, victory in elections is not entirely detennined due to 
oppressive tactics and rigging of electoral results. In many others, the determining 
factor for electoral success is often the amount of financial, as well as other resources 
that is available to the party or individual largely obtained through stolen wealth. 
In summary, it must be admitted that a full right to democratic governance to be 
exercised by peoples remains a radical vision the broad outlines of which we can see 
presently. What must be realized is that democratic governance has become a 
normative rule of international law, and there is no lack of textual provision and state 
practice in support of this proposition. The emerging right to democratic governance 
operates to confer a legitimizing function for states and governments, and at the same 
time, fulfils a shared sense of community expectation of the populace. It is fair, then, 
to say democracy is becoming a global entitlement to be promoted and protected in 
Saudi Arabia by processes that do not compromise the overall safety and integrity of 
the state. The UNDP was particularly persuasive when it noted: 
Democratic governance provides an 'enabling environment' for the 
realization of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and, in 
particular, the elimination of poverty. Effective governance systems are 
likely to be characterized by participation, transparency, equity, 
accountability, coherence, responsiveness, integration, and ethicality. 
Promoting democracy and strengthening the rule of law were strongly 
highlighted and endorsed at the Millennium Summit of 2000.243 
241 For a lively discussion of these see JM Young, "Toture and Inhumane Punishment of United States 
Citizens in Saudi Arabia and the United States Government's Failure to Act" - Hastings Int'l & Compo 
L. Rev., 1992 p. 663 et 01. 
242 Osita Eze, Human Rights in Africa (Lagos: The Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 1984) pp. 
56-57. The latest in time is the attempt by the current President of Senegal who has recently announced 
his candidature for a third term despite the existence of constitutional provisions to the contrary. 
243 UNDP "Democratic Governance" available at: www.undp.org.sa. Accessed September 15,2010. 
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Furthermore, Amartya Sen's argument that development of a state is also predicated 
by a willingness and determination of the particular society to embrace change is 
instructive.244 Thus, it can be argued that in order to secure a smooth reformation of 
the legal system in Saudi Arabia, the reforms must be established under an ideology 
of progressive change and flexible theoretical perspectives. Further, it is important to 
engage with globalization and the democratic imperative. It is also important to 
consider the economic case for reform. There needs to be a balance between the two 
streams within the Saudi society: the first is the traditionalist, while the second 
demands of strategic development. To begin the process of such reform, a balance 
must be established which must come from the current legal system in order to pave 
the way for further development. 
The political and legal system in Saudi Arabia needs an effective mechanism in order 
to keep the society balanced.245 Moreover, from the technical side, the nature of the 
current governing system would help to speed the progress since it is within the 
absolute power of the King to issue the relevant decrees and laws. If such an agenda is 
adopted, the state will secure its long-term development plans, which must be 
processed under a global legal framework. These goals, particularly those regarding 
FDI, cannot be established under the current official laws in Saudi Arabia. 
244A. Sen 2001 pp.50-53 
24SSaudi constitution Article 57(b) the deputies of the prime minister and ministers of the Council of 
Ministers are responsible, by expressing solidarity before the King, for implementing the Islamic 
Sbari'ah and the state's general policy. This is an indication that the system has effectively been 
designed to implement such legal applications and to be directed to serve states general policy. Yet, it 
is a matter of reforming and developing these texts to be much more effective to the new international 
and global development era. Available at: 
http://www.saudi.gov.salwps/portaV!utlp/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CPOos3iTMGenYE8TI 
wMLtOBzA89gIyMtvw8Tl39HE_3gxCL9gmxHRQAfnyRVI accessed 15 February 2012. 
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4.4.2:Traditions versus Development: The Imperative for Legal and Political 
Reforms. 
Developments in human rights and democratic development appear to be very slow in 
reaching the Saudi Arabian state. The Saudi legal system has the unique feature 
among many of its neighbours in that it was never been built or drafted under pressure 
of civil wars like other countries.246 The main legal conflict to resolve is relating to 
the interactions between the local system (Shari'ah laws) and the international legal 
principles of the latter half of the last century and its contemporary manifestations. 
The overwhelming importance of the Shari'ah and its legal traditions is bound to have 
an effect on every aspect of Saudi national life. Saudi Arabia is the birthplace ofIslam 
and home to Islam's two holiest shrines in Mecca and Medina. The king's official title 
is the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques. Although the state's law is based on 
Shari'ah law, several secular codes have been introduced for special committees that 
now largely handle commercial disputes. 
The reluctance of the Saudi Arabian state to embrace international jurisdiction is 
perhaps revealed in its non-acceptance of the compulsory IC] jurisdiction?47 Yet, the 
modern Saudi Arabia must do business with the world and interact with the world and 
especially the richer foreign partners in line with international rules that are not 
necessarily based on Islamic principles. It is suggested that the conflict between the 
two is accountable for the underdeveloped state of overseas FDI into Saudi Arabia. 
However, Saudi legal institutions are, however, not incapable of developing new 
authorities or reconsidering the reformation of the old policies and legal texts. 
Socio-Iegal changes of a commendable nature have not gone unnoticed by Western 
institutions. 
King Abdallah has continued the cautious reform program begun when 
he was crown prince. To promote increased political participation, the 
government held elections nationwide from February through April 
2005 for half the members of 179 municipal councils. In December 
246 A. Sen, Development as Freedom, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) pp. 5-7. 
247 These facts are not lost to the governments and corporations offoreign states where most of the 
investment into Saudi Arabia is meant to come from. The non-acceptance of the IeJ compulsory 
jurisdiction is for instance one of the peculiar features about the state highlighted by the US 
government in its official digest about the Kingdom. See The CIA World FactBook, Available at: 
https:/!www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbooklgeosIsa.html, Accessed on October 10, 
2010. 
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2005, King ABDALLAH completed the process by appointing the 
remaining members of the advisory municipal councils. The king 
instituted an Inter-Faith Dialogue initiative in 2008 to encourage 
religious tolerance on a global level; in February 2009, he reshuffled 
the cabinet, which led to more moderates holding ministerial and 
judicial positions, and appointed the first female to the cabinet. 248 
120 
It is commendable that the Saudi King has indeed committed himself to drastic 
changes and reforms, which reflect much liberalization to the market and more 
freedoms in response to the challenges of globalization. It is also commendable that 
the religious leadership are especially being wooed towards this direction because 
without their consent meaningful progress towards rights and democratic reforms 
would be nearly impossible. Nothing perhaps demonstrates the dramatic 
developments and closer cooperation towards development between the government 
and religious authorities than the epoch making appointment by Saudi Arabia of first 
female minister. King Abdullah appointed Noor AI-Fayez to the Saudi Council of 
Ministers in 2009. She has served as deputy minister for women's education.249 
It can be argued that much of the changes that have occurred are driven by the aim for 
economic success. There is nothing, in fact, wrong in this. It is one thing to note that 
changes are needed to Saudi Arabian domestic laws to bring it in line with 
international standards in rights and democratic values. It is another to show precisely 
what particular route change must follow. What kind of legal parameters Saudi 
government will use? Is it the western values and culture of its principal investors? 
Would a western approach be rejected by the majority of the Saudi conservative 
society? Will there be red lines that the monarchy and ruling system will impose to 
free speech and individual freedom for its citizens on one hand and for business men 
and a growing number of foreign business women.250 
What is clear is that moderate changes towards democratisation and recognition of 
more human rights and freedoms would not violate Islamic law (shari'ah) especially 
where such changes end up in providing economic and financial security to the 
24~ttp:llwww.pbs.org!newshour/updateslmiddle_eastijan-june09/saudi_03-02.html 
249 Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uklworldl2009/feb/16/saudi-cabinet-woman-minister accessed 
19 January 2012. 
2s°Ross, Michael Lewin, 1961-DDoes Oil Hinder Democracy? Vol. 53 World Politics - Number 3 
(April 200 1), pp. 325-361. Also see, human right first society in Saudi Arabia. Available at: 
http://hrfssaudiarabia.org! accessed 17 January 2012. 
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country. In other words, there appears to be nothing in the Shari'ah laws inherited by 
this generation of Saudi Arabians that is incompatible with the pursuit of financial 
gain that will improve the standard of living of the vast majority of citizens. 
Other aspects of the new trends toward integration with the global investment 
community include application to join the WTO as a way of speeding up economic 
development. This signified the process of acceptance of international standards in 
many fields such as education, trade, social, political, legal, and cultural. Tensions, 
however, remain in that some of these changes may contradict the original religious 
character of the State. Saudi Arabia indeed concluded bilateral market access 
negotiations with all interested WTO Members. The WTO General Council formally 
concluded negotiations with Saudi Arabia on the terms of the country's membership 
to the WTO on November 11, 2005, and Saudi Arabia became a full WTO Member 
on December 11, 2005.251 This represents a significant shift away from old traditional 
approaches to trade and investment. 252 Accession into the WTO means that further, 
continuous changes and reformation must take place in order to pave way for socio-
economic development of the state and its expectant population that are eager to 
experience the benefits of growth and a rising economic profile.253 Much more still 
needs to be achieved, and not only the WTO, but interested individual countries and 
regions will insist on securing further reformation from the Kingdom. 
Another important factor is the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001. Although it does not always capture the attention of the world's press, but there 
has been an upsurge in terrorist activity in Saudi Arabia during the decade after the 
New York attacks. Since then the Saudi authorities have realized the dangers of 
extremist ideologies and their destabilising effects of conflicts that threaten its very 
political system and the safety of the monarch. This results in the ill-influence and 
2S1 WTO, Accessions: Saudi Arabia, Available at: 
http://www.wto.orglenglishlthewto_e/acc_e/al_arabie_saoudite_e.htm. Accessed on September 30, 
2010. 
2S2HRH Prince Saud AI-Faisal's Speech at Oxford University 24-2-2005, Available at: 
www.mofa.gov.sa. accessed 13 March 2012 
2S3 The WTO Agreements recognise expressly the link between trade and development. About two 
thirds of the WTO's around 150 members are developing countries. They play an increasingly 
important and active role in the WTO because of their numbers, because they are becoming more 
important in the global economy, and because they increasingly look to trade as a vital tool in their 
development efforts. Developing countries are a highly diverse group often with very different views 
and concerns. WTO, "Understanding the WTO: Developing Countries Overview." 
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misinterpretations of Islamic legal applications and practises. The attempt to cope 
with extremism has led to significant changes both in the social values and official 
policy within the Saudi society. This has created two directions in the society: those 
who accept the need for more acceleration towards greater respect for human rights 
and freedoms as well as those who sympathise with conservatism in order to continue 
to achieve stability. Most importantly Saudi Arabia has since the early 1970s begun to 
look toward being a successful partner in the international arena with the knowledge 
that it cannot stand against the whole international society alone without any 
acceptable legal principles. At any rate, note must be taken of the unmistakeable fact 
that modernization has been happening throughout the Islamic world.254 
It must be admitted that democratic freedoms in Saudi Arabia may never translate 
into European style societies; yet, progression towards greater freedoms must be 
urged. Moreover even the conservative forces in the Saudi state have recognised the 
need towards more individual freedoms as a tool towards a new development 
agenda.255 Hence, there are recently introduced legislation for counsel elections and 
wider policies towards development of libraries, qualitative education, better 
employment and development policies, promise of even more political freedom 
within local communities especially in the areas of freedom of speech, elections, and 
trade. Furthermore justification of the position that there is potential scope for greater 
respect for rights and freedoms may be found in the basic constitutional law, 
particularly articles 50-55 which provide much space for freedoms particularly 
relevant to FDI laws.256 
While this thesis urges greater commitment to change it is also a necessary part of the 
thesis to explain that there may be downsides to wholesome jettisoning of everything 
traditional about Saudi Arabia and to highlight dangers and areas of hypocrisy in 
relation to the liberal agenda. The expectation is that changes to the institutions that 
254 J. Anderson, "Modern Trends in Islam: Legal Reform and Modernisation in the Middle East," 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly (1971), 20: 1-21; Willard A. Beling, King Faisal and the 
modernisation o/Saudi Arabia (London: Taylor and Francis, 1980) pp. 113. 
255 See, Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia Information Office Washington, DC www.saudiernbassy.net 
accessed 17 February 2012; Available at: 
http://www.saudiembassy.netlfilesIPDFlReportslDeveloprnent.pdf accessed 17 February 2012. 
256 http://www.ilo.orglwcmsp5/groupslpublicl---edJ)rotectl---protrav/---
ilo_aids/documents/legaldocumentlwcrns_125883.pdf accessed 20 February 2012 
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matter in Saudi Arabia such as the religious clerics, the monarchy and the 
bureaucratic class will assure an inflow of revenue stemming from globalization. The 
argument also is that if we apply Adam Smith's socioeconomic methods development 
will be accelerated as a result of a combination of political liberties and social 
development under the rule of law.257 Moreover, the assumption is that the educated 
class and local authorities do favour on-going liberalization process. 258 Yet it is 
important to note that there are those who believe that the predominant strand of 
globalisation discourse and the move towards liberal trade policies may also actually 
harm human rights. The main problem, however, appears to lie with the religious 
clerics who do not have a deep understanding of the need for changes. The policies, 
institutions, legal and regulatory barriers faced by private sector businesses in 
developing and transitional economies do not affect the powerful religious class and 
the current system is arguably in their favour. This is the real threat to the Saudi 
government. 259 
Saudi Arabia's lack of freedom is not coming from the refusal of development, but 
from the lack of enthusiasm to explore what is available to be used in the creation of a 
new legal system, not only within the domestic system, but internationally by virtue 
of international jurisprudence and treaties. It can be argued that while change is 
slow,changes highlighted above within the Saudi legal system gives some hope for 
the future. The authorities must however, maintain their current agenda of reforming 
the legal system. It is necessary to also link progress in the context of FDI with 
holistic developmental progress across the entire areas of legal discourse, particularly 
that of human rightS.260 
257 Adam Smith, The Wealth o/Nations, ed. R.H. Campbell, A.S. Skinner and W.B. Todd (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1976). pp. 530-540. 
258 Amr Daoud Marar, "The Duality of the Saudi Legal System and its Implications on Securitisations." 
Arab Law Quarterly 20,4 2006 pp. 389-399 
259Wendell Steavenson, "Pessoptism" The Newyorker, Available at; 
http://www.newyorker.com/talklcommentl20 111031 141 11 0314taco _talk _ steavenson accessed 13 
February 2012. 
260 "Universal Declaration of Human Rights," United Nations, Available at: 
http://www.ohchr.orglENIUDHRlPageslLanguage.aspx?LangID=eng; Ayton-Shenker, D. "The 
Challenge of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity," UNDPI, DPII16271HR, March 1995, Available at: 
http://www.un.orglrights/dpi1627e.htm accessed 15 February 2012; Kayman, M, "A Memorial for 
Jeremy Bentham: Memory, Fiction, and Writing the Law," Vol. 15 Law and Critique No. 207 (2004). 
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However, such applications do not mean that the Saudi authorities have to abolish the 
Islamic Shari'ah law, but instead the authorities should introduce new laws that will 
give clearer guidelines to new applications. This will require the distinguishing 
between constitutional affairs for local and international issues, as well as identifying 
how the Saudi constitution differentiates between firstly, the international, economic, 
and development legal aspects and secondly, how it must be governed starting from 
the planning to the enforcement of any judgments under international standards and 
acceptance.261 
The second part of the constitution will present the legal framework that will govern 
local activities and individuals (the nation),262 in addition to areas that will be 
governed by Islamic law. These constitutional classifications will, again, build up the 
trust in the Saudi legal system internationally. This can help FDI as investors would 
be more eager to invest in Saudi Arabia as long as investors are confident that 
contractual promises made to them will be complied with. Nonetheless, such 
developments in the legal system will give space for mechanisms for state-investor 
dispute settlement such as arbitration tribunals to be available within Saudi Arabia. 
It is possible to explain what went wrong in the (Shari'ah law) dilemma if a deeper 
look is taken into the reason why the Saudis are so reluctant to any economic 
development or legal system reformation. It can be argued to some extent that 
religious clerics looked at the state and its authorities as individuals, and that these 
individuals must practice all of applications of the Islamic religion. Yet, how can a 
state or non-human being worship God, or carry our religious terms and conditions 
like a normal human being. Further, how can the Saudi authorities ask for the world's 
entire legal system to be changed, or give space to its legal system to be held as 
superior to all other legal norms. Shari'ah laws are applicable only to human beings, 
261Saudi constitution Article 54: The law establishes the relationship between the investigative body 
and the Prosecutor-general, and their organization and prerogatives. What we mean by the Law here is 
the new reformed Saudi constitution which needs to classify the different between the individual rights 
and legal procedures and the state relations with the other states and organisations. See, Harold J. 
Berman. Law and Revolution II, 2003 pp. 29-70 
262 Saudi constitution Chapter 5 Rights and Duties, Article 23 [Islam] The state protects Islam; it 
implements its Shari'ah; it orders (people) to do right and shun evil; it fulfils the duty regarding God's 
call. 
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and the state will not be a wrongdoer if it applies a legal system that will help its 
economic factors and empower it to provide welfare to the entire state.263 
A reflection of a new threat and danger to the Monarch due to political reform and 
the legal reform has become a necessity. Work on this thesis began in 2005 - the 
current "Arab Spring" is an example of how this reform can play OUt.264 Meaningful 
reform, it is submitted, requires the separation of the state from the religious sphere. 
But this is not to argue that the state should not be respectful to the national religion 
or that religious traditions should not inform domestic laws. Though this argument 
was first presented in this work in 2005, in the final stage of 2012, current events 
show clear evidence to support our ideas. 
4.5. The Islamic International Law of Development and Saudi Reform Agenda 
One of the original legal theories in Islamic international law is: "Rules and 
obligations must come into existence through authentic consent and not by ideological 
or military force,,?65 
If the Saudi authorities apply its new reformed legal system under such original 
consent, it would lead the Islamic world to a new era of an international global 
paradigm that seeks peace and development away from conflicts. It is argued that 
such reforms would be compatible with the very foundations of the Islamic 
international society. Furthermore, it will by all means receive the authentic consent 
of the people. However, if the Saudi authorities pass these laws, they will be 
enforcing one of the principles of Islamic international law outlined below: 
Islamic international law is, that part of law and custom of the land and 
treaty obligations which a Muslim de facto or de jure state observes in 
its dealings with other de facto or de jure state.266 
263 D. Bonderman "Modernization and Changing Perception oflslamic law," 81 Harvard Law Review 
(1968) pp.l169-93. Also see, A. Maulana Muhammad, Mohammed the prophet (Lahore, 1924) pp.275. 
264 S. S. Osman, M. Nour op.cit; J. Gunenno op.cit., See also footnote 18 and 193. 
26SF. Maleian, The Concept 0/ Islamic International Criminal Law a Comparative Study (Graham & 
Trotman Ltd) 1994 pp. 2 
266 M.T.A Ghuniman,The Muslim Conception o/International Law and Western Approach, (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1981) pp. 35. 
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In this case, the supreme authorities in Saudi Arabia are the sole legitimate powers 
that can enforce such actions and laws. As long as the authorities are under the 
Imam's (the King's)267 influence, they will be able to establish new applications 
within the existing legal system, paving the way to a safer world looking for 
developing projects between all states. In principle, the system of Islamic 
intemationallaw rests on two fundamental concepts: 
1. All international relations should be based on a principle of legality.268 
Article 70. 
International treaties, agreements, regulations and concessions are approved 
and amended by Royal decree. 
2. The practical and philosophical reasons for such international conducts should 
be clearly set forth.269 
It is argued that such development within the international arena will not involve the 
Shari' ah laws that are related to the individual. Therefore, these two principles are the 
main keys to a new legal system concerning peace and development within the new 
era of globalization.27o It is the inability to make these crucial distinctions that has 
unfortunately fuelled speculation of links between Islam and terrorism in the world. 
Further elaboration on distinctions between the principles of Islam, the classifications 
of the role of the individuals and the state, and the sphere of state's activities can 
make the perspectives clearer to the Western society, so that Islam is no longer 
accused of wrongdoing when some misinterpret Islamic principles according to their 
own means and goals. 271 In other words, there is a hig difference between the 
relationship between the Muslim human being and God. Such a relationship is 
267Saudi constitution Article 50; The King, or whoever deputizes for him, is responsible for the 
implementation of judicial rulings 
268Saudi constitution Article 70; International treaties, agreements, regulations and concessions are 
approved and amended by Royal decree. Also see, Ayoub M. AI-Jarbou. Judicial Independence: Case 
Study of Saudi Arabia, Vol. 19 Arab Law Quarterly, No. 1/4 (2004) pp. 5-54 also available at 
http://www.jstor.orgistable/338210S accessed 17 February 2012. 
269F .Malekian, The System of International Law, Treaties and Responsibility (Uppsala, 1987) pp.8. 
27<M. Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations (Baltimore) 1966 pp.68-69. 
271Saudi Constitution Article 55; the King carries out the policy of the nation, a legitimate policy in 
accordance with the provisions ofIs]am; the King oversees the implementation of the Islamic Shari/ab, 
the system of authorities, the state's general policies; and the protection and defence of the country. 
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governed by the religious applications that relate to a living mankind who believe in 
Islam as religion only. This application does not concern non-Muslims, or non-living 
mankind, such as a state. In this case, the state is not considered or required to apply 
or govern or follow the mankind religious applications. State to state relationships 
should be governed by neutral agreements based on the economy of the contracting 
parties, and governed by the principles of the international law or the UN charter if 
applicable. 
The King of Saudi Arabia can practice this power under Islamic law, and can 
additionally pass certain powers to some new authorities that can help the state's 
economy and development plans to maintain their progress governed under the Shura 
Council, which is the equivalent to a Western parliament.272 It is important to explore 
the Saudi constitution in order to establish a sole ground to our empirical proposa1?73 
To conclude this part, it can be argued that Islamic intemationallaw means: 
The equal, mutual and reciprocal respect of obligations expressed by 
rules, norms, regulations, provisions, customs, including moral 
obligations, which prevail for one reason or another between states, 
and organizations, states and groups and states and individuals and 
minor groups is unsettled. 274 
The rapid development in international law may make Islamic laws look unsuitable 
when considering potential new universal applications due to the lack of development 
in the legal systems of Islamic states. It can be argued that it is the juridical authorities 
in Saudi Arabia that apply modem legal applications within its reformed 'legal 
system,' without the influence of the Islamic law (Shari'ah) in order to establish new 
272Saudi constitution Article 62; If the safety of the Kingdom is threatened or its territorial integrity, 
security of its people and its interests, or that which impedes the functioning of the state institutions, 
the King may take urgent measures in order to deal with this danger. If the King considers that these 
measures should continue, he may then implement the necessary regulations to this end. See above 2.1: 
Background of the Study: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and below 8.2: The Saudi Constitution. 
273Saudi constitution Article 61; the King declares a state of emergency, general mobilization and war, 
and the law defines the rules for this. In our case Saudi Arabia is under attack from some terrorists 
groups and this renders the state under "war" by way of statutes. This affords the King more powers 
and authority to apply new laws under this section even if it is for development purposes. 
274F.Maleian, The Concept of Islamic International Criminal Law a Comparative Study (Graham & 
Trotman Ltd) 1994 pp. 5-6. 
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norms for the Islamic constitution reformed applications. 275 However, the current 
Saudi constitution starts with: 
Article 1 ;The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic state with Islam 
as its religion; God's Book and the Sunnah of His Prophet, God's prayers and peace be 
upon him, are its constitution, Arabic is its language and Riyadh is its capita1.276 
Since Islamic law does not have a similar legal categorization to the principle of jus 
cogens defined in the international law system, it can be argued that the mechanism 
we are applying seeks to avoid such complexity.277 This applies when the idea of 
freedom and the utilitarian perspectives are used for the purpose of dividing an 
Islamic state's constitution into two sections to avoid the clash of interests; and not 
between the laws which Islam prohibits, but to actually avoid religious clerics 
misleadingly interpret some issues related to development, economy and peace. 278 
The idea is to limit the use of force in order to create public order in the international 
community. Unfortunately, Islamic literature lacked a development toward peace 
philosophy since 1500 - jus cogens should be seen as a fundamental principle when 
building up this new legal practice. However, this argument will be refused by the 
religious clerics because it will limit their authority and power within the local 
society. Therefore, Islamic states must develop their constitution to achieve the goals 
of their development plans and for peace and harmony to be maintained in the 
international society.279 
Additionally, if Saudi Arabia applies such norms to its constitution, there will be no 
contradictions between its legal applications and international law norms which could 
make the state's actions and treaties invalid when they conflict with new international 
27SSee, Ali Maulana Muhammad, Mohammed the Prophet (Lahore, 1924) chapter I I. N.P.Aghnides 
Mohammed Theories of Finance with an Introduction to Mohammedan Law and Bibliography 
(London: 1916) pp, 77- 95. 
276 Available at: http://www.servat.unibe.chlicVsaOOOOO_.htmlvisited 15 February 2012. 
277 The notion of jus cogens in international law encompasses the notion of peremptory norms in 
international law . Under this view certain overriding principles of intemationallaw exist which form "a 
body of jus cogens." These principles are those from which it is accepted that no State may derogate by 
way of treaty. I. Brownlie, Principles of Public Internationa/Law (Fifth Edition, 1998) p. 515; T. 
Meron, "On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights", Vol. 80 American Journal of International 
Law (1986) pp.l, 14. 
278See M. Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations. (Baltimore, 1966) p. 63. 
279See the international law commission of the United Nations' draft proposal on the Law of Treaties. It 
concluded that the rules of international jus cogens are the consequences of international positive law. 
The Vienna convention in 1969 refers to jus cogens as 'peremptory norms of general international 
law"; Articles 4, 53 & 64. 
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legal norms. If an Islamic state, via its constitution, remains consistent in applying 
some Shari'ah laws that may govern the individual locally, this could eventually 
become evidence of state practice and if enough states apply the laws they may 
become acceptable as international norms that the international society must accept. 280 
Saudi Arabia will not succeed with the understanding that it can enforce Islamic laws 
to the international society, and this is the key to peaceful international relations. Such 
understanding has been in process in Islamic states since 1535, and if the Saudi 
authorities implement new legal reforms, they can reduce international conflicts. 
Moreover, Islam does not regulate the duties and obligations of mankind, and Islamic 
countries and Imams are not the creators of the universe. Islam can regulate the 
relations between the individuals, groups within the Islamic state, and give guidelines 
to the right relationship between God and worshippers. 
Further, if the Saudi reform system is based on the authorities' obligations to the 
international society via valid treaties, any legal application that the state will adopt 
will not be looked at as a breach of any Islamic laws (Shari'ah). Instead, it will be 
within the true teaching of Islam. Prophet Mohammed (PBUH) strongly recommends 
Muslims to respect their agreements or treaties and not violate their obligations?81 
This gives Islamic law flexibility and gives the state much more space and freedom to 
act within the international society as a peacemaker or development seeker. 
At the same time, any action the Saudi authorities take in order to maintain their 
wealth or development and to empower their relationship within the international 
society would not be forbidden in Islamic laws and the state shall not therefore be in 
breach of its obligations. 282 Treaty obligations and responsibilities must not be 
violated and the state shall issue the right local regulations to honour these 
agreements. 
280 L. Rozakis, Shristos, The Concept of jus cogens in the Law of Treaties (Oxford: North-Holland Pub. 
Co., 1976) pp.35. 
281 See, Zvi Yehuda. Hershlaglntroduction to the Modern Economic History of the Middle East (Brill 
leiden 1980) pp. 45, The treaty of 1535, concluded between Sultan Sulayman the Magnificent with 
Francis I, King of France. 
282M.Khadduri War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore) 1955 p.205. Also see, The Holy Qur'an, 
16:91 ·9:7 ·9:4*4: 165. Mohammed Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (Cambridge 
1999) pp. 267-281. 
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It has to be emphasized that Islamic countries and cultures are not immune to the fact 
that the world has moved on and progressed in different ways from the 15th century. 
There is not yet, and most likely will not be, a universal Islamic state, but there is 
indeed a world that is increasingly regarded as a small village. Therefore, Islamic 
states must accept the separation between religious guidelines applicable to 
individuals and its external relations with other states.283 The Saudi authorities to 
some extent are moving forward in implementing some reforms, which will give the 
international society comfort in knowing that the entire Saudi legal system is 
becoming liberal. This is very obvious if note is taken of the new judicial updates and 
reforms taking place in the entire legal system. Again, due to the lack of legal 
awareness and the application of valid theories such as jus cogens across the nation, 
the Saudi society's culture has not sufficiently engaged with the legal reforms. 
There are indeed lessons to be learnt from the historic events leading to the separation 
between the state and religion in Europe during the period 1555-1648.284 Islamic law 
and guidelines will continue to govern the relationships between the individual and 
the states and the individual and God. Yet, to create a constitutional application that 
will be applicable in governing the state's relations with the international society is 
not feasible in the current state of international affairs. The aim is to differentiate the 
Saudi state's affairs from the individual's obligations to God. The religious guidelines 
and perspectives do not obligate the state. Such practice could save the state from 
becoming a religious one and avoid repeating history. Now, Saudi authorities and 
scholars must draw a new line in history of legal, constitutional development and 
peace if they want to apply new reforming policies to the legal system for a brighter 
future for the next generation. 
However, earlier in this chapter we discussed the principles of freedom and legal 
reform in addition to some new Saudi attempts to reform and development such as the 
King Abdullah's economic city and the act of joining the WTO. Nevertheless, it does 
not matter what the state will do or try to achieve, as it will stop at one point when 
283M.Khadduri, The Islamic Law o/Nations, (Baltimore) 1966 pp.60-70. 
284 Philip Hamburger, Separation Of Church And State, (Harvard Harvard University Press,2002) pp. 
21-24,191-2,391-5. 
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such efforts and attempts clash with ultra conservative Islamic clerics and their 
limited vision ofSaudi Arabia's role in a global world.For example, the investment of 
foreign private capital in other countries is regulated by a comprehensive set of legal 
instruments. Yet, unfortunately in Saudi Arabia it is governed by a fragmented 
entities and political structures and there is no unified legal system with the benefit of 
the separation of powers that grants judicial independence. Legal disputes in private 
investment, therefore, depends to a great extent on the autonomy of the contracting 
parties in designing their international foreign investments agreements and the 
applicable arbitrations clause. 
Yet, any foreign investor has to think carefully about the legal mechanisms in the host 
state where political risks can off-set his rights. Indeed, the investor should embark on 
a special legal technique in order to secure those rights against state hegemony. Given 
this concern, we will highlight the legal effects of state commitments "promises," 
which can affect the legal constitution by treaty terms and conditions (Stabilization 
Clauses). This type of action from states will build a notion of legal protection 
available to investors under the host state's law (National Law), or under customary 
international law. 
The reason for focusing on affirmative steps that can be taken by investors is in order 
to reduce the threat of political risks (non-commercial) when they are included in 
contracts operating within unsecured jurisdictions. These securities come only 
through enforceable constitutional guidelines governed by a transparent process that 
limits the state's hegemony via articulating the validity of security clauses. Moreover, 
the use of stabilization clauses can bring up new issues and conflict zones between 
international law and sovereignty, and the validity of the clauses within the 
international law arena. Saudi Arabia will be analyzed as a case study due to its 
special progress toward the latest trends in foreign investment invitations and laws. It 
will be considered within the framework of the new development plans.285 
28S From a practical viewpoint, the Saudi Arabian juridical system has no transparent guidelines that 
show the foreign investor how to tackle problems via the legal channels. Legal advisors and lawyers, to 
some extent, are unsure of whether their clients are submitting to the right court or not. See Emarr vs 
Jadawel entailing a commercial legal dispute in Riyadh 2007 in the high administrative court 'Diwan 
Almazalem'. Available at: http://www.mep.gov.sa accessed 12 February 2012. 
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4.6: Conclusion 
Saudi Arabia faces significant challenges in socio economic terms. Its developmental 
problems and immense and the demand for human and capacity development are 
quite daunting. In a sense however this creates both problems and opportunities for 
investment in the country. On the one hand investments are needed to provide even 
basic amenities and consumer needs. Related to this is the fact that the State is 
simultaneously aspiring to high technological relevance and heavy industrial 
infrastructure and transfer of technology. On the other hand the level of education 
despite some improvement is still too low creating much scope for conservative and 
poverty driven hostility towards foreign and perhaps western involvement in the 
country. This reflects in an arguably negative attitude to changes proposed. It is 
therefore, necessary to advocate socio-Iegal development as a first step towards 
ensuring that the entire populace, state institutions and civil society are all ready for 
the effort of making Saudi Arabia an attractive destination for foreign investment. 
A first step to take in improving the socio economic and socio legal situation in line 
with the above is to recognise that there are important changes and reforms to be 
made to the national to human rights regime. The assumption that human rights are 
inherently Western concepts imposed upon other cultures takes a static view of moral 
and legal principles, and is, therefore, flawed. The contemporary concept of human 
rights has been greatly enriched by legal and political inputs from other cultures and 
civilizations. Islamic civilization was indeed one of the major sources of both human 
rights as well as trading customs such as the lex mercatoria. For this reason better 
appreciation of human rights regime as allowed under the Sharia is imperative. Better 
adherence to human rights will also make the Kingdom a more attractive place for 
investors. This is particularly true in terms of medium and small scale investment 
from foreign companies whose work force may currently be discouraged by a 
perception that human rights does not come high on the agenda of governance in 
Saudi Arabia. 
This is particularly because the more democratic freedom a state can guarantee the 
more it appears that it attracts economic progress. It is not surprising therefore that the 
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richest societies in the world are the ones with wide democratic participation and 
impressive respect for human rights and equality before the law. It is particularly 
necessary for greater participation of Saudi Arabians in the consultative assemblies. 
This will be a good place to start the necessary reforms and to stave off protests and 
subversive activity. The King of Saudi Arabia can additionally pass certain powers to 
new democratically elected authorities. Strategies like this can help create the right 
conditions that will sustain the progress already achieved through the creation of 
economic and industrial cities. 
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Chapter 5. THE STATE's PROMISES. AGREEMENTS. AND FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT PROTECTION 
5.1. Introduction 
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Most states are willing to give guarantees to foreign investors, and these guarantees 
can take different forms.286 These include clauses and instruments offering protection 
against compulsory acquisition; Investment Acts with legal safeguards against 
adverse amendments to the law (such as expropriation);status of most favoured nation 
and the national treatment. This protection has to be put in a legal order through 
international agreements, treaties, and conventions. Yet the question arises: how can 
these statements or promises bind the host state within its jurisdiction and against its 
local laws and norms especially in a country like Saudi Arabia? 
The state can be bound by its promises under international law only when it fulfils the 
terms which obliges it to keep its promises, or when it builds on legal aspects.287 The 
host state is forbidden to nationalize or expropriate FDI according to the International 
Investment Code, Article II. From this perspective one can underline some of the 
state's promises or statements that could bind it, such as: 
(a) The state's policy or public statement, e.g. Liberia288 and Nigeria289 
286 Sornarajah (2010) op.cit., pp. 99-100; A.A. Fatouros, Government Guarantees to Foreign Investors 
(Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1962); Frank E. Nattier, "Investment in Developing 
Countries", Issue 82 of Commercial law and Practice Course Handbook (Practising Law Institute, 
1972); Walde, T. and N'di, G., "Stabilising International Investment Commitments: International Law 
versus Contract Interpretation", OGEL Archive (at www.oilandgas.com/ogel/ accessed 3rd March 
2012). See, for instance, the guarantees offered by Bulgaria, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyz Republic 
available at the following websites http://investbg.government.bg/?sid=18&ssid=46&c=83 accessed 20 
February 2012, http://www.timesca.netlindex.php/legal-opinionll OO-legal-opinionl2495-what-are-the-
legal-guarantees-for-foreign-investments-in-the-kyrgyz-republic accessed 20 February 2012; 
21/1112011 - What are the legal guarantees for foreign investments in the Kyrgyz Republic? Ulan 
Tilenbaev, What are the legal guarantees for foreign investments in the Kyrgyz Republic? The Asian 
Times 2111112011 - available at http://www.timesca.netlindex.phpllegal-opinionl100-legal-
opinionl2495-what-are-the-legal-guarantees-for-foreign-investments-in-the-kyrgyz-republic accessed 
20 February 2012. 
287 Detter De Lupis, The Concept of International Law, (Stockholm: 1987). What is meant by the FDI 
Climate is the legal, economic, social and political estuations, which creates the right increment of the 
successful long term investment. Also see the Investment Climate Report in the Arab countries 1996. 
288 See the website of the Liberia National Investment Commission available at http://www.nic.gov.lr/ 
accessed 15 February 2012. 
289 The Principal Laws on Foreign Investments in Nigeria are (a) the Nigerian Investment Promotion 
Commission Act No.16 of 1995; and (b) the Foreign Exchange (Monitoring and Miscellaneous 
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(b) National state legislation and constitutional guarantees e.g. Article 31 of the 
Indian constitution290 
(c) Official declarations291 
(d) Bilateral and multilateral treaties 
There are therefore, two possible arguments: The first is that the relationship between 
the host-state and multinational companies or private foreign investors cannot be 
governed by international law. The answer to this argument comes within the new 
UN/ILC law draft which confirms that an action or omission by a state or person with 
international personality that leads to harm against the legitimate interests of another 
state or person with international legal personality will be a wrongful act. Such an 
action or omission will create responsibility in international law and may provide 
basis for compensation and other remedies such as reparation.292 The second view is 
that the clash of interests as a result of nationalization or expropriation, are so unique 
and of far reaching effects that the situation must be covered by international law. 
Akehurst describes this inherent tension: 
Provisions) Act No.17 of 1995. The Investment Protection Assurance of the government reads: - No 
enterprise shall be nationalised or expropriated by any Government of the Federation, and - No person 
who owns, whether wholly or in part, the capital of any enterprise shall be compelled by law to 
surrender his interest in the capital to any other persons. - There will be no acquisition of an enterprise 
by the Federal Government unless the acquisition is in the national interest or for a public purpose 
under a law which makes provision for: (a) payment of fair and adequate compensation, and (b) a right 
of access to the courts for the determination of the investor's interest of right and the amount of 
compensation to which he is entitled. - Compensation shall be paid without undue delay, and 
authorisation given for its repatriation in convertible currency where applicable. See Nigerian High 
Commission, "Foreign Investment Requirements and Protections" available at www.nigeriahc.org.uk 
accessed 21 February 2012. 
290 Article 31 provided that "no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law." It 
also provided that compensation would be paid to a person whose property has been taken for public 
gurposes. 
91 Each of these promises need technical elements in order to validate or to render them binding. For 
example, the declaration from state officials needs to cover three terms: I) the official should represent 
the state in high capacity 2) the declaration should be clear and address the particular point concisely 
E.g. we are looking for concepts that deal with integrated projects, which, as far as gas is concerned, 
will give us an end-product such as desalinated water power, or petrochemicals' Oil &Gas Journal, 
Feb.15.1999. Mr.Ali AL-Naimi, Saudi Arabian minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources. Not only 
can the foreign investment declarations or invitations affect the FDI but also political declarations, e.g. 
the end of Iraqi-Iranian war in 1988. This encouraged the foreign investor to invest in the area due to 
the political stability and the freedom of selling. See Investment climate report in the Arab countries 
(1998) pp. 12-18). 
292Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 200 I. General Assembly resolution 56/83 
of 12 December 2001, and corrected by document A/56/49(Vol. IYCorr.4. http://www.un.org!law/ilcl. 
http://untreaty.un.orglilc/textslinstrumentslenglishldraftOIo20articlesl9_6 _ 200 I.pdf accessed 15 
February 2012; See also United Nations International Law Commission, The International Law 
Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Shabtai Rosenne, ed., Volume I (Dorderecht: 
Martinus NiJijoff, 1991 )p. 108. 
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The emergence of transnational companies reflects the globalisation of 
economic activities and new forms of specialisation and the 
international division of labour requiring direct investment in foreign 
markets. Some states, however, for obvious economic reasons, are 
more favourable to the operations of multinational companies based in 
their own territory than other states where these companies are 
operating. Developing countries especially have expressed concern 
about the dominance of TNCs in national economies, in contract 
negotiations and in other respects concerning company interests, 
including interference in the domestic politics of the host state. 
Industralised countries, on the other hand, tend to be more worried 
about the protection of the investments of their multinationals in 
foreign countries and about legal certainty for their transactions.293 
136 
It is difficult not to appreciate that for the foreign investor engaging with a developing 
state, it is possible to experience serious disappointments resulting in heavy financial 
losses. It is arguable that it is the attempt to resist such losses that have led to the 
Aminoil and Aramco cases we have discussed earlier. 
Investors are interested in receiving compensation when the state expropriates or 
nationalise investment in an arbitrary way.294 Multinationals and their home countries 
have in fact become more careful in requesting guarantees that ensure they avoid 
endangering investment. However, it could also be argued that the host state must also 
act in a manner that aligns with its national interests developmental needs and with 
deference to emergency situations. Therefore, the real tasks before a state like Saudi 
Arabia are three fold. First, there must be internal self-conviction to provide a safe 
investment milieu. The political will must be in fact very genuine and shared by the 
most important political actors in the state. Second, there must be social cohesion 
among the citizenry and civil and professional groups. Indeed Saudi Arabia cannot 
afford to be divided on the push toward economic success and the attraction of 
foreign capital in any way. Third, the State must communicate convincingly that it is 
irredeemably committed to economic development through promotion of FDI. 
Divisions and disunity on the issue will be spotted by foreigners and foreign 
businesses. We have shown above that the highest political authorities in the 
293 Peter Malanczuk, Michael Barton Akehurst, Akehursl's,Modern Introduction 10 International Law 
7th Revised edition (London: Routledge, 1997) p. 103. 
294BP Exploration Co v Hunt, [1979] 1 WLR 783. 
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Kingdom have expressed serious commitments to the international community to 
attract and retain capital within an environment of reform. 
The objective of the economic reform discussed here is it to modernize the state and 
get it to comparable Western or international standards. Saudi Arabia would benefit 
from reform of the entire legal system in order to make its laws more transparent and 
applicable to third party states and multinationals. These concepts can also be 
usefulfor the other Middle East states. The era of expropriation and nationalization of 
multinationals is perhaps long gone.295 The history of oil nationalisation in the Middle 
East and other parts of the developing world is a long one and includes the Iranian 
nationalisation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and Libyan Nationalisation of 
American Oil Companies. 296 In truth, the developments and assurances emanating 
from Saudi Arabia are indeed common currency among developing states. What 
makes developments in Saudi Arabia unique is its obvious attraction to Western oil 
multinationals as the largest producer of both oil and gas resources and its influential 
position vis a vis other Arab and middle eastern States. It may be suggested that while 
the prevention of expropriation and nationalization is the best-case scenario for 
investors and the development of international law on the topic has indeed made 
compensation and reparation unavoidable in the event of state expropriation, 
nevertheless, what amounts to prompt compensation in case law is less clear. 297 
Prompt compensation may have to come after long dispute settlement means hence 
29SSee IAIGC, Investment Climate Report in the Arab Countries (Kuwait: 1993) pp. 15-17; A.F .M. 
Maniruzzaman, "Expropriation of Alien property and the Principle of Non-Discrimination in 
International Law of Foreign Investment: An Overview", Vol. 8 Journal o/Transnational Law and 
Policy, No.1 (1998»; Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco). 27/.L.R. 117, 168 
1958. 
296 Iran Chamber Society, "History oflran: Oil Nationalization", Iran Chamber Society Wednesday, 
February 22,2012 available at 
http://www.iranchamber.com/history/oil_nationalization/oitnationalization.php accessed 21 February 
2012. Since the 1970s: forced nationalization of major, foreign-owned oil assets in other parts of the 
world include; Venezuela, Bolivia, Russia, Nigeria and Kazakhstan. Expropriations of foreign-owned 
oil assets more likely with high oil prices and weak political institutions. See S. Gurlev, A. Kolotilin, 
K. Sonin, "Expropriations of Foreign-Owned Oil Assets more Likely with High Oil Prices and Weak 
Political Institutions", 25 March 2008 http://www.voxeu.orglindex.php?q=nodell004 available at 
accessed 21 February 2012; D. W. Bowett, "Libyan Nationalisation of American Oil Companies' 
Assets" Vol. 37, The Cambridge Law Journal No. 1, (Apr., 1978) pp.5-8. 
297 On Monday, April 10th, 2000, Saudi Arabia's Council of Ministers approved a new Foreign 
Investment Law, following the recommendation of the Supreme Economic Council. In a dramatic 
change from the previous investment law, the new Foreign Investment Law allows foreigners 100-
percent ownership of the projects. 
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the problems faced by Aramco discussed earlier.298 This is one of the areas of possible 
improvements for the Kingdom. It should of course make it clear in its policies and 
laws that it will not expropriate in all but the most compelling circumstances but more 
importantly that if it does there will be prompt and adequate compensation. 
The early cases such as the Chozow Factory case299 and the Norwegian Shipowners 
Claims case300 did not turn on the 'prompt, adequate, and effective' formula. The 
Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources and Wealth 1962 also 
merely referred to appropriate compensation,' a phrase that received the arbitrator's 
approval in the Texaco case.301 In Amoco and International Finance Corporation,302 a 
distinction was made between lawful and unlawful expropriations for the purposes of 
determining adequacy and effectiveness of compensation. In the case of unlawful 
taking, full restitution (which has been interpreted to entail calculated future earnings) 
in kind or monetary terms is required so as to put the affected concern back to its 
overall position status ante. While in the case of lawful taking, as was found in 
respect of Iran, the standard was the payment of the full value of the undertaken at the 
moment of dispossession. However the 1962 Resolution tried to reconcile the 
interests of the capital-exporting and importing countries by providing in Paragraph 4 
that nationalization, expropriation, or requisitioning shall be based on grounds or 
reasons of public utility, security, or national interest, which are recognized as 
overriding purely individual or private interests, both domestic and foreign. In such 
cases the owner shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules 
in force in the state enforcing such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in 
accordance with international law. In any case where there is dispute as to 
compensation, the principle of exhaustion of the local remedies of the state making 
the expropriation shall apply. Thus the resolution seeks to guarantee the enjoyment of 
298 See further Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Compensatory Damages (Art. 63(1 », Judgment of July 21, 
1989, Inter-Am. Ct.H.R. (Ser. C) No.7 (1990); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199,279 (1796); 
Garcia v. United States (Decision of the General Claims Commission, United States and Mexico), No. 
292,3 Dec. 1926, reprinted in 21 Amer. J. Inti Law S81 (1927); Benjamin Ferencz, "Compensating 
Victims of the Crimes of War," 12 Va. J. Inti Law (1972) p. 343. 
299The Factory At Chorzow (Claim for Indemnity) (The Merits) Germany v. Poland .. PCIJ Series A, 
No 17, 1928, p. 46. Cases also available at: 
www.worldcourts.com/pcij/engldecisionslI928.09 .13_ chorzow l.htm accessed 21 February 2012. 
300(1922) 1 RlAA, pp. 307, 339-41. 
301 17 ILM, 1978, pp.3, 29. 
30283 ILR, p. 603. 
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legitimate fruits of investment for the capital-exporting states while preserving the 
sovereignty of the capital-importing states to restructure their economy. 
More recent developments like the World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of 
Foreign Direct Investment303 are notable in their compatibility with the Western 
position. Section IV (1) of the Guidelines provides that a state may not expropriate 
foreign private investment except where this is executed in accordance with 
applicable legal procedures, in pursuance in good faith of a public purpose without 
discrimination on the basis of nationality and against the payment of appropriate 
compensation. Section IV (2) notes that compensation will be deemed appropriate 
only where it is adequate, prompt, and effective. 
In contrast, resolutions adopted by the UN have tended to be generally more 
favourable to developing states, but frowned upon by the developed ones. The true 
intentions of these resolutions remains debatable, but scholars from the developing 
states insist they are directed toward the rectification of age-old wrongs.304 Thus, the 
UN Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order 1974 
grants to each state the right to determine the amount of 'possible compensation' as 
well as the mode of payment. It reaffirms that states have an inalienable right to 
nationalize property and is silent on the duty to compensation. The Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States 1974 expressly grants a right: "to nationalise, 
expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property in which case appropriate 
compensation should be paid ... taking into account its relevant laws and regulations 
and all the circumstances that the state considers pertinent.30s" 
Regarding the fairness of the existing rules, it may be observed that although the 
objectives of the developed and developing states in respect of the laws of 
expropriation are opposable, they do not need to be irreconcilable in all cases. It is 
important that the property rights of foreigners should be protected and that the 
practice of international investment is continued. However, it is understandable that 
303 31 ILM, 1992, p. 1382. 
304 V.O Vmozurike, Introduction to International Law, (Lagos: Spectrum Publishing, 1993) p. 138. 
30S OEeD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, "Indirect Expropriation and the right to 
regulate in international law working paper on international investment". No; 2004/4. 
http://www.oecd.orgldataoecdl22154/33776546.pdfaccessed 15 February 2012. 
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nationalization arose in many cases because of the need to correct past ills. Many 
nationalized properties or concessions had been acquired in colonial days by the use 
of force, threats, or deceit. It is also necessary to understand that the international 
economic system has so far not been conducive for the economic growth of the 
developing states. One could also argue that in the immediate post-colonial era, new 
nations had weaker bargaining power vis a viz MNCs. 
In the post-colonial era, most investments, particularly in key industries that form the 
backbone of the economy of states, have taken the form of joint ventures and 
partnerships between the foreign investors and national governments, thus the impetus 
to embark on nationalization policies will naturally be on the decline. There are other 
mechanisms, which go a long way in reducing the harshness of the practice of 
expropriation. An example of this is the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of other States 1966, which sets up a centre for 
settling investment disputes by conciliation and arbitration. The utility of Treaties of 
Friendships and Commerce as a means of avoiding the commencement of dispute 
situations cannot be over-estimated. 306 Multilateral instruments such as the 
Conventions establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 1985 have 
also made provisions for insurance cover 'against non-commercial risks' such as 
measures of expropriation. 
In the light of the above discussions it is pertinent that Saudi Arabia continues to 
project an image of being a safe investment destination for oil and gas industry and 
indeed protect investors not only through promises but also in practices. In this guise 
promises to multinational corporations and other states are crucial. Mutual assurances 
like the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and 
Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments are also welcome developments.307 
306 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America) 1984 ICJ REP. 392 June 27, 1986. The ICJ pointed out that the existence of such a treaty 
between the US and Nicaragua oUght to prevent the US from its actions against Nicaraguan interests in 
the way they occurred. 
307 Chester Brown, Kate Miles, See Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011) pp. 2-3; this agreement is also available at 
http://www.finmin.nic.inlbipalSaudio/o20Arabia.pdfaccessed 17 February 2012. 
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S.2. Improvement upon the regime of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and 
Multilateral Treaties (MITs) 
Bilateral investment treaties have developed as a tool of international economlC 
relations in exponential terms. Their popularity, which grew in the 1980s developed 
even more rapidly in the 1990s, and by the start of the new century had led to 
thousands of such arrangements and instruments.308 A bilateral investment treaty is an 
agreement concluded between two states in which each state agrees to offer certain 
protections to investors and foreign direct investment from the other state. It has been 
held that BITs have a two-fold purpose: to offer legal protection to investors with 
respect to investment in host states and to encourage the flow of investment. 309 It is 
perhaps relevant to note that BITs have a European origin. The first such treaty was 
between Federal Republic of Germany and Pakistan on November 25, 1959. In time, 
other European states adopted this approach to treaty relations with other developing 
states?lO It is perhaps for this reason that some argue that BITs have become the tool 
of choice employed by developed states as a bulwark against expropriation by 
developing states which became a problem since the 1950s. 
Despite this concern, Saudi Arabia has embraced this device with enthusiasm and 
there are currently at least eight BITs between the Kingdom and other states. The 
operative BITs are between Saudi Arabia and the following states: 3 1 1 
Belgium 
Malaysia 
Austria 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
301 Somarajah op.cit., pp. 204-5. For historical accounts on the subject see Rudolf Dolzer and Margrete 
Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties (1995) pp. 1-3; F.A. Mann, "British Treaties and for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments" Vol. 52 BYIL (1982) p. 241; M.S. Bergman, "Bilateral 
Investment Protection Treaties: An Examination of the. Evolution and Significance of the U.S. 
Prototype Treaty," 16 N.Y.U. J. Int'll. & Poly 1 (1983). 
309 Qureshi and Ziegler op.cit., pp. 412-413. 
310 Dolzer and Stevens, op.cit., p. 1; Qureshi and Ziegler ibid. p. 413. 
311 The UNCTAD maintains a list of Bilateral Investment Treaties in its Investment Instruments Online 
Available at: http://www.unctadxi.orgltemplateslDocSearch.aspx?id=779, accessed on October 25, 
2010. 
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Republic of Korea 
Czech Republic 
Switzerland. 
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BITs form only part of the international network of investment rules, which also 
include other bilateral, regional, and multilateral trade agreements with investment 
provisions. Yet it is significant to examine briefly the Saudi Arabian bilateral treaties. 
It is notable that apart from the BITs between the Republic of Korea and Saudi Arabia 
and Saudi Arabia and Malaysia, the majority ofthe BITs are with Western European 
states. The BITs all share a common objective of creation of a special economic 
relationship (a) between the states and (b) between the states and the investors. A 
central feature is the creation of a More Favourable Treatment clause, which can be 
seen in the case of the Agreement between the Governments of the Kingdom Of 
Saudi Arabia And The Government Of Malaysia Concerning The Promotion And 
Reciprocal Protection Of Investments, which stated: 
If the treatment accorded by either Contracting Party, according to its 
laws and regulations, to investments or activities in connection with 
investments made by investors of the other Contracting Party is more 
favourable than that provided for in this Agreement, the more 
favourable treatment shall be accorded.312 
The levelling of the field approach is sometimes so phrased as to nearly be 
incompatible with the liberal free trade ideology that obtains globally. Hence the 
operative parts of the Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Korea 
and the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Concerning the Reciprocal 
Encouragement and Protection of Investments included the provision that states: 
ARTICLE 2 
(1) Each Contracting Party shall in its territory promote as far as possible 
investments by investors of the other Contracting Party and admit such 
investments in accordance with its laws and regulations. It shall in any 
case accord such investments fair and equitable treatment. (2) 
Investments by investors of either Contracting Party shall enjoy full 
312 Agreement between the Government of Malaysia and the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia Concerning the Promotion of investment. Available at 
http://www .iisd.org/pdfl2006/investment_ malaysia _ saudi.pdf accessed 15 Jan 2012. 
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protection and security in the territory of the other Contracting Party. 
Each Contracting Party shall not in any way impair by arbitrary or 
discriminatory measures the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment 
or disposal of investments in its territory by investors of the other 
Contracting Party. 
ARTICLE 3 
(1) Each Contracting Party shall grant investments once admitted and 
investment returns of the investors of the other Contracting Party a treatment 
not less favourable than that accorded to investments and investment returns 
of investors of any third state. (2) In accordance with its laws and regulations, 
each Contracting Party shall grant investments once admitted and investment 
returns of the investors of the other Contracting Party a treatment not less 
favourable than that accorded to investments and investment returns of its 
investors.313 
While it is certainly not mentioned in any of the BITs that open discrimination will 
exist with respect to states that are not party to the bilateral arrangement, issues may 
indeed be raised as to whether some of the BITs are opposed to the general WTO 
arrangement, which is binding on Saudi Arabia. 
Furthermore there is usually the exchange of assurances that funds and profits will be 
freely repatriated. A case in point is that Article 6 of the Agreement Between The 
Republic Of Austria And The Kingdom Of Saudi-Arabia Concerning The 
Encouragement And Reciprocal Protection Of Investments The Republic Of Austria 
And The Kingdom Of Saudi-Arabia. This provision stated: 
Each Contracting Party shall guarantee to investors of the other Contracting 
Party the free transfer of payments in connection with investments and 
investment returns they hold in the territory of the other Contracting Party, in 
particular: 
(a) The principal and additional amounts to maintain or increase the 
investment; 
(b) The returns; 
(c) In repayment ofloans; 
(d) The proceeds from the liquidation or the sale of the whole or any part of 
the investment; 
(e) The compensation provided for in Article 4; 
(f) Payments arising out of the settlement of a dispute; 
313Total number of Bilateral Investment Treaties concluded, I June 2011 available 
http://www.unctad.orglsectionsldite'''pcbb/docslbits_saudi _ arabia.pdfaccessed 15 January 2012. 
143 
144 
(g) Earnings and other remuneration of personnel engaged in connection with 
an investment. 
A central feature of the existing BITs that involve Saudi Arabia is the Settlement of 
Dispute clause. Inevitably, arbitration plays a central part. The dispute settlement 
clauses in all the instances involve dispute settlement arrangements between the 
states, and between the states and the investors. In the case of the latter, it is always a 
requirement that disputes concerning investments between the contracting parties and 
investors "should as far as possible be settled amicably.,,314 If, however, the dispute 
cannot be settled in that way the usual prescription is for a request within six months 
filed to the competent court of law of the contracting party in whose territory the 
investments was made or filed for arbitration under the Convention.3lS 
The matter may also usually be filed for arbitration under the requisite treaty or under 
the Convention of March 18, 1965, on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of other States. If the investor chooses to file for arbitration, the 
contracting party agrees to the settlement by arbitration and not to request the 
exhaustion of local settlement procedures. In the Saudi Arabia and the Belgo-
Luxembourg Economic Union (B.L.E.U.) arrangement it was agreed that, 
11 (4). 
At any stage of the arbitration proceedings or of the execution of an 
arbitral award, none of the Contracting Parties involved in a dispute 
shall be entitled to raise as an objection the fact that the investor who 
is the opposing party in the dispute has received compensation totally 
or partly covering his losses pursuant to the guarantee provided for in 
Article (6) of this Agreement.316 
Similarly in the Agreement Between The Government of the Republic of Korea and 
the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Concerning the Reciprocal 
Encouragement and Protection of Investments, it was stated that in Article 11 (2) that 
314 ARTICLE 11 Agreement Between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and The Belgo-Luxembourg 
Economic Union (B.L.E.U.) Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection ofInvestments. 
m See Article 11 (2). 3. If the dispute is submitted in accordance with paragraph (2) to the competent 
Court of Law of the Contracting Party, the investor cannot at the same time seek international 
arbitration. If the dispute is filed for arbitration the award shall be binding and shall not be subject to 
any appeal or remedy other than those provided for the said Convention. The award shall be enforced 
in accordance with domestic law. 
316 See, The Saudi Arabia and the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union (B.L.E.U.) Agreement 
www.cnarb.comltzzclszwlieuropelBelgiuml200811 /892S.html accessed 19 January 2012. 
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if the dispute cannot be settled amicably within six (6) months from the date when the 
request for the settlement was submitted, it shall at the request of the investor be filed 
with the competent court of law of the Contracting Party in whose territory the 
investment was made, or filed for arbitration under the Convention of March 18, 
1965, on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States. But importantly the provision (3) also stated that if the dispute is 
submitted in accordance with paragraph (2) to the competent court of the Contracting 
Party, the investor cannot at the same time seek international arbitration. If the dispute 
is filed for arbitration, the award shall be binding and shall not be subject to any 
appeal or remedy other than those provided for in the said Convention. The award 
shall be enforced in accordance with domestic law.317 
The BITs have gone far in developing the confidence of the business communities 
between the states. It remains to see whether much more can be achieved globally, 
either through a wide network of BITs, or through a proper engagement with the 
opportunity offered by the Saudi engagement with the WTO. It is this author's 
suggestion that while BITs should be further developed with certain states with high 
value investors, the larger picture must be kept in mind by the Saudi state. The larger 
picture is that more and more states are becoming economically powerful, and they 
must all be convinced of the suitability of Saudi Arabia as a destination for 
investment. In other words, multilateral investment platfonns are key to the 
Kingdom's economic development. It is in this light that the Agreement between 
India and Saudi Arabia discussed above is laudable. 318 Perhaps more importantly 
Saudi Arabia must aim to capitalise on its relative strengths as the largest economy in 
the Middle East, comprising 25 per cent of the Arab world's gross domestic product. 
Also its position as the world's leading oil exporter is relatively safe even as the Arab 
Spring plays OUt. 319 It is on the back of such success that Saudi authorities make 
assertions such as follows: 
317ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules. 
http://icsid.worldbank.orglICSIDlFrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=RulesMain 
accessed 21 February 2012. 
318 Chester Brown, Kate Miles, opcit. 
319 See Jackie DeAngelis, "Saudi Arabia's Growth Draws Investment" CNBC Thursday, 26 May 2011 
http://www.cnbc.comlidl43164222/Saudi_Arabia _ s _Growth_Draws _Investment accessed 21 February 
2012. 
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"Saudi Arabia has become key to the stability of the world economy and this 
is reflected in the number of investors who are lining up to invest in the 
Kingdom ... Thanks to the economic reforms, our rankings on various crucial 
indices have gone up phenomenally in the last few years".320 
Whereas much of this is true, it is also true as we have shown in our discussions 
above that much more still have to be done. Much of the success is actually due to 
vast oil wealth and not a deliberate fine-tuning of national laws to meet international 
standards. Without deep-rooted changes Saudi growth even in the context of a 
favourable investment era (such as in the last decade) will continue to depend on 
continuing good fortune and the vagaries of geopolitics.321 It cannot be debated that 
much more success is achievable if necessary changes are made not only in the sphere 
of rights and democratic standards but also in investment legislation. 
The relative advantages and positional strengths immediately outlined above must not 
be allowed to detract from focus on areas of improvement dictated by commitment to 
international commercial law rules such as the dictates of the ICSID Convention and 
the commitment to the regime of conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes 
between contracting states and nationals of other contracting states. The objective in 
making such facilities available is to promote an atmosphere of mutual confidence 
between states and foreign investors conducive to increasing the flow of private 
international investment. 
While nearly all BITs provide for the reciprocal treatment of investment by each state, 
most BITs are concluded mostly between developed and developing states and 
according to the contract profiles they can decide who needs protection from whom. 
BITs usually address the following topics: (a) The rights of investors from one state to 
enter and establish investment in the other state; (b) The obligation of the host state to 
320 Prince Naifmade the statements at the opening of the Fifth Global Competitiveness Forum. See 
Siraj Wahab, "Saudi Arabia Best Place for Investment" Global Competiveness Forum Jan 2011 
available at http://www.gcfialk.coml?p=37S accessed 15 February 2012. 
321 Saudi Arabia has made good progress as a result of the troubles of its neighbours in recent times It 
is set to make more money as a result of new International sanctions against Iran. See "Saudi Arabia 
Says it can Raise Oil Production to fill any Supply Gap" AI Arabiya News Wednesday, 22 February 
2012 available at http://www.alarabiya.netlarticlesl2012/01/16/1886S3.html accessed 22 February 
2012. Similarly the Libyan crisis was an opportunity for Saudi Arabia to become more attractive to 
buyers of oil and gas resources. See "Clifford Krauss, "Saudi Arabia, Defying OPEC, Will Raise Its 
Oil Output" The New York Times June 10,2011 available at 
http://www.nytimes.coml20lll06/1llbusinessienergy-environmentllloil.html accessed 20 February 
2012. 
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treat investors according to the so-called "minimum international standards"; and (c) 
The right of the host state to expropriate assets of the investor located in the host state, 
with a corresponding duty to provide compensation (usually full compensation). 
From the above, it can be concluded that the development of international BITs 
shapes a new understanding among contracting parties. This kind of co-operation 
creates trust between developed and developing countries. This trust would not be as 
effective if it were not grounded in international law. These shifts open the door to 
other types of international contracts and treaties. But, in this case, it is multilateral 
treaties that allow new parties to become a party to the contract rather than the state. 
International rules on the protection of foreign direct investment contribute to the 
creation of favourable investment climates that benefit both international investors 
and host countries. Further reflection is needed on the rules of investment protection 
rules. Rules of this kind are enshrined in many bilateral or regional investment treaties 
but in some cases they have been subject to unexpected and controversial 
interpretations. Thus, international rules on FDI are not new, and have actually been 
implemented since the Second World War.322 
The first code of foreign investment is the Charter of the International Trade 
Organization (ITO), signed in Havana, Cuba, in 1948. Chapter III of the Charter -
Articles 8-15. These provisions highlight the foreign investment protection 
(specifically, Article 12 (l)(A)(B».323 For example, some treaties of the United States 
have special concerns about the employment and high skills of foreign parties - i.e., 
Article VIII (1) of the treaty with Netherlands. The potential of FDI to contribute 
significantly to economic growth in both home and host countries is being 
increasingly recognized. However, the framework of multilateral rules for FDI should 
ensure the right conditions for international investment to be beneficial to sustainable 
development. Quite naturally, this aspect is of even greater importance for WTO 
322Fraser Cameron, The European Union as a Modelfor Regional Integration. (September 2010) 
Available at: http://www .cfr.orgleuleuropean-union-model-regional-integrationlp2293S accessed 21 
February 2012. The European Community is the most advanced example of regional integration of the 
economies of its member countries, establishing a single internal market governed by common 
institutions and rules, and granting individual rights as to their respect to individuals and enterprises. 
323 Z.A. Kronfol, Protection of Foreign Investment: A Study in International Law, (Netherlands: 
Sijthoff: Leiden, 1972) p. 30. 
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members that are still developing. In this respect, traditional provisions on special and 
differential treatment for developing countries may no longer suffice. 
This argument reflects the non-discrimination principle between the contributing 
parties. This is one of the legal guarantees regulated under the International Trade 
Organization (ITO) Charter 1948 (Chapter III Article II (1)(b»,324 and it covers the 
aim of concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements (Article 12 (2)(b». One of the 
keys to attracting long term FDI is to ensure that the treatment of established investors 
is predictable,325 and must be flexible with changes in applicable domestic laws, and 
regulations should be brought about as transparent as possible. International investors 
have identified difficulties in establishing knowledge of the laws and regulations of 
the host country as an important issue hindering their interest in investments abroad, 
and this can give a clear example of the global trend to the use arbitration in contract 
disputes. 
5.3. Utility and Strategic Value of Stabilization Clauses 
Indeed, having regarded the high capital risk and input that is often involved in 
foreign investment, especially in the natural resources sector, the economic, political, 
and regulatory stability of the host state is extremely important for attracting new 
investors. Therefore, over the last few years, there was a rapidly growing notion of 
BITs and Multilateral Investment Treaties (MITs) aiming to facilitate foreign 
investment in developing and transitional economies by inserting stabilization 
techniques. Likewise, international investment agreements e.g., regarding the 
exploration or exploitation of natural resources have included since the 1 960s the so-
called stabilization or freezing clauses.326 Although it is significant to mention that it 
has been noted that, "the presence or otherwise of such a clause affects the least of 
investors' decisions in countries such as Saudi Arabia and Brazil.,,327 More recently, 
some national investment codes equally provide for stability .provisions. All these 
324Maniruzzaman (1998) op.cit, p. 57. Also see, 
http://www .wto.org/englishlthewto _ e/whatis_ eltiC elfact4_ e.htm accessed 24 February 2012 
325Kronfol (1972) op.cit. 
326 Maniruzzaman, A., « Some Reflections on Stabilisation Techniques in International Petroleum, Gas 
and Mineral Agreements," 4 International Energy Law & Taxation Review, pp. 96-100 (2005). 
327 See Cameroon, P., "Stabilisation in Investment Contracts and Changes of Rules in Host Countries: 
Tools for Oil & Gas Investors" (2006), available at http://lba.legis.state.ak.uslsgaldocJog/2006-07-
05_aipn_stabilization-cameron_final.pdf. accessed on August 30. 2010. 
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legal instruments have in common that they aim at immunizing against the impact of 
possible changes in the host state's law. This development gives stabilization clauses 
great relevance despite the continuing importance of state sovereignty. Therefore, we 
will firstly outline the nature of stabilization clauses in order to analyse them from the 
legal perspective: 
5.3.1: The legal Nature of Stabilization Clauses 
In this case, it can be argued that the nature of the stabilization clauses comes from 
the type of investment, which can give the investor important rights within the host 
state and assure security of investment. Stabilization clauses can be separated into a 
number of categories. 328 
Effective stabilization clauses aim to protect the contract from the application of 
legislation, or administrative measures, subsequent to the contract's conclusion. There 
are at least three identifiable forms of stabilization clauses: 
1. Provisions stating that the investor's right will remain unaffected by 
subsequent enactments; 
2. The anti-consistency rule according to which the agreement will prevail over 
future legislation or regulation if there is inconsistency between the two; and 
3. The incorporation and freezing of the specific date that the host country's 
municipal law was inserted into the contract. In this point arguably the nature 
of the stabilization clause is to remind the state that in this area it is under 
specific conditions and obligations, which cannot be breached. 
Moreover stabilization clauses can be seen as especial procedures that can secure 
economic and development agreements under intemationa1law. On one hand, there 
are those who believe that the validity of stabilization clauses 'branch' from the 
principle of contract sanctity, whereas, on the other hand, there are others who argue 
328 Kronfol (1972) op.cit., pp. 58 
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against their validity on the basis of the principle of sovereignty over natural 
resources, which would not allow authorities to sign away their independence. 
5.3.2: The Validity of Stabilization Clauses 
In an "internationalized" contract where the parties have specified a non-national 
governing law, the validity of the stabilization clauses can be upheld to derive from 
the parties' choice of international law or general principles as the governing law of 
the agreement. In other words, the validity is the enforcement of the agreement. 
Arbitrator Dupuy took that approach in the TOPCO case.329 Even when a stabilization 
clause can be upheld under international law, this of would not detract from the fact 
that the host state's authorities have the power to act in breach of it by changing the 
investment conditions. Yet, nothing can prevent a state from carrying out such an act. 
However, this does not imply that stabilization clauses are useless. It has been 
observed that "the most important aspect of a modem arbitration statute is the 
irrevocability of the arbitration clause. ,,330 
Stabilization clauses have a functional value, in that they support the private 
contractor's bargaining position. When an authority knows that it will be widely 
shamed by an arbitral ruling upholding the stabilization clause and giving it its full 
effect, it will be willing to compromise. When an authority is found to have acted in 
breach of a stabilization clause, the investor will have a right to due compensation. 
To achieve the purpose of stabilization clauses in the long term, contracts including 
such clauses should be away from the changing national law . Even if this happens, the 
contract has to be protected from the host state's law reform. Even still, when the state 
changes its law, the law governing FDI will only exist for that particular contract and 
the new law will not apply to it. Unless the contracting parties agree to change it, the 
clause should be viewed as an independent obligation governed by international law 
329Robert B. von Mehren and P. Nicholas Kourides, "International Arbitrations between States and 
Foreign Private Parties: The Libyan Nationalization Cases",The American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 75, No.3 (Jul., 1981), pp. 476-552. TOPCO, 53 I.L.R. at 474,482, quoting Saudi Arabia v. 
Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco), 27 I.L.R. 117, 168 1958. 
33~mest G. Lorenzen. "Commercial Arbitration. International and Interstate Aspects", Vol. 43, The 
Yale Law Journa/, No.5 (Mar., 1934), pp. 716-765. 
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regardless of state sovereignty. The contract's governing law as a whole will remain 
valid in the eyes of the law. 
5.3.3: Stabilization Clauses and State Sovereignty: Legitimacy of the Saudi 
Investment Policies and Laws 
It is clear that states must retain the right to act within their national sovereignty and 
must be able to make tough decisions in regard to many areas of national and 
international life. In OPEC meetings for instance since the Gulf War, Saudi Arabia 
has been clearly in the dominant position. It refused to relinquish its hold on pricing 
output decision-making. Yet where the confidence of investors is shaken because of 
the action of government, much needed investment may not come in and the 
exploitative industry of the state will suffer. To this extent even a resource rich state 
like Saudi Arabia must curtail its drive for ostentatious actions within its sovereignty 
because the attraction of investors to any given territory is not inelastic. 331 The 
situation where it is recognised that the royal family has effectively constructed 
international and regional alliances aimed largely at preserving its power and " .. .in 
the absence of any institutionalized mechanisms for accountability, the royal family 
has always allocated state resources in the manner of absolute monarchs" may no 
longer continue without serious negative effects and such as reluctance of foreign 
partners to engage with the kingdom. 332 The atmosphere of the international 
investment and the oil revenue in 1996-97 was an initial warning to the Saudi 
authorities when its oil production was reduced from 10,000,000 a day to 2,200,000. 
This forced the Saudi authorities to adopt new legal policies in favour of maintaining 
economic development.333 International co·operation and consultation have, however, 
become more commonplace, particularly under the auspices of the United Nations.334 
331 The thesis in Chapter one noted the criticisms of the alleged use ofthe influence ofa Prince in 
affecting the decision in a case between a company owned by Saudi billionaire Mohammed Bin Issa AI 
Jaber who failed in its bid to claim $381m in damages from Emaar. See Saudi Investment Support 
Centre, "Dubai's Emaar, Saudi's Jadawel settle dispute" opcit. 
332 Amr Hamzawy, "The Saudi Labyrinth: Evaluating the Current Political Opening Democracy and 
Rule of Law", Number 68 Carnegie Papers Middle East Series Democracy April 2006 p. S. Available 
at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/fileslCP68.hamzawy.FINAL.pdf accessed 10 March 2012. 
333 See World Bank, Investment Climate Report in the Arab Countries 1986 pp. 169·181. 
334 The Saudi Arabian legal system is based on Islamic law, the Shari'a, with theQuran providing the 
most important source of law. Nonetheless, Royal and Ministerial Decrees are periodically issued to 
meet the complexities of modern life and commercialized business transactions. Such Decrees are only 
valid, however, if they do not conflict with Shari'ah law. Also, the use of settlement or arbitration for 
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The law and practice of International Arbitration is one of the strong factors that have 
come to temper the full complements of sovereignty. Arbitration continues to be one 
of the best representations and reflection of the laws developed within the 
international economic order. In the case of Saudi Arabia it is contained in the 
Commercial Court Regulations, issued by Royal Decree 5-1-1350H (particularly 
Article (1».335 
If the state is a party to such different types of treaties the question is if a dispute 
arises, how can the contracting parties, or any third party who has an interest, reach 
their goals or protect their rights if there is not clear legal applications or guidelines to 
follow. To some extent, Saudi Arabia is slow in modifying or reforming its legal 
system.336 Saudi Arabia does have a dispute settlement mechanism in its legal system, 
but the current Saudi authorities are trying to modify its regulatory instruments in 
order to provide speedy procedures and preventive measures to deal with any dispute 
between the commercial parties. The Saudi market is characterized by the dominance 
of joint ventures, whereby the national partner is trying to secure some control over 
the enterprise. At the same time, the authorities are engaging in proactive approaches 
in order to respond to any improvements in the disputes settlement mechanisms. New 
tools to bring impartial and independent regional and international bodies are updated 
deciding conflicts is becoming more common. This new trend in the FDI it is not new issue to the Arab 
countries it developed since 1995 UNCTAD Report illustrated that 226 billion dollars is the total FDI, 
1994, and 235 billion dollars in 1995 and United State is the dominate country who attract this 
investments. See Investment Climate Report in the Arab Countries /995 pp. 22-25 See, OPEC Member 
Countries' Crude Oil Production Allocations (1000 bid). 
http://www .opec.org/ opec_web/static _files ...,projectlmedialdownloadsldata JI'IlphsiProductionLevels.p 
dfaccessed 15 January 2012. 
33SEstablishment and conduct of commercial courts is regulated by Royal Decree No. 32 issued on 15 
Moharram 1350 H. (1930). Under this law, a "Committee for Commercial Disputes" comprising two 
"Shari'ah" Judges and one Legal Adviser settle all commercial disputes, except for those related to 
insurance business. The disputes related to insurance business are referred to the Ministry of 
Commerce for decision. Arbitration Law, promulgated by Royal Decree No. MJ46 dated 12/7/1403 H. 
(April 25, 1983) cancelled and superseded the previous arbitration provisions contained in the above-
mentioned Royal Decree No. 32. Since December 31, 1987, Commercial Disputes have been within the 
competence of the Grievances Court (Diwan AI-Mazalem), Commercial Circuit, instead of the 
Committee for Commercial Disputes. The disputes pertaining to negotiable instruments are governed 
by Negotiable Instruments Regulations approved by the Council of Ministers Resolutions No. 692 
dated 26 Ramadan 1383 H. (1963) and issued under Royal Decree No. 37 dated 11 Shawwal 1383 H. 
(1963). These regulations supersede Chapters VI, VII, VIII and IX of Commercial Court Regulations 
issued under Royal Decree No. 32 of 1350 H. also see, Saudi Arabia issued its first Arbitration 
Regulations in 1983 (Royal Decree No. Ml46 dated 1983), and its implementing rules by Council of 
Ministers Resolution No.7/2021/M dated 8/9/1405 H, corresponding to May 27, 1985. 
336See, the Official site for the Ministry of Justice in Saudi Arabia in 2011 the courts. Available at: 
http://www.moj.gov.salar-salCourts/Pagesidefault.aspx accessed 19 February 2012. 
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regularly. These measures were based on the Islamic practice adopted in Saudi Arabia 
to secure foreign investment in a climate of a dynamic market and one of the fastest 
growing economies of the Middle East. Yet it is not easy to enforce an arbitration 
judgment in Saudi Arabia. The difficulty of enforcing foreign arbitration awards in 
Saudi Arabia has led some non-Saudi parties to conclude that arbitrating any disputes 
in Saudi Arabia itself is inimical to investors' interests. A recent case suggests that 
arbitration approach indeed provides few guarantees to investors.337 
It is for these reasons that the concept of stabilisation clauses is of interest to our 
discussion at this stage. Stabilization and adaptation clauses are the two ways to 
achieve the parties' common objective to allocate between them the risk inherent in a 
long-term transaction. 338 Stabilization clauses in the oil and investment contracts are 
used to 'freeze' the parties' rights and obligations in the name of the sanctity of 
contracts (pacta sunt servanda) and adaptation clauses are useful for providing for the 
renegotiation of contractual conditions in the presence of a change of circumstances, 
in the name of the rebus sic stantibus rule. 339 Such legal arrangements are an 
important part of the overall package that a country can offer to potential foreign 
investors. Under commonly used stabilization clauses, the host government commits 
itself "not to change the regulatory framework in a way that affects the economic 
equilibrium of the project, and to compensate the investor ifit does 50".340 
The tension between the practice of stabilisation clauses and sovereignty is clear and 
relates to the Saudi experience as well. As a Cotula put it: 
"While these legal arrangements can help shelter investment from undue host 
state interference, they may also distort the pursuit of sustainable development 
337See, the law of the Board of Grievances 1982. Avalable at: 
http://www.saudiembassy.net/about/country-infonnationllawsfBoard _ ofJfievances Jaw.aspx Emaar 
vs Jadawe/, Available at: www.projectdubai.com/ta _news.php?news _id= 1802&section=cons. Also see 
the new FDI projects in Saudi Arabia, Available at: 
http://www.skyscrapercity.com/archive/index. php/f-641.html. 
338 Piero Bernardini, Stabilization and Adaptation in Oil and Gas Investments, the Journal o/World 
Energy Law & Business (2008) (1) p. 98. 
339 Ibid. 
340 Lorenzo Cotula, "Regulatory Takings, Stabilization Clauses and Sustainable Development", Paper 
prepared for the OBCD Global Forum on International Investment VII "Best practices in promoting 
investment for development" 
Paris, 27-28 March 2008 (OBCD Publication, 2008). Available at 
http://www.oecd.orgldataoecdl45/8/40311122.pdfaccessed 21 February 2012. 
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- the policy imRerative to balance economic, environmental and social 
considerations".3 1 
Developing countries, thus, have the view that these stabilization clauses affect their 
sovereignty especially with regards to the right to the absolute control over natural 
resources. Several United Nations Resolutions recognize this right as pertaining to all 
the states: 1961 UN Draft Natural Recourses 1803 (XVII), UN Resolution 1314 (XIII) 
1958 which gives the state the right to self-determination, UN Resolution 1515 (XV) 
1960 in which the recognition of state sovereignty over its natural recourses is 
specified, and finally Article 25 in the Convention of the Social and Cultural Rights 
1966. Sovereign breach or repudiation of a contract is a political risk when an 
authority or a state entity is a party. When there is no effective remedy against the 
breach, this amounts to the confiscation of the rights of the private party. The 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) Convention of 1988 has 
recognized the specific nature of this risk, including the non-commercial risks that the 
Agency can cover in favour of a MIGA guarantee holder, besides currency transfer 
(including non-convertibility) and expropriation and similar measures. These issues 
are defined in Article 11 of the Convention. Stabilization clauses, involved with a 
specific element of the state, such as economic development, affect the state's 
sovereign powers. Therefore, international law protects state sovereignty; from this 
perspective the state cannot be limited by contractual obligations it has not willingly 
entered into. One such example of this is Hong Kong's insistence of this practice with 
their agreements with Great Britain, though no formal stabilization clause existed in 
the treaty at that time. 342 
There are two arguments with respect to this issue: the first supports state sovereignty. 
Jimenez De Arechaga argued that the stabilization clause could only be effective in 
matters of compensation and cannot be used to limit state sovereignty. The second 
341 Ibid.,p. 2. The writer notes further at p. 3: "These tensions between investment protection and 
sustainable development goals call for the development of innovative approaches that can reconcile the 
investors' legitimate need to ensure stability of the investment climate with efforts to maximise the 
contribution of foreign investment to the pursuit of sustainable development goals". 
342 A/381265. El1983/85. 21 June 1983: Implications, under international law, of the United Nations, 
resolutions on pennanent sovereignty over natural resources, on the occupied Palestinian and other 
Arab territories and on the, obligations of Israel concerning its conduct in these territories. Report of 
the Secretary-General.available at: 
http://unispal.un.orglUNISPAL.NSF/0/60SSC7F840E60A060S2567C9004B7SOE accessed 23 
January 2012. 
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argument views state control as an analogy to state sovereignty as was argued by 
Professor Garcia-Amador. It could be said that Professor Garcia and Judge 
Fitzmaurice's views are more rationa1.343 This can be argued because when the host 
state enters itself into this type of contractual relationship and/or international treaties, 
the state argues to 'shrink' or 'sacrifice' part of its sovereignty in favour of economic 
development or national interest and it is linked to a compensation option, and this 
can come through the BIT and MIT's terms and conditions. Moreover these treaties 
are governed by international law, thus state sovereignty has not been abused, but 
rather the state has chosen to cease some of its obligations to protect investors.344 
Saudi practice in these areas has been of significance. In 2000, Saudi Arabia 
implemented the Foreign Investment Act by the Royal Decree Number (Mil), which 
liberalized the foreign investment laws in the Kingdom. 345 The Saudi Arabian 
General Investment Authority (SAGIA) was created under the Act, which has the 
responsibility for licensing all new foreign investment in Saudi Arabia. Under the new 
Act, foreign persons and entities are permitted to invest in all industries and services 
except for those which are specifically excluded from foreign investment. Saudi 
Arabia presents a wide variety of business opportunities for United States companies. 
343p E. Comeaux, N. S. Kinsella, Protecting Foreign Investment Under International Law, Legal 
Aspects of Political Risk (1997) pp. 12-15 , 29-30;C. T. Curtis, 'The Legal Security of Economic 
Development Agreements' (1988) 29 Harvard international law journal 317 . PP,317-365 
344 AFM Maniruzzaman. Damages for Breach of Stabilisation Clauses in International Investment Law: 
Where Do We Stand Today?Jnlernational Energy Law and Taxation Review (2007) pp. 246-251; E. 
Jimenez de Arechaga, "State Responsibility for the Nationalisation of Foreign owned Property" 
(1978) Vol. II New York University Journal of International Law and Politics pp. 179, 192. See 
further A.F.M. Maniruzzaman, "Some Reflections on Stabilisation Techniques in International 
Petroleum, Gas and Mineral Agreements", Vol. 3 Issue I OGEL (March 2005 at 
www.gasandoil.comJogel accessed on 15 February2012). Judge Jimenez de Arechaga, a vigorous 
advocate of the view that nations should maintain permanent sovereignty over natural resources, states 
that stabilization clauses "give rise to a special right of compensation" in an amount ''much higher than 
in normal cases," and that, when a state expropriates property rights that are subject to a stabilization 
clause, "there would be a duty to compensate also for the prospective gains (lucrum cessans) to be 
obtained by the private party during the period that the concession still has to run. See Paul E.Comeaux 
and Kinsella Ib.id. pp. 29-30; F.V. Garcia-Amador, "State Responsibility in case of "Stabilization" 
Clause", Vol. 2 J. Transnat'L L &Po/ 'y 23, 49-50 (1993).On Internationalization see Ian Brownlie, 
Principles of Public International Law (Clarendon Press, 1998) p. 255. 
34S Royal Decree in Foreign Investment Code Royal Decree no: MIllO April 2000. Also see, Royal 
Decree dated 2/2/1399 H, this also extends to nullifying all matters that contradict with the rules. 
Foreign Capital Investment Act promulgated under Royal Decree No. Ml4 dated 2 Safar 1399 H. 
(January I, 1979). Under Article 2 of this Act, regarding taxation and tariffs the Saudi authorities gives 
preferential treatment to the FDI and has implemented new laws showing it to be so; 3/3170 IN 
2.12.1413H. This law illustrates the alleviation of tax given to foreign investors involved with new 
projects and expansions to existing projects by the state. See Investment Climate Report in the Arab 
Countries /993 pp. 219-222. 
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In 2000, Chevron Phillips Chemical Co. LLC and its affiliates (CPChem) and private 
Saudi investors opened Saudi Chevron Phillips Co. The venture's petrochemical plant 
in Al Jubail is the kingdom's first privately financed basic petrochemical enterprise. A 
second company, Jubail Chevron Phillips, formed in 2003, operates another 
petrochemical facility adjacent to and integrated with the first plant. In 2005, the 
Chevron AIBakri Lubricants Company, a joint venture headquartered in Jeddah, was 
established. 346 
To be effective and successful, a company executive must have a basic knowledge of 
the business community in Saudi Arabia and the Saudi legal system. Such efforts 
would make a huge shift in its economy and attract more interests. However, the 
Saudi authorities have to take this as a lesson and it has to work to avoid any blunder 
in the future.347 
Stabilisation clauses are, thus, a veritable tool against expropriation. In this sense it is 
important that the Saudi legal system portray itself as to be very unlikely to engage in 
expropriation. The uses of stabilisation and adaptation clauses in doing so are vital. 
The term 'expropriation' or what some prefer to call 'nationalization' is used to 
denote the taking-over of foreign private property by a sovereign state in the exercise 
of the right of eminent domain. Generally, expropriation by law of enterprises is done 
with a view to public management in the national interest. It is particularly in this 
context that the term nationalization was developed. Expropriation therefore involves 
taking property, but actions, which are short of the direct dispossession of the assets 
in question, may still constitute the action of expropriation. Thus, in 1965, after a 
series of Indonesian decrees were passed, the UK government stated that: "in view of 
the complete inability of British enterprises and plantations to exercise and enjoy any 
rights of ownership in relation to their properties in Indonesia, Her Majesty's 
Government has concluded that the Indonesian Government has expropriated this 
346See Chevron Corporation, "Saudi Arabia Record of Achievement", available 
http://www.chevron.comlcountries/saudiarabialrecordofachievementl accessed 21 February 2012. See 
further the fact sheets for Chevron. http://www.chevron.comldocumentslpdf/saudiarabiafactsheet.pdf 
accessed 21 February 2012. 
347 In 1995 the Saudi Authorities signed the treaty, which protected the FDI, became a member of 
MIGA. See World Bank, Investment Climate Report in the Arab Countries 1996, p. 137. 
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property.,,348 Indeed, measures taken by a state can interfere with property to such an 
extent that these rights are rendered so useless that they may be deemed to have been 
expropriated even though legal title remain with the original owner (such an example 
can be seen as correctly explained by Malcom Shaw in the decision of Starret 
Housing Corporation v. Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.)349 
Nationalization must, however, be distinguished from confiscation, which is a 
punitive measure and occurs without compensation. It is however, arguable that some 
nationalisations are indeed of a confiscatory nature. In this sense we may note the 
existence of indirect expropriation.35o One such example of this is the measures taken 
after the Russian Revolution of October 1917 that brought in its wake the takeover of 
foreign-owned private property, most of it without any compensation. Normally the 
property rights of foreigners deserve protection under international minimum 
standards, yet such respect for property may sometimes perpetuate a state of unfair or 
exploitative relations. Even Western countries indulged in the policy of 
nationalization after the Second World War, as in Britain between 1949-1950, but 
those industries were privatized in the 1980s. However, the practice took root more 
than anywhere else in the policies of nationalization taken by the Soviet Union after 
its successes in the communist revolution and later on in the practice of the new states 
that emerged during the period of decolonization after the Second World War. 
In reality, there has been little agreement on the rules that guide expropriation. The 
main divisions occur between the views of the Western capitalist economies on one 
hand, and the communist/socialist states, and the developing states on the other. 
Whereas it is common position that expropriation may occur, the developed states 
with much heavy investment abroad, have consistently argued that it must take place 
in accordance with an "international minimum standard" set by international law. The 
developing states have equally consistently denied that this is true, or even desirable. 
348 See Malcolm Nathan ShawJnternational Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2003) p. 
285. 
349See Starrett Housing Corporation. Starrett Systems, Inc., Starrett HOUSing International, Inc., v. The 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Bank Omran, Bank Mellat Award of 14 July 1987. 
16.Iran-US CTR 3. See also Shaw op.cit.. p. 745. 
HO Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, "Indirect Expropriation and The "Right to 
Regulate" Working Papers on International Investment Number 2004/4 in International Investment 
Law September 2004 Available at http://www.oecd.orgldataoecdl22154/33776546.pdfaccessed 15 
February 2012. 
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Their position is akin to that expressed by the Soviet delegate to the International Law 
Association Conference of 1962, who stated that, 
in promulgating nationalism laws, the State fixes the procedure of 
nationalisation, including the question of whether or not 
compensation is to be paid to the former owners of nationalised 
property, when it is to be paid, and in what proportion ... The State 
may decide to nationalise the property without compensation, or with 
partial or full compensation ... Such considerations of a social nature, 
like many others, may be decisive in fixing the size and procedure of 
compensation.351 
Historically, the Board of Settlement of Commercial Disputes often settled disputes 
between parties to trade disputes both national and international. Disputes resolution 
was slow and foreign companies had little confidence in the efficiency of the system. 
It is therefore not surprising that nearly all BIT's at present tend to include a brief 
arbitration clause. Saudi Arabia like many other developing states has found it 
necessary to establish a strong legal structure by signing up to the widely respected 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (CSID). It would appear 
that the Saudi government is indeed satisfied with the jurisdiction of ICSID unlike 
some other developing states. Moreover, the authorities no longer require exclusive 
applicability of Saudi law in the resolution of private commercial disputes. In 
practice, however, Saudi courts tend to apply Saudi law in commercial disputes 
litigated in the Kingdom, even when the relevant contract contains a foreign choice of 
law provision and provides for a foreign forum to have jurisdiction. Business-to-
business (B2B) arbitration assistance, although expensive, is available from local 
chambers of commerce for some types of disputes. 352 Such practice gives the 
contracting parties the freedom of choice of the way they like to conclude their 
case. 353 
3Sl Reports of the International Law Association 1962, pp,148-149. Available at: http://www.ita-
h~.orglenlpublications/index.cfm accessed 15 February 2012. 
35 Although Saudi Arabia is considered seventh among the developing countries who attract FDl and it 
is the largest in tenns ofFDl in the Middle East and North Africa: Investment Climate report in the 
Arab countries. See, FDl report 2008 pp. 2 Available at:http://www.arab-
hdr.orglpublicationslother/escwalforeign-investment-08e.pdf. Also see, The International Arab 
investment Guarantee Corporation 1996 pp. 129. Also see, 
https:! Iwww .cia.govllibrary/publicationslthe-world-factbooklgeoslsa.html accessed 15 February 2012. 
353 Saudi Foreign Investment law, Article 13: Without violation of the agreements to which the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is party, settlement of disputes between the authorities and the foreign 
investor as regard to the latter'S licensed investments, in line with the system, is to be carried out in an 
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With this careful positioning of its international legal obligations it is no serious 
surprise as mentioned earlier that Saudi Arabia has come within the top 20 hosting 
countries in the global FDI inflows.354 This has taken place due to some impressive 
and radical innovations to its legal regime. For example, the company law of France 
was adopted as a model for revising Saudi Company law regime.355 Yet it is argued 
here that more needs to be done and the changes ought to be more holistic. It is 
however, necessary to note that many of the radical changes have taken place under 
the clever use of ministerial authority. It is therefore, arguable that there remains a 
danger that the ministerial directives may be reversed by the religious clerics if they 
choose to be concerned about the religious legal process especially when the legal 
issue comes before a Saudi court sympathetic to the views of the religious class. 
The possibility of such interferences and arbitrary changes is moreover incompatible 
with foreign investment law. It also does not conform to the changing status of 
international trade law. It is also fair to note that there is fierce regional competition to 
attract financial investments. This reality has created a positive environment that is 
beneficial to Western investors. Saudi Arabia cannot in these circumstances afford to 
rest on its oars and must continue to reform its laws to make them responsive to 
global trends. The government must continue to satisfy foreign. investors by for 
example avoiding any conflict in the future with regards to long-term investment 
projects. On the other hand the state must also watch out and avoid unfair bargains 
that lock it into relationships of exploitation. A useful strategy in this direction is to 
offer adequate and well-constructed renegotiation clauses. Such clauses are common 
in international investment law practice and they stipulate that the agreement will be 
open to periodic negotiations in order to adapt it to the new policies or plans if any 
arise?56 Such mechanisms are indeed useful and can be mutually beneficial. This area 
is also one of the key areas in which Saudi lawyers and negotiators must increase their 
amicable manner, but if amicable settlement is not reached, the dispute will be settled in line with the 
re!ulations. 
3S See, UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2010, pp., 4- 44. Available at: 
http://www.unctad.orglenldocslwir201O_en.pdfaccessed 21 February 2012. 
3S5See World Bank and the International Finance Corporation, Doing Business 2011 (The International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development I The World Bank, 2011) p. 15 available at: 
http://www.doingbusiness.org}-/medialFPDKMIDoing%20Business!DocumentslAnnual-
Reports/EnglishlDBII-FullReport.pdf accessed 21 February 2012. 
3S6 Bernardini, op.cit., pp. 98-112. 
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knowledge and technical capacity. Renegotiation clauses and the stabilisation devices 
are in fact realistic methods by which developing states in OPEC and the GCC may 
continue to advance their interests in integrating further into a future of FDI security 
and stability through their involvement in MITs and BITs. 
The Saudi legal system and international conformity: Do Saudi Arabian BITs and 
MITs comply with the Saudi constitution? 
Saudi Arabia is governed by an absolute monarchy that sits at the head of feudal and 
hierarchical authorities. When we talk of the Saudi authorities, we talk of the ruling 
AI-Saud family who, as absolute monarchs, influence and determine every aspect of 
Saudi governance. While the citizens of the United Kingdom are subjects of the 
Queen, that monarchy is not an absolute monarchy, as the system of authorities is 
accorded with a number of checks. Governance and external relations of the United 
Kingdom involves the constitution, statutes, and international treaty. Of these three, 
only the British constitution exists in an un-codified form, embracing tradition, 
statute, precedent as well as treaties and agreements. 357 
Saudi Arabia is similar to the United Kingdom in as much as it does not have a 
written, codified, constitution. The Saudi authorities argue that they already have an 
adequate constitution in the form of the Holy Quran,358 the Muslim holy book, and the 
Sunnah359 of the prophet Mohammed. Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of the religion of 
Islam and it is only until relatively recently that it was suggested that a more stringent, 
defined, set of rules should be put in place and form the basis for the country's 
constitution. Previously it had been argued that on the basis of Saudi Arabia's special 
relationship to the conception and practice of the religion of Islam it had no need for 
written, formal, rules or laws, it was sufficient merely to live by the word of the 
m Lord Talbot declared unambiguously that 'the law of nations in its full extent was part of the law of 
England', See the famous Barbuit's case (1764) 3 Burr. 1478; J. G. Collier "Is International Law 
Really Part of the Law of England?" Vol. 38, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, No.4 
(Oct., 1989) pp. 924-928. 
3S8The recitation of the Gods own words as recounted by the angel Gabriel to Mohammed, the last of 
the prophets. Available at: http://www.religioustolerance.orWisljntr.htm accessed 18 January 2012. 
359 The record made of the Prophet's deeds, utterances and of his unspoken approval and disapproval of 
situations. 
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Quran and to interpret life in accordance with it. From such interpretations and 
applications the right path would emerge and, furthermore, that path would be as 
decreed by the prophet Mohammed. 
Muslim Shari'ah is the law of the Holy Quran as interpreted by clerics. To outside 
observers, this method of dispute resolution and governance may seem cumbersome 
and difficult to understand. To international observers this system may appear to be 
disproportionately Arab centred, whilst this may reflect the literal interpretation of the 
Shari'ah - "the clear path to be followed" is the law of Islam. Saudi Arabia and 
Yemen are the only countries left in the world to base their legal systems purely on 
Shari'ah. It should be noted that there is a second part to the law, regulations called 
the Nizam. There are four sources of Shari'ah law: the Quran, the Sunnah, the Ijma,360 
and the Qiyas.361 
The need to codify, or to introduce a clear, written constitution, was resisted until 
1992. On March 1, 1992, King Fahd recognized the importance to the commercial 
and international interests of the Kingdom of introducing a written constitution. While 
the Saudi approach may have been sufficient for the ruling royal family and its 
subjects, King Fahad introduced three major laws that were to form the backbone of 
the Saudi rule of law and its constitution. These three laws were the Basic Law of 
Authorities, the Consultative Council Law and the Law of Provinces. The 
Consultative Council Law and the Law of Provinces are procedural laws and are 
concerned with the replacement of authorities' council (the Consultative Council 
Lawi62 whilst the other concerns the regulation of the relationship between central 
authorities' agencies and regional governors. 363 
3600r. Mohammad Omar Farooq .The Doctrine of Ijma: Is there a consensus? Upper Iowa University. 
Available at: http://www.scribd.comldoc/4S74 728S/The-Doctrine-of-ljma-Is-there-a-consensus 
accessed 21 February 2012. See also above Chapter 3.5.2. Sufficiency of Islamic Law in Relation to 
Complex Investment Contracts in Light of Aramco, Aminoil and Qatar cases. 
This consists of the consensus of scholars on particular problems that have arisen for which there is no 
clear solution that arises within the Quran or Sunnah. The solutions to these problems are deduced 
from the Quran and validated by the tradition that says "my people are never unanimously in error". 
361 In Arabic Qiya means 'comparing' or 'measwing'. In the Saudi legal context it should be 
interpreted as reasoning by analogy which allows the principles established in the Quran, Sunnah and 
~ma to be extended to problems that are not covered by these other sources. 
61be Consultative Council Law,the full text relative laws at: 
www.saudLgov.salwpslportalllutlp/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CPOos3iTMGenYE8TIwMLt 
OBzA89gIyMfVw8TI39HE _3g1Lz40GD9grnxHRQBKtzgM!. Also at: 
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When Saudi Arabia is said to have a constitution, it would serve as the basic law to 
which we refer, although this would arguably be misleading given that the basic law 
clearly states that the Kingdom's only constitution is the Holy Quran and Sunnah.364 
The subject is further confused by the lack of provision to interpret the manner in 
which the Quran or the Sunnah is to be applied in matters concerning the rule of law 
or constitutional affairs. The basic law preserves the absolute monarchy and does 
nothing to remove, or limit, the powers of clerics in determining, or interpreting, 
matter of constitutional, and legal importance. 
5.3.4. Saudi Law and Practice in BITs and MITs? 
As Saudi Arabia's international role grows so then does the need to acknowledge that 
many of the activities in modern life did not exist at the time of the Prophet 
Mohammed. The problems that arise as part of our life today are not within the 
contemplation of Shari'ah and cannot be interpreted within the four sources of it. 
Such modern issues can be dealt with by reference to the 'Regulations,' or the Nizam. 
The Nizam are statutory codes implemented by the King under authority granted by 
the Shari'ah for him to do as he sees fit in the interests of the country and the people. 
Such sets of principles are necessary for Shari'ah to function outside of the 
parameters of the Kingdom. Through the use of the Nizam company regulations, 
employment regulations, trade regulations and the like can be detennined. In this way 
Shari' ah provides authoritative guidance sufficient to develop a commercial, 
industrial, and technological society. 
http://www.saudiembassy.netlaboutlcountry-infonnationlgovernmentlMajlis _al_shura.aspx accessed 
21 February 2012. 
363 All three of the 1992 laws were issued by the King without fonnal consultation with any authority's 
body. They were instead drafted by an ad hoc committee headed by the Minister of the Interior, Prince 
Nayef, one of the Kings brothers. See May I, Human Rights Watch Report, "Empty Reforms: Saudi 
Arabia's New Basic Laws", Available at: www.hrw.orglreportsl19921saudilINTROTHR.htm. Accessed 
19 February 2012. 
364 Chapter 1, Article 1 "The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic state. Religion: 
Islam. Constitution: The Holy Quran and the Prophet's Sunnah (traditions). Language: Arabic. Capital: 
Riyadh," Saudi Basic Acts, First Edition 1422-2001, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of 
Infonnation. 
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The test of any legal system, or set of laws, is how it is administered in the courtroom, 
which is the Shari'ah courtroom in Saudi Arabia. Shari'ah courts have jurisdiction 
over criminal and civil matters, and over non-Muslims. Appeals from Shari'ah courts 
are made to the Courts of Appeal. More complex civil proceedings, including claims 
against the state or its authorities, and the enforcement of foreign judgements, are 
heard before tribunals that have been specially convened. 
When we talk of bilateral treaties (BITs) and multilateral treaties (MITs) we should be 
sure of what it is to which we refer. BITs are usually treaties that have been entered 
into between two states to form an agreement to do, or not to do, certain actions. A 
BIT could also be an agreement, or treaty, between two groups of states, where one 
group will form a party to the agreement and another group will form another party to 
it. The Vienna Convention 365 sets out the procedure for making, operating, and 
terminating a treaty, however the convention does not particularly distinguish 
between MITs and BITs.366 MITs are agreements that are entered into with multiple 
states or groups of states acting as individual parties. Such agreements will usually 
have as their subject some area of mutual benefit or be contractual in nature. While 
most treaties are bilateral in nature, it is fair to say that most MITs are contractual in 
nature. 
Before entering into a contractual agreement in the Kingdom, it is important to 
appreciate how any dispute may be resolved. With the lack of formal constitution and 
the application of Shari'ah, the manner in which a possible dispute is resolved is a 
very real issue and, in the absence of a suitable system to resolve disputes, could be a 
serious deterrent to trade with the Kingdom. When contemplating entering into an 
agreement with a Saudi organization or entity there are three matters that should be 
considered: whether to use Saudi courts or the courts of another country, the type of 
Saudi tribunal that will resolve any disputes, and the suitability for arbitration. 
In addition to a preference the parties may have, there are additional factors that may 
determine the type of dispute resolution that is applied. If an action is bought against a 
36SThe Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organisations or 
Between International Organisations 1986. 
366 Article 60(1) is the only provision that is limited to BIT's and Articles 40, 41,58, and 60 refer 
expressly to multilateral treaties. 
163 
164 
Saudi company in another state's court, then the body bringing that claim must be 
sure that they will be able to enforce their judgement in Saudi Arabia, or at the very 
least, that there are assets against which a judgement can be enforced. The most 
important question is if the nation within which the judgement has been obtained has 
a reciprocal enforcement treaty with Saudi Arabia. In the event that no such treaty 
exists, the Saudi Board of Grievances will review the judgment to ensure that it does 
not violate Saudi state policy. 
5.4. Issues in Saudi Judicial and Arbitration Practice 
In addition to the court system, the Saudi judicial system is also comprised of a 
system of tribunals. The type of tribunal that has jurisdiction depends on the nature of 
the dispute and may consist of a combination of judges and non-judges. The Board of 
Grievances has jurisdiction over disputes arising from Saudi authorities contracts and 
some commercial disputes. In complex disputes outside experts may be utilized, and, 
contrary to the Shari' ah courts, a system of precedent is used. The tribunal system is 
almost exclusively reserved for the resolution of disputes of an industrial or 
commercial nature. 367 
The arbitration process is also an alternative to using the Saudi judicial system. Prior 
to entering into an arbitration agreement, enquires by contracting parties should be 
made into whether a particular arbitration decision can be enforced in the Kingdom, 
and they should also be aware of the rules governing arbitration. Arbitration in Saudi 
Arabia is governed by strict rules concerning the selection and suitability of 
arbitrators, the duration of the arbitration and the extent the decision can be reviewed. 
The arbitrator must be an expert on Shari'ah, or Saudi commercial law, and once the 
final decision is reached it must be approved by court. Once an award has been made 
and approved, it is enforced through the Civil Rights Directorate if the arbitration has 
taken place within the Kingdom. An alternative would be for a foreign company to 
include an international arbitration clause, however their decision would still need to 
367PrOcedural rules before the board of grievances 1989, Council of Ministers Resolution No. 190,,16 
Dhu al-Qa'dah 1409 [19 June 1989] available at: 
www.saudiembassy.netiabouticountry.information/lawslGrievancesBoardProcedure.aspx accessed 15 
February 2012. 
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be examined to ensure that due process was followed, that the arbitrators were 
suitable, that due process was followed and that the final decision does not conflict 
with the Shari'ah. It may then be found necessary to resubmit the award for 
reconsideration on the merits. 
In an international context, Saudi Arabia is a party to the New York Convention on 
Foreign Arbitral Awards.368 There are two conditions under which a court may refuse 
to enforce an award: firstly, under royal decree,369 recognition of an award under the 
Convention is limited to awards that were made in the territory of another contracting 
state and secondly, the Convention will not be applied retroactively to disputes 
initiated prior to ratification. 
In addition to the New York Convention, Saudi Arabia has also ratified the 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between states and nationals of 
other states. The Kingdom is also a member of the International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes.37o 
We can see that in addition to the court system, there are other mechanisms by which 
dispute resolution can operate within the Kingdom. However, if the intention is to 
enter into a contract with the authorities or a state agency, it is highly unlikely that the 
foreign party will have any ability to negotiate the jurisdiction or the forum by which 
dispute can be resolved. 
When considering whether a treaty complies with the Saudi constitution, the 
distinction between multilateral and bilateral treaties must be understood, as well as 
the intricacies of treaties themselves. When talking about treaties, Memorandums of 
Understanding (MOUs) and exchanges of notes should also be considered. We can 
consider each of these to have the effect of a treaty in as much as they are taken to be 
binding agreements between states; but the issue is if they differ and should we 
consider those differences when judging their efficacy when applied alongside the 
368 June 10, 1958,6997,330 U.N.T.S. 38 ["New York Convention"], 
369Royal Decree No. M 1111994 of January 21, 1994. Available at: http://www.the-saudi.netlbusiness-
centerl accessed 15 February 2012. 
370 Information and Materials about ICSID are available at the official website ofthe body available 
athttp://icsid.worldbank.orglICSID/Index.jspAccessed 19 February 2012. 
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Saudi constitution. However, to some extent and due to the local legal applications we 
can argue that the nine BITs reported by UNCTAD371 to which Saudi Arabia is a 
party are not compatible with the Saudi constitution or some if the local legal 
applications from the practical perspective's. 
Anthony Aust,372 states that one must be especially careful when talking about 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOUs). An MOU would predominantly be a record 
of mutual understanding between two states or the contracting parties, and would not 
necessarily be intended by either party to have the effect of a binding agreement. This 
could be no more than an indicator of how the parties were to behave, rather than a 
document requiring the parties to be forced, under international law, to act in a 
particular manner to each other. Therefore, the MOU can be the right tool to avoid the 
BIT application under the contracting parties' autonomy if the dispute arises. 
Such an MOU need not be drafted in particular terms nor take a particular form. The 
document of mutual understanding could be an email, a fax, a letter, or another 
written document. The law of treaties does not require a treaty document to be in any 
particular form or to use defined terms or wording. In the case of Aegean Sea 
Continental Shelf,373 it was for the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to consider the 
intention and terms of a joint communique issued by the Greek and Turkish Prime 
Ministers and the circumstances within which the communique was drafted so as to 
be able determine its nature. 
The ICJ found that the parties had not intended to enter into an agreement that would 
be enforceable by the court. It was not their intention that the agreement should come 
within the jurisdiction of the court in the event that a dispute arose. We can therefore 
deduce that an intention to submit to international law is derived from the terms of the 
document itself, and the circumstances at the time the document was drafted as 
opposed with the intentions of the parties at the time of a dispute. This vagueness of 
intention has a lasting effect on jurisdiction in the event of a dispute, and this is one 
371 See, the UNCTAD history. Available at: http://www.unctad.orglenldocslosg286_en.pdfaccessed 19 
February 2012. 
372 Anthony Aust,Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2007) pp. 7-20. 
373 IeJ Report Cases and Materials about the ICJ are available at http://www.icj-
cij.orgldocketJindex.php?p 1 =3&p2=3&code=gt&case=62&k=81 accessed 12 March 2012. 
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reason why the informal nature of the MOU may not be best suited to agreements of 
such importance that generally merit documenting in more formal terms. 
Although MOUs are often found in the form detailed above, it could also be that a 
treaty is called an MOU, as there is no uniform title by which a treaty is known. One 
should take care when presented with a document that appears to call itself an MOU. 
It is therefore necessary to examine the content of the document and its terms to 
ascertain whether the intention is that it should have the effect of a treaty. By the same 
token, it has also been the case that as a result of several treaties having the term 
MOU in their title, the attitude that MOUs must be treaties and enforceable as such 
has evolved. Aust suggests that this reference to an MOU in the title of a treaty may 
be an indication of the desire for the treaty to appear less formal and less like a 
binding agreement between two states. The trend behind this could have many 
reasons, and may be as much to satisfy internal domestic expectations, as it is to 
portray a particular state of affairs to other states.374 
The International Law Commission's Commentary states that the use of the phrase 
'governed by international law' is sufficient to infer an intention to create obligations 
under international law. If there was no such intention, the document could not be 
called a treaty. 
The question then is, how does the apparent reluctance of Saudi Arabia to embrace a 
written constitution fit with its becoming party to an MIT or a BIT. We can see from 
other sources of law and international trade how such agreements are subject to 
constitutionality. The nature of dispute resolution in Saudi Arabia and the recourse to 
the Shari'ah courts may be sufficient to put-off foreign investors or businesses from 
investing in, or doing business with, Saudi Arabian entities. Unless a company or 
individual has specialist knowledge of the Saudi legal system, they could be 
considered to be at a distinct disadvantage should a dispute arise. One option would 
be to incorporate a jurisdiction clause into any contract or agreement that favours an 
alternative legal system or jurisdiction over Saudi Arabia in an effort to present a 
more level playing field. Such a clause would be fine between individual, but would 
374 Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2007) pp. 25-35 
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fall foul of Saudi legislation, which prevents the authorities' departments and 
institutions entering into agreements that include jurisdiction clauses that state that 
jurisdiction of any dispute lies outside the courts of Saudi Arabia. This rather insular 
perception of trade with the rest of the world does not mirror the efforts that Saudi 
Arabia is making to embrace world trade and to reduce its reliance on the 
petrochemical industry. For this reason there maybe additional benefits in entering 
into MITs and BITs that have not yet been considered. 
Depending on the purpose or nature of the treaty we may be able to infer a level of 
duality in its content. That is, it may serve a purpose beyond that which may at first be 
apparent. As well as the subject matter of the agreement between the parties that 
forms the treaty itself, there may be additional benefits from entering into the treaty. 
There may be the opportunity to share knowledge and technology, to develop new 
areas and new ideas with the benefit of knowledge gained from a new (possibly 
strategic) partner, or group of partners. There is also the very public act of entering 
into such an agreement, which in itself may say more to those about how you wish to 
be perceived as conducting yourself as the actual substance of the agreement itself. 
For a country such as Saudi Arabia, the overtly public act of entering into a treaty, or 
agreement, with another state or states, is a message to other countries and authorities 
that those concessions can be made. 
These concessions are not only in terms of commercial considerations, indicating a 
willingness to adapt and accommodate methods and practices that may not at first 
seem to be in complete alignment with Saudi customs or practices, and also 
demonstrate a greater compromise. Examples of Saudi Arabian trade policy in the 
past have demonstrated that there is an apparent reluctance of the Saudi authorities to 
give up their sovereignty in the face of international arbitration or dispute resolution. 
Being subject to the rulings and findings of international arbitration bodies has been 
seen as too great of a compromise for Saudi Arabia. International law has long been 
perceived of as part of the trend towards giving up an element of Saudi sovereignty. 375 
37SDaniel W. Drezner, "On the Balance between International Law and Democratic Sovereignty" 2 Chi. 
J Int'l L. (2001) p. 321. 
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Far from being a feeling of lack of control by government officials alone the 
impression also affects those watching the actions of the state from within. The threat 
of the government usinginternational law to bypass state and local institutions or in 
the case of Saudi Arabia religious authorities is seen as very rea1.376 Perhaps the most 
perniciouseffect of recent trends in international law is the proliferation of 
international The Aramcocase award only came to confirm the impression in the 
minds of some jurists. While we may say that this is entirely normal in that when 
entering into agreements with other states, the state loses some of its independence to 
act contrary to the details of the agreement. The impact of such an impression is 
perhaps greater on a country such as Saudi Arabia that has a monarchical and 
religious approach to commerce and economics. Saudi Arabia's special position in the 
Islamic faith means that compliance with the laws of Shari'ah must be seen to have 
equal, or greater, importance than economic or trade factors to leaders and decision-
makers. 
Arbitration requires the parties to submit to arbitrators. who are usually chosen or 
agreed upon by the parties who will also agree to accept the decision of the arbitrators 
and their determination. Most treaties will stipulate how the arbitration panel is to be 
composed, 377whether the arbitrators shall be from a particular country378 or shall be 
possessed of some expert knowledge that shall assist them in their determination. 
Most BITs and MITs will include an arbitration clause that will stipulate that any 
dispute be settled by way of arbitration, and will also define how the arbitration panel 
is to be composed. The effect of an arbitration award will be that the decision of the 
panel is legally binding on both parties. 
In the event that an arbitration clause is not included in the agreement a dispute will 
be settled by way of judicial settlement. The International Court of Justice has certain 
advantages over an arbitration tribunal, in that it is already established and has judges 
376 Ibid., 321, 330. 
3770ary Brian Born. International Commercial Arbitration: Volume 2. (Kluwer Law International, 
2009) pp. 180-212, 346-353.1t is usual to have more than one judge, or arbitrator, however in simple 
matters of dispute it may be agreed that a single judge will determine the dispute. (Most treaties and 
their contracting parties autonomy will stipulate not resist processes). 
3780ary Brian Born. International Commercial Arbitration: Vol. 2 ( Kluwer Law International, 2009) 
pp. 410-461, Usually in an effort to reflect a degree of neutrality between the parties. 
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available to hear disputes. It is also cheaper than convening an arbitration tribunal as 
it is of no cost. 
Once a dispute has been determined, what is its effect on Saudi domestic law or 
policy? In certain instances, it will be for a Saudi court to rule as to whether it shall 
abide by the finding of the tribunal or court. In the event that it agrees to be bound by 
the decision it may find itself submitting to a ruling or judgement that proves to be 
contrary to the principles or rules of Shari'ah. If a ruling is found to be contrary to the 
principles of Islamic faith or Saudi constitution and the Saudi state declined to be 
bound by its terms what methods of enforcement could it expect to be employed, how 
much of an incentive would there be to force adherence to future judgements. The 
answer is that a persistent failure to submit to the findings, or judgment, of an 
arbitration panel or court would seriously undermine the credibility of the state in the 
eyes of the international community. 379 Even worse, it could find that it is subject to 
far reaching penalties such as the withdrawal, or suspension, or diplomatic relations 
or worse, such as trade sanctions, in an effort to force compliance?80 The long-term 
effects of such a policy could be crippling to a country that has such a significant 
reliance on its export market. 
It is with this realisation reason that Saudi Arabia became a party to the New York 
Convention on 18 July 1994.381 However, under Royal Decree No. M 1111994 of 
January 21, 1994, Saudi Arabia has however, attached the following reservation. 
"Awards will be recognized and enforced only if made in the territory of another 
Contracting state". Generally arbitration awards rendered outside Saudi Arabia are 
enforced in Saudi Arabia by the Board of Grievances.382 The law authorizes the Saudi 
Board of Grievances to enforce Judgments issued by foreign courts. Article 6 of the 
379 H Fox, "States and the Undertaking to Arbitrate" Vol 37 ICLQ, (1988) pp. 2-4. See also 
C. Paulson, "Compliance with Final Judgments of the International Court of Justice Since 1987" 
American Journal of International Law, (2004) pp. 321-325. 
380International responsibility is likewise incurred by a State if damage is sustained by a foreigner as a 
result of the States refusal to give effect to the award or judgment. United Nations International Law 
Commission, (1991) opcit., p. 108. 
381 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done June 10, 1958, 
acceded to with reservations by the United States, Sept. 1, 1970, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6690, 
S7S U.N.T.S. 38. 
382Article 8(1)(g) of Royal Decree No. Ml51 dated 17/7/1402 HIll. May 1982 
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Rules of Pleadings and Procedures of the Grievances Board, issued by Council of 
Ministers requires satisfaction of two conditions.383 
First, there appears to be a strict requirement of reciprocity in that it is not enough for 
the Board of Grievances to receive a letter from the Legal Office of the State 
Department of the concerned State to the Legal Counsel of the Saudi Embassy. 
Experts note that the Board would in reality require a specific example of such 
recognition. Second, the Foreign Judgment must not violate Islamic law as enforced 
in Saudi Arabia.384 This perhaps indicates a test of conformity with Wahabi doctrines. 
Furthermore as M.H. Siddiqui correctly describes it is notable that judgment may in 
practice be refused on the grounds that: 
a. The judgment is contrary to Islamic law or public policy. For instance, if it involves 
awarding payment of interest, consequential and/or punitive damages. 
b. Lack of Notice. Default judgment and awards. 
c. Res judicata. A Saudi court has already decided on the controversy. 
d. Dispute is pending before a Saudi Court. 
e. The judgment is against the Kingdom or an agency and instrumentality of the 
Kingdom or an official acting in his official capacity. 385 
f. Lack of reciprocity. It is not enough that the court or laws of the state, where the 
judgment was issued or award was rendered, declare that it would honour the 
judgment of a Saudi court. This must be demonstrated in actual experience and 
practice. 
For this reason it has been suggested that ''the enforcement in Saudi Arabia of a non-
Saudi judgment or non-Saudi arbitral award remains the exception rather than the 
rule".386 Most Islamic states especially in the Middle East are parties to the New York 
Convention and it can be said that this makes it perhaps necessary for Saudi Arabia to 
383 Resolution No. 190 dated 16/1111409 H 120 June 1989. 
384 M.H. Siddiqui "Arbitration under the Shari'a With case study of Saudi Arabia" Vol. 2 
Transnational Dispute Management issue l( January 200S) available at transnational-dispute-
management.com accessed 16 March 2012. 
m Ibid 
386 Ibid. 
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distinguish itself as compliant with the provisions of the Convention. 387 The 
prevailing image as a country where enforcement remains an exception rather than the 
rule is certainly not good enough. 
5.5. Conclusion 
There is little doubt that the Saudi, state's promises to the international investment 
community in the form of BIT's MIT's treaties, agreements on foreign investments 
protection must be given effect to. There is nothing in Saudi law broadly construed 
that prevents it from granting full recognition to its modern trade agreements made in 
good faith. The Shari'a agrees with a general theory of contract. Verse 1 of Chapter V 
indeed instructs believers to 'keep faith with contracts'. It has been shown above that 
the majority of laws discussed and agreements entered into foresee one way or 
another, that a contract should be negotiated in good-faith and with honesty.388 
By way of conclusion we can see that Saudi Arabia may be perceived of as facing 
more serious difficulties in relation to its investment law and practice. While it must 
engender confidence of investors using modern day instruments of legal protection of 
investment and international trade law, it must also keep a close eye on its national 
interests as well as the dictates of Islamic law. The Saudi state is required to submit 
to a multi-tier legal regime. For non-Islamic, or non-Shari'ah countries, it is easier to 
reconcile their judicial process with findings couched in international law. This is 
considerably harder for Saudi Arabia as it is in a unique position. 
The State must embrace the use of sophisticated modern day devices and legal 
regimes such as stabilisation clauses, renegotiation clauses and adaptation clauses. It 
must fashion these to assure investors of the prospects of meaningful participation in 
mOther Muslim state signatories to the convention and their accession dates are as follows: Algeria, 
7-Feb-1989,1-2; Bahrain, 6-Apr-1988,1-2; Bangladesh,6-May-1992; Brunei Darussalam, 2S-Jul-
1996,1; Egypt, 9-Mar-1959; Iran, Islamic Republic, I5-0ct 2001,1-2; Jordan,IS-Nov-1979; Kuwait, 28-
Apr-1978, 1; Malaysia, 5-Nov- 1985,1-2; Mauritania,30-Jan-1997; Morocco,12-Feb-1959,1; Oman,2S-
Feb-1999; QatarI8-0ct-1994; Saudi Arabia,19-Apr-1994,1; Syrian Arab Republic, 9-Mar-1959; 
Tunisia,17-Jul- 1967,1-2; Turkey, 2-Jul-1992,1-2.See Emilia Onyema, "Developments and Enforcing 
Arbitration Awards in Middle East and African Countries", Paper delivered at the 2nd Annual Cross 
Border Arbitration and Dispute Resolution Conference, Melia White House Hotel on 16 November 
2010 p. 1. Also available at www.transnational-dispute-management.com accessed 13 March 2012. 
388"H. B.Wael, An Introduction to Islamic Law (lst edn CUP, 2009); Williams, Rowan, 'Is Sharia law 
unavoidable in England?' (2008) Vol. 17Journal o/the Commonwealth Lawyers' (1) Association pp. 
33,39. 
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in business within its territory as well returns on their investment. It must also refonn 
its domestic, or day-to-day, laws of corporate governance. It must, however, be seen 
to be conducting itself in accordance with the principles of Shari'ah. It is hard to see 
how the current system could reconcile this conflict without significant modification 
or constitutional refonns. 
There are therefore, a few things that can be recommended. The country's 
international commercial arbitration practice ought to be elaborated upon and 
improved. Unless further development of arbitration can be achieved Saudi Arabia 
would appear to be at a continuing disadvantage. The improvements needed span the 
development of new and improved arbitral institutions; the development of capacity 
among its arbitrators and very importantly a strong respect for the enforcement of 
international awards. 
Yet there are limits that the Saudi State must not exceed in its quest for FDI. For the 
Saudi state to accept a ruling that is in apparent conflict with Shari'ah would not only 
be seen as unacceptable in tenns of the country's position as the presumed leader of 
the Islamic faith, but it would also be seen as encroaching on the sovereignty of the 
authorities in as much as they should be free to govern its country in any way they see 
fit. Islamic principles are there to protect the state against hann. Thus, stabilisation 
clauses, which have a very high likelihood of creating grave environmental damage 
may be un-Islamic and also against the true national interests. It is notable that 
throughout the Qur'an and hadith there are many general references to the 
environment (Le. animals, plants, mountains, seas etc.). The environment is 
considered to be blessings from Allah. Islamic law generally requires that the 
environment be protected. Flora, fauna and animals must be treated with kindness, 
and land must be utilized sensibly. For specific wanton damage to the environment 
there are prescribed punishments.389 
389 Legal 500," Saudi Environmental Laws" available at 
http://update.lega1500.comlindex.php?option=com _ content&task=view&id=474&ltemid=525 accessed 
21 February 2012. 
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For this reason, it may be of greater benefit to the Saudi authorities to consider the 
benefits of the less formal MOUs. MOUs are relatively informal in character and they 
can be adapted, or added to. 
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Chapter 6; FDI IMPLICATIONS OF SAUDI ARABIA'S. REGIONAL. 
COMPETITVE AND LINKAGE DIPLOMACY 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter will evaluate Saudi Arabia's commitments to three major international 
organisations of multilateral diplomacy and the value of the state's commitments to 
these groupings and its stated aim to achieve development through management of its 
valuable natural resources. The organisations to be discussed herein are the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries(OPEC) the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(Gcei90 and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Although observations regarding 
the areas of similarities with other developing states of the OPEC, GCe and WTO 
among other intergovernmental organisations will undoubtedly be of interest to us, 
this chapter will however, focus on how Saudi Arabia can put its membership and 
diplomatic activities in these organisation to approach its developmental needs within 
the context ofFDI. 
There is little doubt that the formation of OPEC and Saudi Arabia's membership of it 
has benefited all the participating states.391 Similarly participation in the GCC and the 
390 The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf was brought into existence on 25th May 
1981. Their Majesties and Highnesses, the leaders of the United Arab Emirates, State of Bahrain, 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Sultanate of Oman, State of Qatar and State of Kuwait met in Abu Dhabi, 
United Arab Emirates, where they reached a cooperative framework joining the six states to effect 
coordination, integration and inter-connection among the Member States in all fields in order to 
achieve unity, according to article 4 of the GCC Charter. Article 4 also emphasized the deepening and 
strengthening of relations, links and areas of cooperation among their citizens. The areas of 
coordination of the GCC include: Political Affairs, Military Cooperation, Security Cooperation, Media 
Cooperation, Cooperation in the field of Human and Environment Affairs, Legal and Judicial 
Cooperation, Consultative Commission of the Supreme Council, Cooperation in the Field of Auditing, 
Cooperation with the Republic of Yemen. Economic Relations with the Other Countries and Economic 
Groupings. Information and material about the GCC is available at: http://www.gcc-
sft.org/eng/index.html accessed 23 February 2012. 
3 J J.E Peterson. The Politics of Middle Eastern Oil (Washington DC: Middle East Institute, 1983) 
pp.147 available at https:llwww.cia.gov/ciaipublicationslfactbooklrankorderI2003rank.htmlaccessed 
12 March 2012. Also available at 
www.imf.org/extemaVpubslftlweo/2004/01/pdflappendix.pdf.accessed2IFebruary2012.An 
important OPEC declaration also calls for boosting cultural co-operation among the member states. It 
calls for the organization of a summit conference for the heads of states and authorities from OPEC 
member states to be held at regular times after consultation with the member states so as to enhance the 
capability of the oil cartel to continue along the path of its achievements, which were based on oil price 
and production. 
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WTO, are positive aspects of Saudi Arabia's foreign policy. It is indeed difficult to 
imagine that the state could have abstained from these organisations without much 
damage to its economic prospects. Developing countries generally share a lot of 
similarities and many of them engage in peer emulating policies. 392 Many of the 
OPEC countries like Saudi Arabia do not have a diversified economy and depend on 
their oil revenues for survival. Although there may be cultural differences especially 
along the lines of religion and ethnicity the basic aspiration towards development is 
perceptible. Benefits of the linkage politics they have engaged in since the 1970s 
range from sharing production methods to coordinating price mechanisms. 393 
Furthermore, OPEC members have over time learnt from each other's mistakes and 
identified best practices, thus, introducing measures to improve their general business 
environment (some of these are identified below). They have also realised the 
importance of co-operation among the national petroleum companies among the 
OPEC member states, as well as between these companies and the international 
petroleum industry.394 Quintessential progress was made in 1975 following the First 
OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) Heads of State Summit in 
392 See for instance, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). Up to 20 countries have acceded to 
the APRM.5 Accession entails "undertaking to submit to periodic peer reviews, as well as to facilitate 
such reviews, and be guided by agreed parameters for good political governance and good economic 
and corporate 
governance. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) has been proposed as a key element of the 
New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). See Memorandum of Understanding of the 
APRM, 
African Peer Review Mechanism Organisation & Process, Objectives, standards, criteria and indicators 
for the APRM. Ravi Kanbur "The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM): An Assessment of 
Concept and Design" Working Paper Department of Applied Economics and Management (New York: 
Cornell University, 2004) pp. 1-3 available at 
http://dyson.comell.eduJresearchlresearchpdf/wpI2004/Cornell_ Dyson _ wp040 l.pdf accessed 13 March 
2012. 
393 Linkage politics is adopted by states with a common interest to advance their interests in a specific 
area or set of interests. Edward A. Kolodziej, "Implications of Security Patterns among Developing 
States" Vol. 3 Air University Review, (1982) p. 21. 
394 See, Klaus Schwab and Peter Cornelius, eds.,The Arab World Competitiveness Report: 2002-2003 
(World Economic Forum, 2002) pp. 168. It all began with a modest Ministerial Seminar for Oil-
Producing and-Consuming Countries on July 1-2, 1991, co-hosted by OPEC Member Venezuela. This 
evolved into the world's premier channel for high-level producer-consumer dialogue, the 
aforementioned International Energy Forum (IEF). This declaration calls for a dialogue aimed at 
finding effective channels of co-operation between oil producers and oil consumers to stabilize the oil 
market. It also calls for contributions to international economic growth and environment protection 
from OPEC members. The declaration reiterates that OPEC would go ahead in its efforts to accelerate 
economic development in developing countries through its aid programs; the International OPEC 
Development Fund and the International Fund for Agricultural Development. It urges industrial 
countries to contribute positively to these efforts and to work toward the reduction of debts of the 
developing countries. See New Charter consolidates OPEC's drive for Dialogue. OPEC Bulletin 
Commentary March 2011. Available at: http://www.opec.orglopec_weblenlpressJoomI2016.htm 
accessed 19 February 2012. 
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Algiers, Algeria in 1975. 395 The finance ministers of member countries in a 
declaration proposed the creation of a new multilateral financial facility to channel 
OPEC aid to developing countries.396 
Furthermore there has been a realisation that FDI must progress in tandem with 
innovation, knowledge transfer and scientific progress.397 In Saudi Arabia, the King 
Abdul-Aziz City for Science and Technology (KACST) was introduced to put the 
country on the track for scientific renaissance.398 
This development is based upon the correct view that scientific research and 
technological advancement are pivotal elements of the progress and prosperity of 
nations in various developmental areas. The realisation is that: 
"developed countries, striving towards progress, have long understood ... have 
spared no expense on research and development (R&D), dedicating a 
considerable portion of their GDP (Gross Domestic Product) to this p~se, 
which has led to the phenomenal scientific and information revolution.3 
395 Solemn Declaration I Conference of Sovereigns and Heads of State of OPEC Member Countries 
Algiers, Algeria, 4-6 March 1975. OPEC, OPEC Solemn Dec/arations Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries 
1975,2000,2007, Algiers, Caracas, Riyadh available at 
http://www .opec.orgl opec_web/static _files -projectlmediaidownloads/publicationsiSolemn _Declaration 
I-II1.pdf accessed 23 February 2012. 
~ Agreement Establishing the OPEC Fund for International Development available at 
http://www.ofid.orglpublications/PDF/ AE-engl_Fund.pdf accessed 27 February 2012. 
397 The development in this area has been Incremental over the last decade. For instance, in the first 
quarter of2001, Algeria issued a series of tenders for contracts, including investment in fixed-line and 
mobile phones, infrastructure projects and a consultancy on the privatization of state-owned 
monopolies in the energy and financial sectors. In the first quarter of 2001, Algeria issued a series of 
tenders for contracts, including investment in fixed-line and mobile phones, infrastructure projects and 
a consultancy on the privatization of state-owned monopolies in the energy and financial sectors. In 
Venezuela, flood-related reconstruction and rural development programs are providing a major boost to 
infrastructure investment. Incentives offered to foreign investors in the non-oil sector and clear policies 
to privatise telecommunications, power projects, and regional electric utilities and transport, will 
contribute greatly to enhancing the business environment. In Indonesia, the cumulative effects of 
liberalization and trade deregulation, associated with financial adjustments, have recently increased the 
private sector's access to credit and spurred export-led growth; manufacturing now constitutes a larger 
proportion of GOP than either agriculture or petroleum. See M.M. Qurashi, Abdul Qayyum Kazi, 
Tajammul Hussain "Science and Technology Policies for Third World Countries" (Morocco: 
Publications of the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization ISESCO, 2010). 
398 The King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology (KACSn is an independent scientific 
organization administratively reporting to the Prime Minister. KACST is both the Saudi Arabian 
national science agency and its national laboratories. The science agency function involves science and 
technology policy making, data collection, funding of external research, and services such as the patent 
office. Information and materials about the KACST is available at 
http://www.kacst.edu.saleniaboutlPagesidefault.aspx accessed 23 February 2012. 
399 Mohammed ibn Ibrahim AI-Suwaiyel, "President's Address" (KASCT, 2012) available at 
http://www.kacst.edu.salenlaboutlpages/presidentspeech.aspx accessed 12 March 2012. King 
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This is also an example of how countries copy from each other -throughout the region 
Qatar and UAE at least have also adopted similar strategies with emphasis on the 
science/ education linkage.400 
OPEC member states have indeed committed themselves to enhancing efforts and 
their programs that aim at the diversification of their economies. The industrial 
countries and the relevant international organizations are requested to co-operate in 
the realisation of this goal. The declaration further recommends enhancing ties among 
research centres in OPEC member states so as to boost research, and it also 
recommended considering the possibility of establishing a research institute or a 
university. The declaration called on finance ministers in OPEC member states to 
explore the means for cementing financial co-operation among the member states. 
At Riyadh in 2007 The OPEC member states made important observations in the form 
of a Solemn Declaration about the true nature of their collective national interests to 
retain control over their natural resources whilst still being successful at attracting 
much needed investments. 
It was noted inter alia: 
The Sovereigns and Heads of State stress that the exploitation of the 
depletable oil resources in their countries must be based, first and foremost, 
upon the best interests of their peoples and that oil, which is the major source 
of their income, constitutes a vital element in their development. 401 
Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology (KACST) is an independent scientific organization 
administratively reporting to the Prime Minister. KACST is both the Saudi Arabian national science 
agency and its national laboratories. The science agency function involves science and technology 
policy making, data collection, funding of external research, and services such as the patent office. 
KACST has currently over 2500 employees. Based on is charter 31.1.2.1.985, KACSTs main 
responsibilities can be summarized as follows: Main Responsibilities: 1. propose a national policy for 
the development of science and technology and develop strategies and plans necessary to implement 
them. 2. Coordinate with government agencies, scientific institutions and research centers in the 
Kingdom to enhance research and exchange information and expertise. 3. Conduct applied research 
and provide advice to the government on science and technology matters. 4. Support scientific research 
and technology development. 5. Foster national innovation and technology transfer between research 
institutes and the industry. 6. Foster international cooperation in science and technology. 
400 Rory Jones, "Science and Education Key to UAE Innovation" The National Ju13, 2011 p.2. 
401 Solemn Declarations of the OPEC 1975 (Algiers) 2000 (Caracas), 2007 (Riyadh) are available 
online at 
http://www.opec.orglopec_web/static_files..,projectlmedialdownloadslpublicationS/Solemn_Declaration 
_I-III. pdf accessed 23 February 2012. 
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In a sense the OPEC developing states could be said to be in mutual competition with 
each other to attract the few states that have corporate entities capable of making 
meaningful investments in their territories. This may be true but the importance of the 
coordination that must exist between the producers must not be underestimated. This 
interestingly has produced a certain level of suspicion in international relations. This 
is reflected in the following statement of the 2007 Solemn Declaration; 
3. Moreover, the Sovereigns and Heads of State condemn the threats, 
propaganda campaigns and other measures which have gone so far as to 
attribute to OPEC Member Countries the intention of undennining the 
economies of the developed countries; such campaigns and measures that may 
lead to confrontation have obstructed a clear understanding of the problems 
involved and have tended to create an atmosphere of tension that is not 
conducive to international consultation and co-operation. They also denounce 
any grouping of consumer nations with the aim of confrontation, and condemn 
any plan or strategy designed for aggression, economic or military, by such 
grouping or otherwise against any OPEC Member Country.402 
Similarly with respect to the GCC it is clear that the member states are in natural 
competition to attract FDI towards individually, yet in a sense they are better 
coordinating in the way they have been doing. Firstly they are collectively in 
competition with other parts of the developing world and must make themselves 
competitive as a region. Secondly their developmental needs are again quite similar. 
One of the paradoxes in the development of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCe) 
and Saudi Arabia is the strong economic dependency on foreign labour. It is still the 
case however that a local labour force is still not in place to supply the huge job 
market in oil and gas exploitive activities of Saudi Arabia. It is suggested that this is 
because the educational system, has not been specifically targeted to reflect and 
respond to development plans. The economic development in Saudi Arabia is based 
on the oil industry, so there is real need to work on human development to replace the 
huge amount of foreign skilled labour. Indeed it is also true that there may be a need 
to develop a skilled labour force for the non-oil based industries which Saudi Arabia 
and other Gulf countries are now investing in, to create the diversification necessary 
for the post oil dependent state. The following points will clarify this statement: 
402 Ibid. 
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1. Gee countries are facing profound changes and transfonnations in different 
areas, such as politics, economics, social status, and culture. 
2. Gee productivity systems are observing massive restructuring; these 
operations are based on four elements: 
(a) Generating a specific capitalist productivity system, transferring the 
existing system of employing high technology equipment and 
reinvesting the funds. 
(b) The continuation of the 1980s economic refonnation, which is 
based on the re-acquaintance and rethinking of the role of oil as the 
core of equilibrium in both the economic and social sides and as a 
generator of development. The financial restoration will not be focused 
on the industrial sector only; it will cover the whole authority's system. 
However, the new idea of development will give the private sector the 
chance to participate in the national economy; besides, the state will no 
longer be the fundamental actor in the national economy focusing its 
attention on the economic restoration in Gee because of: 
(i) The subordination of Gee in the oil sector, which 
represents the 95 percent of total exports; 
(ii) The high dependency on foreign labour and foreign 
consumer goods, which represents 45 percent of the total 
income; and 
(iii) The profound liability on the oil market being deeply 
affected by price changes. 
(c) The inconsistency of the educational system and the re-adaptation 
of the national labour force for the goal of participating in the 
international market and to cope with the requirements of new 
technologies; therefore the underlined restoration will be in the centre 
of the following: 
(i) The restructure of economic development plans by 
adopting efficient policies and procedures; 
(ii) Joining the Gee economic market as a whole; and 
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(iii) Revising the economic and political style of the Gee, 
which will lead to a better usage of oil policies to achieve 
economic development.403 
The points above are designed to encourage the Gee authorities to enter into more 
advanced stages of development which are not solely based on - or affected by - oil 
prices. The newly stated objectives of development include transformation of the 
largely mono export economy typified by Saudi Arabia and trying to adjust the 
economic system towards liberal capitalism by the reinvestment and continuance of 
capital. Furthermore and very importantly in the case of Saudi Arabia it is desirable 
that other areas of investment must be cultivated. Therefore, attention will be focused 
on a new stage of developmental strategies in Saudi Arabia. The two main 
problematic issues with development are the educational system, its position in the 
development strategies and the lack of a national labour force. 404 
Saudi Arabia's political power is based on its possession of oil reserves. The Saudis 
are haunted by the prospect that one day there will be no more oil below the sand. 
When that day comes, the oil companies will leave, the migrant workers will probably 
follow and Saudi companies staffed by Saudi workers will have to take their place. 
This is a prospect that has instilled an acute sense of pragmatism in the Saudis and 
their developmental policies. Bearing this in mind as the primary driving force for 
change, many other factors contribute to the changes in the overall position of Saudi 
Arabia with respect to its power and ability to influence events around it. The changes 
themselves can be categorized under three main processes: 
1. The development of Saudi's population into a workforce of adequate quality 
to satisfy the needs of the ambitious development plans that the Kingdom 
began to set for itself, after the decision was taken to divert most of the rising 
oil revenues into the development of a non-oil economy. 
403 Farhan AI-Farhan, "OPEC Policies and the Economic Development of Member States the Saudi 
Arabian Experience and what is needed in the 21st Century" April 2003, available at 
http://www.cailaw.org/academy/magazine/opec-publication.pdf accessed 15 March 2012. 
404 O.N Khadegah, The Human Recourses Development In Kingdom o/Saudi Arabia and Gee States 
(Paris Centre D 'etudes Euro-Arab, 1998) http://www.ain-al-yaqeen.com/issuesl20031107/feat2en.htm 
accessed 23 February 2012. 
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2. The industrial development of the country and the attempts that began in the 
1970s to create a modern sector from scratch, and to transform the country 
from a less-developed state where most of the production was employed in 
traditional industries into one with a growing modern industrial sector. There 
were also attempts to diversify the economic base away from the total 
dependence on fossil fuels in a country where oil is the only source of external 
political influence. 
3. The development of the political relations of Saudi Arabia with other states, 
especially those of the Gulf and the Middle East. 
Each of the above processes contributed to the transformation of Saudi Arabia into a 
well-developed and effective power on the world stage. Since 1973, Saudi Arabia has 
successfully created a development revolution in order to diminish its dependence on 
oil as the primary source of national income. It has achieved this by encouraging 
investment in alternative industries that will create employment opportunities, 
increase GDP figures, maximize revenue derived from oil wealth and diminish 
Saudi's dependence on oil. 
It is in this direction that the phenomenon of Saudi Industrial cities is created. Saudi 
Arabia's now has fourteen "industrial cities", comprising 92.8 million square meters. 
The cities are managed by the Saudi Industrial Property Authority (MODON).405 
Each industrial city has an on-site Administration to handle the day-to-day needs of 
investors and oversee the site development process. 
The primary task of MODON is planning industrial cities in the Kingdom and it is 
also tasked to encourage establishment, development and management, maintenance 
and supervision of these cities including, but not limited to, the following areas: 
Implement the strategy to develop the industrial cities; Develop rules and 
procedures relating to the establishment of industrial cities and their 
development, management, maintenance and operation; Propose appropriate 
locations of land belonging to the state to establish industrial cities and 
recommend necessary suggestions to the Supreme Economic Council for 
approval and adoption by the Council of Ministers for specific industrial city. 
Also, acquire land owned by the private sector and licensing for its 
development by the private sector for specific industrial cities according to its 
405 http://www.modon.gov.salEnglishIPagesldefault.aspxaccessed 27 February 2012 
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regulations and executive statute. Cooperate with the relevant authorities to 
provide services and necessary facilities to set limits of industrial cities.406 
In this way the government allows for the direct investment in strategic industries 
such as power generation, water desalination, and petrochemicals. For development 
processes to work effectively, they must have strong strategies in dealing with all 
eventualities from war to effective diplomacy. Older authorities like Kanovsky 
observe: "Of the many strategic interests that the USA and its allies have in the 
Middle East, surely one of the most crucial is securing energy supplies from that 
region".407 
He also develops this point of view by adding: 
... Since 1970s much attention has focused on OPEC: indeed, much of 
the influence that Arab, and practically all Gulf states (GCC) have 
wielded in world affairs derives from their asserted cohesiveness and 
presumed ability to bring the industrialised world to its knees with a 
turn of the spigot. This widely held belief rests upon two assumptions: 
that oil is and will continue to present a sellers' market in the 
foreseeable future and that the countries comprising OPEC will pursue 
common policies toward common objectives.408 
Kanovsky later argues that both of these hypotheses are false and claims that for a 
variety of reasons the price of oil is likely to drop in the near future.409 In reality the 
old fear of the price of oil dropping has been replaced in more recent times by the fear 
of oil drying Up.410 The contradictions between Kanovsky's arguments and reality can 
406 The Industrial City names and their total area (M2) statistics are as follows: Riyadh 1 st. 451,000, 
Riyadh 2nd. 18,786,000, Jeddah 1st. 12,807,000, Dammam 2nd. 25,487,000, Makkah 730,117 02-520 
4927, Qaseem 1,542,934, Ahsa 1,543,000, Madinah 9,949,000, Assir 2,663,000, AI-Jouf3,OOO,OOO, 
Tabuk 4,000,000, Hail 2,560,000, Najran 6,550,000, Total Area 92,773,051. SAGIA, "Industrial 
Cities" available at http://www.sagia.gov.salenlWhy-Saudi-Arabiai A-Commitment-To-The-
Best/Industrial-Cities/ accessed 25 February 2012. See also below our brief discussion on Economic 
Cities. 
407Eliyahu Kanovsky, "The Forgotten Dimension: Economic Developments in Arab Countries and their 
Possible Impact on Peace Agreements," Mideast Security and Policy Studies, December 1992. 
Available at: http://www.biu.ac.iVBesalNmideast.html 
408Joseph Kostiner, "The GCC States and the Security Challenges of the Twenty-First Century," 
Mideast Security and Policy Studies, No 86, September 2010. 
409 Kanovsky 1992 
410 See John Vidal, "How much oil does Saudi Arabia actually have?" The Guardian ,Tuesday 15 
February 2011 available at http://www.guardian.co.uklenvironmentlblogl20111febl15/0il-saudi-arabia-
reserves accessed 24 February 2012. The writer wrote: "Is it 260bn or 550bn barrels? Should we 
believe the Americans or the Saudis? The answer may lie in the provenance of the information ... 
senior US embassy staff were warning Washington that reserves could be 40% less than stated and that 
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be analysed from an ideological perspective, which can be seen as an outcome of a 
hegemonic imperialistic thinking. His argument rejects OPEC merely because it does 
not represent the decolonization of Arab countries, whereas imperialistic ideology 
profoundly views the whole scenario as an inferior complex compared to the post 
imperialist powers of England, France, and Germany, etc. In other words Kanovsky's 
analysis is dated. It raised important questions, some of which this thesis has pointed 
out such as the unfairness of international laws and the problems faced by developing 
countries, but the analysis in a sense lives in the past as there are more pressing 
enquires to make such as -are the OPEC members correctly reinvesting their profits? 
Are the member states deepening their socio-Iegal environments (in education, 
health,welfare provision, security etc,)? Is oil money being pressed to the use of 
genuine and holistic progress? Indeed have the individual member states reached their 
peak in ability to attract investment even in the field of oil and gas? 
Nonetheless OPEC, as an international organization has proved to have a very strong 
economic character. It has shown this by targeting the development of its member 
states as a goal to achieving the highest GDP growth possible. In 1996-1997, when 
the total world economic growth rate was 3.8 percent, (slightly increased from 1996 
when it reached just 3.7 percent), non-OPEC developing countries reached a growth 
rate of 4.3 percent in 1997 when in previous years the highest rate reached 5.4 
percent; whereas OPEC reached a GDP growth rate of 4.9 percent in 1997 against a 
4.6 percent rise in 1996.411 However, the new world economic growth changed 
dramatically since 1997, which was at 3.6 percent in 2011 and has been revised down 
to 3.7 percent in 2012.412 It is in these difficult circumstances that oil investment and 
investment in other industries must be planned for through regulation by the 
authorities in the Kingdom. In other words particularly in recessionary times 
"peak oil" might be imminent." See also Ugo Bardi," Peak Oil: The Four Stages of a New Idea" Vol. 
34 Energy (2009) pp. 323-326; Pedro de Almeida and, Pedro D. Silva "Timing and Future 
Consequences of the Peak of Oil Production" Vol. 43 Futures (2011) pp. 1044-1055. 
41Ihttp://www.escwa.org.lb/divisionslliblUploadslGDP2006mar.pdfflsearch=O/0220PEC%20Member.lo 
20States%20Real%20GDP%20Growth%20Rates%22 accessed 27 February 2012. 
412 At least for now, the deceleration of global output seems to have stabilized, although many risks 
remain, particularly in the Euro-zone. The US is forecast to grow at 1.6 percent in 2011 and at 1.8 
percent in 2012. The Euro-zone is now expected to expand by 1.6 percent in 2011, but by only 0.8 
percent in 2012. Japan's economy is expected to recover by 2.4 per cent in 2012, after a contraction of 
0.8 per cent in 20 II 
http://www.opec.orglopec_web/static_ files j>rojectlmedialdownloadslpublicationsIMOMR _October _ 2 
OI1.pdfaccessed 27 February 2012. 
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strategies to attract investment have to be sharpened and more carefully delineated if 
development is not to become stalled. 
When these old figures are associated with new ones since 2003, The Economic 
Analysis Division within the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia 
(ESCWA) expects that, in general, the positive GDP growth of the past three years 
will continue in 2006, despite on-going political instability in parts of the region, 
negative expectations and increasing risks from asset prices bubbling in financial and 
real estate markets in several GCC and MDE countries.413 Oil prices are expected to 
remain at elevated levels throughout 2007-2020, supported by demand growth in 
Asia, and the disruption to supplies from destabilised oil producing Arab states with 
production and refining constraints and supply uncertainty.414 GDP growth in the 
GCC sub-region is forecasted to decelerate by approximately a percentage point, at 
5.8 percent. Yet Saudi Arabia is ranked as "below potential: countries with high FDI 
potential but low FDI performance," by UNCTAD.41s The above rates show that 
major economic expansion occurred in developing countries where the average 
economic growth was 4.6 percent. This was also reflected by a high demand for oil, 
particularly from Asia. 
One of the crucial developments is the growing economic, political, military, and 
diplomatic relationship between China and the Middle East. This has led to dramatic 
improvements in the development of OPEC member states. In 2006, Chinese oil 
companies planned to build or upgrade more than a dozen refineries before the end of 
this decade, adding over 2.6 million barrels to the country's daily crude distillation 
capacity. The planned new capacities would account for almost 40 percent of the 6.6 
M-bpd markets.416 
413Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, "National Accounts Studies of the ESCW A 
Region," United Nations. See also, ESCW A Report 2001-2005. 
http://www .escwa.un.org/informationlpublicationsleditluploadlictd-07 -1 S-e.pdf accessed 27 February 
2012 
414Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, "ESCWA's Regional Forecasts 2010-2011," 
United Nations, Available at: www.escwa.un.org. accessed 21 February 2012. See Table 6, pp. 1-6. 
415 OPEC Annual report, 1997 http://www.unctad.org!TemplatesIPage.asp?intltemlD=2468&lang=l# 
accessed 28 February 2012 
416 'Saudi to return as China's top oil supplier - Aramco' see, Amy Jaffe and Jafeer Elass: Saudi 
Aramco national flagship with international responsibilities. James Baker Institute for public policy. 
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There are a number of facts that explain how the market grows rapidly. For example, 
world oil consumption rose by about 1.2 M-bpd in 2005, after an increase of 2.6 M-
bpd in 2004. The non-OECD countries account for 1.1 M-bpd of the 2005 increase, 
and the OECD as a whole account for 0.1 M-bpd. In 2004 when China's oil use 
increased by 0.9 M-bpd, its demand rose by only 0.4 M-bpd in 2005, despite 
continued strong economic growth. In the United States, a 0.4 percent decline in oil 
demand in 2005, which resulted from a combination of high prices, hurricane-related 
disruptions, and a mild winter. It was the first decline in US demand since 
2001. According to all the statistics, Saudi Arabia owns the biggest oil reserve in the 
world with 264.3 billion barrels.417 
The Saudi Arabian economy is unique in that it adheres to what has become known as 
the Islamic Growth Model as advanced by writers like Robert Looney.418 Indeed 
Saudi Arabia is an example of a country where religion governs all aspects of 
everyday life and the running of the state, its institutions, and its people. It is, 
therefore, important to emphasize that the foremost consideration given by the 
Kingdom in its attempts to industrialize and modernize itself has been to whether such 
a process of development would be in conformity with its religious ideals. In a 
traditional and deeply religious state such as Saudi Arabia, any industrial 
development or modernity plans that do not give credence to religious concerns, or 
that could be perceived as a threat to the Kingdom's traditions, are not only politically 
dislocating, but will be doomed to fai1.419 
The historical base for modernization in Saudi Arabia was founded in the ten-point 
reform program announced in November 1962. This program endorsed the decision to 
divert much of the state's oil revenues into the economic and industrial development 
Rice university 2007 pp 15-18 available 
at:http://www.rice.edulenergy/publications/docsINOCs/PapersINOC _ SaudiArarnco _Jaffe-Elass-
revised.pdf accessed 28 February 2012. 
417 See, The International Energy Outlook 2009. http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaflieoloil.html 
418 Robert E. Looney, Saudia Arabia's Islamic Growth Model Vol. 16 Journal of Economic Issues 
No.2 (Jun., 1982), pp. 453-459. 
419Energy Infonnation Administration, Short-Term Energy Outlook, (April, 2006) 
www.eia.doe.gov/erneulsteo/pub/ accessed 23 February 2012. 
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of the Kingdom. It is however always important to put the process of development in 
Saudi Arabia within its Islamic context. 
6.2. Saudi Arabia and National Labour42o 
The development transformation covers a wider scope than factories and plants, as 
industrialization remains an input of the development process rather than a goal in 
itself. The industrialization process involves increasing the possession of capital 
equipment and working towards increasing the productivity of the workers. Saudi 
Arabia's economic and developmental strategies are designed specifically for the 
particular country in question and should enable the industrial sector to be 
entrepreneurial and innovative. It aims not to just increase output or national income, 
but also to introduce modem technology and to work toward changing the state's 
attitudes towards development. However, Saudi Arabia's development plans have 
been, and will continue to be, affected by:421 
1. The availability of capital; 
2. The availability of cheap energy; 
3. Diversification as a means of offsetting a wasting asset; 
4. Industrial ramifications of the participation agreements; and 
5. The Saudis desire to achieve the maximum economic and social benefits for 
Saudi nation from the industrial development, i.e. a willingness to succeed. 
As stated earlier, Saudi Arabia is a young state, and as pointed out in the first 
development plan of the 1970-75, "about 46 percent of the population is below 15 
420 See, The Labor and Workmen Law of the Kingdom has been approved by the Council of Ministers 
on his Decision No 745 dated 24 Sha'ban 1389 H. (4 November 1969) and issued under Royal Decree 
No. Ml21 of 6 Ramadan 1389 H. (6 November 1969). Labour disputes are governed by this law 
http://www.saudia-online.comllabor_workmenJaw.htm 
421 See, The Saudi t/h development plan.pp.126 available at http://www.mep.gov.sa!accessed 23 
February 2012. 
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years of age and, therefore, not included in the group from which the (current) labor 
force is recruited. ,,422 
Saudi Arabia's efforts to create its own educated and flexible labour force were 
hampered by the oil boom, which attracted a considerable number of foreign workers 
into the country. This influx of quality workers caused the proportion of Saudis in the 
working population to decline from 72 percent in 1975 to 57 percent in 1980.423 
The plan to replace the non-Saudi labour force by a national labour force had to be 
pushed from two directions: encouragement and enforcement. This was because it had 
been recognized that the goal would not be achieved if left to develop under the forces 
of the natural market. The co-operation of both the state and the private sector is 
needed to achieve the same goal. Towards this end the following procedures were 
implemented: 
(a) Aid and subsidized loans were no longer approved unless the recipient had 
reached certain levels of 'Saudi-sation,424 and has adopted replacement 
policies. 
(b) The rules of contracting with the non-Saudi labour forces were respected. 
(c) Adoption of hierarchy policies to stop importing foreign labour because of 
their experience but to 'home-grow' the experience in question. 
(d) To encourage women to work especially in the fields of education, health, 
and administration. 
(e) To replace the foreign labour force with a national labour force in many of 
the employment sectors for example in the public sector. 
In a strong economy such as that of Saudi Arabia the long-term effect of the lack of a 
national labour force can affect economic growth. Because the oil industry is the 
422Ministry of Economy and Planning, "The Ninth Development Plan Report and Procedures," 
Kingdom o/Saudi Arabia, Available at: http://www.mep.gov.sa. Also see, 
http://countrystudies.uslsaudi-arabial37.htm accessed 23 February 2012. 
423 See, the Saudi five year plans, http://countrystudies.uslsaudi-arabial37.htm 
424A new tenninology came between 2000-2002 which signified a conscious effort by the government 
to replace all the non-Saudis by Saudi nationals in the workforce. Available at: 
http://www.saudiaramco.com/contentldamlPublicationslSaudization%20Guide_Contractor.pdf 
accessed 19 February 2012. 
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largest industry in Saudi Arabia, the non-national labour force reflects an error in the 
long-term developmental plans of the country. A larger, stronger, capable, and more 
experienced Saudi workforce in oil and gas as well as other professions would be 
more prominent and will make much more significant national impact than if the 
knowledge and know-how remains concentrated in the hands of a temporary foreign 
workforce. 
During the 1980s and through much of the 1990s, Saudi Arabia undertook a rapid 
process of modernization based solely on the purchasing power that oil revenues 
could provide. But, if that process were to be broken down into its constituent 
components, it would find more of a process of advancement than of actual 
development. That was only to be expected, perhaps, as the involvement of Saudi 
nationals in the professional and technical groups may have naturally been impeded 
by the delay factor - due to the time it takes for people to filter through the various 
levels of education provided by the schools, universities, and colleges that proliferated 
during the 1970s and 1980s.425 
By making a conscious effort to limit the number of foreign workers in the country 
and slowly but steadily educating and training its own nationals to replace them, 
Saudi Arabia is providing the way to a future where its people will be stronger and 
more secure in the knowledge that they are increasingly contributing to their own 
economy. This is seen as the means of strengthening the foundation for its own 
development. This new drive became noticeable when a recent phase of national 
development ended when the main cause for importing and maintaining such a large 
foreign workforce, namely for the creation of infrastructure was more or less 
eliminated. For that reason, it was predicted that the number of non-Saudis in the 
labour force would decline to less than 30 percent by the year 2005.4261t is important 
to note that this ambitious objective has not been reached. The American 
government's estimation is that 80% of the labour force as at 2011 remains non-
42S See the latest increase in Saudi universities since 2000, 
http://www.mohe.gov.sa/en/Pages/default.aspx. accessed 21 January 2012 also see, 
http://www .4icu.org/sa/ http://www.un.intlsaudiarabialch6-6pln.htmaccessed 21 January 2012. 
426Since 2006, there has been a decline of Saudi nationals in the workforce, due to the refonns by King 
Abdullah. See AI-Jazeera, "Saudi King to Announce Refonns," AI-Jazeera, March 18,2011, Available 
at: http://english.aljazeera.netlnews/middleeastl20 11103/20 113187145714459.html accessed 20 
February 2012. 
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national. 427 The uninspiring situation revealed here goes a long way to prove the 
position of this thesis that neither FDI increases nor genuine economic development 
will take place without holistic reconsideration and reengineering of the socio legal 
status of the Saudi Society. Without the whole gamut of human rights including 
women's rights and political freedoms being better respected the Saudi state and 
indeed many other OPEC and GCC member states will struggle to achieve their 
developmental targets. 428 
The main reason for Saudi Arabia's new 'Saudi-sation' drive has been explained; the 
following presents additional factors that the Saudi decision makers had to consider: 
Firstly, a global recession in the early 1980s led to a slump in oil prices and this 
curtailed some of Saudi Arabia's more ambitious projects, and forced it to try and 
obtain the maximum return on its investment. One of the clearest ways of doing so 
was for it to invest more in its own people rather than just spend its income on 
projects run by a transient workforce, who on the whole, took their earnings with 
them back to their own countries instead of putting it back into the Saudi economy. 
Secondly, Saudi Arabia's increasing influence and prestige following the 1973 oil 
embargo compelled some Saudi decision-makers to believe that although foreign 
labour would always playa role in Saudi life, it could not be allowed to be essential to 
development. There was an increasing need for Saudi Arabia's expanding 
international role to be firmly backed by an active, experienced, and diversified native 
workforce. 
It is due to these and other aforementioned reasons that the Kingdom felt that a 
decisive action was needed to train and employ more Saudi nationals and to replace 
the majority of the foreign workforce. It has not been an easy or fast aim to achieve, 
but the Saudi efforts to improve the quality of its workforce was further strengthened 
by the policies of , Saudi-sat ion' and are beginning to pay dividends. Saudi Arabia has 
427 Central Intelligence Agency "Middle East: Saudi Arabia" The World Fact Book available at 
https:llwww.cia.gov/library/publicationslthe-world-factbooklgeos/sa.htmlaccessed 20 February 2012. 
428 John Sfakianakis. "Saudi Youth Struggle to Find Work Raises Urgency for Refonn" Arab News 
available at http://arabnews.com/economy/article267060.ece?comments=all accessible 23 February 
2012. 
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taken the initiative in providing training to Saudi nationals in its economy's modem 
sector by providing vocational colleges to cater for the non-academically inclined 
Saudi males. The college's second intention was to train those Saudis that had left 
agriculture, which became one of the main sources of the industrial workforce.429 
6.3. The Diversification Strategy 
Saudi Arabia had to work hard within OPEC's policies to achieve its own goals and to 
ensure the stability of oil prices at a certain level. It needed a long-term guarantee of 
income with which to maintain the continuity of its development plans. It was 
working toward adopting new policies to change the old task of constructing a model 
budget based purely on the price of oil. The authorities recognized a high dependency 
on oil, and as such, Saudi Arabia, as a member of OPEC, understood that the role of 
its development was to reduce its dependency on oil by adopting a capitalistic 
economic system. 
Beginning in 2005, Saudi authorities started to reveal their new diversification 
strategy process.430 As an example, they announced the undertaking of mega projects 
and developments of some financial facilities as a master plan to transform Riyadh 
into an international financial centre. In May 2005, the Capital Markets Authority 
(CMA) announced a plan for the creation of a mega financial city - the King 
Abdullah Financial District (KAFD) - located on 1.6m square metres of undeveloped 
land close to the city centre, with around 3m square metres of office space. The idea 
was to bring the Kingdom's banks, stock exchange, and the CMA along with the 
central bank and the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) under one roof. 
Riyadh is not the only new financial centre in Saudi Arabia. The $27 billion King 
Abdullah Economic City under construction at Rabigh, will also have a 'Financial 
429 Alsahlawi, Khalid Abdul Aziz, 'Human Resources and Economic Development: The Case of Saudi 
Arabia' Journal o/Third World Studies. Spring 2004. available at: 
http://flndarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3821/is_ 200404/ai_ n9399317 l?tag=content;coll accessed 23 
February 2012. 
430 SAGIA, "The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Strategic Powerhouse, Global Strength" available at 
http://www.sagia.gov.salDocumentsIDownload%20center/lntemationalO/02OMediao/020o/020Publication 
s/saudi_arabia_l.pdfaccessed 16 March 2012; Amr Hamzawy, op.cit., pp.l0-14. 
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Island' or 'city-within-a-city' with 500,000 square meters of office space.431 
This project should be seen as a reflection of the regional development in the gulf and 
not based on pre-existing plans. Such errors can be easily identified when we look at 
the legal structure to such projects. In fact there are no legal guidelines that could 
govern such investments. In the past, Saudi Arabia has pursued an industrial policy at 
home that is aimed at diversifying the economic base of the state and to tap into its 
natural resources of oil and gas. Compared with other Arab oil producers it has made 
comparatively little investment abroad. The industrial area that has received the most 
attention in Saudi Arabia is without doubt the petrochemical industry. Moreover, no 
other Arab country has planned its industrial development in such a detailed fashion. 
Its petrochemical plants have been successfully developed to be export-oriented, 
protected, subsidised, capital intensive, and unburdened by labour costs. 
This thesis argues that Saudi Arabia has been able to pursue such an industrial policy 
more readily than its Arab neighbours because of the country's unique attributes, 
including its ability to earn more, simply because it was allowed to sell more. Its 
annual export earnings potential reached a peak of 120 million barrels, which allowed 
it to build up huge monetary reserves in the 1970s and 1980s. Secondly, it invested in 
the skilled management to carry out its intended policies of 'Saudi-sation'. It has also 
proved to be a low absorber of funds and is, therefore, in a strong position to diversify 
its funds into development plans, unlike high absorbers such as Iraq or Iran. Saudi 
Arabia enjoys close and co-operative contacts with a number of Western companies. 
which have helped through the technology transfer processes; its strategic relationship 
with the USA also assisted in this regard.432 
Although the 1970s were marked by capital accumulation, even Saudi Arabia was not 
immune to the inflationary effects of the 1980s global recession. As a result, in the 
1980s, development was carried out with more caution and the reserves were drawn 
down to stem the effects of the economic recession. 
431 See. The King Abdullah Economic City. The Economic City leads the master-planning and 
development of the 168 million sq m King Abdullah Economic City (KAEC) 
http://www.kingabdullahcity.com/enlHomelindex.html accessed 25 February 2012 
432 Gavin, J and Marks, "Oil Wealth Offers New Opportunity". The Global Banker Monday 02 August 
2004. http://www.thebanker.com/contentisearch?SearchText=GavinO/02C+ J+and+Marks accessed 23 
February 2012. 
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During the period of the first two five-year plans (1970-1980), the emphasis was 
placed on developing the infrastructure, on social welfare projects, and in the non-oil 
industries. The share of non-oil manufacturing in GDP remained low during the 1980s 
and 1990s, and was further impeded by the impact of the Gulf War. This era heavily 
concentrated on the production of building materials and other intermediate goods, 
but was constrained by the lack of skilled Saudi personnel, and instead had to rely on 
foreign labour. There was a high growth rate in non-productive sectors such as trade 
and services during the 1970s, and it has been argued that this reflected rising 
spending on imports. 
During the 1980s the Saudi authorities' industrialization program ascribed the 
responsibility for major projects to state enterprises in partnership with foreign 
companies. The Saudi private sector was encouraged to lead the way in creating small 
industries. At the same time, the state enterprises concentrated mainly on the 
development of capital-intensive hydrocarbon-based industries aimed at reducing the 
heavy dependence on crude oil exports. Two industrial cities were built: Jubail and 
Yanbu. These housed new oil refineries and gas-based petrochemical plants. 
The importance that diversification played in the Kingdom's industrial and economic 
base can be appreciated by considering two of the basic broad objectives contained in 
the last five-year development plan of 1990 to 1995: 
(a)To reduce reliance upon the production and export of crude oil as the main 
source of national income; 
(b) To continue the structural changes in the Kingdom's economy so as to 
establish a diversified economic base, with due emphasis on industry and agriculture; 
The industrialization of Saudi Arabia is the responsibility of both the public and the 
private sectors. But it is in the private sector where Islamic lines have made their 
mark, because the private sector is operated by modem and conventional rules and 
regulations, which are not related to a large extent to any Islamic or Shari'ah 
applications. The authorities' policy is to only intervene when absolutely necessary, 
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such as when funding the building of new heavy industries that require a level of 
investment that only public spending can provide. 
Saudi Arabia's drive for industrialization has been motivated by the fundamental 
objective of building and maintaining a viable industrial base. In the long-term, 
assuming success, this industrial base is hoped to reduce the Kingdom's economic 
dependence on oil. Currently, the levels of such reductions are difficult to assess. Yet, 
despite the acute awareness of the Saudi planners and decision makers to ensure that 
the development process was compatible with the fabric of the society, areas of 
friction have developed. As has already been mentioned, Saudi Arabia is a very 
traditional society with deeply entrenched beliefs. It was therefore, not surprising that 
the prospect of industrialization and modernization was met with some suspicion. 
The suspicions raised included a worry that industrialization was unlikely to run 
smoothly when spearheaded by foreign workers who had no commitment or 
obligation to the welfare of the country. Another suspicion was that industrialization 
would not be helpful if the industry formed a symbolically modern sector of the 
economy without developing ever-expanding links with the native economy and 
culture. The industrialization drive in Saudi Arabia has been fuelled by the wish to 
diversify away from a dependence on oil. Until the early 1980s, oil revenues 
consistently had a share of GNP of no less than 90 percent. The Saudis seemed to 
have realized that whatever influence oil offered, it also afforded influence to others 
over itself. An economy so vulnerable to fluctuations in oil prices could easily be 
weakened or placed in danger. So, the authorities moved toward diversifying income 
into other industries. This included investing heavily in agriculture with the aim of 
achieving self-sufficiency in food production and slowing the migration of its 
population from the country into big towns. 
To summarize, the importance of the creation of a viable non-oil industrial base to the 
political and economic future, and hence the regional standing of Saudi Arabia, is 
essential. The diversification of the economic base of the Kingdom away from oil and 
its derivatives is the most essential aspect of the industrial base. It would be 
unrealistic to expect diversification to be a short-term goal for it is in fact a long-term 
one especially in view of the problems that have been discussed. 
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However, there are positive signs that this industrial base has begun to appear and the 
success of the petrochemical industries attest to that. However, serious and yielding 
decisions must soon be taken about how to take diversification even further. It cannot 
be denied that both agriculture and the export of wheat have limited success, but this 
can be attributed to heavy subsidization and the country's lack of adequate water for 
irrigation, industrial, commercial, and domestic use. This does not bode well for 
future expansion. 
To summarize the main points of the arguments stated above, it seems that the success 
of the heavy industries that will form the backbone of the industrial diversification 
base, are conditional on whether the national workforce can catch up with the pace of 
industrial development. If one is moving in the direction of modernization and the 
other is stuck with traditional ideas and methods, then the two will have difficulty 
merging and working together effectively. This is the most important obstacle that has 
faced the development of Saudi's human resources. The reason for this is that little 
attention has been paid to the co-ordination of the two processes, with the result being 
the unbalanced development of the Kingdom. 
The aim of Saudi-sation is to bridge some of the gaps between the needs of the 
modem sector and the existing human resource skills. But it will be difficult due to 
attitudes toward the modem sector, in areas such as work production and efficiency. If 
the only jobs that most Saudis are willing to take are in management then graduates 
are bound to outnumber the posts available. This can only result in serious 
unemployment levels. 
Thus,it is likely that young unemployed and educated graduates will be forced to 
accept a lower status range of jobs. The result of this is in the long-term, they may 
vent their frustration through social problems. A problem that could face the 
development of the Kingdom's alternative economy is that 'Saudi-sation' has been 
shown to have its limits. The Asians, mainly, at the present time, from Sri Lanka and 
Pakistan, are proving to be the largest sector of the working population because they 
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are cheaper to employ than the Saudis and many industries are taking advantage of 
that fact.433 
A way for Saudi Arabia to reduce the large number of migrant workers in the 
Kingdom while maintaining the economic viability of its industries could be to follow 
the example of Japan. Like Japan, Saudi Arabia could start by creating export-
orientated industries aimed at its immediate neighbours, or even finance the setting-up 
of Saudi industries abroad where raw materials are cheaper and more available, as 
Japan has done in South East Asia. In this manner, productivity and profit could be 
maintained without the competitive aspect of importing more workers. Industrial 
development has been shown to have both strengths and weaknesses. The Saudi 
petrochemicals industries are continuing to enjoy an unassailable advantage. With 
proven oil reserves of more than 200 billion barrels amounting to more than a century 
of oil left, Saudi Arabia will be providing, expanding and processing oil long after 
most, ifnot all, current oil reserves have lost their exploratory viability. 
Saudi policy rests on the hope that it is only a matter of time before organizations 
such as the European Union reduce or drop the import tariffs against such 
petrochemicals. This is a persuasive possibility; because the Gee petrochemical 
industries are reaching such a level of competition that it makes financial sense to buy 
processed oil, rather than the crude oil of Saudi Arabia. By developing these 
industries, Saudi Arabia is consolidating its position as the main oil producer and 
exporter in the world. 
It is, therefore, possible to conclude that the Kingdom's future security cannot be 
discussed without linking it with relationships maintained with the West. The more 
important Saudi oil is to the West, the more Saudi Arabia's security will be assured, 
and the stronger its position will be with respect to its neighbours. Yet, such industries 
continue to require co-ordination and co-operation amongst the Gee countries, given 
433Muhammad Asad Sadi and Basheer Mohammad AI-Ghazali, Doing business with impudence: A 
focus on women entrepreneurship in Saudi Arabia (King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals, 
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, 2009). available at: 
http://www.academicjoumals.org/ajbmlpdflpdt20 1 0/JanlSadiO/020and%20Al-Ghazali.pdf accessed 23 
February 2102. 
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the proliferation of petrochemicals plants in the Gulf. Otherwise, the new power of 
the petrochemicals industries will be much curtailed. 
6.4. The Future of OPEC and Saudi Arabia 
The victory over Iraq in the First Gulf War, in which the USA took the major role 
with Saudi and British assistance, signalled the dawn of a new era in international 
relations. No longer is the world divided into two distinctly antagonistic polar 
spheres. International co-operation and consultation have become more 
commonplace, particularly under the auspices of the United Nations. 
OPEC's most recent meetings point to this greater sense of co-operation between the 
oil-consuming and the oil-producing countries where an exchange of information and 
ideas is on the agenda to promote more harmonious relations. 434 All the OPEC 
meetings during the 1990s had two major themes: the future pricing and production 
policies and the future of the Russian petroleum industry. As the Middle East oil 
producer's share of the world oil output is set to increase rapidly over the next two 
decades (from 12 percent to nearly 40 percent), oil demand by the consuming DECO 
nations is expected to rise slowly from 75 M-bpd to 85 M-bpd over the same period in 
which the OECD oil output is set to fall. The new statistics show that the Middle East 
accounted for 30.6 percent of world oil production in 2004, down from 31.5 percent 
in 1999.435 Production in Iraq was disrupted by unrest in 2004, but production in other 
countries was not affected. Most Middle East oil production comes from a small 
number of very large fields; more than half of Saudi Arabia's production has come 
from the giant Ghawar field. The importance of Middle East oil peaked in the mid-
seventies, when it reached 39 percent of world supply. Million-barrel-per-day 
producers in the Middle East are Saudi Arabia (8.9 M-bpd in 2004), Iran (3.9 M-bpd), 
the United Arab Emirates (2.4 M-bpd), Kuwait (2.4 M-bpd) and Iraq (1.8 M_bpd).436 
434 Indeed it is true that "Among all international trade organisations, OPEC has proved to be a good 
example ofan alternative international political economy with an undisputed amount of bargaining 
power and one of the few powerful organisations not controlled by the West This gathering brings 
great benefits in both economic and political sense for oil exporting countries". Jamola Khusanjanova, 
"OPEC's Benefit for the Member Countries", Vol. 2, Research in World Economy No.1 (April 2011) 
available at www.sciedu.ca/rweaccessed 16 March 2012 pp. 14, 16. 
mWTRG Economics, "Oil Price History and Analysis," WTRG, Available at: 
www.wtrg.com/priceslhtm. 
436 See, All the official data at, http://www.opec.orgiopec_weblen/data..sraphs/33S.htm accessed 23 
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The oil forecasting method is a completely new approach in predicting the oil 
production needed for nations, geographic regions, special categories, and the world. 
It evolved over a period of seven years with the purpose of superseding obsolete 
pencil-and-paper sketches and outmoded curve-fitting techniques, and to meet a set of 
rigorous design specifications. The method breaks world oil production into the top 
42 oil-producing states, accounting for more than 98 percent of world production in 
1998. The user then separately forecasts the oil production for each of the 42 nations. 
Next the Expected Ultimate Recovery (EUR) and the Oil Reserves (OR) are 
calculated by integrating each nation's oil production curve (Le. its complete life 
cycle of oil production from start to end). The national forecasts are then calculated, 
as needed, to get the forecasts for the regions and categories, and the world. 
It would, therefore, seem that OPEC's future is related to issues out of its control such 
as: world oil demands according to the latest revisions, world oil demand growth for 
1999 has been adjusted up from the previous 1.20 M-bpd to 1.29 M-bpd. The 
adjustments are most noticeable in the growth rate of developing countries, which has 
been revised up by 0.3 percent from the previous 1.4 percent. OECD oil consumption 
is also up, by O.Olmb/d, mainly to account for higher growth in North America. The 
figure for apparent consumption in the former CPEs has also been increased to stand 
at 0.18 M_bpd.437 
World growth of oil demand had to be revised down for the year 2000. Demand for 
the revision grew on average by 75.81 M-bpd for the year 2000. The quarterly data 
shows that compared with year-earlier figures, consumption declined by 0.4 percent 
during the first quarter; for the remaining three quarters, demand growth recovered 
rising by 1.4 percent, 2.0 percent and 1.5 percent, respectively. On a regional basis, 
OECD consumption registers a marginal increment of 0.1 percent to average 47.67 
February 2012. 
437See the official data at. http://www.opec.orglopec_web/enldata...sraphsl330.htm accessed 28 
February 20120ECD countries, currently accounting for close to 60% of world oil demand, see a 
further growth of 4 M-bpd by 2030, reaching 53 M-bpd. Developing countries account for most of the 
rise in the reference case, with consumption doubling from 29 M-bpd to 58 M-bpd. Asian developing 
countries account for an increase of20 M-bpd, which represents more than two-thirds of the growth in 
all developing countries. Nevertheless, energy poverty will remain an important issue over this period. 
By 2030, developing countries will consume, on average, approximately five times less oil per person, 
compared with OECD countries. 
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M-bpd. DC consumption is expected to show a rise of 2.7 percent; however, due to 
the limited reliability and availability of the data, no definite conclusion can be drawn 
yet. Finally, "other regions" apparent consumption growth derived from production 
and trade statistics, seems to have increased by 3.1 percent. 438 
A recognized expert of the oil industry, Odell, predicted that oil demand would 
increase five times the amount demanded in 1979. European sources said that the oil 
cartel would propose a document setting a reference price of $20-23 a barrel for the 
period 2000 to 2010. As one of the new ideas to control oil prices and the production 
levels, the Saudi authorities hinted that OPEC should be replaced. This called for the 
US Energy Secretary to be contacted so that he could call for oil to be at a price of 
$20-25 a barrel, warning that at $30 price would be damaging to developing 
countries. "Thirty dollars is too high," he told a press conference on the second day of 
the International Energy Forum in Riyadh (this has in the internationalcontext proved 
to be completely outdated). "It hurts consuming countries, especially developing 
ones," Richardson said. "We should not accept $30 a barrel.,,439 However he added 
that $10 a barrel was too low and that the United States favoured a range of between 
$20 and $25 a barrel. The conclusion that may be drawn from this is that world 
markets will continue to cause oil prices to increase as long as speculators interest 
themselves in the market and unless governments in the oil producing countries alter 
their laws to contain what was seen as the inordinate rise of oil prices. The real 
question, however, is whether the oil rich states should concern themselves with 
keeping oil prices low or they should endeavour to make as much money as they 
possibly can to finance their own development. 
Planners and policy makers are helped to make careful decisions and policies based 
on a continuous series of annual forecasts that helpfully reveal all of the critical 
events in the life cycle of world oil production: 
438CRS Report for Congress, World Oil Demand and its Effect on Oil Prices,Updated June 9, 2005. 
A vailable at: 
www.fas.orglsgp!crs!miscIRL32530.pdf#search==%22WORLDO/0200ILO/020DEMANDo/022 accessed 
23 January 2012. 
439Walid Khaddauri, "Infonnation and Oil Markets," International Energy Forum, November 19,2005, 
pg 1-18. 
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1. The peak in world oil production was forecasted to occur in 2005, and by 2040 
production is predicted to fall by 53 percent - an average decline of2.1 percent 
per year over 35 years. More oil has, however, been produced beyond that 
produced in 2005. 
2. The OPEC/non-OPEC crossover event was predicted to happen in 2007, 
which it did in September 2007, and by 2040 the OPEC nations are predicted 
to produce 75 percent of the world's oil.440 It must be noted that both OPEC 
and non-OPEC nations will be in steep decline after the OPEC peak in 2011. 
Two more critical events are also predicted. 
3. The Middle East/non-Middle East crossover event is forecasted to occur in 
2023, and by 2040 the Middle East will produce 64.1 percent of the world's 
oil. 
4. The Muslim/non-Muslim oil production crossover event is forecast to occur in 
[sic] 2001, and by 2040 these Muslim nations will produce 73.0 percent of the 
world's oil. The former USA President Clinton was advised of this 
situation.441 
It is believed that around 2050, Saudi Arabia will still have enough oil in the ground 
for domestic consumption and for a respectable petrochemical industry. Because of 
this, while most observers of the petroleum scene have focused their attention on the 
price of oil, the Saudis were thinking about long-term marketing structures. 
Crude oil prices were expected to remain at around $35 PB through the year 2005. 
The share of oil in total world energy demand is expected to decline also: from 38 
percent in 1989 to 34 percent in 2005. In addition, there will be a shift toward 
alternative sources of power such as natural gases and hydroelectricity. In reality the 
price of oil increased dramatically in 2005. Since theFirst Gulf War, Saudi Arabia is 
440 The "OPEC crossover event" is when OPEC production is projected to exceed non-OPEC 
production and thereafter OPEC dominates both World oil production OPEC, "September-October 
2007 Edition of the OPEC Bulletin," OPEC, October 2007; Richard Duncan, "World Energy 
Production, Population Growth, and the Road to the Olduvai Gorge," Population and Environment 22, 
No.5 (May-June 2001): 6. 
441 In his new analysis Duncan maintains his irrational argument about the oil demands and peaks. See, 
Duncan, Richard, "The Olduvai Theory - Energy population and Industrial Civilization,"1he Social 
Contract. Winter 2005, 129. Available at: 
http://www.hubbertpeak.comlduncanlOlduvaiTheorySociaIContract.pdf accessed 23 January 2012; 
Duncan, R, "Letters Responding to Richard Duncan's Olduvai Theory Essay," Social Contract 
Journal, 16, No.3 (Spring 2006). 
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clearly seen to be in the dominant position at recent OPEC meetings. It has refused to 
relinquish its hold on pricing and output decision-making. Therefore, an OPEC 
dominated by Saudi Arabia, with its emphasis on long-term strategy can moderate 
prices, which it hopes will increase consumption and satisfy Western policy-makers 
and consumers. 
Saudi Arabia has a strong influence over the GCC members and other Arab countries. 
It also has an ever-increasing influence in the Islamic world especially given that it is 
a key member of OPEC. All these elements will add more power to its position as the 
biggest oil producer in the world. This option has been shaped by the power of the 
decision-makers to guarantee the stability of the price and production of oil to cope 
with world demand. However, as an Islamic state, Saudi believes that the oil wealth 
was granted by God, and is, therefore, conscious of its responsibility and is working 
with other producers and consumers to ensure a level of stability on the international 
oil markets (as King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz has said). 
On the other hand, the state's system has helped to process the development of Islam 
into a comprehensive system with a flexibility suited to developmental and economic 
growth locally and globally.442 This point is developed further in Chapter 8 but it 
suffices here to say that this is achieved through consensus building with liberal 
scholars and careful politicking with the existing rivalry between Islamic Schools.443 
The government working together with some moderate Islamists agree with liberal 
reformists on the need to press for reform, but they all seem to come from different 
directions and have different end destinations in view. Moderate Sunni Islamists, 
mostly religious scholars critical of the fundamentalist Wahhabi interpretation of 
Islam, place more emphasis on reforming the religious establishment. They believe 
that without garnering religious approval and without ensuring the full compatibility 
of reform demands and sharia provisions, broad segments of the Saudi population will 
ultimately view any reform measures as endangering their values and way of life. 
442CGES, Saudi Oil Policy 2007. Available at: 
http://www.cges.co.uklresources/articlesl2007/1 0/09/saudi-oil-policy accessed 24 February 2012. 
443 N. Brown, A. Hamzawy and M. Ottaway, Islamist Movements and the Democratic Process in the 
Arab World 2006 Carnegie Papers, Middle East Series (Washington Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2006) p. 5-6. Available at 
http://www.carnegieendowment.orglfileslcp_67..srayzones_final.pdf accessed 12 March 2012. 
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Scholars such as Abdel Aziz al-Qasim, a lawyer based in Riyadh, and Hassan al-
Malki, a 
former instructor at the religious Imam Muhammad bin Saud University, advocate an 
innovative interpretation of religion that can help ground the modem ideas of 
accountable government, political participation, human rights, and formation of civil 
society organizations into a legitimate Islamic framework. Their position rightly is 
that without opening the mosque and the school-the two strongholds of official 
Wahhabism-to moderate thinking, the battle for reform and the struggle against 
extremism cannot be won. A similar position to that of liberal reformists is adopted by 
Moderate Shiite Islamists. Having had to endure Wahhabi discrimination in the last 
decades, they, however, place no hope in the possibility of reforming the religious 
establishment. To an extent they have succeeded in their attempts to get the royal 
family to limit the powers of the Wahhabi clerics and promote the plurality of Islamic 
schools ofthought.444 
In the context of the religious nature of holy writings we can see how God - "Allah" -
distinguishes between heavenly benefits and secular benefits. For Muslims, this 
argument is more than logical because it comes from their religious faith. However, 
for non-Muslims it is difficult to comprehend, because it is not based on a 
recognizable theory or science. However, we will conclude this part of the thesis with 
this verse from the Holy Quran: 
And seek by means of what Allah has given you the 
future abode, and do not neglect your portion of this 
wor/d 445 
In other words, Muslims should not become deeply involved in a materialistic way of 
life. They should look at all the materialistic opportunities as permissible, but not 
profoundly justified. Moreover, the King's speech about oil prices and the future of 
OPEC described the position most succinctly. 
444H . . 9 amzawl Op.Clt., p. . 
44.5 Holy Qur'an, 28:77 
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Islamic beliefs radically conflict with the materialistic approach of gaining economic 
growth and development. The materialistic theory represents the core idea of Western 
progress, such as in the fields of economics and technology. Nonetheless, this is not 
recognized in an Islamic system. We will focus on Saudi Arabia as an example of an 
Islamic state because of the significance that oil has had on its development. Their 
faith in Islamic principles can be said to be the prop to their political, economic, and 
developmental progress. Worship is a simple structure in Islam and is based on the 
right to a basic standard of life. It is one of the economic rights of the individual in the 
Islamic system. The Holy Quran states: 
And in their wealth there is acknowledged right for the 
needy and destitute. 446 
The order here comes from God, and it does not include unfair justice or the 
sacrificing of other people's rights without reason or legitimacy. Yet, God shapes it as 
worship 'Ebadh.' Therefore, we can see the clear meaning of these verses. In Islam, 
no one should suffer from poverty or deprivation, regardless of origin, race, or 
religion. This (Islam) would "guarantee the interests of both the producers and the 
consumers," as the Crown Prince said in an opening address to the 7th International 
Energy Forum.447 As the world's biggest oil exporter, he renewed the Kingdom's 
commitment to: 
Continue supplying the oil necessary for world economic 
growth and its readiness to increase production if such a 
measure were needed.448 
Nonetheless, urging co-operation with consumers, he added: 
It is worrying to us when we are blamed for the rise of oil 
prices to the final consumers.449 
446 Holy Qur'an,Sl:91 
447International Energy Forum, "Summary," International Energy Forum, November 17-192000 It is 
worrying to us when we are blamed for the rise of oil prices to the final consumers, Available at: 
www.ief.orgl20/0ocumentsIIEF7HCStatement.pdf. Accessed 24 February 2012. 
448 Ibid. 
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It would appear from later actions that the reason for such increase might rest with 
international speculators rather than the producers. 
The Crown Prince called for a permanent secretariat meeting to be set up to promote 
co-operation, which some observers considered a first hint by Saudi Arabia to reform 
OPEC. Relations between consumers and producers need not be one where one 
benefits and the other loses. This occurs when oil is priced at only $10 a barrel under 
the current highs and below the cartel's $22-28 price band mechanism. Such modest 
results have in fact become history and the price of oil and the expectations from oil 
investment have over the last ten years increased tremendously for many reasons 
some of which go beyond the enquiry of this thesis. 
The main conclusions of the world's oil forecast are summarized as follows: 
1. World total liquids production remains on a peak. plateau since 2006 and is 
forecast to fall off this peak. plateau in 2009. Increasing numbers of oil experts 
are forecasting impending peak production plateaus. According to the 
International Energy Agency (lEA), the current peak production of 87.2 mbd 
occurred on January 2008. As long as demand continues increasing then prices 
will continue increasing. 
2. Forecast world crude oil and lease condensate (C&C) production retains its 
2005 peak. The forecast to 2100 shows declining C&C production, using a 
bottom up forecast to 2012. The forecast to 2012 shows a slight decline to 
2009, followed by a 3%/year decline rate to 2012. 
3. W orId oil discovery rates peaked in 1965 and production has exceeded 
discovery for every year since the mid-1980s. Discoverable reserves in giant 
fields also peaked during the mid-1960s. The time lag between world peak 
discovery in 1965 and world peak production in 2005 of 40 years is similar to 
the time lag of 42 years for the USA Lower 48. 
449 Ibid. 
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4. World C&C year on year production changes to October 2007 and November 
2007 show significant declines for Mexico, North Sea and Saudi Arabia and 
significant increases for Russia, Azerbaijan and Angola. As Russia is likely to 
be on a production plateau and Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE have 
probably passed peak production, the world C&C production will continue to 
decline slowly. 
5. Saudi Arabia retains its 2005 C&C peak, which is the same as the peak year 
for world C&C (Fig 2). Saudi Arabia C&C production has dropped to 9.0 mbd 
which is 0.6 mbd less than its peak in 2005. It is now almost a certainty that 
Saudi Arabia passed peak C&C production of9.6 mbd in 2005 
6. Kuwait retains its 2006 minor C&C peak. Kuwait C&C production has now 
dropped to 2.5 mbd which is less than its peak in 2006. There is a strong 
likelihood that Kuwait has passed its minor 2006 peak. Kuwait's major peak 
was 3.3 mbd in 1972. 
7. UAE retains its 2006 C&C peak. UAE C&C production has now dropped to 
2.6 mbd, adjusted for maintenance, which is just less than its peak in 2006. 
There is a reasonable likelihood that UAE passed its 2006 peak. 
8. World natural gas plant liquids are forecast to increase due mainly to new 
OPEC projects (Fig 15). World ethanol and XTL production is forecast to 
almost double by 2012. World processing gains are forecast to decline slowly 
to 2012. 450 
The forecast method disaggregates world oil production into the top 42 oil-producing 
nations of the world (together producing over 98 percent of the world's Oil).4S1 The 
450 The Oil Drum, "World Oil Forecasts Including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE - Update Feb 
2008" DrumBeat, February 17,2008 available at http://www.theoildrum.com/nodel3623 accessed 17 
March 2012; Sam Foucher, "Peak Oil Update - December 2007: Production Forecasts and EIA Oil 
Production Numbers" December 29,2007 available at http://www.theoildrum.com!nodel3439 accessed 
17 March 2012. 
451Richard C. Duncan.Heuristic Oil Forecasting Method #4.Abstract & Methods. June, 2001. Available 
at: www.mnforsustain.orgloil_duncanJ_abstract_method_heuristic _ oiljorecasting.htm accessed 21 
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importance of these predictions, therefore, is that the fundamentals of Saudi Arabia's 
oil fortunes are strong. The same remains for some other neighbouring oil states. 
Their supplies will remain very much sought after by traditional investors in the oil 
and gas sector as well as newer players in the field from China and India. While 
predictions for Saudi Arabia are good they also reveal serious emerging competition 
from within and outside OPEC. 
OPEC's oil has been a critical source of petroleum during the last century, and will 
continue to be throughout the 21 st century. According to oil industry analysts, the 
collapse of the Soviet oil industry - the world's largest producer - resulted in a 
complete disintegration of the previous system. This led to OPEC returning to the 
spotlight as the leading and largest source of petroleum in the world. It is, however, 
fair to note that in the last decade, the Russian oil industry has somewhat revived 
through a number of joint ventures with Western firms.4s2 This, therefore, is the more 
reason that Saudi Arabia cannot afford not to reform as competition may really not be 
totally weak. If the price of OPEC's oil soared with respect to its share of world 
production, consumers would be provided with an incentive to conserve supplies and 
simultaneously look for alternative sources of energy. However, some potential 
alternative sources such as nuclear power and coal do not have the support of public 
opinion. Yet, efforts are mounting around the world to curtail the combustion of all 
fossil fuels (oil, coal, and natural gases), because of the resultant air pollution, acid 
rain, and the emerging evidence of climatic change. 
When we try to project the future of OPEC within a Saudi Arabian context, the 
picture is positive. Yet, it needs to be understood in its wider perspective because 
February 2012. Each nation is modelled separately and independently. The time span of major interest 
is the 80-year period from 1960 to 2040. The graphs show oil production data from 1960 to 1998 and 
oil forecasts from 1999 to 2040. The 42 national forecasts are then aggregated into 7 geographic 
regions (e.g. North America) and 6 categories (e.g. OPEC and non-OPEC nations) to generate their 
respective forecasts. Finally, the oil forecasts for a1142 nations are summed to get the world oil 
forecast. This method is both user-intensive and time consuming. Duncan and Youngquist op.cit., Also 
see, See, Colin J. Campbell, "Forecasting Global Oil Supply 2000-2050" Hubbert Centre Newsletter 
(M. King Hubbert Centre for Petroleum Supply Studies, 2002) pp. 3, 10. Available at 
http://www.oilcrisis.comlcampbelVCampbell_ 02-3 .pdf accessed 24 February 2012. 
4S2Robert Pirog, "Russian Oil and Gas Challenges" CRS Report for Congress 20, 2007 pp.1-2 available 
at http://www.fas.orglsgp/crs/row/RL33212.pdf accessed 17 March 2012; Anonymous, 
"Kremlin's Growing Role in Russian Oil Industry Curbs Western Investors" The Wall Street Journal 
April 27, 2004. 
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what has emerged from one's understanding is a picture of a country tied between the 
demands of its fellow Arabs who seek political concessions and the demands of its 
consumers, the Western countries who seek economic concessions and favours. Saudi 
Arabia has continuously sought to pursue its own national interests. It has attempted 
to optimize the benefits and minimize the drawbacks of its contacts with its Arab and 
Western friends, an endeavour which has necessitated concessions to both its friends 
and foes at different times. The 1973 oil crisis was an instance in which Saudi Arabia 
submitted to the demands of its Arab neighbours to impose an embargo on the USA, 
but it also managed to display a sufficient degree of restraint to indicate the reluctance 
with which the action was taken so as to minimize the impact on the West. 
Indeed, Saudi Arabia has proved adept at considering all the allies with the right 
sentiments and policies. However, on the other hand, the procuring leadership of the 
Arab community espoused moves toward Arab economic independence and 
vociferously attacked Western hegemony. In general terms, Saudi Arabia has not tied 
itself down to a restrictive model of development. It has managed to maintain a 
degree of flexibility and compromise in an effort to reach its long-term goals. It 
offered the Western companies based in the state the choice to be either overtaken 
slowly and willingly, or forcefully when the oil business was nationalized. When all 
the other countries severely curtailed oil activities in the land, Saudi Arabia retained 
Western companies as partners. This has resulted in a successful petrochemical 
industry. It raised the price of oil whenever it saw fit and necessary, but always took 
care to sugar the bill with favourable terms. 
It is thus, important that whatever reforms being discussed Saudi Arabia's careful 
international relations with its international investors and their host states must be 
protected just as much as its obligations to OPEC. It is indeed because of the 
existence of the latter that there are reasonable returns to Saudi Arabia to finance its 
development. OPEC ensured that the oil prices rose profitably to unprecedented levels 
in the last few years so much so that discussion moved dramatically from a decade 
long projection of $20 to $30 per barrel (by 2010) to what has been referred to as a 
$100 per barrel crisis in 2008? The role of OPEC in securing financial benefits to 
developing states and maintaining market supply and demand is clear in the following 
quote: 
207 
208 
Economists have estimated that the competitive market of oil would be under 
$20 per barrel if not for OPEC. OPEC has administered control by limiting its 
production to a staggering degree. From 1973 to 1979, OPEC's average 
annual production was not very different from that during 2001 to 2008, even 
though today member countries claim to hold over twice the global reserves 
that they held at the end of the prior period.4s3 
As a result of the OPEC diplomacy its members are said to be in a position where 
they could continue producing oil for 80 years at its 2008 rate given its identified and 
profitable oil resources (without any discoveries). By comparison non OPEC oil 
producing states are projected to be able to produce their collective reserves only for 
the next 27 years. While OPEC has maintained the production capacity to satisfy oil 
demand it is equally true that "it is primarily interested in maintaining high oil prices 
by controlling production".454 Thus, as the price of oil fell in July 2008 from $145 per 
barrel toward $100 per barrel in September of 2008, OPEC responded by cutting its 
production by up to 520,000 barrels per day (which is less than 2 percent of total 
OPEC production).4ss 
In the framework of OPEC, Saudi Arabia never hesitated to take advantage, i.e. by 
raising prices when it appeared that it was acting within a general OPEC consensus or 
when it felt it had a legitimate reason for doing so. It was also keen to increase its 
production at the time of the shortfall caused by the Iranian revolution.4s6 On the other 
hand, Saudi Arabia's general moderate position on prices is well-known and often 
stated by its representatives. In its relationship with the West, it has sought to 
strengthen bilateral ties, but these too have not been flexible. 
When it comes to investments, Saudi Arabia has invested in such a way as to build up 
its own infrastructure and viable export-orientated industries. Its petrochemicals and 
associated plastic industries are a case in point. It did not follow many other countries 
that invested significantly in overseas equities and property, both of which can be at 
the mercy of stock markets. Indeed, this was a very clever position to take because 
4'3 S.M. Gorelick, Oil Panic and the Global Crisis: Predictions and Myths (Sussex: Wiley and Sons, 
2010) pp. 2-5. 
454 Ibid. p. 5. 
m Ibid. 
4'6 See AI-Farhan (2003) opcit., 36-38 
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Saudi Arabia is well aware that these are prone to seizure and other types of 
international politics. The seizure of Kuwaiti, Libyan, and Iranian investments and 
assets are cases in point. OPEC must be considered as a continuously strengthening 
force in the oil industry, resisting political and inter-state differences, reconciling at 
the same time the member states' interests with worldwide stability and progress. 
However, world stability is not based on a simple supply of lower cost crude oil to 
consumer countries, but on a favourable price that allows global economics to 
function and a common understanding between producers and consumers to develop. 
In fact, in an oil war, the danger is that political matters usually come before 
economic or industrial issues. Moreover, the latest event in the international arena that 
evolved around Iraq can give a clear indication that to some extent a country like 
Saudi Arabia may not need to focus on military expenditure in the future. The case of 
the war on Iraq offers clear evidence that the international society and the weak 
system of the United Nations are to some extent powerless in such events.4S7 When it 
comes to international law or United Nations resolutions, Western powers can divert 
or achieve their goals without paying any consideration to others. Therefore, the 
international law ought to be reformed or allow for the creation of a new era of 
cooperation based on more equality, to reduce Western hegemony while promoting 
global trade. 
Membership in OPEC and GCC among others is helpful to Saudi Arabia because it 
makes the participating states stronger and more capable to represent their individual 
and collective interests in international relations. Western authorities are willing to 
pay huge sums to their own experts and organizations, in order to pursue strategic 
"futuristic studies" particularly in various American universities, think tanks, paid for 
mainly by the military-industrial complex, and big business, including oil groups. 
This is done in order to help countries such as the US and the EU in finding new 
energy supplies or renewable energy so that their dependence on the Middle East oil 
is diminished. If this becomes the case, countries like Saudi Arabia have to work 
harder to support their own scholars and students and to secure the new generation's 
4.S7See for example, Dietrich Kappeler, "Iraq: Have Diplomacy and the UN Really Failed?" Leller from 
Blonay, March 27, 2003, Available at: textus.diplomacy.edulthinafl'xGetXdoc.asp?IDconv=2979; 
Ibrahim I.M. Oweiss, "Why Did the United States Fail in its War on Iraq?", Address before Model 
United Nations, January 11,2007) available at: www9.georgetown.edu. Accessed 24 February 2012. 
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economic stability through diversification. In the same way that the West is looking 
forward to finding a replacement for oil, the Saudis have a great chance of achieving 
their goals, which can be seen since 2006 due to the economic progress and the 
reform agenda.458 It is to be believed that this can work in reality and that it is not just 
a dream. It is to be wished that the wiser authorities and leaders would take this into 
consideration for the foregoing reasons. 
All Islamist movements aim to present Islam in a pure form founded upon Quranic 
judicial principles. It is not possible to cite all movements with an Islamist agenda. 
Numerous movements are active globally such as Ikhwan ul Muslamin, Jamat 
elslami, Hizbul Tahrir, and Khalafa. Yet, the groups have considerable diversity 
regarding their viewpoints, ideals, and methods for their implementation. Despite 
these differences, these movements present grave challenges to the existing power in 
most Arab oil-producing countries and all have a demand for the implementation of 
Islamic law. The fundamental problem that the Muslim world faces today is that of 
the established western model of separating the church from the state. The movements 
do not recognize this model and thus, believe it to be the root of the social and 
economic harm in the Muslim world. The claim is that this lost power can only be 
regained via a return to true Islam. The duty of the state is to introduce a Shari' ah-
based law to create a just society. Should the authorities fail to uphold the unity of the 
Ummah and provide harmonious living to its subjects, it cannot be considered Islamic 
and therefore, must be replaced. As Henry Sigman writes "at the heart of Islamic 
political doctrine lies neither the state, nor the individual, nor yet a social class, but 
the Umma, the Islamic community tied by bonds of faith alone. ,,459 The problem is 
exacerbated by the fact that the voices of democratisation are increasingly confused 
with voice of Americanism creating an instinctive reaction of disapproval even among 
those who believe in forward looking reforms.46O 
4S8Financial Standards Forum, "Best Practice Report: Saudi Arabia," Financial Standards Forum, 
March 2010, 1-12, Available at: www.estandardsforum.orglsaudi-arabialstandards accessed 24 
February 2012. 
mHenry Sigman, "The State and the Individual in Islam", Vol. 54.The Muslim Wor/dNo. 1 (January 
1964) p. 14. See also Noorhaidi Hasan, Islamic militancy. Sharia, and democratic consolidation in 
post-Suharto Indonesia. Vol. 143 RSIS Working Papers 07 (2007) et seq. 
460M. Ottaway,"Promoting Democracy in the Middle East: The Problem of U.S. Credibility", Carnegie 
Paper No. 35 (March 2003) p. 13. Ottaway writes: "Although Arab writers have had little good to say 
about the U.S. intention-or pretense, as they saw it-to promote democracy in the Middle East, at 
least a few writers have been willing to go beyond the anti-American diatribe. Some writers like Uraib 
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The Islamic economic system stems from Islamic law becoming the focal point of 
Islamic economics. Mostly, it has developed on a reactionary basis to the neo-
classical economic systems of Western colonialism and it is an attempt on the part of 
the Muslim societies, to develop an original path.461 
In the Middle East specifically, the legacy of a predominantly Islamic civilization is 
inextricably linked with its political and economic ideology. 
The following tables display figures showing proven oil and gas reserves in Islamic 
countries. The data shows that Islamic countries possess about 75.9 percent of the 
world's proven oil reserves and about 47.3 percent of the world's proven natural gas 
reserves. It must be noted that the figures only display proven reserves, allowing for 
the possibility of the presence of vast unproven reserves: 
No table of figures entries found. 
(Proven reserves in billions of barrels) 
Clcountry 
Percent of World Oil, Percent of 
World December World Oil & Gas Journal, 
Reserves 2004 Reserves January 2006 
r Saudi r-1262.1 ~266.8 Arabia 
~ICanada* 10.4 14.7 113.8 178.8 
~IIran 112.1 1130.s 110.3 132.5 
~IIraq 110.6 1115.0 Is.9 115.0 
rs.--IKuwait 19.2 199.7 17.9 101.5 
r United Arab r169.9 r- 97.S Emirates 
r.-IVenezuela* 14.8 152.4 16.1 79.7 
rs.--IRussia 16.2 167.1 14.6 60.0 
~ILibya 13.2 133.6 13.0 39.1 
Al-Rantawi however, note in "the need for political, economic, administrative, and fiscal reform in the 
Arab world is real, even if it is the Americans that tell us about it." See Uraib Al-Rantawi, Al-Dustour 
quoted in U.S. Department of State, "Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI): Arab Press Wary". 
Cited in Ibid. 
461 See, 0ystein Noreng .Oil and Islam: Social and Economic Issues (Chichester, New York: Published 
for the Research Council of Norway by J. Wiley & Sons, 1997) p. 34. 
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110. INigeria 13.4 136.6 12.7 135.9 
ru.-IUnited States 12.0 121.4 11.7 121.4 
ru.-IChina 11.4 115.4 11.4 11s.3 
ru:-IQatar 11.8 120 11.2 115.2 
114 ~-----IM~~i~~------ ri:-4---------1I4-:-s---------11~O------- ["1 2.9- - - ------- --------- -
~i------- ["Alg;ri;----------- rC4-----------lii3----------IO~9------------ ~i4----- ---.------- --------- --
rt6.-[BrazU-------il:O--------lll.2 -----r<>:9-lll.2 "---.---------~-.. -
~rKazakh;t;~--ro.8-----19.0 [0.7 19.0--------- --9.0 
118. INorway 10.9 19.9 10.6 17.7 
~IAzerbaijan 10.6 17.0 10.5 I 7.0 
120. IIndia 10.5 14.9 10.4 I 5.8 
rn-IOman 10.4. 14.8 10.4 I 5.5 
rn--[Angola -----10.8. 19.0 fDA I 5.4 
~IEcuador----10.5 - 15.5 10.4 I 4.6 
r~[fudon;si;----~.5 15.3 
----
10.3 r 4.3 
-
f25rUi("-------rO.4-----r3.9------ro·3 -- ~----------------4.0 
~'Yemen 10.3 13.0 10.3 1 4.0 
~IEgypt 10.3 13.6 10.3 I 3.7 
~IMalaysia 10.3 13.0 10.2 I 3.0 
~IGabon 10.2 12.2 10.2 1 2.5 
~ISyria -roT-----~--ro.2 12•5 
~~gentina---~~2-------[2.3--rO.2 ------["-23-----------------r Equatorial 
Guinea 
f2 --ll,S rr 
rn-IColombia 10.1 11.5 10.1 I 1.5 
~IVietnam [OJ 11,3 I 10.6 
~IChad [0.0 10.0 10.1 11.5 
~IAustralia 10.3 13.6 10.1 I 1.4 
~IBrunei 10.1 11.1 10.1 11.4 
~IDenmark 10.1 11.3 10.1 I 1.3 
~IPeru 10.1 10.9 10.1 I 1.0 
Total Muslim ~1822.1 r-1855.6 Countries·· 
Total Western 111121303 World (EU, North 
America, Australia) 
IOther Countries 120.6 1214.9 117.3 \223.6 
IWorld Total 1100.0 11,OS1.S 1100.0 11,292.5 
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Source: Energy Information Administration Table Posted: March 3, 2009. 
It becomes clear therefore that the Middle East is a particularly rich area in terms of 
oil and gas reserves. This fact is not lost to the countries that desire oil and gas 
reserves. In a sense, in fact, Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia become victims of 
their oil blessing. They also become hostage to the fluctuating fortunes of oil pricing. 
Subsequent to the Gulf War in particular, falling revenues and internal pressure were 
felt in the Gee countries. In Saudi Arabia, the budget deficit has always 
approximately been $12 billion since 1990.462 The resulting cut backs indeed forced 
authorities in the region to look to non-oil revenue sources. A significant effect of 
reforms, introduced by the authorities to attract foreign investment, would be reducing 
the amount of people in the public sector. This effect would be vast due to the 
demographic shift trebling in Saudi Arabia from 1970-1992. With more than 78 
percent of the population younger than the age of 34,463 water resources, food 
consumption, and investment into education has been increased. However, with less 
than half of that Saudis graduating from universities able to find jobs, and the 
authorities wanting to attract large foreign investment in the gas sector, the job market 
has yet to increase, causing discontent. This shows that it is not enough to aspire 
towards educational participation of the citizenry but that the state must consider 
seriously how to provide quality jobs for the population of graduates. It also 
underlines the position that development is a holistic exercise with many interlinking 
factors. 
This has resulted in the population being more aware of the oil wealth not being 
utilized properly in the development of critical economic sectors. The rise in Islamic 
tendencies, particularly the fundamentalist groups in North Africa and Egypt, would 
appear to correlate with falling oil revenues although whether an increased oil price 
462 Glen Carey, "Saudi Arabia Foresees 2011 Budget Deficit of 40 Billion Riyals", available at: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/newsl20 1 0-12-20/saudi-arabia-foresees-20 II-budget-deficit-of-40-billion-
riyals.html accessed 24 February 2012. See alsoJames Baker, Political, Economic, Social, CullUl'al 
and Religious Trends in the Middle East and the Gulf and Their Impact on Energy Supply, Security and 
Pricing (Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, 1998). 
463 Refer to: Paul Stevens, Saudi Arabia and the Opening of its Hydrocarbon Sector, Vol. 37 CEPMLP 
Internet Journal (2006). 
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has reduced this trend is difficult to ascertain. In order to fully understand the 
situation, it is necessary to have background knowledge of the recent political history 
of the Middle East and North Africa. Britain and France, who colonized these regions, 
contribute substantially to the post World War II political composition, as did the 
United States, which surfaced as an influential force both militarily and economically. 
The installations of stable political regimes were of the utmost importance due to the 
geo-political and economic strategic significance of the region. Thus, monarchies 
were placed throughout the region and were supported by the West even after the 
departure of Britain and France. As a result, the majority of ruling families have been 
pro-West in their attitudes. 
In light of Western and US military presence being motivated by protecting oil 
interests, it is then logical to assume that Islamists in these countries view the West as 
aiding the existence of non-Islamic regimes. Islamists see oil as a ground for which 
the West infiltrated local societies and corrupted leaders, and hence, the presence of 
American forces in the Middle East is a source of much opposition to the regimes in 
Saudi Arabia. Thus, in an Islamic culture, oil is considered to be a negative force that 
has attracted Western hegemony. One of the more extreme views on the subject states 
as follows: 
The oil lies in Muslim lands. Vilification of the enemy is part and parcel of 
Eurasia energy geopolitics. It is a direct function of the geographic distribution 
of the World's oil and gas reserves. If the oil were in countries occupied 
predominantly by Buddhists or Hindus, one would expect that US foreign 
policy would be directed against Buddhists and Hindus, who would also be the 
object ofvilification .... The collective demonization of Muslims, including the 
vilification of Islam, applied Worldwide, constitutes at the ideological level, 
an instrument of conquest of the World's energy resources. It is part of the 
broader economic, political mechanisms underlying the New World Order.464 
Unfortunately the existence and animosity of such fundamentalist religious thinking 
makes the whole project of increasing investment in Islamic societies even more 
difficult both for Westerners and for the liberal and moderate scholars as well as 
governments in countries like Saudi Arabia. 
464Metaexistence Organisation, "Report Analysis Battle for Muslim's Countries OU" (Metaexistence 
Organisation Geo-Political Think Tank, 2008). 
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6.5. Conclusion 
The importance of the creation of other viable non-oil exports is given. The push 
towards a sophisticated industrial base for the country with the advent of industrial 
cities and economic cities is also crucial to the political and economic future of the 
Saudi Kingdom. The diversification of the economic base of the Kingdom away from 
oil and its derivatives is the most essential aspect of the industrial base. Successes in 
this area are also important to the regional standing of Saudi Arabia as a leading 
nation in the Middle East. The device of economic cities and industrial cities are also 
further reasons why the Saudi state must provide a believable regime of protection for 
investors. 
Membership of the OPEC and the GCC is of beneficial importance to the 
participating states. The suspicion that cartel behaviour and closer coordination by the 
Gulf states may somehow be of negative effect to investors and the states where they 
emanate from has not proven true. In fact the close coordination and diplomacy 
between the participants of these organisations only assures them of a fair 
representation in international relations. It allows them to set their priorities right 
through processes of peer pressure and recommitment to best practices. Indeed the 
many directives and standards set among these states towards increasing effort at 
education, industrialisation and the protection of weaker societal groups such as 
women and the youth all go towards assuring a more rational business environment 
for investors. More importantly the diplomacy played at these organisation and the 
standards set have a way of reinforcing the resolve of the states towards impressive 
socio economic changes. This in the case of Saudi Arabia is of great importance in 
creation of socio legal changes that will assure a better society for all. 
The fact that OPEC and the GCC have an impressive representation of Muslim 
societies among the member states goes to prove that there is nothing incompatible 
between Islamic traditions and modernisation or progress. It also shows that Islamic 
states based on the Sharia are also capable of diplomatic processes and commitment 
to International law and particularly international economic law. In sum the economic 
diplomacy played by the OPEC states and the GCC states has been a positive force in 
the experience of Saudi Arabia. It is in fact necessary to add that closer commitment 
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to these bodies and their ideals must go hand in hand with other reforms that have 
been suggested in this thesis so far. 
It is obvious that the Saudi authorities keep repeating the same scenario in their 
reluctance to apply clear and written constitutional guidelines to their financial and 
economic sectors. It is also possible to note that the current trends in the international 
legal system seem to encourage transparent legal policies. This is promising in that 
there is awareness among the new educated generations who are eager to break from 
the 'old school's policy' practices of non-transparency and move with global trends 
which are not necessarily promoted by Western societies but are championed by 
intergovernmental organisations in which Islamic states feature prominently. Some of 
these efforts are to create strategic advisory services and link up with organizations 
outside Saudi Arabia in order to provide a transparent policy to foreign investors and 
to guide them through the domestic domain. Moreover, such organizations can 
pressurise the authorities to reform their out-dated policies.46s 
465Financial Standards Forum, "Best Practice Report: Saudi Arabia," Financial Standards Forum, 
March 2010, 1-12, Available at: www.estandardsforum.orglsaudi-arabialstandards accessed 21 
February 2012. 
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Chapter 7; GLOBALIZATION, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND THE ROLE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY IN THE SAUDI LEGAL REFORMS 
7.1. Introduction 
We have examined in the last chapter manifestations of regional integration and the 
advantages and imperatives of this trend for Saudi Arabia. It is also necessary to 
examine the attempts of the Saudi Kingdom to integrate with the global economy by 
engaging with global institutions and the country's efforts to submit to international 
dispute resolution mechanisms. Globalisation is the process enabling financial and 
investment markets to operate internationally, largely as a result of deregulation and 
improved communications. 466 Globalisation internationalises the international 
business place makes it worldwide in scope and application. The carving out of an 
international law on foreign investment itself may be said to be a manifestation of 
globalisation.467 In a sense globalisation and neoliberalism are both perplexingly and 
Ubiquitous phenomena. The orthodox understanding of globalisation is based on a 
notion of increasingly borderless market extension, an apparently all-encompassing 
'condition' in which market rules and competitive logics predominate, while the 
political leverage of nation-states recedes into insignificance. 468 In view of the 
globalisation phenomenon it is not possible to discuss Saudi Arabian investment 
regime outside the "new constitutionalism" which applies to most states. This refers 
to the removal of "key aspects of economic life from the influence of domestic 
politics within nation states. A manifestation of this new orthodoxy is the network of 
bilateral investment treaties and arbitration agreements designed to ensure foreign 
investors security from "discrimination" and "expropriation," and conferring standing 
on investors to sue in the event that their investment interests are impaired.469 
Globalization emerges, therefore, from the treatment of international issues 
commonly as affecting the 'global village' and increases the homogenization of tastes 
466 Simon Jeffery, "What is Globalisation?" The Guardian Thursday 31 October 2002 available 
athttp://www.guardian.eo.uk!worldl2002loctl31/globalisation.simonjeffery accessed 2 March 2012. 
467M Somarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (Cambridge: CUP, 2010) p. 5. 
468 Adam Tiekell and Jamie Peck, "Globalisation or Neoliberalisation?" in A Tiekell, Making the 
Global Economy (2003) p. 275 
469 D Schneiderman, "Investment Rules and the New Constitutionalism" Vol. 25 Law & Social Inquiry, 
No.3 (2000) p. 89. 
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and attitudes, deregulation, and the elimination of legal, physical, fiscal/financial, 
technical barriers, rapidly developing scientific and technological innovations, and 
predictive uncertainty. These are just some of the factors that underline the 
importance of the emerging economic integration of approaches and relationships 
amongst blocks of countries.470 The main argument here is that most countries and 
organizations cannot ignore the reality of an increasingly complex global 
environment. These must include appreciation of: the political environment, the 
importance of both legal and economic aspects, and the complete ideological 
understanding. We will thus, focus in the next few sections upon the facets of the 
economic environment as they represent the starting point of the development process 
along with greater emphasis on legal aspects. We will then highlight the importance 
of the phenomenon on the engagement of Saudi Arabia with the WTO. Although the 
WTO is seen as epitomising the economic strand of globalisation to understand the 
shortcomings of the organisation from the perspective of a developing country like 
Saudi Arabia we will focus specifically on the institutional aspects of the WTO and 
especially its dispute settlement systems. The dispute resolution rules and the 
experience of states in using it betray a lot about the relationships of power that 
subsist amongst the state members. Finally, we will consider the different political 
systems and regimes embraced by the member countries and their relationship to the 
development process. It is hoped that this analysis will help fine tune our analysis to 
make it more relevant to a multilateral trade regime which is crucial for economic 
success of a state such as Saudi Arabia aspiring towards economic progress via trade 
and investment. 
470Soyoung Kim, Jong-Wha Lee, and Cyn-Young Park Emerging Asia: Decoupling or Recoupling 
No. 311 June 2009. Asian development bank. Available at: 
http://aric.adb.orglpdti'workingpaper/WP31_0ecouplinLor _ Recoupling.pdf. accessed 21 February 
2012. Globalisation has cast the institutions created in the aftermath of the Second World War to 
oversee global economic and political governance into stark relief. Improved economic integration has 
increased the vulnerability of countries towards economic events taking place beyond their borders. 
Some authorities, however, have failed to develop the global institutions needed to oversee and 
regulate global markets for the public good. As a result, the tendency to produce outcomes 'inimical' to 
the public good has been left unchecked. This tendency includes increasing levels of inequality and 
instability. It follows that any attempt to develop a model ofglobalisation capable of meeting the 
human development challenges of today must include an agenda for institutional reform in order to 
cope with political regimes, other institutions, and new economic trends in the international arena. 
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7.2. WTO, and the Trend towards Economic Integration 
The diplomacy of integration has become recognisable as a key strategy of emerging-
market countries that were not previously adequately included in the core of global 
economic discussion and governance. 471 Hand in hand with developments in 
regionalism is the need to embark upon an encompassing engagement with the global 
world of trade. This may take the form of regional integration with the Gee as in the 
case of Saudi Arabia and it may take the form of global integration with global 
institutions such as the WTo.472 WTO reports confirm that integration remains a 
strong feature and objective of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GAIT) 
and WTO regimes.473 In many ways economic success and the ability to engage with 
the benefits of international trade especially for developing nations requires more and 
more on the ability to engage with the WTO. The WTO is an international 
organization dealing with the global rules of trade between nations. Its main function 
is to ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably, and as freely as possible. Like 
the Gee, the WTO has both formal and informal rules that shape decision-making. 
Formal rules are brought into force by the consent of states, and in theory they have 
an inherent legitimacy. However, the consent itself may not have been achieved by 
47lNico/ds M Depetris Chauvin, "The Rise of the Gulf: Saudi Arabia as a Global Player" pp. 45-52. 
Available at: http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_194S0-S44-2-30.pdf? 1 00428135533 accessed 21 February 
2012. 
All nations in Latin and North America, the Caribbean, Africa, the Pacific, South East Asia and almost 
all European countries are members of an integrated organisation. Although countries such as Japan, 
China and India have seemed unaffected by the mood of integration for a long time, the recent attempts 
of APEC have included Japan and China in a new regional economic cooperation organisation since 
1989. M. Trebilcock and R.Howse, The Regulation of International Trade (London: Routledge, 1999) 
p,g. 353-378. 
2 The rationale of integration between developing countries stands on the creation of regional markets 
with the primary consideration of an economic basic development rather than taking into account a 
more specific field of trade transactions. Such integrations are to be considered the starting point of 
Free Trade Agreements (FT A), customs unions, common markets, and economic unions. 
473 Corinne Bagoulla and Nicolas Peridy, "Regional Integration and North-South Industrial Location: 
An Application to the Euro-Mediterranean Area," World Trade Organization," (201 I);YousifKhalifa 
AI-Yousid, "Oil Economies and Globalization: The Case of the GCC Countries," Available at: 
www.luc.edulorgs/meealvolume6/al-yousif.doc accessed 4 March 2012. The World Trade Organisation 
came into being in 1995. It is the successor to the General Agreement on the Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). The GAIT celebrated its golden jubilee in Geneva on 19 May 1998 and the past SO years 
have seen an exceptional growth in world trade. Merchandise exports grew, on average by 6% 
annually. Total trade in 1997 was fourteen times the level in 1950. GAIT and the WTO have helped to 
create a strong and prosperous trading system contributing to unprecedented growth. The system was 
developed through a series of trade negotiations, or rounds, held under GATT. The first rounds dealt 
mainly with tariff reductions, afterwards with other areas such as anti-dumping and non-tariff 
measures. The latest round the 1986-1994 Uruguay Round led to the WTO's creation. Many deals have 
been concluded for tariff-free trade in information technology products, financial services deals 
covering more than 95% of trade in banking, insurance, securities and financial information. 
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legitimate means. Hence the question posed by Pascal Lamy: "Do developing 
countries have their rightful place in WTO priorities"? The answer is "no- not yet".474 
He rightly noted that 
Clearly, there is a feeling of discontent amongst a large number of developing 
countries that the odds in the trading system are stacked against them, a 
conviction that the Uruguay Round imposed substantial obligations on them 
without delivering commensurate benefits. I agree with this to some degree. 
Although globalisation brings a lot of benefits to emerging economies, it has 
not done so thus far for most sub Saharan African countries.475 
Singapore for instance had occasion to state that although the WTO's trade 
liberalizing rules and commitments bring a new dynamism to world trade there 
remains good reason for growing discontent amongst certain countries that the system 
has failed to deliver for all states in fair measure. For instance exports from 
developing countries continue to face significant market access in the developed 
world.476 
Nonetheless, WTO rules have a de facto legitimacy to the extent that they reflect the 
interests of all participating states. The WTO Charter sets out the formal rules and 
institutions that govern the WTO's decision-making, which in essence provides for 
one vote for each member state and the universal participation of all members in all 
meetings. The votes of all the member states are equal. If consensus should fail, 
various rules of One-Member-One-Vote (OMOV) majority voting can be invoked.477 
474 Pascal Lamy "Do Developing Countries Have their Rightful Place in WTO Priorities?" Speech at 
the World Economic Forum, Southern Africa Economic Summit Durban, South Africa, 22 June 2000 
p. 1. Available at http://trade.ec.europa.euldoclib/docsI2004/december/tradoc _120800.pdf accessed 17 
March 2012. 
475 Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
476 The Singaporean Minister for Trade and Industry stated: "It is important for the WTO to address 
this discontent. We need to find effective mechanisms to permit developing countries to address their 
concerns and thus secure their continued active participation in the system". Lee Yock Suan, 
"Singapore: Statement Circulated by H.E. Mr., Lee Yock Suan Minister for Trade and Industry (at the 
Working Session on Implementation)", World Trade Organisation Ministerial Conference Second 
Session Geneva, 18 and 20 May 1998 WTIMIN(98)1ST/37 18 May 1998 available at accessed (18 
March 2012) pp. 1-3. 
477 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO, Articles IX: 1 (and footnote 1) and XlI:2. See also 
Gulf Research Centre Foundation, "WTO and Globalization: GCC Impact". Workshop at Cambridge 
University 6 - 9 July 2011. Available at http://grcevent.netlcarnbridge2011/pdt2/wsS.pdfaccessed 23 
February 2012. Most of the GCC members are also the dominant members in the most important 
energy organisation in the world OPEC. Therefore, one of the paradoxes in the development of the 
Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) is the strong economic dependency on foreign labour. The 
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At face value, these rules appear to reflect a model of democracy.478Yet there are 
views such as that expressed by Pascal Lamy and the Singaporean Minister of Trade 
mentioned above (and others addressed below) that argue that there is a continuous 
problem of democratic deficit in the WTO, that its benefits are unequally distributed 
and that its dispute resolution mechanisms remain skewed in favour of companies 
from powerful states.479 
The WTO is rapidly assuming the role of a global authority, as 144 nations, including 
the US, have joined the organization. The WTO represents the rule-based regime of 
the policy of economic globalization. Commercial interests represent the central 
operating principle of the WTO. It is for this reason that it was completely 
unavoidable for a state like the Saudi Kingdom not to engage with and join the WTO. 
Not doing so would have very seriously jeopardised the economic potential of the 
state. Saudi Arabia has indeed ratified eight bilateral investment promotion and 
protection agreements other than agreements under the GCC and the Arab League.48o 
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) generally are intended to promote and protect 
foreign direct investment treaties. These instruments are a relatively new element in 
international economic relations. The existence of a bilateral investment treaty is in 
practice a condition for national insurance against political investment risks as to 
guard against risks such as dispassion, impossibility of currency transfer and war 
underlying problem could be solved by long term plans and internal policies with the main idea of 
reaching an average economic level of development (UN Development Report 1999). The lack of a 
local labour force is the result of an imperfect educational system, which is the quintessence for 
responding to the needs of development plans. The development in GCC is based on the oil industry; 
thus, the real need is to work on human development to replace the huge amount of foreign skilled 
labour. The following point will clarify the statement, "GCC countries are facing profound changes and 
transformations in different areas, such as politics, economies, social status and culture." especially 
within globalisation trends. 
478 A brief explanation of the GCC voting system will be introduced. In Article Nine of the Charter, 
each member of the Supreme Council shall have one vote, while the resolution of substantive matters 
shall be carried by the majority's vote. However, to enhance and support our argument some of articles 
of the GCC and the WTO charters will be presented. 
479 Robert Howse, "How to Begin to Think about the 'Democratic Deficit' at the. WTO", in S. Griller 
(ed.), International Economic Governance and Non-Economic Concerns: New Challenges for the 
International Economic Order" (New York: Springer Wien, 2003) pp. 1-2; Robert Howse, The WTO 
~stem: Law. Politics & Legitimacy, (London: Cameron May, 2007). 
4 See for Instance, Arab News "Saudi Arabia, Switzerland to Sign Investment Protection Accord" 8-
March-2006; available at http://www.bilaterals.orglspip.php?article4061 accessed 17 March 2012; US 
Trade Representative, "U.S. and Saudi Arabia Conclude Bilateral WTO Accession Agreement, Press 
Release, 9 September 2005 available at http://www.bilateraIs.org/spip.php1article2698 accessed 17 
March 2012. 
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damage. The practice has been growing steadily in importance during the past few 
decades.481 It has been correctly observed that: 
It should be recalled that these are only one element in a bundle of measures 
destined to encourage and protect foreign investment. Developed countries 
consider them part of their policy towards developing countries. The latter 
normally conclude them, among other reasons of a political or legal nature, 
because they need resources for development. These resources are largely in 
the hands of transnational corporations and the developing countries seek to 
attract them by a variety of measures, including guarantees under bilateral 
treaties with the home countries of the transnational corporations 
concerned.482 
Saudi Arabia accession to the WTO dates back to 11 December 2005.483 Membership 
in the WTO has helped to remove many obstacles in the path of expansion of global 
business enterprises. Membership and the trend towards global economic integration 
has arguably encouraged and increased respect for democratic processes and 
increased respect for labour rights, environmental protection, human rights, consumer 
rights, social justice, local culture, and national sovereignty. Moreover, it can be 
stressed that international agreements, like that mentioned between the WTO and the 
GCe, encourage legal protection for multinational companies to operate in 
developing countries.484 
48tUnited Nations on Transnational Corporations, Bilateral Investment Treaties, (New York: United 
Nations, 1988) p. iii. Saudi Arabia's BITs are, thus, a modest haul when compared with a state like 
India a State that has signed till date BITs, with 57 countries since negotiations were commenced in 
1994. Agreements have also been finalised with 4 other countries and negotiations have being held 
with number of other countries. Press Information Bureau, "Bilateral Investment Promotion and 
Protection Agreement with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia" Government of India Press Release 12 
January 2006 available at http://www.bilaterals.orglspip.php?article3541 accessed at IS March 2012. 
482 United Nations on Transnational Corporations, Ibid., p. iv. 
483 Working party report WT/ACC/SAU/61, Goods schedule WT/ACC/SAUl6 IIAdd.I Services 
schedule WT/ACC/SAUl611Add.2; Protocol of accession WT/U627 General council decision 
WT1L/627. Information about Accessions: Work in the WTO and Protocols of accession for new 
members since 1995, including commitments in goods and services are available on the WTO official 
website at http://www.wto.orglenglishlthewto_elacc_e/completeacc_e.htm#list accessed 17 March 
2012. 
The Kingdom had been negotiating Its terms of accession to the GA TI, and then the WTO , since 
1993. Accession negotiations proceed on two tracks: (I) bilaterally to open up KSA's markets to US 
exports and investment; and (2) multilaterally to focus on WTO rules issues that include agriculture, 
customs protection of intellectual property rights (IPR), treatment of state-owned enterprises and 
services. Fact Sheet Accession of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) to the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) available at 
http://www .bilaterals.orglIMG/pdflSaudi_Arabia_accessionjacl_sheet.pdf accessed 17 March 2012. 
484Trebilcock and Howse, op.cit., p. 4S; It is true that "The WTO has become the vehicle for 
Iiberalisation, with the multinationals at the wheel. It has the power to punish governments who 
'interfere'" See World Development Movement, "World: Multinationals and the World Trade 
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7.3. Adapting to the Modern Dispute Resolution Regimes: WTO Dispute 
Settlement System. 
The dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO is a legacy of the GATT. However, 
the WTO package is much more sophisticated. The Members of the WTO decided to 
strengthen the GATT rules on dispute settlement. The result is said to be the first 
supranational arbitration body485. Three bodies compose the dispute settlement system 
of the WTO. The General Council is the executive body of the WTO and it has to 
meet as the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). The DSB was established 486 to 
administer the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). The DSB also have the 
authority for establishing Panel procedures, adopt Panel and Appellate Body Reports 
as well as power to agree in and allow suspension of trade concessions in case of non-
implementation of the DSB decisions. The second body is the Appellate Body, which 
has the responsibility of reviewing Panel's recommendations with regards to issues of 
law. The Appellate Body members shall broadly represent the Members of the WTO 
universe.487 The third body is the Panel. The Panel is an ad hoc group appointed from 
a list of experts in each field of the "Covered Agreements." The panel is, therefore, an 
independent body established by the Dispute Settlement body, consisting of three 
experts, to examine and issue recommendations on a particular dispute in the light of 
WTO provisions.488 
Organisation", September 1st, 1999 available at http://www.corpwatch.orglarticle.php?id=329 accessed 
9 March 2012. 
485 Vide F., Macmillan, WTO and the Environment, (London: Sweet and Maxwell 
2001), p 7. 
486 Vide Article 2 of The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes, "The Dispute Settlement Understanding" (DSU), printed in 
World Trade Organization, The Legal Texts (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), p. 354. 
487 Vide Article 17.3 of The Dispute Settlement Understanding. 
488 The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes explains the 
Working Procedures of the Panel. It contains Inter alia that: 1. In its proceedings the panel shall follow 
the relevant provisions of this Understanding. In addition, the following working procedures shall 
apply. 2. The panel shall meet in closed session. The parties to the dispute, and interested parties, shall 
be present at the meetings only when invited by the panel to appear before it.3. The deliberations of the 
panel and the documents submitted to it shall be kept confidential. Nothing in this Understanding shall 
preclude a party to a dispute from disclosing statements of its own positions to the public. Members 
shall treat as confidential information submitted by another Member to the panel which that Member 
has designated as confidential. Where a party to a dispute submits a confidential version of its written 
submissions to the panel, it shall also, upon request of a Member, provide a non-confidential summary 
of the information contained in its submissions that could be disclosed to the public. See WTO official 
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After the DSB adopts a report of a panel (and the Appellate Body), the conclusions 
and recommendations contained in that report will automatically become binding 
upon the parties to the dispute. The DSU indeed provides that, when the parties 
cannot find a mutually agreeable solution, the first objective is normally to secure the 
withdrawal of the measure found to be inconsistent with the (WTO) Agreement 
(Article 3.7 of the DSU). Wherever a violation complaint is successful the panel 
(including the Appellate Body) will have found an inconsistency with the WTO 
Agreement and expressed this finding in its conclusions. The panel (and the Appellate 
Body) then concludes by recommending that the Member concerned must bring its 
measure into conformity with WTO law (Article 19.1 of the DSU). Article 21.1 of the 
DSU adds that prompt compliance with the recommendations or rulings of the DSB is 
essential in order to ensure the effective resolution of disputes.489 
In relation to the Saudi Kingdom the process of transplanting international treaty 
provisions into national norms is being intensified with the operation of the WTO's 
agreements. The kingdom's experience is still very bare and it is possible to assert 
that there will be many surprises ahead. There are limitations upon the states' freedom 
of choice that will only become clear in the future. A lot of the issues that will come 
up for decision may run against Islamic jurisprudence but perhaps more importantly 
will involve sensitive issues of sovereignty. The areas of possible impact are diverse 
and they include: manufacturing, information technology, service sector, banking 
industry insurance, telecommunications. In its Accession Protocol, Saudi Arabia 
finally agreed in 2005 that the issuing of licenses to insurance companies would be 
with no economic needs test or quantitative limits. This brings the Kingdom more in 
conformity with its obligations under the WTO rules. 
The Accession Protocol also stipulates that in connection with the authorization of 
foreign banks and financial institutions to operate in Saudi Arabia, the criteria that the 
authorities should have adopted a long time ago, however, only few European banks 
have been granted licences and only one bank has obtained a full retail banking 
website, op.cit., http://www.wto.orglenglishlres_eIbooksp_e1analyticJndex_e1dsu_1 0_ e.htm accessed 
17 March 2012. 
489 Ibid. 
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operation.49o What is then the effect of this provision on the Saudi reformed legal 
systems? In the absence of the restraints imposed by the international agreement, the 
Saudi legislative and judicial organs may interpret the word "prudential" in 
accordance with their own understanding and Islamic culture. With the stipulations of 
the international agreement, however, the interpretation of Saudi law must take into 
account the understanding and interpretation of the same term or words by the WTO 
and international community, as well as the possible reactions of other members. 
If a member considers that the Saudi authorities failed to comply with the prudential 
criteria in issuing business licenses to foreign insurance companies or banks, it may 
invoke the WTO's dispute resolution mechanism. Upon the pronouncement by the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body, the losing party will have no choice but to obey the 
ruling. If Saudi Arabia loses the case, it must rectify the defects in its law enforcement 
mechanisms, including the interpretation of its own local laws, otherwise, there might 
be major difficulties in attempting to use international legal remedies until the laws of 
the state have been aligned with internationally recognized trade standards.491 
When the laws and legal systems of most of the WTO members have common 
provisions with identical interpretations, or at least a similar basis, the laws, or at least 
the laws falling into the purview of the WTO will be globalized. As WTO agreements 
cover most economic sectors, it can be said that the process of the globalization of the 
law is becoming true, if not already a reality.492 Under these circumstances, the 
traditional power of sovereign states is now significantly and substantially restrained 
even though it may be argued that it has taken place with the explicit agreement of 
sovereign states.493 
The member state must implement basic and lasting reforms in relation to 
international trade and other aspects such as human rights and employment law 
490 See: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, www.sama.gov/salsiteslsamaenlPages!Home.aspxaccessed 
23 February 2012. 
491 WTO official website op.cit. 
492 Andrew Lang, World Trade Law After Neoliberalism: Reimagining the Global Economic Order 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) p. 61,81 et seq. 
493WTO, "Protocols of accession for new members since 1995, including commitments in goods and 
services"available at http://www.wto.org/Englishlthewto_e!acc_e!completeacc_e.htm accessed 23 
February 2012. 
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(particularly to foreign workers) to achieve and produce simpler and less burdensome 
set of regulations for the implementation of technology exchange and the provision of 
access to commercial redress in cases where a breach of contract, intellectual property 
matters, and patent law may arise. 
For Saudi Arabia just as in the case of most other developing states it is important for 
policy makers to realise that they have to familiarise themselves with this 
sophisticated regime and that engaging with the law and practice requires well 
informed strategies and intelligent approaches. Negotiation at this level is 
sophisticated and requires careful preparation. 494 In a sense developing countries 
would have only themselves to blame if they are repeatedly losing their cases at the 
WIO DSS. In the first place they could have insisted on some important concessions 
in the areas of their own interest at the time the regime was being put in place and 
furthermore they ought to have come to grips with the use of the system after these 
many years of practice in the area. A developed country hardly ever makes a 
concession in the multilateral forum without getting anything in return. The trick 
appears to be in careful presentation of issues and preparation for the event. Dedicated 
teams are maintained for this sort of sensitive jobs and adequate training is given.49s 
It has already been mentioned that there was under-participation by developing States 
at various stages in WIO negotiation processes. This meant that the negotiation 
outcomes of the Uruguay Round were unlikely to be in their interests. Indeed the 
Director- General of the WI~, Pascal Lamy had conceded that the current WTO rules 
are in clear favour of the rich and economically powerful States over the poor and 
comparatively powerless States.496 
494 See Patrick Dumberry, "Are BITs Representing the "New" Customary International Law in 
International Investment Law?"Vol. 28 Penn State International Law Review, Issue 4 (2010) p. 679. 
mEric Gotwald, "Levelling The Playing Field: Is It Time For A Legal Assistance Centre For 
Developing Nations in Investment Treaty Arbitration" Vol. 22 American University international Law 
Review (2007) pp. 246-248, 252. 
496 Pascal Lamy, "Its Time for a New "Geneva Consensus" on Making Trade Work for Development" 
Emilie Noel Lecture New York University Law School, New York: 30 October, 2006) available at 
http://www.wto.org/english!news_e!sppl_e!sppI45_e.htm accessed 17 March 2012. 
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In terms of past and continuing negotiating capabilities and dexterity at dispute 
settlement the situation remains skewed against the interests of developing states. It is 
noted that: 
The negotiating culture of the GAIT served to exclude numerous Members 
from important aspects of deal-brokering. Policies and treaties were negotiated 
in notorious 'Green Room' meetings to which only certain Members were 
invited, and in which discussions are secret. Green Room decisions were then 
presented to other Members as/ails accomplis.497 
To the best of the understanding of this author representation of Saudi Arabia in this 
area remains ad hoc and sporadic. The problems in this area, however, go beyond the 
WTO but are found in other multilateral arrangements. 
An account of discussions of the stabilisation of greenhouse gas emissions at the Rio 
Convention has been used by Philippe Sands in an illuminating account to describe 
the relative ease with which the wishes of developing states, including Saudi Arabia, 
can be side-lined and compromised. 
The OPEC countries signalled their objection. It has never been clear to me 
whether the United States might secretly have been hoping they would 
succeed. On the last day of negotiations, late into the night, the French 
chairman of the negotiations, the avuncular French diplomat Jean Rippert, met 
with a representative group of states, the so-called 'friends of the chair' He 
appeared the following morning to present to the assembled plenary a 
compromise text. This was to be taken up or rejected, it was not open to 
further negotiation or discussion. The clock had stopped. We had an hour to 
review the draft. When we returned Saudi Arabia, Iran, Nigeria and other 
OPEC countries objected. To adopt the text as it stood would undennine their 
economic prospects, they insisted. The chainnan asked whether there were 
any fonnal objections to the adoption of the text. He looked around the large 
conference room at the United Nations headquarters in New York packed to 
the rafters with official delegates and observers from industry and the NGOs. 
Many OPEC countries vigorously waved their nameplates in the air, trying to 
attract M. Rippert's attention. He did not see them although everyone else did. 
Declaring that he could see no objections, the chairman announced the 
Convention's text to have been adopted, to great applause and relief. This was 
consensus in international law-making -not the same as unanimity. 
International law on global warming was up and running.49B 
497 Sarah Joseph, Blame It on the WTO: A Human Rights Critique (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011) p. 63. 
498 Philippe Sands, Lawless World: Making and Breaking Global Rules (London: Penguin books, 2006) 
pp. 85-86. See also Oduntan (2006) op.cit., 85-86. 
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However, it is interesting to note that some developing states are faring well under the 
system. For instance, writers like J. Jackson have noted that since 1995, the LDCs 
seem to be in a better position than ever before, due to the new Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU) system within the WTO agreement. 499 The WTO is indeed 
attempting to provide greater technical support to improve the negotiating and 
technical capacities of developing countries through, for example, the Integrated 
Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance to Least Developed Countries.soo 
This instrument coordinates policy efforts in this regard between the WTO and other 
international financial and development agencies, and identifies technical assistance 
needs in relevant States. 
7.4. Arbitration and Saudi Arabia's Bilateral Investment Treaties 
Apart from the regional agreements concluded under the Arab League and the GCC, 
discussed in the last chapter the Saudi Kingdom has concluded investment promotion 
and protection agreement with the eight countries: Italy, Germany, Belgium, Taiwan, 
China, France, Malaysia and Austria. These agreements aim towards mutual 
promotion and protection of the investments of the nationals and enterprises of both 
contracting parties in their territories. They also aim at providing appropriate 
regulatory environment to stimulate and increase investment, trade and industrial 
activity between the parties. 501 It has been correctly noted that with the global 
recession especially as it affects the leading Western economies Saudi Arabia has 
assumed the role of a capital exporting country just like the US and the UK. Saudi 
Arabia has, for instance, unveiled plans to develop large-scale overseas agricultural 
projects to secure food supplies. Progress in this direction is being made with 
Ukraine, Pakistan, Sudan, Turkey and Egypt. 502 In a partnership between the 
Kingdom's government and private sector projects of at least 100,000 hectares will be 
set up in several countries to grow crops such as wheat, com, rice, soyabeans and 
alfalfa, a feed for livestock. It is perhaps interesting that in reversal of situation, some 
499 Dispute Settlement Understanding, the WTO Agreement that Covers Dispute Settlement. John H. 
Jackson, "Settlement Understanding -Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligation", The 
American Journa/ o/International Law Vol. 91, No.1 (Jan., 1997), pp. 60-64. 
'00 Joseph op.cit., p. 64. 
'OIYahya AI-Samaan, "Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes by Means of Domestic: Arbitration in 
Saudi Arabia" 9 Arab L.Q. 217 (1994) p. 217; Lang opc:it., p. 81; Gottwald op.c:it., p. 244. 
S02 Andrew England, "Saudis Plan to Grow Crops Overseas", Financial Times 13 Jun 2008, pp. 3-4. 
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countries, such as the US, are, however, concerned that bilateral agricultural 
agreements could distort world food markets.503 
Developments have been so dramatic that certain erstwhile capital exporting western 
states now are interested in inviting Saudi Arabia's wealth to invest in their 
territory. 504 It is, however, notable that the various BITs entered into by Saudi Arabia 
place dispute settlement by arbitration as a central feature of the cooperation and 
agreement between the participating states. Importantly the Agreements provide for 
arbitration under ICSID for the settlement of disputes between the host state and the 
private parties of the other state as well as ad hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL 
arbitration rules to settle disputes between private parties. Examples of this include 
article 9 of the agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Belo 
Luxembourg economic union (b.l.e.u.) concerning the reciprocal promotion and 
protection of investments signed in Jeddah on April 22, 2001 and article 10 of the 
Agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Austria 
concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment signed in 
Riyadh on June 30, 2006. Others include Article 10 of the Agreement between the 
Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Government of Malaysia 
concerning the promotion and reciprocal protection of investment signed in Kuala 
Lumpur on October 10, 2000. There are slight variations such as the provision for ad 
hoc arbitration tribunal under 11.2.b of the Agreement between Saudi Arabia and 
Austria using the rules of UNCITRAL for the purpose of settling disputes between 
host states and private parties. The importance of these developments apart from 
giving assurances to those who enter into BITs with the Saudi Arabia state include 
S03 Ibid. 
S04 James Kirkup, "Gordon Brown Invites Saudi Arabia to Invest in Britain's Nuclear Industry", The 
Telegraph (20 Jun 2008) p. 4. Louisa Bojesen and Catherine Boyle, Saudi Arabia's sovereign wealth 
funds are examining acquisitions around the world. Louisa Bojesen and Catherine Boyle, "Saudi 
Arabia Looking at Buying Opportunities: FinMin" cnbc.com available at 
http://www.cnbc.comlidl44900277/Saudi_Arabia_Lookin1-at_Buyin1-0pportunities_FinMin 
accessed 17 March 2012. It is not the first time that Saudi Arabia's oil money has been put to the 
service of western powers. The dramatic growth of Saudi oil revenues over the last three decades 
allowed the kingdom to become a major fmancial contributor to the global struggle against 
communism. Formerly a recipient of U.S. aid, Saudi Arabia began to send its own money abroad in the 
mid-1970s, including collaborations with the Americans in sponsoring anti-communist rebel 
movements in Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan. Josh Pollack, "Saudi Arabia and the United States, 
1931-2002" Vol. 6 Middle East Review o/Internalional Affairs No.3 (2002) pp. 77-78. 
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that the domestic business community also begins to pay more attention to arbitration 
as a fast, cheap and effective dispute settlement mechanism. sos 
7.5. Saudi Arabia and the ICSID Convention 
An important feature of the Saudi Arabia involvement with the World Bank and its 
related global financial institutions is the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). S06 ICSID is an 
autonomous international organisation with close links with the World Bank. All of 
the members of the ICSID Convention are also members of the World Bank. The 
ICSID Convention, which came into force on October 14, 1966. provides facilities for 
the conciliation and arbitration of disputes between member countries and investors 
who qualify as nationals of other member countries. Recourse to ICSID's jurisdiction 
is voluntary but a party to the dispute cannot withdraw its consent unilaterally and 
member states are required to enforce ICSID arbitral awards.s07 The acceptance of 
ICSID jurisdiction has been seen as one of the most significant steps taken by Saudi 
Arabia in its history of economic diplomacy. S08 This is particularly true in that it has 
given "investors confidence to continue with their existing investments" and it 
remains" a tool for attracting further investments".s09 
Article 25(4) of the Convention, allows any contracting state to notify ICSID of the 
class or classes of disputes that it mayor may not be willing to submit to ICSID 
arbitration. Pursuant to this provision the Kingdom. in its ratification instrument, 
reserved the right not to submit or accept the jurisdiction of ICSID in relation to all 
SOSBaamir (2008) op.cit., p. 145; Peter Egger, and Michael Pfaifennayr, "The Impact of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment" Vol. 32 Journal a/Comparative Economics. Issue 
4,( December 2004) p. 788. 
S06Casses and materials about the International Centre for Settlement ofInvestment Disputes (ICSID) 
are available at 
<http://www.worldbank.orglicsid>, accessed 6 March 2012. 
S07 J. Lew; L. Mistelis and S. Kroll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (1st edn, 
Kluwer Law International, 2003) pp. 22. 
S08 Saudi Arabia signed the Convention in September 1979 and it entered into force in June 1980. 
Council of Ministers Resolution No. 372 of 15/03/1394 H. (1974). See also Royal Decree No. Ml8 of 
22/02/1394 H. (1974). 
sOCJaaamir (2008) p. 140. 
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questions pertaining to oil and to acts of sovereignty to ICSID whether by way of 
conciliation or arbitration.510 
Investment arbitration in Saudi Arabia is therefore, liable to be governed by the 
ICSID rules in contrast to commercial arbitration, which is governed by the 
Arbitration Act of 1983 or other rules provided that the rules are recognised by the 
Saudi authorities. It must be said however that nothing prevents an investor from 
submitting claims to a Saudi Commercial arbitration proceeding although it will 
probably take some time for such level of confidence in Saudi Commercial Arbitral 
route to become routine for foreign investors. It is for this reason that most likely 
disputes in relation to the oil and gas investment field will continue to go for ICSID 
arbitration. The Saudi government became a party to an ICSID arbitration for the first 
time in the Ed Ziiblin AG v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia case.5J1 Far from being in the 
glamorous world of oil and gas investment the dispute related to construction the case 
related to the construction of university facilities. 
On January 28, 2003, the Secretary General of the ICSID registered a request for the 
constitution of the arbitration panel. It is however crucial to note that a settlement was 
reached by the parties and the proceeding discontinued at the request of the claimant 
in accordance with article 44 of the Arbitration Rules.512 It has been suggested that the 
settling of disputes out of court and very quickly represents the maturing of the Saudi 
Kingdom and is a lesson learnt from the bitter experiences of the Aramco case. This 
approach, which promotes quick amicable resolution, is indeed commendable and 
should be continued well into the future. Baamir indeed thinks "It is also the reason 
for the very small number of disputes against the Saudi government, bearing in mind 
the intensive constructions and governmental contracts during the 1970s and 
1980s".513 
510 G. Delaume, 'ICSID Arbitration and the Courts', Vol. 77The American Journal o/Internal;onal 
Law, No.4 
(1983), pp. 784-796. 
SIIEd ZiJblin AG v. Kingdom a/Saudi Arabia. ICSID case No.( ARB/03/1). 
m A list of the concluded the concluded cases ofICSID, Case No. (ARB/03/1) are at 
<http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/conclude.htm> , accessed S March 2012. 
m AbdulrahmanYahyaBaamir, Saudi Law and Judicial Practice in Commercial and Banking 
Arbitration A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, School of Law, Brunei 
University (2008) p .141. 
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7.6. Developing a More Responsive International Commercial Arbitration 
Regime with the Influence of the Shari'ah 
We have argued extensively in this thesis as to the importance of dispute resolution 
mechanisms to the regime of FD I. We have also looked at the DSU mechanism and 
will adopt the view that Saudi Kingdom must seek to develop capacity in its relevant 
Ministries and departments in order to properly engage with this regime. It will of 
course prove crucial to the country's chances in appearing before DSU in cases. 
Important bilateral disputes will be settled in this way and the issues will turn on 
significant sums of monies. We may reiterate in this section that reforms to the 
dispute resolution practice of the Saudi Kingdom in international commercial law 
generally is a central component of the task of any serious reforms to the FDI regime. 
Whereas it is also true as we have shown in earlier chapters that International 
commercial arbitration law had a difficult start in the Saudi experience. As a writer 
put it 
Saudi reaction to the ARAMCO case indicates that the Saudis have little 
confidence in the ability of foreigners, especially non-Muslims, to apply 
correctly the Shari'a and to identify the real differences between it and the 
general (mostly Western) principles of international commerciallaw.sl4 
Despite this reality it is also true that from the early days of oil exploration until the 
1950s arbitration was the primary means of resolving disputes between Saudi and 
foreign companies.sls Arbitration also continues to be the best tool for resolution of 
such disputes of which there will be many in the forthcoming decades.sl6 State and 
public entities are increasingly attuned to international arbitration to resolve disputes 
in financial, economic or commercial and even diplomatic matters.Sl7 It is for this 
reason that we will devote the next few pages to the particular relevance that 
arbitration has to the proposed reforms. Indeed arbitration must move away from its 
SI4 George Sayen, "Arbitration, Conciliation, and the Islamic Legal Tradition in Saudi Arabia", 9 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of. International Law (1987) pp. 940-941. 
SIS For commentary on the arbitration climate in Saudi Arabia prior to 1983, see generally A. Lerrick" 
Q Mian, Saudi Business and Labour Law (1982). 
SI~ote the importance and acceptance of the ICSID route, 'About ICSID', (2012) International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes, available at 
http://icsid.worldbank.orglICSIDIICSID/AboutICSID_Home.jsp accessed on 3 Marth 2012. See also 
Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration, 5th ed, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, New York, 
2010. 
SI7 Amazu A. Asouzu, International Commercial Arbitration and African States: Practice, 
Participalion and Institutional Development(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
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sporadic nature and become systematic in Saudi Arabia and, therefore, symptomatic 
of its many improvements in terms of a more responsive legal regime for FDI. 
The modest achievements of the Arbitration Regulation of 1983 must be recognised. 
The Arbitration Regulation of 1983 ("the Regulation") serves two important 
objectives of the Saudi government. First, it provides a comprehensive, uniform set of 
rules which are accessible to foreign business persons and their legal counsel. The 
Regulation is designed to allay their fears over the previous lack of judicial and 
legislative support for commercial arbitration. Second, it established governmental 
control not only over arbitration procedure in general, but also over the actual 
arbitration proceedings by providing for supervision by governmental agencies, 
parastatals, courts, or perhaps the Chambers of Commerce and Industry.sl8 
The Arbitration Act of 1983 repealed the related provisions in the Code of 
Commercial Courts of 1931. It can however be said that the Act is a codification of 
the Hanbali law of arbitration. Regardless of the religious restrictions, the Act and the 
Implementing Rules were described as clarification and simplification of the 
traditional Islamic system. The Act provides a framework for commercial arbitration 
in a flexible way that makes arbitration a real alternative dispute resolution 
mechanism. S 19 
The adoption of international legal standards in arbitration will require courageous 
changes in the law some of which will not sit quite so easily with prior Islamic 
jurisprudence. Compromises will therefore have to be made across a host of issues 
even within the field of arbitration itself. For instance, in international arbitration 
generally arbitrators can emanate from various backgrounds or professions .The 
arbitrator is in a sense an ordinary man. In Islamic jurisprudence however the 
arbitrator is required to possess all the qualifications of a judge 'Qadi'. Indeed there is 
difference in Islamic jurisprudence as to whether arbitration, is in act tantamount to 
litigation, agency, conciliation or whether it is a combination of all of these. 
mGeorge Sayen, "Arbitration, Conciliation, and the Islamic Legal Tradition in Saudi Arabia" Vol. 9 U. 
Pa. J. Int'/ Bus. L. (1987) pp. 211, 912; Allam, Saudi Arabia/Arbitration in the Kingdom: The New 
Implementation Rules, Middle E. Executive Rep., Aug. 1985, p. 9. 
s'~aamir (2008) opcit., p. S3. 
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The schools of Islam and their relation to Saudi Arabia have been explained in 
chapter two of this thesis.520 The Maliki School believe that arbitration is litigation. 
This opinion is also shared by some Shafi' es and the Hanbali School. The Hanbali 
School added that the arbitral award is a binding judgment on all the parties.521 Some 
Malikies, however, believe that arbitration is an agency contract while the Hanafies, 
hold the belief that arbitrators are conciliators as they are appointed with the 
disputants' acceptance and each party can decline and deny the arbitration before the 
issuance of the award, exactly like conciliation.522 The Hanbalies consider arbitration 
as litigation; therefore, an arbitrator must possess the same qualifications as a court 
judge and arbitral awards should carry the same strength as a court judgment. 
Arbitration is indeed according to some of the views a combination of litigation and 
agency such as among the Hanafies'. 523 The Shafi' es considers arbitration an inferior 
system compared to the judiciary. This is because the appointment of the arbitrator 
can be revoked at any point up to the time of the issuance of the final award, which 
shows that an arbitrator is at a lower grade than a court judge. 524 
Clearly thus, there is no real unanimity in the understanding of the very nature of 
arbitration. In this case it will be difficult to forge a pan Arab understanding of how to 
take arbitration forward in the region as a whole. In this sense Saudi Arabia must 
develop its own national understanding, which of course must be forged within 
international understanding and standards of international commercial law.s2s Some 
writers have expressed their frustration with the predominant western view of 
arbitration and the seeming refusal to admit the contributions of Islamic jurisprudence 
to enrich arbitral practice. One such view hold it that Islamic law is more developed, 
settled and complete than the lex mercatoria: 
... it strikes as rather surprising that the tribunals and Courts seem willingly to 
accept an 'inferior' or deficient system of law, but when it comes to the 
Shari' ab, which suits perfectly the needs of the parties (otherwise, they would 
not have chosen it), they refuse determinately to apply it ... two reasons: the 
first, far more antagonistic, is that the tribunals and the Courts have some kind 
'20 See above chapter 2.2. Saudi Arabia and Islam in the Twenty-First Century. 
m M. IbnQodamah, Almoghni (Ist edn.,Hajar Publications, 1992), vol. 10, p. 263 
m Baamir (2010) op.cit., pp. 60-61 
mThe Encyclopdia of Islam 72 (2d ed. 1960). 
'24 Baamir (2010) op.cit., p.61. 
mSaiyed, Mahmood, Arbitration Rules: a Comparative Study between Shari' a, Kuwaiti and Egyptian 
Law (Ist edn., Cairo, Aleman Publishers, 2000) p. 23-25. 
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of grudge against the Shari'ah or the countries it is present in, or the Islamic 
civilization in general. This sounds far too hostile. The remaining justification 
and the only one so far it seems acceptable, is that the tribunals and Courts 
which refused the application of the Shari'ah as the governing law of the 
merits of the arbitration simply got it (the Shari'ah) wrong. This in fact would 
constitute a reasonable explanation. They got it wrong because they don't 
know the Shari'ah, what it is, how diverse and multifaceted it is, and how akin 
to any other 'hard law' legal systems it actually is.526 
The difficulty of an arbitration practice that is based entirely on Islamic 
understandings are, however, patently clear. It is, therefore, important to state that 
any modem Islamic state must be prepared to move as close as possible to the 
common understanding of arbitral law and institutions as possible. This may mean 
significant compromises on key issues such as gender representation on arbitral 
institutions among others. The preferred view of this study however is that Islamic 
principles is already a part and parcel of world civilisation and has impacted upon 
laws at any rate. Islamic law is indeed one of the streams that flow into the lex 
mercatoria. It is for this reason that some Leboulanger points out that " ... the doctrine 
can serve to accommodate important third-world concerns". 527 Hence it is important 
for compromises that make Saudi Arabia a desirable arbitral forum to be made at this 
stage. 
The task before the lawmakers in increasing the relevance of international commercial 
arbitration with considerable influence of Islamic law is huge and cannot be 
underestimated. Yet doing so is possible. As put it: "Even promoters of Islamic 
arbitration may at times ground their arguments in terms of the lex mercatoria. They 
argue that the lex mercatoria and Islamic law are perfectly consistent."s28 Hence 
although there are many models to choose from and there is indeed a lex mercatoria 
that reflects a truly international practice of arbitration the country not only has to 
develop its own national competences but it must also sit well and engender 
confidence in foreign parties before Saudi Arabia becomes a favoured forum for 
526 Ibid 
m Yves Dezalay, Bryant G. Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commel'cial AI'bil1'ation and the 
Construction of a Transnational Legal Order ( Chicago: Univ. Of Chicago Press, 1998) p. 90 footnote 
57. 
mLeboulanger, Philippe. 1991. "L'arbitrage international Nord-Sud." In Etudes offertesoffertes A 
Pierre Bellet (1991) p. 323 cited in Ibid. 
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arbitration of disputes529• There is in some instances a more liberal approach in the 
Shari'ah law than in modem approaches. For instance, on the issue of the permissible 
age of an arbitrator western law if not practice may learn a few lessons. Under Islamic 
law a person who acts as an arbitrator can even be below the usual age of legal 
capacity under for example English law. Shari'ah scholars distinguish between the 
age of maturity and the age of discernment. Scholars disputed about the age of 
maturity as some fixed the age at 15-18 and the majority of scholar's recognised 
maturity to be attained by physical puberty. All scholars in all schools agreed on the 
age of 7 to be the age of discernment. 530 Following this distinction it is possible to 
argue that a 16-18 year old can have the capacity to be an arbitrator. Whereas the 
possibility of this situation occurring under English or American law will be 
negligible.531 
Developments and strategies must however be deep and decisive and cannot just be 
cosmetic. To convince the sceptical international business and investment community 
that arbitration has come to stay in Saudi Arabia will require genuine gestures. 
Evidence of the governments appreciation of the need to address arbitration 
specifically as an issue in attracting and managing FDI may be seen in the 
development of a unique body known as the Saudi Arbitration Team. A Royal Decree 
issued in 2002 established the Saudi Arbitration Team532 and the body is tasked with 
the functions of promoting as wide as possible arbitration in Saudi Arabia as an 
auxiliary mechanism to litigation. Its members attend conferences and acquire 
specific training and competence in international arbitration. In principle this thesis is 
in support of this creation and in fact argues that the team oUght to be expanded both 
nationally and in the various component units of the Kingdom. The task of 
popularising arbitration and in fact alternative dispute resolution mechanisms is a 
central component of the drive towards a modem commercial economy. It is, 
however, the case that there is some scepticism among scholars in the field who seem 
529 The validity of the lexmercaloria as the law, or rules of law to infonn international arbitration is 
clear and all countries may indeed tap into this source to govern the resolution of disputes which arise 
between parties 
53Daaamir (2008) op.cit., p. 64. 
531 134 A. Lerrick and Q. Mian, Saudi Business and Labor Law (2nd edn., Graham &Trotman, 1987), 
pp. 
106-107; Baamir op.cit., p. 64. 
S32 Issued under number 7/5/23165 dated 24/08/2002. AbdulrahmanYahyaBaamir, "Shari'a Law in 
Commercial and Banking Arbitration: Law and Practice in Saudi (Surrey: Ashgate, 2010) p. liS. 
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to see the development of the Saudi Arbitration Team as meaningless diversion and 
perhaps a waste of resources. One such scholar wrote: 
In reality, problems related to the Saudi law in general and arbitration in 
particular cannot be solved by forming such teams as Saudi Arabia is in need 
of developed arbitration centres instead of the time-consuming proceedings 
before DiwanAlmazalim. The problems related to the legal system in Saudi 
Arabia need at least another generation before they can be solved. Personally, 
I believe that this team as well as some other committees benefit its members 
only for the reason that after six years of its creation i.e. in 2008, many of the 
members of the Saudi Arbitration team have been studying in the UK for the 
last five years. 533 
This criticism may indeed appear overly harsh and cannot be followed completely. 
Indeed the author himself appeared later to water down his position in a later 
publication but the point is well taken that formal mechanisms is not the end of the 
road to creating meaningful respect for arbitration both as an institution and as a field 
of legal practice. Much more has to be done by the state to make respect for arbitral 
awards sacrosanct and to create a general milieu for the rule of law in Saudi Arabia. 
Hence Baamir's revised criticism is valid when he wrote that: 
The legal community is expecting more from the team than just advertising, 
because it is only organised entity, which is able to develop and work on the 
idea of establishing independent arbitration courts and centres. 534 
To make Saudi Arabia an attractive forum it is suggested that the following strategies 
must be adopted and expanded upon. The role and functions of the Saudi Arbitration 
Team must be expanded. Capacity building in this area is crucial. It is suggested that 
even more members have to be appointed and a regional structure developed. The 
Saudi Arbitration Team must be charged with the purpose of targeting their expertise 
and service to the economic cities and industrial cities we discussed in earlier 
chapters. Saudi Arabia must ensure that its national courts particularly the Board of 
Grievances are aware of their increasing international role and reputation. This is in 
that they must be seen to be very professional in their dealings and the quality of 
justice they mete out must be unscrupulous. 
S33Baamir (2008) op.cit. p. 287. 
S34Baamir, (2010) p. 115 
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Guzman and Sykes were correct in noting that "A state that created a reputation for 
courts that were scrupulously even handed might be able to capture" arbitral business 
as an attractive forum. 535 
Because jurisdictions also compete over the quality of their contract law in terms of 
promoting their territory as a better forum it is important for the Saudi state to develop 
in a more holistic fashion its contract laws and also fine tune its regimes for agency, 
franchising, distributorship etc. 536 It has been noted that " .. .if lawyers want their 
forum to be selected they will have some incentive to ensure that the substantive law 
is attractive to the parties.,,537 In essence a more sophisticated legal regime is needed 
to operate an emerging economy the size of Saudi Arabia. The public policy 
exception to enforcement of judgments must be rarely resorted to and in the most 
exceptional cases. It is in fact necessary to argue that it is actually good public policy 
of Saudi Arabia that it is seen to be a desirable and attractive forum in international 
commercial arbitration as this will attract investment and economic progress. 538 
On the whole Saudi Arabia has to realise that particularly in this area it is in fierce 
competition not only with its immediate neighbours within the Gee but indeed with 
the rest of the world including western advanced jurisdictions. These states are 
equally vying for relevance in the area of international commercial arbitration. 
Legislative reform of Sweden's arbitration legislation was embarked upon in the last 
decade based primarily on the desire to maintain Sweden and to strengthen Sweden's 
position as an attractive venue for international arbitrations39. Similar developments 
are embarked upon all over the world and the emergence of many competitors may 
have their impact on Saudi jurisdiction both positively or so perhaps negatively. 
7.7: Conclusions 
From an optimistic perspective, the membership of the Saudi Kingdom in the WTO is 
a major advancement in the Kingdoms economic reform programme and its 
m Andrew T. Guzman and A. O. Sykes, Research Handbook in International Economic Law 
~Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2007) p. 120. 
36 Ib.id., p. 172 
537 Ibid .• p. 291 
538 Katherine L. Lynch, The forces of economic globalization: challenges to the regime of (London: 
Kluwer, 2003) p. 250, 276. 
539Ibi.d 
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integration as a member of the global economy. However, while membership within 
global institutions provides for Saudi Arabia's commitment to WTO international 
trade laws, much work remains to be done domestically to reform the country's 
internal economic and legal order to ensure the full benefits of the agreements entered 
into are implemented. The reform and development of Saudi Arabia's domestic 
industry and service sectors will also have an impact on foreign investment. Other 
critical considerations include a determination that the Saudi Kingdom will open its 
markets and reduce to some extent the level of control the government will seek to 
exercise to protect national and even certain religious interests. 
It may be argued that with the zeal at which Saudi Arabia has been embracing 
regional and international economic integration and particularly international dispute 
resolution techniques and regimes, the attitude of the Saudi Government toward 
international arbitration is no longer strongly influenced by the outcome of the 
Aramco award of 1958. 
Although international arbitration appears to continue to be 'a useful tool of favour by 
western parties' 540 it is also the case that the severity of the situation can be reduced 
by substantial improvements in capacity of arbitrators, arbitral institutions and 
lawyers from Saudi Arabia in the law and practice of international commercial 
arbitration. In this way it should be recommended that further institutional 
development and training should be embarked on particularly in the requisite 
ministries and the Saudi Arbitration Team. 
The need to ensure that dispute settlement is a central component of the reforms to 
Saudi law and economy cannot be overstated. The creation and operation of the 
economic and industrial cities and the arbitration is next to impossible without 
investors having confidence that dispute settlement will be conducted under 
internationally acceptable rules and that the awards and decisions of panels and 
tribunals will be respected by Saudi courts as well as the Saudi state. The general 
S40 This argument has been impressively raised by when he wrote that some western companies have 
engaged in the arguably unfair tactical use of arbitration The disappointing outcomes of the Aramco 
arbitration were expected due to the lack of legal experience and the naIVe or the "too honest" conduct 
with Aramco, which was also a normal result for being the weaker party in the dispute" Baamir (2008) 
op.cit., p. 146. 
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direction of Saudi Arabia policy in this area is good and the use of clauses in the Gas 
Concessions of 2004-show openness toward the outside world in this area. 
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Chapter 8; CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING AND ECONOMIC REFORM 
8.1. Introduction 
This thesis has maintained that there are imperative socio economic and socio-legal 
considerations that the Saudi state must grapple with in its drive towards economic 
transformation through a successful harnessing of its FDI potentials. It is suggested in 
this chapter that without exploring the possibility of changes within the Saudi 
constitutional framework genuine changes and reform in trade and development will 
be rendered extremely difficult. This chapter explores the case for an overhaul of the 
Saudi Constitution. It argues that there are benefits of introduction of transparency 
into the Saudi constitutional system. The relationship between the Saudi legal system 
in its current structure and the question of whether it has been suitably reformed after 
the many changes outlined in earlier chapters. It discusses how reforms can be 
welcomed or encouraged by the international society. Focus will then be directed on 
the impact of such reforms on FDI applications, and how the Saudi society can benefit 
from it in the long-term. It is argued here that without significant changes to the 
constitutional order in Saudi Arabia, the many efforts at modernising the Saudi 
economy and improving upon Saudi law and practice including arbitration; will lead 
to only modest results. 
Development and constitutional reform are, therefore, inextricably linked. The 
absence of deep-seated constitutional reform will make further and more dramatic 
economic success next to impossible. The Saudi legal system will also continue to 
attract suspicion and non-acceptability among the legal schools and systems around 
the world. The connection between constitutional reform and economic success has 
also been made elsewhere and the reasons are equally persuasive in relation to the 
Saudi kingdom. For instance, it has been said of the Philippines that it: 
... requires the revision of the economic provisions of the Constitution if it is 
to become a major recipient of foreign investment flows like other high 
growth economies in East Asia. These economic provisions were adopted in 
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1935 and have helped to reduce the country's ability to achieve a strong 
economic development record for seven decades. Reforming these policies 
can be undertaken by making the specific policy issues the subject of ordinary 
legislation rather than through constitutional provisions that are hard to 
change.54! 
Like the Philippines and indeed many struggling developing economics the very 
nature and order of the constitution may make the country inherently unfit for the 
level of integration into the world economy that is desired after. S421t is often the case 
that constitutional reform may be necessary to provide the legal order that permits 
certain desirable economic activity to take place or provide regulatory environment or 
macroeconomic circumstances for investment to flourish. Hence constitutional 
reforms were needed in Mexico in the 1980s allowing Corporations (domestic and 
foreign) to be able to acquire land, but the holding was limited to no more than twenty 
thousand hectares. The constitutional reform provided a basis for the establishment of 
plantations and general restructuring of the forestry sector to improve productivity. It 
was envisaged that "in the long run (around the year 2010) one can expect the supply 
of wood to increase". 543 
Thus while it is true is that the reasons for constitutional reform in most countries 
would appear to have nothing to do with the economic sphere and more to do with 
political issues (e.g. ethnic conflicts or independence), it is indeed true that most 
constitutional reform will have some effect in economic terms. It is, therefore, true of 
Saudi Arabia also that the most obvious benefits of constitutional reform would be 
increased foreign investments, higher rate of economic growth and employment; 
rising incomes for the population; and sustaining the fight against poverty. As in the 
case of Philippines considered above provided the changes are genuine and well 
executed other less obvious benefits may follow in the nature of changes to the 
macroeconomic fundamentals of the country: reduction of the fiscal deficit; lessening 
541 Gerardo P. Sicat, "The Economic Argument for Constitutional Reform" University of the 
Philippines School of Economics Discussion Paper No. OS 12 December 2005 pp. 1-2. Available at 
http://www.econ.upd.edu.phlrespub/dplpdfIDP200S-12.pdf accessed 29 February 2012. 
542 In the Philippines, for instance, foreigners cannot own land. They have to adjust their investments, 
without prospects of owning land, except through mechanisms that involved majority control of the 
land by nationals. Foreign capital is also restricted to 40 percent equity contribution in any corporation 
if these companies are to engage in public utilities and in the exploitation of natural resources. Ibid., p. 
4. 
'43 Don G. Roberts and IIan Vertinsky, "Impact ofNAFTA on Energy Markets" in Foreign lI'IVestmenl 
and NAFTA (Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1994) pp. 222. 
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of the external debt burden; improvement of trade and payments and stabilization of 
the national currency increase of the saving rate; and improvement of the country's 
financial markets. 544 
Constitutions are documents for the statements of general principles and objectives of 
a nation. They are not the place for detailed approaches to specific issues and 
questions. Constitutional reform in any country may be painful to bear by some 
sectors in the society and may not be well received especially by the elites that the 
prevailing situation may serve. Constitutions provide not only statements about their 
political structure, the duties of their officers, the relationship of state and local 
governments, the political and duties rights of citizens, but it also allocates the 
privileges and advantages. In this way economic advantages and often disadvantages 
are shared among the citizenry without expressly stating it as an aim to do so. S4S 
It is, however, important to state here that constitutional reform must not subvert the 
grundnorm of society.546 It must not endanger the cultural and religious makeup of 
the society in a way that wastes the heritage of the state. It must also not be so 
reckless as to endanger the very careful internal and external alliances and 
relationships that the Saudi state has developed over the past decades. Constitutional 
reforms for the sake of economic progress must be not be unduly rushed as history 
shows us that it may indeed take some time to make meaningful, economically 
focused constitutional reforms.547 In other words constitutional changes may have to 
take into account external relations as well. An example may be made of the anxiety 
of the US that future changes in Saudi Arabia may create a situation where China 
assumes control over Saudi oil resources in the long-term. This was discussed at a US 
'448' . 2 Icat Op.CIt., p. . 
'4' Ibid., p. 4. 
54~e grundnorm or basic norm is the highest form of validity in Kelsen's system oflegal norms. The 
reason for validity ofa norm is another norm, which is the basic norm of the highest authority. 
SeeTayyab Mahmoud,"Kelsens Constitutions, Coup d etats and Courts" available at 
ialsnet.orglmeetings/constitution accessed 26 February 2012. 
5471t has been noted that "liberal democracy emerged from a series of constitutional reforms, rather than 
as a quantum leap from authoritarian to democratic governance." Roger D. Congleton, Perfoctlng 
Parliament: Constitutional Reform. Liberalism. and the Rise of Western Democracy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011) p. i. 
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Congress committee discussion of the threat of China's ascendancy and energy 
demands.548 
It is necessary to state here that these recommendations are purely academic in nature 
and with every respect to those who drafted the Saudi Constitution in 1993 they are 
not meant to subvert the state but to improve upon the economic and social wellbeing 
of Saudi Arabia. Recommendations will be stated first then a comparison with the 
recent constitution and other constitutions will follow. There will be a chosen format 
along with selected wordings to enable the implementation of some ideas, so that they 
may be fitted into the suggested constitution and to create transparency in the text. 
8.2. The Saudi Constitution 
It has already been mentioned that Saudi Arabia operates a monarchical system of 
government and is run under Islamic law. The Islamic state is based on principles 
prescribed by the Quran (Islam'S Holy Book) and the Shari'ah (Islamic system of 
jurisprudence), Provincial Council, a Consultative Council (Majlis AI-Shura), and a 
Council of Ministers. 549 
It is nearly impossible to discuss reforms in Saudi Arabia without at least considering 
the monarchy and its relations with other major political actors in Saudi Arabia. 
Recent reform measures in Saudi Arabia have stemmed from power relations among 
the major political actors. The interplay is correctly described as follows: 
To a great extent, the interplay between the royal family and the Wahhabi 
religious establishment has determined the pace as well as the scope of 
implemented reforms. Other actors, however, have also entered the political 
arena and now play an important role in shaping the reform process. Although 
far from organized and viable opposition movements, these dissenting 
groups- most notably liberal reformist groups, moderate Islamists, and 
conservative religious scholars critical of official Wahhabism-have 
increasingly placed reform issues in the public space and as such have induced 
the royal family and the religious establishment to address their demands . 
.548 U.S Congress Committee on International Relations, Special Subcommittee on Investigations, Oil 
Fields as Military Objectives: A Feasibility Study, Report Prepared by the Congressional Research 
Service, 94th Cong, 1st session, 211t August 1975, (Washington, DC: US Authorities Printing Office, 
1975) Parts I and II, pp. 1-39.Available at http://www.mtholyoke.edulacadlintrellPetroleurnlfields.htm 
accessed 2 March 2012 . 
.549 See above 2.1: Background of the Study: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
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Apart from a few confrontational moments, the newcomers have avoided 
direct clashes with these two giants of Saudi politics. Instead, they have 
pushed for gradual government concessions in key spheres and tried to sustain 
the momentum of political opening.55o 
The most important provisions of the constitution on the monarchical systems are as 
follows: 
Article 5: 
(a) The system of authorities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is that of a 
monarchy. 
(b) Rule passes to the sons of the founding King, Abd al-Aziz Bin Abd ai-Rahman 
al-Faysal Al Sa 'ud, and to their children's children. The most upright among 
them is to receive allegiance in accordance with the principles of the Holy 
Koran and the Tradition of the Venerable Prophet. 
(e) The King chooses the Heir Apparent and relieves him of his duties by Royal 
order. 
(d) The Heir Apparent is to devote his time to his duties as an Heir Apparent and 
to whatever missions the King entrusts him with. 
(e) The Heir Apparent takes over the powers of the King on the latter's death 
until the act of allegiance has been carried out. 
This article gives members of the Royal Family the constitutional rights via the 
authorities' system to be represented as the Royal Family Council and in one of three 
councils: 
1. The Royal Family Council (see House of Lords in UK) SSl 
2. Consultative Council (see House of Commons in UK) 
3. Municipal Councils (see the City Councils in UK) 
SSO AmrHamzawy, "The Saudi Labyrinth: Evaluating the Current Political Opening Democracy and 
Rule of Law", Number 68 Carnegie Papers Middle East Series Democracy April 2006 p. 6. Available 
at http://www.camegieendowment.orglfileslCP68.hamzawy.FINAL.pdfaccessed 10 March 2012. 
·5.SlAsmaAisharif, Amnesty: Saudi Plans Anti-Terror Law to Stop Dissent Reuters Fri, Ju122, 2011. 
Available at: http://news.yahoo.comlamnesty-saudi-plans-anti-terror-Iaw-stop-dissent-
1 1 24S4023.html.Accessed 2 March 2012. Saudi Arabia of planning a crackdown on public dissent with 
new anti-terror legislation that it said was a cover to stop further pro-democracy protests in the absolute 
monarchy. 
The reason to the recommendation of this new division is to avoid the international critics of the Saudi 
monarchy and to give the royal family an international right via the constitution as well as playing a 
major role in day-to-day authorities policy. Yet this shall be controlled via the King and the senior 
members of the royal family and the representatives shall be from the young and educated members of 
the family prepared for future duties. Also see, The Centre for Democracy and Human Rights in Saudi 
Arabia, "Saudi Response to Arab Uprising Newsletter" July 27,2011 http://www.cdhr.infolaccessed 4 
March 2012. 
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In a sense the Saudi Arabian state has run quite impressively with the current system. 
Yet it cannot be said that there is no scope for improvement. As argued above there is 
a trend towards democratisation the world over. There is also an emerging right to 
development which traditional way of doing things in a state may prevent. SS2 This 
reality has not been lost to the powerplayers in Saudi Arabia. These include the royal 
family, the religious establishment, the Shura and municipal councils (discussed 
below). There is also the positive reality that the political players in all sectors realise 
the need for reforms. The problem is that the power players exploit the weakness in 
each other's position. This makes it difficult for rapid changes to occur. 
Saudi intellectuals and observers differ in their assessment of the balance of power 
between the royal family and the clerics. Some liberal reformists contend it is the 
royal family that retains the upper hand. To the outside world, however, it may appear 
that it is the opposite and that it is the religious factions alone that dictate the speed of 
reform. The position of this thesis is that the slowness of reform is a product of both 
spheres. In fact it is true that the Wahhabi clerics do move along with change.553 The 
problem is that the pace of introduction to change particularly in the area of 
democratisation of the political space is slow. Several tentative steps towards 
liberalisation have been approved by the religious clerics without problems. This 
includes when late King Faisal introduced a decree in the 1960s to permit female 
education despite fierce Wahhabi opposition. 
The latter reduced their opposition hence the education of females in Saudi Arabia 
goes on with full force and with dedicated universities today. Recently there has also 
been introduced a decree to end the ban on mobile telephones with cameras. These 
instances show that the Wahhabi clerics will ultimately accept modernisation and 
reform if the monarchy offers leadership especially in economic sectors. SS4 They 
would not venture to openly oppose current reforms should the royal family 
demonstrate a resolve to pursue such a course. This view holds it that the tension 
between moderates and conservatives within the royal family has enabled Wahhabi 
clerics to restrain the reform drive and influence the power balance between the two 
m See above 4.3. Globalization, Liberal Democracy and Right to Democratic Development of the 
Saudi People 
S53H . 46 amzawy, Op.Clt., p. - . 
'
S4H . 5 amzawy, Op.Clt., p. . 
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factions in favour of the conservatives. Yet, an opposing view, held most notably by 
moderate Islamists, stresses the autonomy of Wahhabi clerics. Although the religious 
establishment is sustained by generous royal allocations, the religious establishment 
itself has not been co-opted, but instead continues to defy the royal will. As a writer 
put it: 
Regardless of which view is most accurate, in today's Saudi politics the 
religious establishment remains anti-reform and the onl~ major political force 
that is not substantially influenced by moderating trends. SSS 
The Royal Family has apparently effectively constructed international and regional 
alliances thus far. But it is suggested that many of its postures are aimed at preserving 
its power. Most significant, its strategic alliance with the United States since the 
discovery of oil in 1938 has protected its rule in moments of regional turmoil. in 
particular during the confrontation with pan-Arab Nasserism in the 1960s and in the 
aftermath of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1991. SS6 
Theoretically, therefore, implementing reform and attaining development will occur 
only if the monarchy continues to see the reason for progress in this direction. The 
modernising agents of change such as Non-governmental organisations, civil society 
groups, intellectuals and the younger generation have provided relatively significant 
pressure on the authorities to ensure that the monarchy does continue to favours 
gradual changes. 
As a western commentator wrote after the recent onset of the Arab spring: 
Saudi Arabia is scarcely immune to protest and dissent, and has long struggled 
with the challenges of reform. What is most striking about the Kingdom over 
the past weeks of crisis, however, has been the lack of any major challenge to 
government and the way it functions. This may well not continue. More 
secular Saudi intellectuals and youth are already sending letters and petitions, 
and calling for more rapid reform. Some more extreme voices are going 
further and calling for "days of rage" - mirror imaging similar calls in Tunisia 
and Libya. In today's Middle East, some demonstrations seem inevitable in 
m Ibid., p. 7. 
'~Ibid., 5. 
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every country, and no one can guarantee Saudi Arabia's future stability in a 
time of turmoil. 557 
At the same time, there are good reasons to hope that Saudi Arabia will continue on 
the path to peaceful reform and change. It is important to note that with the show of 
dissent during the Arab spring crises the Monarchy did not react with a wave of 
stringent security measures. Instead, his government issued a series of royal decrees 
that provided a multi-billion dollar investment in stability by meeting the people's 
needs. The economic carrots offered the population are significant and they include: 
(a) $10.6 billion (SR 40 billion) in new funding for housing loans through the 
Real Estate Development Fund. 
(b) $7.9 billion (SR 20 billion) in funding to increase the capital of the Saudi 
Credit Bank 
(c) $266 million (SR 1 billion) to enable social insurance to increase the number 
of family members covered 
(d) $319.9 million (SR 1.2 billion) for expansion of social services. 
(e) $933 million (SR 3.5 billion) to help the needy repair their homes and pay 
utility bills 
(f) $126.9 million (SR 476 million) to support programs for needy students at the 
Ministry of Education. 
(g) $3.9 billion (SR 15 billion) to support the General Housing Authority 
(h) A 15% pay increases for state employees. 
(i) 50 percent increase in the annual allocations for recognised charity 
organizations to the tone of $120 million (SR 450 million). 
G) $26.7 million ($100 million) annual allocation to projects of the National 
Charitable Fund is awarded SR 100 million.558 
Although these are considerable commitments and indicative of willingness to change 
the position of this thesis is that more needs to be done. The changes cannot be 
55? Anthony H. Cordesman, "Understanding Saudi Stability and Instability: A Very Different Nation" 
(CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies, Feb 26,2011) available at 
http://csis.org)publicationlunderstanding-saudi-stability-and-instability-very-ditferent-nation accessed 
17 March 2012. 
m Ibid. 
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economic alone but must be deeper in a political sense. Political changes 
will,however, depend on two important factors: 
(1) Whether the monarchy is willing to work closely in bringing other 
political players on board and 
(2) most importantly whether the monarchy is willing to devolve more 
democratic powers. 
Although there is generally an appetite for reform as a result of the Arab Spring it is 
suggested that revolutionary reformexemplified by the kind of chaotic and militant 
events witnessed in Libya and Syria among others is not desirable.ss9 It is suggested 
that reform must not be forced by confrontation or by violent means. What is required 
is a painstaking process of gradual reformation. Studies about the nature of 
constitutional reforms of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries reveal that: 
In no case did parliamentary democracy emerge in a single great constitutional 
leap. The gradual emergence of modem parliamentary democracy is evident in 
the core architecture of contemporary constitutional democracies. The most 
obvious are those in which a monarch still occupies the national throne, as in 
the United Kingdom, Koninkrijk der Nederlanden (the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands) ... (Kingdom of Sweden) and ... (the Kingdom of Belgium)."s60 
Saudi reform to the monarchy and the way and manner by which more participation 
of citizens in government should progress must emerge out of genuine negotiation 
between the political players. 
"90sman and Nour, op.cit.,Lisa Anderson op.cit., supra note 18 Chapter 1. 
'60 Ibid., p. 6. 
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8.2.1: Social Capital Engineering 
Though often criticized as a feudal system, Saudi Arabian society has a character that 
can adapt and cope easily with new theories.561 When searching deeply into political 
theory, one could find that the principle that needs to be the starting point in the Saudi 
constitutional reforms agenda is that of the social capital. If these assets are 
engineered to fit within the Saudi new political society, they will help to generate a 
political movement under the supervision and wise control of the monarch. 
Therefore, this power should be given to the Royal Family Council since it still 
maintains its trust, network, and norms within the cultured Saudi society. This can be 
seen and reflected by the shape of Saudi society and the tribal alliance and loyalty to 
the monarch. If such powers are implemented, the result will be the creation of civil 
associations that can secure and guarantee the monarch's long-term control of the 
democratic and constitutional agenda; which started since the Municipal Councils in 
2004. 
The idea of advocating critical approaches to reform of the legal system is in order 
to provide much needed social justice and freedom, which the world over is linked 
to economic development 
The Royal Family council has been engaging in social engineering and many of the 
reforms are reflections of the intention to make the country progressive while still 
recognising traditional linkages and institutions: Recognition is given to the 
relationships between political power blocs. These include: 
561 Examples of these since 2000 include refonn of the Shura Council, the holding of municipal 
elections,legalization of human rights organizations and professional syndicates, educational reform 
measures, institutionalization of the national dialogue conferences. In September 2011, King Abdullah 
inaugurated the 60,OOO-student Princess Nora bint Abdulrahman University. This is the largest all-
female university in the world. He also announced that women would be allowed to serve as full 
members of the appointed Consultative Council and would be allowed to vote and run for office in the 
next municipal elections. See United States Department of State, "Background Note: Saudi Arabia" 
available at http://www.state.gov/r/paleilbgn/3584.htm accessed 3 March 2012; See also Hamzawy 
op.cit., pp. 10-14; 
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1. Networks: the relationship between the Royal Family and the tribes, local 
people and commercial activities within their district. 
2. Norms: it is well known that the Saudi Royal Family is dominated by the 
Arabic cultures and that they have been continuously supporting nation (see 
Article 43 of the Saudi constitution). This norm is adopted by most of the 
Royal Family members. These norms will preserve those who will be 
members of the council and will give those rights and duties to the 
constitutions according to their district. 
3. Trust: if the citizens knew that it is within their constitutional right to go and 
present their concerns and wishes, a true value will be created in people's 
consciences. 
If these changes are applied, Western writers or politicians will find less to criticize 
about Saudi Arabia since this level of power sharing has also being their experience 
and sometimes up till today. Yet, it must be admitted that the Saudi situation is quite 
different due to both historical factors and culture.562 In this study, the examination of 
the political arena cannot go any further, yet the aim is to identify the need for such 
development and to support the arguments presented with theoretical and historical 
evidence in order to maintain the suggested legal-constitutional approach and its 
reforming applications. The theocratic basis of the Saudi monarchical system is much 
stronger than in most other monarchical states. 563 Anthony Cordesman makes the 
point clearly when he wrote: 
The King's title of Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques is not a hollow 
honorific. The Saudi government's success in honoring and supporting Islam, 
in support the global flow of pilgrims to Mecca and Medina, and in honouring 
the Koran is absolutely critical to its popular legitimacy. 564 
562The Queen of England must be briefed nearly on a weekly basis on all government business. She 
accepts resignation of Prime Ministers and even the Commissioner of the London Metropolitan. She 
has a say in the appointment of the Archbishop of Canterbury among other significant powers. See the 
English political structure and constitutions, Queen's powers and the House of Lords history. Available 
at: http://www.rogerdarlington.rne.uklBritishpoliticalsystem.btml accessed 2 March 2012. 
563 It is interesting to note that there is a view that Saudi Arabia is not a theocracy, due to the fact that 
the King and its administration do not possess any religious titles and have nothing to say regarding the 
interpretation of holy texts and the actual organisation of the mosque internal affairs. See Daniela 
Pisoiu, Mosque and Slale: Comparative Analysis (Netherlands: ORIN Verlag, 2009) p. 13. This view 
is, however, not appreciative of the full understanding of Saudi State, culture and heritage. 
'64 Cordesman op.cit., 
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Article 7: 
Authorities in Saudi Arabia derive power from the Holy 
Quran and the Prophet's tradition. 
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This article did not classify the state's powers and its duties. Therefore, clarity must 
be present with regards to the different powers, duties and limitations of the state, for 
example: 
The authorities of the state consist of the following: 
The judicial authority is comprised of: 
(a) The Constitutional court as the top and Supreme Court in the country;565 
(b) Local judicial authorities deal with local state affairs and the 
individuals·566 , 
(c) International, commercial, and economic judicial authorities only 
governed by the King and the constitutional COurt;567 
(d) An executive authority;568 
(e) A regulatory authority; 569 and 
(f) consultative authority. 570 
565 Compare with the Supreme Court of the USA, see article 70. In 2007 a law created a new Supreme 
Court to replace the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) as Saudi Arabia's highest court authority. The 
same law transfers powers that the Ministry of Justice formerly exercised to the SJC, such as the 
authority to ability to establish and abolish courts, and name judges to the Courts of Appeal and First 
Instance. The doctrine of independence of the judiciary applies and this independence is protected by 
law. The king,however, also has the authority to hear appeals and has the power to pardon in cases 
where the punishment is not ordained in the Qur'an. United States Department of State, "Background 
Note: Saudi Arabia" op.cit. 
5~is is what Islamic law deals with, see Articles 45-50. 
567 This issue is not within the local judicial authorities, see article 70. 
568 This is according to the related issues within the constitution and the King's authorities.lt refers to 
the Executive-King (chief of state and head of government; rules under the title Custodian of the Two 
Holy Mosques).United States Department of State, op.cit. 
569 See Articles 50,55,56,57,58 
570 See Articles 7 recommendations and Article 68-69. Legislative-a Consultative (or Shura) Council 
with advisory powers was formed September 1993. Op.cit. 
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Article 8 [Authorities Principles]: 
Authorities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are based on 
the premise of justice, consultation, and equality in 
accordance with the Islamic Shari 'ah. 
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This article can be used as a safeguard to establishing the separation of powers within 
the judicial system and to divide the judicial system into three dimensions: 
1. The Constitutional Court, which shall be comprised of seven judges. Three 
with expertise in Islamic law and three with expertise in international law, 
(sitting according to the nature of the case). It must be a balanced court, and 
the head of the court's vote must finalize the decision if the voting is tied. The 
judges do not have to sit separately but the existence of judges with 
demonstrable competence in the areas mentioned is of great value. 
2. The Shari' ah court, which deals with individuals and all issues regulated 
within the territory under the Shari'ah. 
3. The commercial and economic court. This court deals with international issues 
such as treaties, arbitration, FDI, and all other issues that are not under Islamic 
law due to their special nature and their effect on the national economy and 
development plans. 
Chapter 4 - Economic Principles 
Article 15: 
No privilege is to be granted and no public resource is to 
be exploited without a law. 
This article is the cornerstone of any development or refonn in the legal system in 
Saudi Arabia. This means that even when the Islamic clerics try to stop some 
development projects or specific aspects which can increase the state's revenue, the 
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(F ATW A) will find its way into this article. If there is any dispute with regard to the 
constitution, the religious clerics theoretically can go to the court and appeal (a 
situation which has not arisen). So, the project can maintain its progress without any 
delay and if the constitutional court issues a judgment in favour of the religious 
clerics, their rights will only be limited to financial compensation, which goes to the 
state's treasury. This procedure gives immunity to commercial activities as if these 
disputes have arisen in international law. However, in this case the government shall 
publish to the general public the cost of the royal court expenditure or issue a law to 
justify the privileges and financial allowances provided to the project. 
It is important to note that this provisions does share a lot in common with the 
western concept of the Rule of Law. Although the idea of rule of law has clearly been 
aspired to in all major cultures and civilisations throughout the centuries, the concept 
was popularised by A. V Dicey in his book Introduction to the Study of Law of the 
Constitution written in (1885). In it he summarised the rule of law under three main 
heads.57l 
(a) That no man could be punished or lawfully interfered with by the authorities 
except for breaches of law.!t is for this reason that moral wrongs like adultery are not 
punishable under criminal sanctions in many Western societies, whereas the opposite 
is true of Islamic societies. In other words as long the actions or prohibition of action 
is authorised by law government may thus act or refrain from acting accordingly. 
(b) That no man is above the law and everyone, regardless of rank, is subject to the 
ordinary laws of the land. 
(c) That there ought to be compliance with the general principles of the constitution 
and the results of judicial decisions determining the rights of the private person. In 
this way the society would be inherently protected and can do without a specific bill 
of rights. 
571 AV Dicey, introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (first published 188S, 10th cd, 
1959) pp. 195-202. 
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To state that the rule of law is an unqualified good is to state the obvious. The benefits 
are numerous. The idea that governments should have restraints, and that everyone 
should be governed by and under the law protects the weak from unrestrained 
governance and protects the powerful from the corruptive influence of power itself.s72 
It is suggested that the more Saudi Arabia is seen to adhere to this particular 
constitutional provision the more western states will feel comfortable to engage in 
business with the state in its territory. 
Chapter 5 - Rights and Duties 
Article 23 [Islam]: 
The state protects Islam; it implements its Shari 'ah; it 
orders people to do right and shun evil; it fulfils the duty 
regarding God's call. 
This article should be stressed more and identified with other judicial branches and 
hierarchy in the Saudi legal system. It shows clear indications that the Islamic law can 
only govern individuals and local disputes. This is the main reason as to why the 
Saudis apply the new norms of both the constitutional and commercial and 
administrative courts in order to be governed by new schools of thought and modem 
laws that maintain the Saudi development process. Consequently, these are mere 
actions and they need to be observed within the constitution as well as make others 
assured of their rights. It is notable that the text mentions "shun evil" and does not 
forbid reforms. Thus, it is argued here that reforms that are not evil can be followed as 
far as possible and practicable. Although it is admitted that it is difficult to objectively 
understand the concept of evil, nevertheless it may be said that reforms, in the 
direction of liberty, and legal development cannot be said to be evil, subject of course 
m In Entiek v Carrigton 95 Eng. Rep. 807 K.B. 1765, the courts affinned that a warrant issued by a 
Home Secretary for entry into private property and seizure of allegedly seditious material was against 
the law and amounted to trespass. In this way the judiciary in England affinned its role as protector of 
the weak (individuals and private organisations) against the ever-increasing oppressive tendencies of 
the executive arm of government. 
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to the finding by appropriate religious clerics that any particular set of reforms or Act 
introduced may be correctly regarded as an evil act. It is also necessary to say that the 
manner in which any authority arrives at the determination of evil must not be such 
that it allows people to be deprived of their fundamental human rights. 
Article 26 [Human Rights]: 
The state protects human rights in accordance with the 
Islamic Shari 'ah. 
This article can be used not only to support individual rights and freedoms but to 
protect property rights by the entire judicial system. It elaborates on much more than 
just the King's rights and powers when it concerns matters of national security and 
economic interest. 
It reverberates with the notions of natural justice which gave birth both to human 
rights law and the rule of law in the modem sense. S73 It is, thus, no wonder that a 
society, which is generally deficient in relation to the rule of law, will soon enough 
find itself running low on its human rights record. Similarly it is clear that wherever 
human rights comes under systematic attack by agents of the state, the rule of law, if 
it still exists at all, will soon be a thing of the past. Businessmen from foreign lands 
will normally prefer jurisdictions that do not run low on both human rights and the 
rule of law. 
Article 29 [Science, Culture]: 
The state safeguards science, literature and culture,' it 
encourages scientific research,' it protects the Islamic and 
Arab heritage and contributes toward the Arab, Islamic 
and human civilization. 
m Modern political scientists have also stated "historically the idea of human rights derived from the 
idea of natural rights, which itself derived from the idea of natural law". See Peter Jones and Albert 
Weale Rights: Issues in Political Theory (London: The Macmillan Press, 1994) p. 96. 
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his article needs to be interpreted over the next decade and more in a way that protects 
intellectual property of the proceeds of scientific research. In this way Saudi Arabia 
will also distance itself from countries like China that have a reputation for not 
granting full protection for patents and copyright which emanate from investments in 
scientific research and technological products. Liberal interpretations in this manner 
will put Saudi Arabia in conformity with other civilizations and encourage confidence 
in investment in high tech areas. This however does not mean that Saudi Arabia must 
go ahead and accept controversial changes that are not linked to business and 
investment such as euthanasia, stem cell research and genetic modification. On issues 
such as this conformity with the Koran may continue to guide progress. 
Chapter 6 - "The Authorities ofthe State" 
Article 44: 
The authorities of the state consist of the following: the 
judicial authority; the executive authority; the regulatory 
authority. These authorities cooperate with each other in 
the performance of their duties, in accordance with this 
and other laws. The King shall be the point of reference 
for all these authorities. 
It can be argued here that the constitution lacks clarity and left many issues covered in 
ambiguity. These ambiguities include continuing overlapping of functions and no 
strict separation of powers. The judiciary for instance, includes the executive. The 
door also remains open to the religious clerics to exercise significant powers over the 
legislature and to reshape and direct the aim of the constitution's powers and 
authorities. As a result of the strong influence of the religious cleric on the executive 
and the membership of the executive in the judiciary there can be an undue religious 
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influence of the interpretation of the constitution. Therefore, it is an immediate 
necessity to arm a constitutional court with expertise in constitutional law. 574 
Article 45: 
The sources of the delivery of fatwa in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia are the Devine Book i. e. the Quran and the 
Sunnah of His Messenger. The law will define the 
composition of the senior ulema body, the administration 
of scientific research, delivery of fatwa and it's (the body 
of senior ulema 's) functions. 
In this article, one could argue that no limitations to power are outlined, thus 
presenting a threat to the state's entire system. It can be viewed that it is 
recommended to relate this article to religious issues, to any disputes between 
individuals, and religious enquires which may need more guidelines or advice from 
the senior Ulemas.575 This process must be governed by law, which means that the 
fatwa must go through constitutional processes and that the King must approve of 
it.576 This would help individuals gain more confidence in the state and its powers as 
well as serve as a practical method of shifting trust and faith towards the state. 
Article 46: 
The judiciary is an independent authority. There is no 
control over judges in the dispensation of justice except in 
the case of the Islamic Shari'ah. 
574 It could be that it would not harm the Saudi legal system to start with foreign expertise and some 
Saudi scholars to establish the important field of the legal system. Modern scholars must dominate the 
le~al system since there has been an unfavourable experience with the religious ones. 
57 The ulema, or Islamic religious leaders exist in Saudi Arabia and indeed many other Islamic 
Countries. They serve a unique role by providing religious legitimacy for Saudi rule. Except for Iran, 
where the ulema participated directly in government, Saudi Arabia was the only Muslim country in 
which the ulema constituted such an influential political force. The kingdom's ulema included religious 
scholars, qadis (judges), lawyers, seminary teachers, and the prayer leaders (imams) of the mosques. 
As a group, the ulema and their families included an estimated 7,000 to 10,000 persons. However, only 
the thirty to forty most senior scholars among them exercised substantive political influence. These 
prominent clergy constituted the members of the Council of Senior Ulema, an official body created by 
Faisal in 1971 to serve as a forum for regular consultation between the monarch and the religious 
establishment. Fahd continued the precedent set by Faisal and Khalid of meeting weekly with Council 
of Senior Ulema members who resided in Riyadh. 
576 See the recent U1emas Fatwa in the jihad in Iraq and in Saudi Arabia and the latest terrorist activities 
in Saudi Arabia. In such a case the King would have a strong argument against the Ulemas, since they 
argue that the Islamic law is the basic constitution to the state then they need his approval to any Fatwa 
they issues since he is head of the state. 
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Islamic law only governs individuals and local issues; it does not interfere with 
international relations, foreign policy, development plans, or any aspects of the state's 
sovereignty in international economic law and relations. If Article 8 is revisited, the 
terminology gives a clear indication that it is related to the individuals. Therefore, the 
King has the rights to enforce any applications which he sees useful to the country. 
Article 48: 
The courts will apply the rules of the Islamic Shari 'ah in 
the cases that are brought before them, in accordance 
with what is indicated in the Book and the Sunnah, and 
statutes decreed by the Ruler, which do not contradict the 
Book or the Sunnah. 
Hypothetically, if the constitution is reformed, this article would be redrafted 
according to the new constitutional powers. In addition, new specialized courts and 
Islamic rules will maintain the main concepts to govern individuals and other aspects 
according to the limitations of the constitution. 
Article 50: 
The King, or whoever deputizes for him, is responsible for 
the implementation of judicial rulings. 
This article underlies the position of this study that the separation of powers in Saudi 
Arabia is not clear. If for instance, a series of controversial judgments are issued 
against the state, it would appear that implementation will not occur automatically but 
will depend on whether the King or whoever deputizes for him are desirous of going 
ahead despite their contrary view and ordering implementation. Where the issue turns 
upon hundreds of millions of dollars investors may not be confident that rational and 
impartial implementation would still proceed. The possibilities of this doubt have 
already been demonstrated by the Aramco case discussed in earlier chapters. It is, 
therefore, necessary to enhance further the separation of powers and the rule of law by 
tinkering with the constitutional order to shore up a separate judiciary. 
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Article 53: 
The law establishes the seniority of the tribunal of 
complaints and its prerogatives. 
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This article seems formless as it uses the law as the method of interpretation. There is 
a need to firstly to decide which law governs what. Where is the expert who will be 
in charge of such interpretations? Within state's departments there is the 'Expertise 
Committee'. This is a committee having mainly recommendatory functions. It is not a 
specified court of constitutional affairs. Moreover, it is not independent and it has no 
supremacy above the other courts. 
Article 55: 
The King carries out the policy of the nation, a legitimate 
policy in accordance with the provisions of Islam; the 
King oversees the implementation of the Islamic Shari 'ah, 
the system of authorities, the state's general policies; and 
the protection and defence of the country. 
This article must include two more aspects: national interests and the state's welfare. 
The sacredness of the supremacy of the constitutional court and the independence of 
other authorities, while the King maintains the last word in anything related to the 
state's international affairs, security, and economic issues, because these elements are 
within the state's protection and defence. 
Article 62: 
If there is a danger threatening the safety of the Kingdom 
or its territorial integrity, or the security of its people and 
its interests, or which impedes the functioning of the state 
institutions, the King may talee urgent measures in order 
to deal with this danger. And if the King considers that 
these measures should continue, he may then implement 
the necessary regulations to this end. 
This article is well written in that it provides the King with the authority to supersede 
any other power in the country and to apply the applicable laws or functions to 
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maintain state sovereignty and welfare. It is argued that the state will be under 
economic danger in the long-term if it maintains its reliance on one source of income 
i.e. oil. The state needs more investments and investors to flourish the local economy 
and to diversify the Kingdoms' economy from oil.s77 The state must, therefore, do 
more to stand out within the region and indeed internationally as a safe destination for 
investment not only in the field of oil and gas but other areas as well. 
It is however argued here that this provision does not mean that disapproval of 
government's actions or mere political dissent is the same as "threatening the safety 
of the Kingdom or its territorial integrity". As argued extensively above in Chapter 4 
there is an emerging right of democratisation and respect for human rights which 
while it does not mean that every demand must be met with approval does guarantee 
that there is more scope for dissent.s78It can be argued that Saudis' recent scandal with 
regard to the academic reformists and their jail sentences raised many questions about 
the Kingdoms commitment to its own constitutional commitments and in relation to 
its conformity to democratic reforms. S79 In other countries, such actions would lead to 
a huge debate about legality. The high court dictates and indicates the right to 
supersede fundamental rights granted via the constitution. However, who gives this 
power to do so, and who passes this power to the judge to act on King's behalf? It can 
m American Congress Committee sessions about the Chinese bid to buy the American oil company 
and their scenarios for the Oil productions and consuming in the long-terms and how they see Saudi 
Arabia as their target. C-SPAN 14 July 2005. 
578 See above 4.3. Globalization, Liberal Democracy and Right to Democratic Development of the 
Saudi people. See also Sen,op.cit., p. 1-5; 
579 Amnesty International, Saudi Arabia: Lengthy Sentences for Reformists a Worrying Development, 
23 November 2011, available at: http://www.unhcr.orWrefworldldocidl4ecf3bd82.htmlaccessed 19 
March 2012. The nine academics were arrested in February 2007: Dr Saud a1-Hashimi - 30 years' 
imprisonment, 30 years' travel ban following release and a fine of2 million riyals (approximately 
USSS34,000); Abdul Aziz al-Khariji - 22 years' imprisonment, 20 years' travel ban following release 
and a fine of 1 million riyals (approximately USS267,OOO); Dr Musa a1-Qimi - 20 years' imprisonment 
and 20 years' travel ban following release; Dr Suliaman al-Rashudi - 15 years' imprisonment and 15 
years' travel ban following release; Abdul Rahman Khan - 20 years' imprisonment and 20 years' travel 
ban following release; Essam Basrawi - 10 years' imprisonment and 10 years' travel ban following 
release; Saifal-Din aI-Sharif - 10 years' imprisonment and 10 years' travel ban following release; Fahd 
al-Qurshi - 10 years' imprisonment and 10 years' travel ban following release 
Abdul Rahman al-Shumayri - 10 years' imprisonment and 10 years' travel ban following release. The 
other seven: Waleed al-Amri - 25 years' imprisonment and 2S years' travel ban following release; 
Abdullah al-Rifa'i (Syrian national) - 15 years' imprisonment and deportation to Syria following 
release; Ali al-Qirni - 10 years' imprisonment and 10 years' travel ban following release; Mutassem 
Mukhtar - 10 years' imprisonment and 10 years' travel ban following release; Ridat a1-Majayshi - eight 
years' imprisonment and eight years' travel ban following release; Khaled a1-'Abassi - eight years 
imprisonment and eight years' travel ban following release 
Saleh ai-Rashidi (Yemeni national) - five years' imprisonment and deportation to Yemen following 
release. 
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be observed that the court itself may have committed an unconstitutional act. If the 
Saudi judges had properly directed themselves, they ought to have refused such cases 
as falling outside their jurisdiction.s80 Even more recently Saudi reformists continue 
to be jailed under circumstances raising doubts about the fairness of the Saudi judicial 
system. 58 I 
There are, thus, obviously some worrying developments in Saudi Arabia whichclearly 
are not in conformity with its important status as a major political and economic force 
in the region. The income from its vast oil resources has primarily funded its strong 
influence, and the Kingdom has, in tum, sponsored poorer developing Arab nations. 
What remains is for the Kingdom to offer clear moral leadership by applying its own 
constitution in a way that avoids oppression of dissenting voices. Furthermore, such 
leadership will only improve its Islamic influence the broader Muslim world. It will 
also improve its standing as a safe economic jurisdiction for investment. The future of 
economic security in Saudi Arabia depends upon its ability to grapple with some of 
the reforms discussed above. These include changes to its political, educational, 
administrative, social, and legal sectors. 
Article 68 [Consultative Council]: 
A Consultative Council is to be created. Its statute will 
specify how it is formed, how it exercises its powers and 
how its members are selected. 
The MajIis al-Shura, or Consultative Council, is a legislative body that advises the 
King on issues that are important to Saudi Arabia. It is a modem version of a 
traditional Islamic concept - an accessible leader consulting with learned and 
experienced citizens - which has always been practiced by Saudi rulers. The 
'80Human Rights Watch, "Saudi Arabia: Court Confirms Jail for Reformers Royal Pardon Needed to 
Free Constitutional Monarchy Advocates" July 27,2005. Available at 
http://www.hrw .orglnewsI2005107/26/saudi-arabia-court-confmns-jail-refonners accessed 3 March 
2012.This is one of our constitutional errors and it is carried out by religious clerics. In other words 
these three academics practiced their rights via the Saudi constitution see, Articles 29, 43. However the 
court went against Articles 38-39 and imprisoned them without any indication of the legal breach or 
unlawful actions. 
'81 Rashid Abul-Samh, "Saudi Reformists Jailed" AI-Ahram Issue No. 1074, 1 -7 December2011 
available at http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1074/re3.htm accessed 17 March 2012. 
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Consultative Council currently consists of 150 members appointed by the King for a 
four-year renewable term. Based on their experience, members are assigned to 
committees. There are 12 committees that deal with human rights, education, culture, 
information, health and social affairs, services and public utilities, foreign affairs, 
security, administration, Islamic affairs, economy and industry, and finance.S82 
Originally the Consultative Council was restricted to discussion of regulations and 
issues of national and public interest, but the mandate of Majlis AI-Shura was 
broadened in 2004 to include proposing new legislation and amending existing laws 
without prior submission to the King. This of course is a commendable step and 
perhaps the inclusion on April 7, 2003 of the MajIis AI-Shura as a full member of the 
Inter-Parliamentary Union symbolically marks the maturing of the Council as a 
modem legislative chamber. 
Despite these changes there is still much scope for improvement This article can be 
improved via the inclusion of extra consultative councils, which would provide the 
state with adequate counsel and transparency to the people. It is suggested that a state 
the size of Saudi Arabia both in size and population cannot meaningfully be 
legislatively covered by only 150 people in one chamber of this sort. The UK for 
instance, has a bicameral legislature and there are more members in the houses of 
parliament than the Saudi Kingdom. In essence even more members are 
recommended for inclusion into the Royal Family Council; the Consultative Council 
and the Municipal Councils. 
Article 70: 
International treaties, agreements, regulations and 
concessions are approved and amended by Royal decree. 
This article makes it very clear that in anything related to the state's development 
projects, the King must approve the economic aspects. In Article 62, the King 
"2 Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia Washington DC., "MajIis AI-Shura (Consultative Council)" 
available at http://www.saudiembassy.netlaboutlcountry-infonnationlgovemmcntIMajIis_al_shura.aspx 
accessed 17 March 2012. 
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maintains the same powers and they are within his command. Therefore, it is 
questioned where the religious clerics are getting their power in this case? 
8.2.2: Critical Analysis to the Saudi FDI 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) or inflow of foreign capital to a country to promote 
economic growth to the benefit of foreigners and the national economy is a hot topic 
in developing countries. The Saudi Arabian government has sent some strong signals 
that it welcomes such an inflow by establishing an empowered entity the Saudi 
Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA) to spearhead the FDI efforts. 
Saudi Arabia is in a fortunate position whereby its political stability is an asset both in 
the Kingdom and abroad. One of the impact of reforms is the size of liquidity 
surpluses generated by the most recent initial public offerings of shares on the Saudi 
stock market illustrate this; the routine over subscriptions of new listings in the 
multiples of 40 or 50 occur nowhere else in the world. 583 As such, questions 
concerning foreign direct investment into Saudi Arabia have to be discussed in terms 
of what is the right legal reform would bring to the Kingdom what it is currently 
missing. 
The advantages associated with foreign direct investment for the Kingdom are many. 
Firstly, foreign investments into a country are assumed to lead to higher productivity 
and labour standards through the demonstration effect of foreign multinationals in the 
way they manage advanced production processes and systems. Domestic companies 
benefit from modem know-how and technological transfer, as well as the creation of a 
pool of a domestic skilled labour force that foreign companies have trained, and who 
could be employed in domestic companies. Such advanced knowledge depends on the 
583 Despite the relatively recent beginnings of the Saudi stock market. it has become one of the biggest 
markets in the Arab world. The Saudi Stock Market. operated and managed by Tadawul. now ranks 9th 
among the world's major emerging stock markets by market capitalization. Mohamed A. Ramady. The 
Saudi Arabian Economy: PoliCies, Achievements, and Challenges Second edition (London: Springer 
Publishing. 2010) p. 159. 
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development of the legal system584 
Secondly, FDI in a country's infrastructure will not lead to banking or debt crisis 
compared with financing lending from abroad such as happened with many Latin 
American countries that saw inward flows of capital, not in projects, but to 
government lending. Some economies become so dependent on foreign loans that it 
takes decades to remove the debt servicing obligations and gain better borrowing 
credit ratings. 
Thirdly, unlike intemationalloans, part of the profits of the FDI is reinvested in the 
country of investment, which leads to further growth in project investments. In 
additions if we apply the income tax criteria then the local economy will flourish and 
the government budget will be able to focus on advanced reforms in the future. 585 
The disadvantages of FDI should not be overlooked. The first disadvantage is that 
successful foreign operations could drive domestic competitors out of the market and 
this might be the case with sophisticated financial services. Secondly, if the FDI 
sector is large enough and they borrow from domestic banks to expand, their action 
could drive borrowing rates up causing problems to domestic operations. Again, if the 
FDI sector is large in a country, this could cause balance of payments problems for 
the domestic economy with large profits being repatriated by the foreign companies. 
Finally, one of the major criticisms ofFDI is that they could concentrate on a narrow 
base of investment in the economy, which could benefit a small section of the 
population, or concentrate in special economic enclaves such as mining or other 
natural resources extraction.586 
It is however necessary to point out that all the above are sensible possibilities but 
there are sceptical views as well which must be considered Prakash Loungani and 
Assaf Razin offer a critical view stating: 
584 See OECD, Foreign Direct Investment for Development: Maximising Benefits, Minimising Costs 
(Paris, OECD Secretariat, 2002) pp. 1-3 et seq. 
585 Ibid. 
586 IMF, "How Beneficial Is Foreign Direct Investment for Developing Countries?" Vol. 38 Finance 
and Development No.2 June 2001) pp .. 1-2. 
265 
266 
The resilience of foreign direct investment during financial crises may lead 
many developing countries to regard it as the private capital inflow of choice. 
Although there is substantial evidence that such investment benefits host 
countries, they should assess its potential impact carefully and 
realistically ... Despite the evidence presented in recent studies, other work 
indicates that developing countries should be cautious about taking too 
uncritical an attitude toward the benefits ofFDI. 587 
Fortunately for Saudi Arabia, some of these potential negatives of FDI are minimized 
as the oil sector is in state control, and most mineral activity is through joint ventures. 
While there is some concentration of foreign investments in petrochemical industries, 
foreign participation is also evident in many sectors, and the Saudi financial services 
sector does not seem unduly worried at the opening up of this lucrative market to FDI, 
post the Saudi WTO entry. FDI has forced Saudi financial institutions to become 
more competitive and identify core niche areas such as Islamic financing to compete 
with foreign institutions. The major FDI benefit that the Kingdom has acquired is to 
be considered in terms of the transfer of technology and management expertise, rather 
than capital inflows. 
The emphasis on technology transfer has been recently emphasized in the Saudi 
government's invitation for foreign investment participation in the Kingdom, coupled 
with parallel initiatives to ensure a more transparent administrative, judicial and 
regulatory regime. SAGIA must also do more to listen to the feedback that foreign 
firms give about existing obstacles to doing business in Saudi Arabia. Other 
government agencies and bureaucracies must attempt to adapt to the needs of FDI if 
the Kingdom is to remain competitive. 
Furthermore, targeted reforms of specific statutes are also desirable. The Saudi 
Arabian Foreign Investment Act arguably needs some re-examination. 
(a) Article 1, ought to provide in the clearer and more accurate 
definitions of several terms and expressions. 
m Prakash Loungani and AssafRazin, How Beneficial Is Foreign Direct Investment for Developing 
Countries? Vol. 38 Finance and Development: Quarterly Magazine o/the IMFNo. 2. (June 2001). 
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(b) In all the Articles making up the body of the Act the search 
for brevity has exacerbated the likelihood of 
misinterpretation and misconstruction. In the case of acts of 
government the more detailed the clauses and articles 
making up the body of the act the better for the 
understanding of both native and foreign lawyers in the 
interpretation of any function of the act. Article 16, having 
considerable bearing on foreign investors currently extant, 
should have been the subject of greater explanation and more 
concise wording. 
(c) Article 17, does not allow for pre-advice of such Regulations 
as are envisaged and therefore may cause difficulty in 
enforcement as the Rules come into full force and effect 
upon the date of publication. In many jurisdictions a grace 
period of several days or weeks and allowed in order that the 
effect of the Rule as published does not cause hardship to 
law abiding investors. 
(d) Under the Executive Rules of the Foreign Investments Act, 
there seem to be several contradictions or conflicts within the 
body of the text. 
(e) The point in Article 5, beginning "Prohibition and ending at 
"compensation" is vague and inexplicit in that the court's 
ability to issue confiscation orders is not specified and no 
definition of public interest or any suggestion of detailed 
calculation of "fair compensation" is provided. 
(t) In Article 6, in the paragraph commencing "The intended" 
and ending with "Production processes" the very breadth of 
suggested legal acceptance of the Laws of Saudi Arabia 
being equal to those of the United States of America or the 
European Union would lead to the almost impossible 
determination of right as the potential conflict of laws would 
lead to interminable litigation. The Laws of the United States 
are not defmed; does the paragraph mean the Federal 
Uniform Commercial Code or the laws of the various States 
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making up the Union? When dealing with the laws of the 
European Union, is the intention to refer only to those laws 
current as accepted by all member states or to each member's 
trade and financial laws? The "standards and specification" 
would lead to many disparate determinations of ''usual and 
acceptable trade practices" as each nation has developed 
such practices over the centuries and according to the 
professional or trade bodies which make up the 
commercial/industrial framework of that particular nation. 
(g) In the paragraph beginning "The Foreign" and ending "The 
Act" there is no definition of "substantial" which would, 
again, cause considerable room for argument. The last 
sentence of this Article is open to very many interpretations 
and, as such, should be redrafted to preclude the ambiguity. 
Without entering into a lengthy examination of the rest of the Executive Rules, it will 
be seen that the Act was drafted in a manner which leaves very considerable scope for 
litigation and was drafted, as was usual in the past, with the major interpretation left 
to such governmental authorities, as are or would be, from time to time, in power. 
This being only one example of current law in need of revision it will be the task of 
future generations to make certain that laws are drafted in accordance with 
international best practice and not drafted in outline and left to the determination of 
ministers of judges without proper guidance within the laws themselves. 
There are several examples on which to draw in the modernization of laws in Middle 
Eastern nations, as some have already taken advantage of internationally renowned 
legal draftsmen and specialists in trade, financial and commercial law. These have 
been retained as advisers to governments and have achieved great success in 
formulation laws, regulations, and operating instructions for newly created stock 
exchanges and investment programs. 
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8.3.The new rights and opportunities for foreign investors to own property in 
Saudi Arabia 
As Saudi Arabia grew, its reliance upon its investors diminished. Again, this is most 
graphically evidenced by the privatisation of ARAMCO and the introduction of rules 
and laws in relation to the way that foreign companies and investors conducted their 
business within Saudi Arabia. As Saudi Arabia becomes more familiar and efficient at 
the exploiting its own national resources, so it comes to rely on the American 
expertise in its partnership with ARAMCO brought to bear on the development plan. 
Like a child learning to walk, it was not long before the Saudi authorities decided that 
they no longer needed the stabilizing, guiding hand of the United States and broke 
away from the partnership. What started as a slow implementation of increased 
taxation was that the Saudi authorities echoed similar moves that were being made 
around the world by other oil producing countries S88 and effected an enforced 
nationalization of ARAMCO, bringing it entirely under the wing of the Saudi 
authorities, or more precisely, the Saudi people. 
While this was of undoubted benefit to the Saudi authorities, and the nation as a 
whole, it had negative and far-reaching effects on foreign investment in Saudi Arabia. 
What incentive is there to make a substantial capital investment in a country that 
would, arguably, breach agreements and contracts and potentially nationalize a 
company as it saw fit? These are not the rules of capitalism that the rest of the world 
was playing with, if such a situation were to arise how any dispute would be 
determined? The system of Shari'ah law with Saudi Arabia does not did lend itself to 
the determination of such conflicts and has not evolved in the way that many of the 
other legal systems around the world have done. To many outside the faith of Islam 
the findings of the Shari' ah courts would be seen as alien to that which may 
previously have been deemed common sense. In this sense the Saudi Arabian 
authorities still has a lot of work to do in providing a transparent and consistent legal 
framework for the resolution of commercial disputes. 
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Saudi Arabia has now grown to be a key player within the world economy and that 
growth has meant that has to adapt to occupy a new place in a global economy. In an 
effort to adapt it has to review its policy toward foreign investment and become more 
of an attractive package to foreign investment. The Saudi authorities are now actively 
encouraging foreign investment and implementing systems that go towards offering 
foreign investors inducements, or at least relaxing those restrictive rules that, until 
recently, were particularly onerous on incoming capital investors. One the most 
dramatic ways in which this is being affected is through the introduction of capital 
market and insurance company control laws. S89 The authorities also revised and 
reduced the taxes that had been previously levied on foreign owned capital. These 
measures have, together, provided for a more attractive climate for foreign investors 
and helped to reduce the economic reliance on the petrochemical industry. 
The steps that Saudi Arabia is taking toward embracing its commercial potential and 
actively developing alternative revenue streams to the petrochemical industry are 
illustrated in the adoption of new laws. At the heart of these new laws is the desire to 
encourage foreign investment in the Kingdom. 
In April 2000, King Fahd passed a royal decree approving the Foreign Investment 
Law, which changed the manner in which the Kingdom managed foreign investment. 
Before the King issues his royal decree, the law must be approved by the Council of 
Ministers who also approved the formation of the General Investment Commission. 
The General Investment Commission is the body that overseas and is responsible for 
introducing authority's policy to encourage foreign investment within the Kingdom. 
They are also the organization that issues investment licenses to foreign investors. 
The Foreign Investment Law updates previous legislation and is a major step toward 
global commercial integration. Perhaps the most significant is that it allows foreigners 
to own 100 percent of their businesses that are located in Saudi Arabia. There are also 
provisions for foreigners to own real estate in the Kingdom so that they have the 
means to own the property that their business functions in and that they, or their 
589Capital market and insurance company control laws 2003. Available At;www.lIS-
sabc.orglflles/publidAI-Dulcheil.ppt 
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employees, live in. They are also able to enjoy significant incentives and subsidies 
that were previously only available to Saudi companies, or those companies that were 
majority Saudi owned. One of the biggest incentives is the availability of access to 
loans from the Saudi Industrial Development Fund. As well as providing financial 
incentive and subsidy in the fonn of favourable authority's loans, the Foreign 
Investment Law also allows for a significant reduction in the corporate tax rate. 
Previously the rate of corporation tax had been set at 45 percent on profits over 
SR,590100.000, the Foreign Investment Law reduced that to a rate of 30 percent. In 
addition, foreign companies were now allowed to carry forward corporate losses for 
an unspecified amount of years. 591 
It is perhaps worthy exercise to compare the Saudi legal regime described 
immediately above to that of the UAE. There are similarities such as the 100% 
foreign ownership but the UAE has more attractive features for investors across many 
grounds. For instance, in contrast with the Saudi situation there are no corporate or 
personal income taxes and there are Low tariffs (around 5% for virtually all goods) 
and there are no minimum capital investment requirements. There are no restrictions 
on repatriation of profits or capital and excellent infrastructure, support services, and 
communications. This is one area which Saudi Arabia although improving cannot as 
of present match the UAE. There are also at least 40 double taxation agreements and 
at least 30 bilateral investment treaties. Access to the UAE also creates an opportunity 
to penetrate fast growing neighbouring markets. 592 
Indeed it is fair to say that there is quite disparate approach taken by the states in the 
region. Some are arguably more responsive and others perhaps lagging behind. While 
Saudi Arabia may lag behind the UAE's attractions across many areas of investment 
it does come ahead of others as well. Hence a writer noted. 
590 Saudi Riyals 
S9iSee, HSBC Bank Report. Available at: 
http://www.hsbcnet.comltransactioniattachmentslpcm/pdflsaudi.pdflWT.ac=CIBM_ cntry "'pro_sub _sau 
di_On. Accessed 3 March 2012. See also Deloitte report 2011. Available at: 
http://www.deloitte.comlassets!Dcom-
Global!Local%20AssetslDocumentsffaxlIntIO/020TaxO/020andO/020BusinessO/0200uidesl20111dtt tax hi 
~light_2011_Saudi%20Arabia.pdfaccessed 4 March 2012. - -
92 Aref Al Farra, "Investment Refonn in the UAE", Paper presented at Working Group 1 and Steering 
Group Meetings of the MENA-OECD Investment Programme UAE Amman-September 4th, 2007 
available at http://www.oecd.orgldataoecdl20/44/392960S3.pdfaccessed 18 March 2012. 
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... analysis of the legislation, legal doctrines and policies of Saudi Arabia, 
UAE, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman shows that all of these countries made an 
outstanding progress in liberalizing foreign investment regulation. Thus, 
national treatment of foreign investment was established, 100 percent foreign 
ownership was allowed, negative lists have been reduced, contribution 
restrictions have been eased, etc. Further liberalization is expected due to the 
worldwide processes of globalization and integration as well as requirements 
that might be imposed by WTO.s93 
In Saudi Arabia it has been the job of the General Investment Council to implement 
these changes and encourage their adoption by foreign investors. In improving the 
efficiency of this process, the General Investment Council have made the process by 
which foreign companies apply for their investment license much easier and quicker. 
The Council must deal with all licence applications within a 30-day period and, in the 
event that the application is declined, there is now a right of appeal against the refusal. 
The Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA) later updated this rule.s94 
The majority of these changes are intended to make the provisions of the Law to be 
more business friendly by providing more flexibility to foreign investors and bringing 
the ability to obtain legal redress, with particular reference to property ownership, in 
line with that enjoyed by Saudi nationals. A further change is adopted when the 
Shoura Council approves a decision to reduce the tax payable on the profits generated 
by foreign companies from 45 percent to a maximum of 25 percent. 
In tandem with the Foreign Investment Law, April 2000 saw the introduction of the 
Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA) by the Council of Ministers. 
The aim of SAGIA is to promote, and provide information to foreign investors about 
foreign investment in the kingdom. SAGIA assist in the formulation of authority's 
policies in relation to investment activity and opportunity, they comment and advise 
on future authorities policy and initiative in an effort to make the Kingdom more 
attractive for foreign investment. As part of their remit SAGIA will review and 
evaluate investment proposals, and ultimately license them. SAGIA provides the 
licenses necessary for foreign investors as well as ancillary support services. The 
m Tony Maalouli, "Laws and Regulations on Foreign Investment in the Middle East UA£, Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman" Paper delivered at Singapore Conference on Doing Business in the 
Middle East on 17 April 2008 p. IS. Available at 
http://www.uaeahead.comlknowledge/conferenceS/singcont7singconf.htm accessed 17 March 2012. 
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program is designed to offer advice and assistance in regarding overseas investors, 
and to ensure that they have access to the correct advice necessary to ensure 
compliance with authorities regulations and to ensure that SAGIA set up an Investor's 
Service Centre (ISC) to provide licenses to foreign companies, provide support 
services to investment projects, offer detailed information on the investment process, 
and coordinate with authorities ministries in order to facilitate investment procedures. 
The ISC must decide to grant or refuse a license within 30 days of receiving the 
application and supporting documentation from the investor. However, in 2010, Saudi 
Arabia was listed as one of the top 10 most competitive economies. S9S 
Of these, 1,686 projects are valued at $10.5 billion and are 100 percent foreign-
owned.s96 Unfortunately, to date SAGIA does not appear to have lived up to the high 
expectations engendered by its creation. Investors complain that impediments remain, 
many of which are outside SAGIA's capability to correct. SAGIA is, however, trying 
to make it easier for businesspeople to visit the Kingdom and is able to provide 
sponsorship for visa requests directly without having to ask a local company to 
sponsor such visits. 
Areas of continuing concern to investors include the 1996 regulation requiring each 
company employing over 20 workers to include a minimum of five percent Saudi 
nationals. This number increases by five percent per annum, and has now reached 40 
percent of a firm's workforce. Companies not complying with the Saudi minimum 
personnel rule will not be given visas for expatriate workers. Few firms have been 
able to meet these requirements. Foreign firms are under constant pressure to employ 
more Saudis.s97 The list of jobs/positions that may no longer be held by non-Saudis is 
expanding. Investors are not currently required to purchase from local sources or 
export a certain percentage of output and their access to foreign exchange is 
unlimited. There is no requirement that a share of foreign equity be reduced over 
time. The authorities do not impose conditions on investment such as locating in a 
specific geographic area, a specific percentage of local content or local equity, 
59SSAGIA, "The Hard Facts," Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority, Available at: 
www.sagia.salenlWhy-Saudi-ArabialThe-hard-facts. Accessed 3 March 2012. 
Ib.id.,SAGIA reports are available at www.sagia.gov.sa. 
597 See the new royal decree A/121 7/211432H. Available in Arabic at: 
http://www.saudLgov.salwpslportaVlutlp/c4/04 _SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CPOos3iTMGcn YE8TI 
wN3XOcLA8~4JDAwEB3Q3djU _3gxCL9gmxHRQB7Zmodl accessed 3 March 2012. 
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substitution for imports, export requirements or targets, or financing only by local 
sources. Investors are not, however, required to disclose proprietary information to 
the Saudi authorities as part of the regulatory approval process. 
Local companies that sponsor visiting businesspeople need to have the Saudi 
Chamber of Commerce authenticate the sponsor letter prior to the visa being granted. 
SAGIA opened a Women's Investment Centre in Spring 2003. In February 2001, 
SAGIA developed a negative list of sectors off-limits to foreign investment. 598 The 
sectors currently closed to foreign investment include three manufacturing categories 
and 16 service industries. The list includes real estate investment in Mecca and 
Medina, some sub sectors in printing and publishing, some sub sectors of 
telecommunications, audio-visual and media services, distribution services in 
wholesale and retail trade, land and air transportation services, fisheries and toxic 
centres, blood banks, and quarantines. Although these sectors are off-limits to 100 
percent foreign investment, foreign minority ownership in joint ventures with Saudi 
partners may be allowed in some sectors. 
Insurance and telecommunications sectors were opened to foreign investors in 2004. 
Other authoritative bodies, such as the Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu, and 
the Riyadh Development Authority, have also been active in promoting opportunities 
in Saudi Arabia's industrial cities and other regions. In addition to the majority 
authorities-owned Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation (SABle), private 
investment companies, such as the National Industrialization Company, the Saudi 
Venture Capital Group, and the Saudi Industrial Development Company have also 
become increasingly active in project development and in seeking out foreign joint 
venture partners. 
The Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIOF) is an important source of financing 
for investors. SIDF is a development finance institution affiliated with the Ministry of 
Finance. The main objective of SIOF is to support the development of the private 
598See Ib.id. Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA) is the prime facilitator of the 
KAEC development. Established by Royal decree in 2000, it is the Saudi government body responsible 
for promoting investments in the Kingdom and providing 'One Stop Shop' services to the investors. 
SAGIA's '10 X 10' and '20 X 20' initiatives focus on raising Saudi Arabia's living standards and 
achieving rapid, sustainable economic growth within the Kingdom. 
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industrial sector by extending medium to long-term loans for the establishment of 
new factories and the expansion, upgrading and modernization of existing ones. 
Foreign investors are eligible to receive low cost financing for up to 50 percent of 
project costs (Le., fixed assets, pre-operating expenses and start-up working capital). 
Loans are provided for a maximum term of 15 years with repayment schedules 
designed to match projected cash flows for the project in question. 
8.4. Legal Protections Available to Overseas Property Owners 
In a further attempt to encourage and embrace foreign investment in the Kingdom, the 
Saudi Arabian authorities introduced the Real Estate Law seven months after the 
Foreign Investment Law is implemented. Both laws complement each other and can 
be seen to provide a solid base for inward foreign investment. The Real Estate Law is 
perhaps the most radical, in as much as it makes provision for foreigners to establish 
interests (Le. property ownership) within the Kingdom that had previously been 
unavailable. The law entitled, and devised a means by which, non-Saudis could own 
property within the Kingdom. There are caveats, such as the property must be the 
private residence of an individual applicant and permission must be received from the 
Interior Ministry. Businesses can also benefit from the new law. A business may 
purchase property to house their business in or to house its workers and owners. There 
is also provision for developers or landowners to rent out their property in an effort to 
encourage long-term investment in the Kingdom. It is also hoped that major 
companies and industry will be enticed into Saudi Arabia. 
The Real Estate Law consists of eight articles, which are summarized as follows: 
Article 1: 
Non-Saudi investors, either persons or companies, may own the required real estate 
for their licensed businesses provided the approval of the licensing authority is 
obtained. This includes property for personal residences and workman's housing. The 
property may also be leased to other entities. 
If the concerned license allows for the purchase of real estate or land for construction, 
investment, and sale or leasing, the total cost of the project, both land and 
construction will not be less than SR 30million. The investment will have to be 
carried out within the first five years of ownership. 
27S 
276 
Article 2: 
Non-Saudi expatriates enjoying normal legal residence status in Saudi Arabia may 
own real estate for housing purposes, provided they acquire a license from the 
Ministry of Interior. 
Article 3: 
Foreign accredited Missions in the Kingdom may, on the basis of reciprocity, own the 
property where the Chancery and the official residence are based. International and 
regional organizations may also own property where their headquarters are based 
within the limits of the agreements that govern their operations. A licence from the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs is conditional in this case. 
Article 4: 
With the exception of inheritances, non-Saudis may not own real estate in Mecca or 
Medina unless the estate is endowed to a particular Saudi institution in accordance 
with the regulations of Shari'ab. However, non-Saudi may lease property in Mecca 
and Medina for a two-year renewable period. 
Article 5: 
The enforcement of these regulations will not override the following: 
(a) Property ownership privileges acquired by citizens of GCC countries by virtue 
of GCC Ownership Regulations; 
(b) Acquisition of ownership rights in terms of property by inheritance; 
(c) Regulations, cabinet resolutions and royal decree prohibiting real estate 
ownership in certain locations. 
Article 6: 
The Notary Public and any other competent agencies are hereby prohibited 
from notarising any transfer or transaction that is not consistent with the 
provisions of these regulations. 
Article 7: 
Implementation of the provision of these regulations shall not prejudice the 
following: 
(a) Ownership rights acquired by Non-Saudis under previous regulations. The 
provision of these regulations, upon their validation, shall be applied when 
ownership of the real estate is transferred; 
(b) Privileges granted by the rules governing real estate ownership in the Arab 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GeC) states; 
(c) Regulations, Cabinet Resolutions and Royal Decrees that prohibit real estate 
ownership in certain locations. 
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Article 8: 
(a) These Regulations supersede the Regulations on Ownership of Real Estate 
by Non-Saudis in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia issued by Royal Decree No. 
M/22 dated 121711390H. 
(b) These Regulations shall be published in the official gazette and shall 
become effective ninety (90) days following the date of their publication. 
The success of these laws is evidenced by the current boom in building and 
development in the Kingdom and has pushed real estate to the forefront of the Saudi 
economy. Real estate is now the fastest growing commercial sector in Saudi Arabia 
and has drawn in over SR 1 trillion in investment. 599 Furthermore, the exponential 
growth of real estate in Saudi Arabia is said to be second highest only to that of 
Shanghai. 600 Despite the adverse changes due to the global recession Saudi Arabia 
property investments still bring in highly profitable yield and the domestic property 
market is still booming. This development takes the shape of shopping malls, opulent 
hotels, and shimmering office blocks and complexes.601 This is particularly so in the 
economic cities referred to in earlier chapters. 
The Saudi Arabian construction industry is second only to the oil industry in terms of 
economic size and is estimated to have contributed over $15 billion to the Saudi 
national economy in the last year.602 This is not only due to foreign investors. Higher 
than expected oil profits have enabled the authorities to increase their budgetary 
spending on schools, hospitals, colleges, and other municipal buildings. Also, events 
post 9/11 have meant that Saudi Arabians are actively repatriating their funds, feeling 
that Western countries, in particular, are hostile and are no longer comfortable places 
to have funds invested or otherwise tied up. 
This situation indeed comes in contrast with the trend explained earlier about leading 
western states expressly courting Saudi Arabian business and sovereign funds to 
S99 Albawaba,"Saudi Real Estate Market Fastest Growing Market in the World"Counh'y Specific News 
A/bawabal2 July, 2005 available at www.a1bawaba.comlenlnodel30S102 accessed 11 March 2012. 
6OOSoiaiman AI-Mayad, chainnan of the Tanmiyat Group told a symposium in early 2005 that the 
growth of real estate "is considered the second highest in the world after Shaghai". The Saudi based 
Tanmiyat Group are among the heaviest players in the burgeoning real estate game. In 2004 they 
joined the Gulf Finance House and backed $3.8 billion Legends Dubai land project last year as 
strategic investors, underwriting 40% of the $302 private placement flotation for the project's first 
£,hase - Financial Times business I It August 2005. 
IKhalil Hanware, "Saudi Housing Sector Growth "fastest"in Middle East" Arab News July 11 2011. 
602See, The Construction Sector in the Kingdom o/Saudi Arabia report. Available at: http://www.us-
sabc.orglfileslpubliclConstruction _ Brochure.pdf accessed 6 March 2012. 
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invest in western industry.603 Although Western nations worry about the security 
implications of foreign countries, including Persian Gulf states, acquiring important 
positions in key industries and companies they are still in dire need of the oil money 
that is found in some Middle East states like Saudi Arabia.604 It is in this light that 
Western states need to realise that there is some reverse logic that they also must 
remain diplomatic and cautious with states like Saudi Arabia. There of course again is 
the fact that Saudi money and the money of other rich Gulf States may be spent 
elsewhere in the developing world as well. Hence experts advise: 
With cash flows growing rapidly, it is neither prudent nor desirable for SWFs 
to invest entirely in safe, fixed-income assets such as U.S. Treasury bonds or 
even in individual, publicly-listed companies. Many SWFs have shifted 
toward a 2005 recommendation, made by an international consulting firm to 
the Kuwait Investment Authority, that it "decrease the fund's allocations to the 
traditional asset classes (such as publicly-listed equities and bonds) and 
increase the allocation into non-traditional and uncorrelated asset classes (such 
as alternative investments, private equities, and real estate)." In practice, this 
has led the Kuwaitis and others to shift investment targets from slow-growth 
economies like the United States, Great Britain, and Germany to rapidly-
growing economies-namely, China, India, South Korea, and Turkey.6OS 
8.5. Conclusion 
Development and constitutional reform are inextricably linked phenomena. This 
connection is not usually made in law but remains true to the extent that business will 
only go to countries with a stable social order. A stable social and legal order is, 
however, dependent on deep seated constitutional reform which will make further and 
more dramatic economic success possible. The Saudi legal system will also continue 
to attract suspicion and non-acceptability unless it transforms from a strictly 
monarchical system to a more stable representative democracy based upon the rule of 
law and respect for human rights. The connection between constitutional reform and 
economic success is therefore undeniable. 
603 Nimrod Raphaeli and Bianca Gersten, "Sovereign Wealth Funds: Investment Vehicles for the 
Persian Gulf Countries" Middle East Quarterly (Spring 2008) pp. 45-53. 
604 The former EU trade commissioner Peter Mendelsohn at a stage talked about "Europe's interest in 
maintaining control over important and politically sensitive key industries could be achieved via the 
instrument of the golden share," a mechanism that gives the holder veto rights in certain circumstances 
and can be used to protect a company from any takeover deemed to endanger national security. 
60S Cited in RaphaeJi and Gersten, op.cit. p. 52. 
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Despite welcoming foreign investment, in the real estate sector there are still ancillary 
measures that must be taken in order to make the package more attractive to foreign 
investors. At present, the Saudi legal system, or means for dispute resolution, is 
skewed in favour of Saudi interests - and unless there is a sizeable incentive for 
investors this could be seen as reason not delay investing in Saudi real estate. 
Authorities such as SAGIA cannot fully utilise their potentials under the rule of law if 
the Judiciary continues to be perceived by the investment community as biased. Apart 
from political reforms towards better adjustments to the rule of law and democratic 
rule reforms in specific sectors such as intellectual property, and property markets law 
are recommended. The changes the Saudi authorities are making in an effort to enter 
the global marketplace, are tangible - and the protection of inward investors is 
evidently being addressed. How far this is able to develop within the strict regime and 
adherence to Shari'ah remains to be seen; but it will be a course of development 
eagerly watched by potential investors around the world. 
The Saudi authorities seem to have taken a more 'correct' approach since 2000, by 
adopting and enforcing new laws that affect the constitutional order. The current 
developments have given a clear indication that the modem monarchy system is in 
need of further important legal review and guidance. The current constitutional 
reforms under the new Royal Family Council (Nezam AL-Bai'ah) are unique in that 
changes affect even the monarchy itself. For example,ideas being actively considered 
include the options of voting to appoint the king. Such a change will be ground-
breaking but highly welcome. 
Some argue that such reforms are a constitutional crisis; yet in reality, it is the 
opposite. Saudi Arabia needs more constitutional reforms in every field, starting with 
educational, judicial, legal, trade, and political appointments. This means that the 
decision to choose the future ruler of the Kingdom will no longer be in the hands of 
one person alone - the King - but a group of princes. Under the title "Thanks to a 
Humane King," the Saudi writer Turki al-Hamad writes in AI-Sharq AI-Awsat "for 
the first time in the history of Saudi Arabia, the head of the state has given up some of 
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his powers... for the sake of stability." 606 The changes will go some way toward 
satisfying those who have long feared internecine disputes within the royal family that 
could trigger a major constitutional crisis. Crucially, in a royal family with several 
thousand princes, the law does not specify how many will be on the new commission, 
and that leaves the door open for future disputes. For Saudi reformers, the new law 
will likely be seen as nothing more than tinkering with a system they already consider 
deeply autocratic and which concentrates power within the royal family. 
If Saudi authorities and stakeholders maintain such approaches, a new era of 
transparency and rule of law can flourish and give a clear indication to the 
international society of remarkable development; this would in tum encourage and 
boost the country's economic progress. 
The current King seems motivated and confident of the partnership between the 
public and private sectors in order to support the nation's development and reforms. 
This perspective is the correct approach in which to invest in the new generation. 
Therefore, it can be asserted that Saudi scholars should work together to create new 
entities and research centres locally and globally in order to become an effective 
partner in the global economy. This could channel revenues to the Saudi local 
economy and reduce the pressure on the depleting natural resources. 
Liberal minded scholars particularly in the younger generation must make themselves 
formidable through rigorous scholarship and they must be willing to make courageous 
contributions to national debates. Recently Ten Saudi scholars described as moderate 
took the courageous step of forming the kingdom's first political party and have asked 
the king for recognition. 6071t is unlikely that this particular effort may succeed. It is, 
however, necessary to recommend that moderate activists and civil society must 
organise themselves into think-tanks and strategic studies institutes. Such institutions 
will provide legal, environmental and energy research facilities, focussing on the most 
recent trends within these fields. 
~agdiAbdelhadi, "Saudi Succession Laws Overhauled," BBC News, October 2S, 2006, Available at: 
news.bbc.co.ukl2Ihilmiddle eastl6084002.stm. 
007 Huff Post, "Umma Islamic Party, Saudi Arabia's First Political Party, Fonned By Moderate 
Scholars" Huffington Post 02110111 available at http://www.huffingtonpostcoml2011l02/10/umma-
islamic-party-saudi-_n_82142S.html accessed 17 March 2012. 
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Ultimately the demand for constitutional reforms will not succeed if the current Saudi 
authorities do not wish to move forward with more reforms starting with the 
constitutional field and seek to move towards globally recognised principles of 
democratisation, the rule of law and modernisation. The Saudi authorities cannot 
become prisoners to old traditions and impractical rules of law. 
To conclude, the entire country must be carried along with the reforms and the entire 
country must be run with greater transparency. The rule of law must be encouraged 
and civil society must be given greater scope of operation. NGOs and the private 
sectors will help to lift the veil of ignorance and move the country towards much 
needed economic and social progress. 
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Chapter 9; GENERAL CONCLUSION 
One of the most devout and insular countries in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia 
has emerged from being an underdeveloped desert kingdom to become one of 
the wealthiest nations in the region thanks to vast oil resources. But its rulers 
face the delicate task of responding to fcressure for reform while combating a 
growing problem of extremist violence. 08 
The above quote is quite apt in summing up the essence of the land of challenges and 
opportunities that is the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of 
Islam and home to Islam's two holiest shrines in Mecca and Medina. The king's 
official title as the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques is indicative of the 
importance that the country has in the region and to the larger Islamic world. Saudi 
Arabia is also already an important investment destination in the Middle East and it is 
impressively high in recent World Bank's investment league table. The Kingdom is 
also an important diplomatic and political player in the GCC, the League of Arab 
States, OIC, OPEC and the United Nations among other intergovernmental 
organisations. The country has a unique opportunity as a result of its extensive oil and 
gas resources to lift its population out of poverty and to enjoy the full potential of its 
oil wealth. It is, however, clear that to achieve much greater successes and faster 
development that is commensurate to its potentials and natural resources, the country 
must address itself, to far ranging reforms of a legal, political, sociological and 
economic nature. A massive socio-Iegal and socio-economic reform that is aimed at 
sustaining current growth and achievement even more successes is required. To do 
this Saudi foreign direct investment laws must examine developments in the field at 
the global level and particularly the fate of other comparative developing state. 
Saudi Arabia's effort to develop and to participate meaningfully in the world of trade 
and economic relations must be based on a thorough understanding of its traditions, 
BBC News,"Saudi Arabia profile" 16 January 2012 Available at http://www.bbc.co.uklnewslworld-
middle-east-1470270S accessed 20 March 2012. 
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culture and its special Islamic inheritance. Thus the test of compatibility with Islamic 
principles and doctrines is a prerequisite of any longstanding reform. Islamic law is, 
fortunately compatible with progressive legal ideas and is accepting of change that is 
geared at lifting populations out of the danger of poverty. The major schools of Islam 
considered in this thesis are all compatible with the idea of legal reform. The 
predominant Wahabbi School in the Kingdom is comfortable with the idea of legal 
reform on many issues from property rights to rights of extraction and sale of natural 
resources. Islamic law also can clearly cope with complex jurisprudential concepts 
and issues and foreign direct investment. 
Ownership is a critical incentive for engaging in economic activity, is also recognised 
as a concept in Islamic law. Indeed with regard to ownership of natural resources of a 
people or country, all four major schools of Islamic jurisprudence agree to the same 
fundamental principles which proceed from the premise that there is a possibility to 
own resources and to alienate such property in exchange or for sale. The anti-western 
inclination of conservative Islamist groups must not be allowed to succeed in equating 
modernisation economic growth and scientific progress with westemisation. The 
danger in allowing these views to go unchallenged is that the status quo will remain 
the same in many areas of national life and in terms of modest international trade 
involvement. There is a negative view of oil in Saudi Arabia, as its wealth has been 
restricted to a minority, and the majority have not received any monetary benefit. 
The benefits of international trade and investments are, and ought to be, mutual. This 
has been the case from time immemorial. It is indeed true that the development of 
international trade is also reflective of power relations between states. Mutuality of 
interests certainly may not be tantamount to equality or fairness. Saudi Arabia as a 
developing state must, therefore, continue to explore its inherent advantages and 
challenges in the international arena in terms foreign direct investment. 
The history of investment arbitration involving Saudi Arabia and the Middle East 
reveal the impact of power relations. The initial experiences of the Kingdom and 
some other Islamic state in Investment arbitration were one of suspicion and 
dissatisfaction. This is particularly true of the AMINOIL and ARAMCOawards among 
others. The era of suspicion and rejection is, however fortunately over and the region 
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as well as Saudi Arabia has now embraced arbitration as a choice means of resolving 
their dispute in oil and gas as well as other investment areas. It may be concluded that 
there is still a pressing need for legal reform in relation to arbitration regime and 
investment laws of the Saudi Arabian state. Continuous modification and reform is 
imperative in many areas. These principally include improvements in the area of 
capacity development, in legal training and reform of the domestic arbitral processes 
including enforcement of domestic and foreign awards. Although certain changes 
have been made since the era of the cases highlighted above it is fair to say that 
scholars still detect continuing failures of the Saudi Arbitration Law and its 
Implementing Regulations. 
The enforcement of foreign judgments is still seen as poorly adhered to. The 
suggestion that; "the enforcement in Saudi Arabia of a non-Saudi judgment or non-
Saudi arbitral award remains the exception rather than the rule". Is clearly 
unacceptable and must be speedily addressed.609 Saudi Arabia's commitments under 
the New York Convention must be given full effect to. Such a commitment should 
also reduce to the barest minimum instances of resort to the public policy exception 
under Article 5 of the Convention. The possibility of the application of the public 
policy exception and the application of demonstrable reciprocity provide basis for 
suspicion of the Kingdom's commitment to enforcement of foreign judgments and 
will continue to affect confidence of foreigners in doing business with Saudi Arabians 
and in the country as well. 
It is clear that those countries that look towards the Shari'a as the supreme source of 
all rules must consider that international law regulating FDI may constitute a 
necessary exception to their reliance upon the Shari' a. Compliance with International 
laws may dictate outcomes that go against both the national interest and the Shari'a. 
Autonomy of the contracting parties is the bane of FDI relations and International 
Commercial Arbitration accords sanctity to contracts, the emerging lex mercatoria 
and pacta sunt servanda. The Saudi State must give effect to these principles and they 
are arguably well provided for in the jurisprudence of Shari'a law. More frequent 
resort to the Fiqh methodologieslike Ijma (consensus) Qiya (Analogy), Istihsan (The 
609 Ibid. 
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Public Interest), Istihab (presumption of Continuity) and Uri (Local custom)) will 
help remove ambiguities in newer areas of international commerce and industrial 
relations. 
In relation to the idea that Islamic law is inadequate in dealing with modem 
commercial affairs, it appears that this view is erroneous. Every legal system just like 
every language is capable of being used to cover all human circumstances. The belief 
exists partly because of the ignorance of Western jurists and even some Muslim 
writers who do not sufficiently understand the true nature of theShari' a. With 
appropriate resort to the Jjma and Qiyas when the Qur'an and the Sunnah is silent 
upon a matter or in new and analogous situation Islamic law will be able to cope with 
any transaction that can occur on earth. However, the fault is not only upon Western 
scholars but it also lies on Islamic scholars who have not being sufficiently 
elaborating Shari'a principles in a confident and competent manner 
Finding the right balance between the rights and responsibilities of foreign investors, 
on the one hand, and those of governments, on the other, is a key imperative of legal 
refonn. There need to be a balance that combines the stability, predictability 
transparency and mutuality of interest between the host state such as Saudi Arabia and 
its investor community. It is important that the process of fairly and equitably 
rebalancing, the various interests in FDI situations is continually reviewed. 610 
. Even worse are the clerics and scholars who adopt a fixed and very conservative 
view of Islamic principles. These scholars do the most damage and truly make it 
impossible for the Shari' a to perfonn its task in modem international relations. This is 
also not to say that there is no deliberate bias against Islamic law and other competing 
legal world view as a result of power politics in world affairs. As a result it may 
indeed be better for the modem international law to be used when the matter is of 
international commercial nature. 
Ultimately, oil companies such as AMINOIL and ARAMCO are overseas investors 
and commercial trading entities. The increase in transnational transactions, both 
610 AI-Fadhel, ibid., p. 16. 
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between member states and commercial companies means that there will be a 
concomitant increase in transnational disputes. In light of current trends, arbitration 
will remain a choice mechanism for dispute resolution and management. It is however 
still true that many of the judgments emanating from international courts have shaken 
the confidence of the resource-rich states in referring disputes to these bodies. This, 
however, does not mean that developing states like Saudi Arabia could not have 
approached their cases with more expertise and due care. In fact, the prevailing 
situation, as we have argued above, simply shows the crucial nature of the resource-
rich state to acquire better expertise across board to cover contract negotiation and 
dispute resolution phases. There is also the need for international lawyers and scholars 
to argue in favour of changes that will make dispute resolution fairer and more 
responsive to the needs of developing states. 
Saudi Arabia's membership and participation in the WTO is commendable. Yet 
procedures of its ad hoc tribunals have been shown to lean in favour of richer and 
more economically powerful countries and companies. Commendable improvements 
include the recently instituted WTO Legal Advisory Centre, which offers financial 
assistance to poor countries by co-financing their litigation. The better the legal 
advice a party obtains, the better the chances of its success. 
It must also be argued that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia must reform its constitution, 
and bring its state laws into conformity with international norms. This contention does 
not seek to make the Kingdom into a "Western Nation", but to operate in a 21st 
century world of commerce and industry, the laws of which are in constant flux even 
traditional societies must adapt. As such, the Kingdom must consider the possibility 
of adopting constitutional reforms to allocate Islamic law for internal use, and 
embrace a parallel commercial private law program compatible with the international 
legal practice. In other words the Dubai approach ought to be adopted by Saudi 
Arabia. 
It remains, therefore, to see how our conclusions may allow us to begin to understand 
the necessary holistic changes in Saudi Arabia's regulatory environment that must be 
put in place given the determination of the government to move away from a past of 
suspicion of international law and particularly International commercial arbitration. 
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Given the unique natural gifts of oil resources that the country possesses the future 
must be planned for with all the seriousness it deserves in order to maximise the 
benefits of trade and investment and modem international relations. It is suggested 
that the changes must first of all come from within in a socio legal sense. 
Saudi Arabia faces significant challenges in socio economic terms. Its developmental 
problems and immense and the demand for human and capacity development are 
quite daunting. In a sense however this creates both problems and opportunities for 
investment in the country. Investments are needed to provide amenities and to meet 
the needs of a fast developing middle class and its consumer needs. Related to this is 
the fact that the State is simultaneously aspiring to high technological relevance and 
heavy industrial infrastructure and transfer of technology. The level of formal 
education is still too low despite some improvement. This creates much scope for 
conservative and poverty driven hostility towards foreign and perhaps western 
involvement in the country. 
This reflects in an arguably negative attitude to change. It is, therefore, necessary to 
advocate socio-Iegal development as a first step towards ensuring that the entire 
populace, state institutions and civil society are all ready for the effort of making 
Saudi Arabia an attractive destination for foreign investment. 
There are important changes and reforms to be made to national laws and to human 
rights regime. The assumption that human rights are inherently Western concepts 
imposed upon other cultures takes a static view of moral and legal principles, and is, 
therefore, flawed. The contemporary concept of human rights has been greatly 
enriched by legal and political inputs from other cultures and civilizations. Better 
adherence to human rights law will also make the Kingdom much more attractive 
place for investors. It will also remove some of the misgivings among expatriates in 
the country and among those that wish to work there that Saudi Arabia is a difficult 
place to live and one, which is fraught with dangers. 
The argument has to be successfully made that there should be greater participation of 
Saudi Arabians in the consultative assemblies. 
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In an appreciably brief time the Saudi state has engaged in an impressive number of 
BIT's and MIT's as well asin agreements on foreign investments protection which 
must be given effect to. There is nothing in Saudi law broadly construed that prevents 
it from granting full recognition to its modem trade agreements made in good faith. 
The Shari' ah agrees with a general theory of contract. Verse 1 of Chapter V indeed 
instructs believers to 'keep faith with contracts'. It has been shown above that the 
majority of laws discussed and agreements entered into foresee one way or another, 
that a contract should be negotiated in good-faith and with honesty.611 
By way of conclusion we can see that Saudi Arabia may be perceived of as facing 
more serious difficulties in relation to its investment law and practice. While it must 
engender confidence of investors using modem day instruments of legal protection of 
investment and international trade law, it must also keep a close eye on its national 
interests as well as the dictates of Islamic law. The Saudi state is required to submit 
to a multi-tier legal regime. For non-Islamic, or non-Shari'ah countries, it is easier to 
reconcile their judicial process with findings couched in international law. This is 
considerably harder for Saudi Arabia as it is in a unique position. 
The State must embrace the use of sophisticated modem day devices and legal 
regimes such as stabilisation clauses, renegotiation clauses and adaptation clauses. It 
must fashion these to assure investors of the prospects of meaningful participation in 
in business within its territory as well returns on their investment. It must also reform 
its domestic, or day-to-day, laws of corporate governance. It must, however, be seen 
to be conducting itself in accordance with the principles of Shari'ah. It is hard to see 
how the current system could reconcile this conflict without significant modification 
or constitutional reforms. 
There are therefore, a few things that can be recommended. The country's 
international commercial arbitration practice oUght to be elaborated upon and 
improved. Unless further development of arbitration can be achieved Saudi Arabia 
would appear to be at a continuing disadvantage. The improvements needed span the 
611"H. B.Wael, An Introduction to Islamic Law (1st edn CUP, 20(9); Williams, Rowan, 'Is Sharia law 
unavoidable in England?' (2008) Vol. 17Journa/ 0/ the Commonwealth Lawyers' (l) Association pp. 
33,39. 
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development of new and improved arbitral institutions; the development of capacity 
among its arbitrators and very importantly a strong respect for the enforcement of 
international awards. 
Yet there are limits that the Saudi State must not exceed in its quest for FDI. For the 
Saudi state to accept a ruling that is in apparent conflict with Shari'ah would not only 
be seen as unacceptable in terms of the country's position as the presumed leader of 
the Islamic faith, but it would also be seen as encroaching on the sovereignty of the 
authorities in as much as they should be free to govern its country in any way they see 
fit. Islamic principles are there to protect the state against harm. Thus, stabilisation 
clauses, which have a very high likelihood of creating grave environmental damage 
may be un-Islamic and also against the true national interests. It is notable that 
throughout the Qur'an and hadith there are many general references to the 
environment (Le. animals, plants, mountains, seas etc.). The environment is 
considered to be blessings from Allah. Islamic law generally requires that the 
environment be protected. Flora, fauna and animals must be treated with kindness, 
and land must be utilized sensibly. For specific wanton damage to the environment 
there are prescribed punishments. 
For this reason, it may be of greater benefit to the Saudi authorities to consider the 
benefits of the less formal MOUs. MOUs are relatively informal in character and they 
can be adapted, or added to. 
Viable non-oil exports should be given actively pursued by the Saudi state. This of 
course includes the application of laws that are targeted towards the creation of other 
export products apart from the usual oil and gas resources. The diversification of the 
economic base of the Kingdom away from oil and its derivatives is the most essential 
aspect of the industrial base.The push towards a sophisticated industrial base for the 
country with the advent of industrial cities and economic cities is one of the most 
significant developments in Saudi socio economic history.This special zones are also 
crucial to the political and economic future of the Saudi Kingdom. Successes in this 
area vastly improve the regional standing of Saudi Arabia as a leading nation in the 
Middle East. The device of economic cities and industrial cities do in fact provide a 
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genuine way of reinvesting of the revenue that is generated by Saudi Arabia's current 
standing as the world's leading producer of oil and gas resources .. 
The suspicion that cartel behaviour and closer coordination by the Gulf states may 
somehow be of negative effect to investors and the states where they emanate from 
has not proven true. In fact the close coordination and diplomacy between the 
participants of these organisations only assures them of a fair representation in 
international relations. It allows them to set exchange best practices and attain the best 
prices for the export of their non-renewable resources. The diplomacy played at these 
organisation and the many legal standards put into operation between them allow for 
the peaceful management of competition and thereby contribute to world peace and 
security. Closer commitment to these bodies and their ideals must go hand in hand 
with other reforms that have been suggested in this thesis so far. 
It is necessary to recommend more transparency in government and in business 
activities. This would involve adoption of international anticorruption standards. 
Some of these efforts are to create strategic advisory services and link up with 
organizations outside Saudi Arabia in order to provide a transparent policy to foreign 
investors and to guide them through the domestic domain. Out-dated policies 
fmancial standards and opaque practices must be expunged in official and business 
regulatory services .. 
Membership within global institutions such as the WTO and the United Nations 
create further basis for legal reformsand it also means that Saudi Kingdom will open 
its markets and reduce to some extent the level of control the government will seek to 
exercise to protect national and even certain religious interests. It may be argued that 
with the zeal at which Saudi Arabia has been embracing regional and international 
economic integration and particularly international dispute resolution techniques and 
regimes, the attitude of the Saudi Government toward international arbitration is no 
longer strongly influenced by the outcome of the Aramco award of 1958. 
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Although international arbitration appears to continue to be 'a useful tool of favour by 
western parties,612 it is also the case that the severity of the situation can be reduced 
by substantial improvements in capacity of arbitrators, arbitral institutions and 
lawyers from Saudi Arabia in the law and practice of international commercial 
arbitration. In this way it should be recommended that further institutional 
development and training should be embarked on particularly in the requisite 
ministries and the Saudi Arbitration Team. 
There is great need to ensure that dispute settlement procedures especially in 
alternative dispute resolution and arbitration form a central component of the reforms 
to Saudi law and economy. The creation and operation of the economic and industrial 
cities and the arbitration is next to impossible without investors having confidence 
that dispute settlement will be conducted under internationally acceptable rules and 
that the awards and decisions of panels and tribunals will be respected by Saudi courts 
as well as the Saudi state. The general direction of Saudi Arabia policy in this area is 
good and the use of clauses in the Gas Concessions of 2004-show openness toward 
the outside world in this area. Authorities such as SAGIA cannot fully utilise their 
potentials under the rule of law if the Judiciary continues to be perceived by the 
investment community as biased. Apart from political reforms towards better 
adjustments to the rule of law and democratic rule reforms in specific sectors such as 
intellectual property, and property markets law are recommended. The changes the 
Saudi authorities are making in an effort to enter the global marketplace, are tangible -
and the protection of inward investors is evidently being addressed. How far this is 
able to develop within the strict regime and adherence to Shari'ah remains to be seen; 
but it will be a course of development eagerly watched by potential investors around 
the world. 
It is however recommended that the Shari'ahprovides enough basis for judges and 
arbitrators to draw inspiration for unbiased and fair conduct. Much can be learnt from 
the following hadith: 
612 This argument has been impressively raised by when he wrote that some western companies have 
engaged in the arguably unfair tactical use of arbitration The disappointing outcomes of the Aramco 
arbitration were expected due to the lack of legal experience and the naIVe or the ''too honest" conduct 
with Aramco, which was also a normal result for being the weaker party in the dispute" Baamir (2008) 
op.cit., p. 146. 
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Following a dispute between them, the Caliph of the Muslims and an ordinary 
man chose to have their differences determined by an arbitrator and went to 
see him. When they arrived, the arbitrator, very astonished, came to greet 
them and asked the Caliph why he had not requested him to come to the 
Caliph, instead of the Caliph coming to him. The Caliph replied that one must 
go to the arbitrator to consult him. The arbitrator then invited them to enter 
and offered a cushion to the Caliph. However, the latter refused it and said that 
this was the first act of bias on the part of the arbitrator. (Mabsut: The Imam 
As-Sarsafi) 
Development and constitutional reform are to be seen as inextricably linked 
phenomena. It is submitted that business will only go to countries with a stable social 
order. A stable social and legal order is, however, dependent on deep seated 
constitutional reform which will make further and more dramatic economic success 
possible. The Saudi legal system will attract more investment and financial success if 
transforms from a strictly monarchical system to a more stable representative 
democracy based upon the rule of law and respect for human rights. The connection 
between constitutional reform and economic success is therefore a central conclusion 
of this thesis. Constitutional reform must however be well managed and must be 
engaged in through rational and well planned political dialogue rather than violent 
means as witnessed in many other countries involved in the so called Arab spring .. 
The Saudi authorities seem to have taken a more 'correct' approach since 2000, by 
adopting and enforcing new laws that affect the constitutional order. The current 
developments have given a clear indication that the modem monarchy system is in 
need of further important legal review and guidance. The current constitutional 
reforms under the new Royal Family Council (Nezam AL-Bai'ah) are unique in that 
changes affect even the monarchy itself. Saudi Arabia needs constitutional reforms in 
every field, starting with educational, judicial, legal, trade, and political appointments. 
The move towards more collective appointment of future rulers of the Kingdom 
means that for the first time in the history of Saudi Arabia, the head of the state has 
given up some of his powers for the sake of stability. The changes will go some way 
toward satisfying those who have long feared internecine disputes within the royal 
family that could trigger a major constitutional crisis. For Saudi reformers, the new 
law will likely be seen as nothing more than tinkering with a system they already 
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consider deeply autocratic and which concentrates power within the royal family. The 
onset of a new era of transparency and rule of law would in turn encourage and boost 
the country's economic progress. 
The current King seems motivated and confident of the partnership between the 
public and private sectors in order to support the nation's development and reforms. 
This perspective is the correct approach in which to invest in the new generation. 
Therefore, it can be asserted that Saudi scholars should work together to create new 
entities and research centres locally and globally in order to become an effective 
partner in the global economy. This could channel revenues to the Saudi local 
economy and reduce the pressure on the depleting natural resources. There should be 
a focus on scientific and technological development. The creation of scientific hubs 
and centres of excellence in educational research should be taken more seriously and 
at least one such scheme should be established in every province of Saudi Arabia. 
Liberal minded scholars particularly in the younger generation must make themselves 
formidable through rigorous scholarship and they must be willing to make courageous 
contributions to national debates. Moderate activism is recommended for civil 
societyand such groupings must organise themselves into think-tanks and strategic 
studies institutes. To conclude, the entire country must be carried along with the 
reforms and the entire country must be run with greater transparency. The rule of law 
must be encouraged and civil society must be given greater scope of operation. NGOs 
and the private sectors will help to lift the veil of ignorance and move the country 
towards much needed economic and social progress. 
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